OPINION
Why
Western liberals misunderstand Hungary
The
country has rejected liberal universalism and is being punished for
it by the European public.
By GYÖRGY SCHÖPFLIN
10/10/15, 5:30 AM CET Updated 10/11/15, 9:38 PM CET
To understand
Hungary’s response to the migration crisis, it is important to
consider its primary principles: compassion, legality and political
responsibility.
The Hungarian
government’s first priority is the rule of law; i.e., its
obligations under the Schengen and the Dublin regulations and its
responsibility to Hungarian citizens, who expect security and
competence. Recent surveys that place public support for the
government at 80 percent suggest that it’s fulfilling its domestic
responsibility. Much the same can be said for the Hungarian
government’s responsibility under Schengen and Dublin. For all that
the building of the fence on the Serbian border has been criticized,
these are Hungary’s obligations to its EU partners.
The mass migration
of 2015 demands a deeper analysis, because the assessment adopted by
many is simplistic. Neither economic considerations, nor compassion,
nor the 1951 Geneva Convention offer a sufficient basis for a migrant
policy. These overlook the cultural, historical and psychological
experiences of the Hungarians.
The arrival of
migrants involves three stages: reception, integration and then
assimilation, even though this last stage is widely rejected by
Western European elites who remain committed to multiculturalism. So,
what are the ground rules with which migrants are expected to
conform, and which will pave the way to acceptance as full members of
the host community?
The Western answer
seems to be: obey the law, and pay your taxes. This could seem
broadminded, but is, in reality, nothing of the kind, because a
community — with its customs, trust, moral norms, and codes of
conduct — is built on much deeper foundations. And to become a
member means not merely to be integrated, but to be assimilated.
Since World War II, the idea of assimilation has been rejected.
Non-European immigrants are expected only to be multicultural, which
gives rise to parallel societies that generate rival codes of loyalty
and impedes their full membership.
* * *
The liberal
paradigm, with its universalist pretensions and overweening
self-confidence, frowns on assimilation. Where does this conceit come
from?
In broad historical
terms, liberalism believes that it has defeated all its opponents.
From the 18th century on, it successfully marginalized Christianity
as the primary source of morality in Europe. Then, at terrible cost,
liberalism defeated Fascism (strictly speaking, it did not do so on
its own, but let that pass). Two generations on, liberalism saw off
Marxism, again attributing the victory entirely to itself — Francis
Fukuyama’s “End of History” being the clearest example of this.
In the 1990s in the
West, liberalism also concluded that it must put an end to ethnic
nationalism: Ethnicity was declared unacceptable and to be a
nationalist was beyond the pale. The wars of Yugoslav succession were
the trigger. Note that liberalism’s victory did not mean that its
defeated antagonists were destroyed. A hegemony was established,
under which political and economic propositions could only be
advanced from inside the liberal thought-world. In that sense, it was
a famous victory.
If we put these
propositions together — that liberals consider the community to be
marginal and are convinced that liberalism will overcome its
opponents — we see why liberals are so lackadaisical about Islam.
If they’ve sent Christianity into retirement, they will — so they
believe — deal similarly with Islam.
And yet, if the
liberal thought-world is built on human dignity, universalism and
consensual conflict resolution, then Islam gives rise to a collision.
Islam has its own version of universalism, and little sympathy for
Western liberal values. This collision is a serious challenge to
liberalism, which liberals are keen to avoid, even while describing
attempts to characterize Islam in this way as racist and xenophobic.
Against this
background, what Hungary is doing constitutes a multiple challenge.
It rejects liberal universalism and insists that Christian values are
as valid as secular liberal norms. It applies the rule of law and
further insists that this transcends glib compassion. And it treats
the safeguarding of Hungarian nationhood as a justification for its
policies and practices. It’s no wonder that Western liberals —
and their frontline soldiers in the media — despise and detest
Hungary, a country they have made no attempt to understand.
A final thought: In
the migrant crisis, Hungary has been exercising agency. This is
unusual in West-East relations, where for the most part, Central
European states follow the Western model. Some of the opprobrium
heaped on Hungary is more than likely derived from the West’s
dislike of Central Europeans behaving like other European states, no
longer subalterns but as agents in history.
György Schöpflin
is a Hungarian MEP from the Fidesz party.
Authors:
György Schöpflin
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário