segunda-feira, 29 de fevereiro de 2016

"Limpeza" da fachada da Rua Augusta dos Pastéis de Bacalhau com Queijo ...


 Imagens do Dia / OVOODOCORVO
A Junta de Santa Maria Maior ( Baixa ) que herdou o problema da CML ( que não fez nada durante anos ) dos reclamos ilegais, inicia hoje a limpeza e retirada dos mesmos na fachada da Rua Augusta dos Pastéis de Bacalhau com Queijo !!
OVOODOCORVO



Ministro da Cultura afasta António Lamas do CCB e nomeia Elísio Summavielle, outro homem do património

Li e apreciei o artigo de Raquel Henriques da Silva sobre os tratos de polé dados a António Lamas, pelo ministro da Cultura. Não concordo em tudo com a avaliação encomiástica feita pela articulista. Discordo em especial da não detecção de finalidades mercantilistas no reino do Monte da Lua (onde os portugueses nem sequer podem entrar gratuitamente uma vez por mês, como manda a lei para todos os monumentos nacionais). Mercantilismo também exalava por todos os poros no plano congeminado para Belém, plano além disso demasiado centralista e desrespeitador da posição da autarquia lisboeta. Mas, dito isto, partilho por inteiro a avaliação quanto à capacidade e visão estratégica de António Lamas e sobretudo quanto ao indecoroso enxovalho de que foi alvo. Como aqui antecipei em Dezembro, dias depois do actual ministro ter tomado posse (Publico, 8.12.2015), estamos parente mais um triste caso em que as políticas se definem pelas agendas de amigos do políticos de turno. Lamentável e à consideração da maioria que suporta o governo e não quererá talvez apenas ficar pela função lubrificante da geringonça.

Luís Raposo, Lisboa
Cartas à Directora
01/03/2016 - 01:30

Com a chegada ao Governo da coligação PSD-CDS, Summavielle enfrentou muitas críticas por ter aceitado o cargo de director da DGPC, a convite do então secretário de Estado da Cultura, Francisco José Viegas. Comentava-se nos corredores da Ajuda e fora deles que tinha sido escolhido pelo escritor porque ambos eram maçons. Militante de base do PS, maçon que não frequenta muito as sessões e “republicano fora de época” – assim era parte do retrato que de si mesmo fez na referida entrevista de 2012 -, rejeitou sempre tal associação.”
( … ) “Agora não faltará quem defenda que são as mesmas filiações maçónicas, que tanto João Soares como Elísio Summavielle assumem publicamente, a explicar a sua entrada no CCB. Outros argumentarão que a presidência do CCB é um cargo de confiança política.”
LUCINDA CANELAS / PÚBLICO / 1-3-2016

Ministro da Cultura afasta António Lamas do CCB e nomeia Elísio Summavielle, outro homem do património
LUCINDA CANELAS 29/02/2016 - 21:59 (actualizado às 23:13) / PÚBLICO

João Soares cumpriu o prometido na sexta-feira e afastou o presidente do CCB. Para seu substituto escolheu um dos seus adjuntos, um técnico do património com quem tem vindo a trabalhar desde 1990.

O ultimato foi apresentado na sexta-feira e cumprido três dias depois. A 26 de Fevereiro, depois da apresentação do Orçamento de Estado para a Cultura no Parlamento, João Soares dissera aos jornalistas que, caso não lhe chegasse até esta segunda-feira qualquer pedido de demissão do presidente do Centro Cultural de Belém (CCB), iria usar dos instrumentos legais à sua disposição para o afastar. E foi precisamente o que fez esta segunda-feira.

Depois de um dia com a agenda carregada no Alentejo e em Lisboa, o ministro da Cultura recebeu já de noite, no seu gabinete, António Lamas, “a quem entregou cópia do despacho da sua exoneração do cargo de presidente do Centro Cultural de Belém”, informa o comunicado que chegou às redacções às 22h. “O novo presidente do Centro Cultural de Belém será o Dr. Elísio Summavielle”, lê-se a fechar a breve nota do gabinete de João Soares.

O PÚBLICO não conseguiu ainda obter qualquer reacção de Lamas nem de Summavielle. Também não foi possível ainda determinar se o Estado terá de pagar alguma indemnização ao antigo presidente do CCB, cujo mandato, se cumprido até ao fim, só deveria terminar em Outubro de 2017.

O braço de ferro

Para o lugar ocupado pelo ex-presidente da Parques de Sintra - Monte da Luz desde Outubro de 2014 irá agora Elísio Summavielle, 59 anos, um técnico superior formado em História e militante socialista que já passou por diversos organismos públicos ligados ao património desde a década de 1980, ocupando várias vezes cargos de direcção. Summavielle era agora adjunto de João Soares.

Na sexta-feira, e sem querer avançar um nome, o ministro dissera já aos deputados ter encontrado um substituto para Lamas: "[É] uma solução alternativa, capaz, de alguém com experiência, bastante mais jovem, com provas dadas, nomeadamente ao nível de responsabilidades públicas num ministério.”

António Lamas, 69 anos, assumira a presidência em Outubro de 2014, a convite do governo de Passos Coelho, mas fizera questão de lembrar ao PÚBLICO, na semana passada, que não militava em partido algum e que já exercera funções de gestor público por nomeação de governos PS, PSD e de coligação PSD-CDS. Com o convite do anterior governo, Lamas assumira também o encargo de criar um plano estratégico para a gestão do chamado eixo Belém-Ajuda, a área monumental mais visitada do país, entregue ao ainda governo de coligação CDS-PSD em Agosto do ano passado. Esse plano, que visava a gestão integrada daquele espaço urbano – três dezenas de locais e equipamentos de interesse turístico entre monumentos, museus e jardins –, foi concebido por uma estrutura de missão chefiada pelo próprio Lamas, equipa que o actual executivo socialista decidiu extinguir.

Em Conselho de Ministros, e segundo uma resolução publicada em Diário da República (DR) na passada quarta-feira, 24 de Fevereiro, o governo de António Costa considerou que esta estrutura poderia vir a “comprometer a missão e o papel” do CCB “no quadro da sua intervenção prioritária”, a do apoio à criação artística contemporânea e à sua divulgação. Uma preocupação que era já comum a muitos agentes do meio cultural, que vêm criticando a programação cada vez menos relevante da casa.

No mesmo texto do DR, muito breve, sublinhava-se ainda que nesta tomada de posição pesara o facto de a equipa do então presidente do CCB não ter ouvido a Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, um dos principais agentes no terreno, no decorrer dos trabalhos que levaram ao novo projecto para Belém. Acusação que Lamas viria a refutar de forma peremptória, sem avançar nomes dos vereadores e dos técnicos com quem ele e a sua equipa haviam reunido diversas vezes.

Antes destas declarações de António Lamas, já o ministro da Cultura dissera numa entrevista ao semanário Expresso (20 de Fevereiro) que o presidente do CCB devia tirar as “devidas consequências” de ver extinta a equipa que chefiara no eixo Belém-Ajuda, deixando nas entrelinhas que esperava dele um pedido de demissão. Um pedido que António Lamas garantiu ao PÚBLICO não estar disponível para apresentar. O braço de ferro terá terminado agora.

Património e política

Elísio Summavielle começou a trabalhar na área do património desde que em meados da década de 1980 se tornou técnico superior do Instituto Português do Património Cultural, o IPPC, organismo de que a actual Direcção-Geral do Património Cultural (DGPC) é herdeira e a que António Lamas presidiu entre 1987 e 1990.

Foi precisamente em 1990 que, profissionalmente, os caminhos de Summavielle e do actual ministro da Cultura se cruzaram pela primeira vez. João Soares era vereador da cultura e requisitou-o ao IPPC para seu assessor. No ano seguinte, o agora presidente do CCB tornou-se chefe da divisão de património cultural da autarquia, sendo reconduzido em 1994, ano da Lisboa Capital Europeia da Cultura, em cuja sociedade foi representante da câmara (1993-1994).

Da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa Summavielle passou para a já extinta Direcção-Geral de Edifícios e Monumentos Nacionais (DGEMN), onde foi subdirector entre 1996 e 1999. Com a experiência adquirida na DGEMN e no antigo IPPC, este socialista que nunca escondeu ambições políticas chegou a liderar, depois, os três organismos que se ocuparam do património: primeiro o Instituto Português do Património Arquitectónico, em 2005, seguido do Instituto de Gestão do Património Arquitectónico e Arqueológico (Igespar), onde chegou em 2007, e da presente DGPC, por cuja direcção teve uma passagem fugaz, entre Fevereiro e Novembro de 2012. Menos de um mês depois de deixar a direcção deste megaorganismo que ajudou a conceber, fundindo os institutos que se ocupavam do património e dos museus, era candidato à presidência da Câmara Municipal de Mafra pelo PS, eleição que perdeu para Hélder Sousa Silva e para o PSD.

Na entrevista que dera ao PÚBLICO em Agosto de 2012, três meses antes de se afastar da DGPC, deixara bem claro que chefiar uma autarquia estava nos seus planos: “Dos 272 concelhos que conheço no país há pelo menos 20 onde eu não me importaria de ir a uma eleição local”, disse na altura.

Pelo meio, entre 2009 e 2011, as suas responsabilidades no aparelho de Estado tinham-se avolumado ao aceitar ser secretário de Estado da Cultura, num período em que à frente do ministério estava a agora deputada socialista Gabriela Canavilhas.

Com a chegada ao Governo da coligação PSD-CDS, Summavielle enfrentou muitas críticas por ter aceitado o cargo de director da DGPC, a convite do então secretário de Estado da Cultura, Francisco José Viegas. Comentava-se nos corredores da Ajuda e fora deles que tinha sido escolhido pelo escritor porque ambos eram maçons. Militante de base do PS, maçon que não frequenta muito as sessões e “republicano fora de época” – assim era parte do retrato que de si mesmo fez na referida entrevista de 2012 -, rejeitou sempre tal associação.

Quando, menos de um ano depois, apresentou a sua demissão ao substituto de Viegas, Jorge Barreto Xavier, evocou “razões pessoais” para o afastamento, defendendo que assumira o cargo num “cenário irrepetível” – o convite fora feito por um secretário de Estado de quem era amigo há mais de 20 anos e que colocara “inequivocamente o património no centro da sua acção [política]”.

Agora não faltará quem defenda que são as mesmas filiações maçónicas, que tanto João Soares como Elísio Summavielle assumem publicamente, a explicar a sua entrada no CCB. Outros argumentarão que a presidência do CCB é um cargo de confiança política.

Summavielle fazia já parte da equipa do ministro na Ajuda, que o requisitara à DGPC para seu adjunto.

O que significará para o eixo Belém-Ajuda a escolha de o substituto de António Lamas ter recaído sobre um técnico com uma já longa carreira no património? O tempo o dirá.


Clashes as authorities demolish homes in Calais 'Jungle' camp / Violences en marge du démantèlement partiel de la « jungle » de Calais

Violences en marge du démantèlement partiel de la « jungle » de Calais
Le Monde.fr | 29.02.2016 à 12h45 • Mis à jour le 29.02.2016 à 21h14

L’Etat s’était engagé à une « évacuation progressive » de la zone sud du camp de Calais. Mais le premier jour des opérations de démantèlement, lundi 29 février, a été marqué par des heurts avec la police dans l’après-midi, sur fond de colère d’associations et de migrants. Selon La Voix du Nord, les opérations de démolition ont dû cesser aux alentours de 17 h.
Deux bulldozers et une vingtaine de personnes d’une entreprise privée mandatée par l’Etat sont arrivés à 8 h 30 pour démonter une vingtaine d’abris situés dans une zone de 100 mètres carrés. Une trentaine de fourgons des compagnies républicaines de sécurité (CRS) et deux camions antiémeute étaient stationnés à l’entrée ouest, route de Gravelines, et les accès à la « jungle » étaient filtrés, rapportait Nord Eclair. Une centaine de policiers ont été mobilisés pour l’occasion, dont trois compagnies CRS et la brigade anticriminalité (BAC).

Heurts avec la police
Après une matinée plutôt calme, la situation s’est tendue en début d’après-midi. A la suite d’un départ de feu volontaire sur le site, des migrants ont visé les CRS avec des projectiles. Selon la préfecture, quelque 150 personnes – majoritairement des militants du réseau No Border, un mouvement altermondialiste qui lutte pour l’abolition des frontières – ont pris part aux affrontements. Une journaliste de BBC News a évoqué une « escalade rapide de la violence » et l’usage par la police de gaz lacrymogène et de canons à eau :

Une vingtaine de cabanes ont été incendiées par des migrants et des militants de No border, ce qui a nécessité l’intervention des pompiers, selon un photographe de l’Agence France-Presse (AFP). Trois personnes de No border et un migrant mineur ont été interpellés, et cinq CRS ont été légèrement blessés, selon la préfecture. En fin de journée, des heurts sporadiques opposaient encore migrants et CRS, qui ripostaient de nouveau par gaz lacrymogène aux projectiles.
Dans la soirée, quelque 150 migrants, certains armés d’une barre de fer, se sont introduits une heure sur la rocade portuaire jouxtant la « jungle », lançant des pierres ou tapant sur des véhicules en partance vers l’Angleterre. Les forces de l’ordre, d’abord présentes en nombre réduit, ont répliqué par des tirs de gaz lacrymogène, avant d’évincer totalement les migrants de la route. A 19 h 45, elles avaient repris le contrôle de la rocade, jonchée de débris, et l’accès au port depuis l’A16 a été fermé.

Colère des associations
Des associations historiques, comme L’Auberge des migrants, ont vivement critiqué l’attitude des forces de l’ordre dans la journée : « Les policiers sont arrivés le matin et ont demandé aux migrants encore présents de partir et, dans la foulée, ils ont tout démoli. La façon dont c’est fait est violente, dégradante et contraire aux engagements de l’Etat », a déclaré François Guennoc, l’un de ses représentants.
« Le démantèlement avait été annoncé comme pacifié, ciblant les tentes vides et les abris inoccupés », a commenté Olivier Marteau, responsable du projet Calais pour Médecins sans frontières.
« Il a en réalité ciblé tous les logements de la zone 9, densément occupée et habitée, et inévitablement dégénéré en violences, dans un camp où vivent des familles et des enfants. »
Si la préfecture reconnaît qu’une « vingtaine de migrants étaient encore présents dans la cinquantaine d’abris traités », seules « quatre ou cinq personnes ne voulaient » pas partir selon elle, et il a « fallu faire beaucoup de persuasion par les maraudes » avant que les abris ne soient démantelés.

« Comportements inacceptables »
Ce déploiement dissuasif des forces de l’ordre visait « à sécuriser le travail de l’entreprise » chargée du déblaiement, mais aussi à « permettre aux maraudeurs de travailler sereinement », pour « que les migrants ne soient pas sous le joug des activités de No border », a expliqué à l’AFP Fabienne Buccio, la préfète du Pas-de-Calais, présente sur les lieux.
Les maraudes sociales de la préfecture, qui tentent de convaincre les migrants de rallier l’un des 102 centres d’accueil et d’orientation disséminés en France ou rejoindre le centre d’accueil provisoire composé de conteneurs chauffés, ont en effet été sérieusement perturbées vendredi par les militants de No Border.

Ils avaient notamment tenté d’empêcher certains migrants de prendre place dans les bus requis pour leur acheminement en centre d’accueil et d’orientation. Une militante britannique de No Border a été interpellée lors de cette opération, ont fait savoir deux sources policières. Dans un communiqué lundi, la préfecture a de nouveau fustigé des « comportements » et une « pression » sur les migrants « inacceptables ».
Le tribunal administratif de Lille a rejeté, le 25 février, le recours des associations qui s’opposaient à l’évacuation de la partie sud de la « jungle », à l’exception des « lieux de vie » (école, théâtre, centre juridique…) qui devraient rester en place. Près de 1 000 migrants se trouveraient encore dans la moitié sud du camp selon l’Etat, un chiffre contesté par les associations, qui ont procédé au comptage de quelque 3 500 migrants encore sur place, dont 350 mineurs isolés.
Par ailleurs, la zone nord, qui abrite dans des tentes et cabanes entre 1 100 et 3 500 personnes selon les sources, n’est pas concernée par cet ordre de démantèlement.
Manuel Valls, le premier ministre avait assuré le 23 février que l’évacuation prendrait « le temps nécessaire » pour apporter une « réponse humanitaire » aux migrants en quête d’un passage vers la Grande-Bretagne. La préfecture avait confirmé qu’il n’y aurait pas d’expulsion par la force.





Clashes as authorities demolish homes in Calais 'Jungle' camp

Police fire teargas at migrants throwing stones and setting fire to shelters after dozens of makeshift shacks dismantled

Angelique Chrisafis in Paris, Peter Walker and Ben Quinn
Monday 29 February 2016 23.56 GMT

Clashes between police and migrants continued into Monday evening after authorities moved in earlier in the day to dismantle parts of the refugee camp known as the Jungle.

The homes of up to 200 people of the approximately 3,500 people living in the camp had been demolished by the middle of the day, according to a British refugee aid group, as smoke went up from blazes engulfing makeshift shelters.

Some homes appeared to have been set alight by the heat of teargas canisters fired at crowds by riot police, said a spokeswoman for the British volunteer group Help Refugees, while some residents seem to have set others on fire in protest.

Video footage from a volunteer inside the camp showed residents running away from clouds of teargas. Reuters said police fired teargas at about 150 people and activists who threw stones, and at least three shelters were on fire.

The clashes continued into the evening near a motorway heading to the port of Calais, where vehicles were blocked by migrants on the stretch of road overlooking a piece of ground which had previously been part of the camp.

Strewn with debris, the port road was eventually taken back by police, who arrested one person and three members of the No Borders activist group.

The work began in the early morning, with orange-vested work crews dismantling several dozen makeshift wood-and-tarpaulin shacks by hand before two diggers loaded the debris into large trucks. Police in riot gear shielded the work, and initially there were no reports of unrest beyond a report of one British activist being arrested.

Reacting to the demolitions, Amnesty International said that both the French and UK governments had to live up to responsibilities in relation to those who were evicted, including facilitating access to asylum proceedings in France and visas to the UK for those with family members there.

“Although it’s taking place across the Channel, this is not an issue that the UK can wash its hand of,” said Amnesty International’s Europe and central Asia director, John Dalhuisen.

The prefecture of Calais, which late last week won a court battle allowing demolition to begin, wants to clear large parts of the southern part of the site on dune land just west of the town’s busy docks. It adjoins the road leading to the ferry terminal, a draw for those seeking to smuggle themselves on to trucks bound for the UK.

Volunteer groups have warned that moving people from the camp will do little but disperse many elsewhere around Calais. A UK-based group, the Refugee Rights Data Project, said that of the 460 residents asked what they would do if the camp was dismantled, 80% said they would remain in Calais or move to a more basic refugee encampment in nearby Dunkirk.

The study suggested authorities’ plans to evict people “is unlikely to provide a viable solution to the current humanitarian crisis on our doorstep”, said Marta Welander, the founder of the project.

Of those who lost their homes on Monday, some had moved into space elsewhere in the camp, Help Refugees said, while others had been seen carrying sleeping bags into Calais. “We don’t really know yet what people will do, but it seems likely some will just be dispersed to other areas around Calais,” a spokeswoman said.

Clare Moseley, of Care4Calais, another British volunteer group, said prefecture officials arrived at the camp at 7am and gave residents an hour’s notice to leave or face arrest. “The police presence is massive,” she said. “They have the whole area cordoned off.” French media reported that about 40 vans of riot police were in position near the site.

Workmen start to dismantle a section of the camp. Photograph: Pascal Rossignol/Reuters
Help Refugees said some of its volunteers had been blocked on Monday morning from entering the camp, home to refugees and migrants from countries including Syria, Afghanistan, Sudan, Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt.

A spokeswoman said the demolition began in a section of the camp with a mostly Iranian population: “People were being told they had to leave,” she said, “otherwise they would be arrested. A lot of people seemed quite confused.”

A spokesman for the Calais prefecture denied there was a vast new clearing operation under way. He said French officials from asylum agencies and other state agencies would continue to go from tent to tent to talk to talk to migrants about their options, as they had done last week.

He said: “There is a reinforced police presence today to allow those officials to enter and talk to people. But this is a gradual process which will take place over several days and weeks. There will be no bulldozers.”

Fabienne Buccio, the head of the Calais prefecture, said three-quarters of the homes in the southern part of the camp were now empty after officials encouraged residents to leave over recent days.


Police were needed, she said, in case what she described as “extremists” tried to stop migrants accepting offers of new accommodation or buses to centres elsewhere in France.

French authorities said earlier this month they intended to bulldoze half of the main camp, warning between 800 and 1,000 migrants and refugees to leave a seven-hectare southern section of the site. Buccio previously told Le Monde she intended to reduce the size of the camp by about half.

Care4Calais is among the groups that have opposed the dismantlement plans in the French courts. A legal appeal against last Thursday’s ruling had been lodged last week, Moseley said, and was expected to be heard soon.

A Help Refugees spokeswoman said Monday’s work did appear to be the start of wider clearance. “That’s what it’s looking like. They did say it’s going to be slow and respectful, giving people options, and I suppose they have in a way. But at the same time they’re not giving people access to information. One person was seen being given their options as their shelter was being dismantled, so the respect they talked about last week isn’t really happening.”


While some residents have moved into shipping container shelters and a small number have left on state-provided coaches to centres elsewhere in France, many more than the official estimate of 800 to 1,000 people remained inside the main camp. A census carried out by two charities recorded 3,455 people living there, with one group telling the Guardian this week that this included 445 children, of whom 305 were unaccompanied.

The Refugee Bill: Budget Battle Begins over Germany's New Residents


The Refugee Bill: Budget Battle Begins over Germany's New Residents

By Markus Dettmer and Christian Reiermann

No one knows how much integrating the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Germany will ultimately cost. Yet the battle over financing has already begun. Finance Minister Schäuble doesn't want to borrow money or raise taxes, but his approach may be wrong.

When it comes to calculating the refugee bill in Germany, things can get very tricky, real fast. On the one hand, no one can seriously say how much money is going to be required in order to manage the influx of refugees coming into Germany. On the other, government ministers and officials, politicians and commissions need the most reliable figures possible in order to create plans and make forecasts so they can move ahead at all.

As such, it's always good to have someone who knows exactly what they want. And that is a perfect description of Wolfgang Schäuble, of Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Schäuble, the German finance minister, is certain that he doesn't want to borrow money. He wants Germany to maintain its current balanced budget -- all the way through to 2020. That conviction is laid out in Finance Ministry documents on medium-term financing prepared by Schäuble's staff and sent to various divisions of the federal government.
Doing so will be relatively easy for Schäuble in 2016 and 2017. He closed 2015 with a budget surplus of around €12 billion ($13 billion) after breaking even in 2014. The government plans to apply half of that surplus to each of the next two years to finance the costs of the refugees.

After that, though, things get a bit tighter. Even in Schäuble's calculations, the fiscal burdens for the government created by asylum-seekers are expected to increase each year. He's calculating around €10 billion for this year and about double that in 2020. This is forcing the government to address difficult questions about how it intends to raise this money. Will it do so through borrowing? Or will the country have to raise taxes?

At this point, Schäuble is ruling out both. He wants to plug the holes in the budget created by the unforeseen expenses at least in part through cyclical tax revenues (e.g. government revenues that are growing as a result of positive economic developments) and the rest through general cuts across the federal budget.

Should Costs Be Viewed as Expense or Investment?

Critics argue this is the wrong approach, symptomatic of a compulsion to save in Germany that has become almost Pavlovian. Expenditures for integrating refugees, they argue, are in fact an investment in the country's future and should be treated as such.

The political debate about how to deal with the refugee crisis is now also becoming a battle over money. State governments, in particular, are assuming that expenditures will be greater than so-far planned.

In a joint letter penned to Schäuble last week, North Rhine-Westphalia Finance Minister Norbert Walter-Borjans of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and his Bavarian counterpart Markus Söder of the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party to Merkel's CDU, said states face extra expenditures of up to €25 billion in 2016 alone. That's far higher than previous forecasts.

The typical political back and forth followed. Walter-Borjans and Söder demanded that Schäuble increase the federal government's share to 50 percent of actual expenditures and complained that Berlin thus far hasn't even provided half that amount. And Schäuble played his role to perfection as well -- with a knee-jerk rejection of the demand.

The bizarre aspect of this dispute is that the calculations of all involved are exceedingly flimsy. Nobody knows how many refugees will ultimately make their way to Germany. Calculations by the federal government assume that 3.6 million refugees will flow in to Germany between 2015 and 2020.

In 2015, over a million refugees came to Germany. The government is now estimating 800,000 asylum-seekers will arrive in 2016, with that figure sinking to 600,000 in 2017 and 400,000 in each of the subsequent years until 2020.

1.1 Million Refugees or 770,000?

But even when it comes to the number of refugees currently in Germany, the data is far from reliable. The government simply knows too about the huge numbers of people who have entered the country. It doesn't even have an accurate count of how many refugees are actually here.

It's actually quite probable that of the people who fled to Germany last year, far fewer than a million are still in the country. Many refugees were counted twice and many who were registered in 2015 have likely left the country. "The net immigration of refugees, due to return-migration and out-migration, is likely to be around 65 to 70 percent of the gross in-migrations," states the Nuremberg-based Institute for Employment Research, which is part of the Federal Employment Agency. Based on that figure, of the 1.1 million refugees believed to have entered into Germany, only around 770,000 are still here.

When it comes to costs, the numbers floating around the country couldn't be any more disparate, either. The Institute for the World Economy at the University of Kiel has calculated a number of scenarios -- one with a migration rate as high as the one currently being experienced or even higher, and others with fewer migrants and with either less or greater out-migration. Its lowest estimate for all these different scenarios puts annual costs at €24 billion, with the highest coming in at €55 billion.

'Sufficient Scope' for Carrying Burden

At first glance, these appear to be immense sums, but they also have to be measured against Germany's economic strength. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) currently estimates that refugee costs in 2016 will account for only 0.35 percent of total German gross domestic product (GDP) of over €3 trillion, meaning an absolute cost of around €11 billion.

Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, which is not known for rose-tinted glasses, estimates that additional expenditures relating to refugees in 2016 will add up to about 0.25 percent of GDP as compared to 2015 spending. "The massive influx of asylum-seekers poses tough challenges for Germany in many respects," the Bundesbank wrote in its current monthly report. "Thanks to the current favorable economic situation, however, there is sufficient scope within government budgets to absorb the associated financial burdens without breaching the deficit ceilings."
Beyond all the statistical uncertainties remains the fundamental question of how to assess the economic and political costs of integration. Should they be viewed purely as expenditures or also as investments? There's much to suggest the latter.

The fact is that the stream of refugees is hitting Germany at the most fortuitous conceivable moment. Thanks to a healthy economy, state and federal treasuries are flush. The labor market is robust, with many jobs in need of filling.

At the same, government expenditures for refugees are more than just costs -- they could also have a positive knock-on effect. The reason being that only part of the money goes straight to the refugees, with some also getting pumped directly into the economy. Take manufacturers of container buildings, for example, who are providing temporary housing for refugees, the carpenters helping to erect these facilities or the wages of people who are providing services to the asylum-seekers. Finally, the government funds paid to the refugees often returns to the economy in the form of consumer spending. All these factors combined could actually lead to economic growth.

The IMF is calculating that the increased government expenditures will boost economic growth in Germany during the next year by 0.3 percent over previous forecasts. The Bundesbank has arrived at a similar figure. For the year 2020, the IMF expects that the refugee developments in Germany will lead to between 0.5 percent and 1.1 percent in additional economic growth, assuming that the country is successful in integrating the newcomers into its labor market. Either way, the German economy is currently experiencing stronger growth than would without immigration. And if they successfully enter the labor market, Germany's new residents will also help finance the German state in the form of taxes and social security contributions.

Good News and Bad News

Ultimately, the costs of the refugees are also an investment in tomorrow. And there is an opportunity for Germany to better integrate its immigrants than it did in the past. Robert Beyer, a researcher at the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability at the University of Frankfurt, has conducted a study for the IMF on the integration of migrants into the German labor market from 1980 to the present. The good news is that, even if integration is difficult, and even if unemployment is considerably higher for migrants at first than it is for Germans, the share of immigrants without jobs falls over time as they acquire the language and obtain professional qualifications. The longer migrants live in Germany, the higher the percentage that find gainful employment. Without any knowledge of the German language, migrants initially earn up to 30 percent less than a native German would earn in the same role. But once immigrants begin to acquire German, this earning gap slowly begins to close.

The bad news is that regardless how well-qualified migrants are, how long they have lived here, whether they have completed their training here in Germany and if their German is excellent, the wage gap never fully closes. Immigrants' risk of becoming unemployed is also greater than for Germans. "The finding is surprising and also alarming," Bayer says, adding that "even after they have been in Germany for long periods of time, companies are generally employing them at levels beneath their actual qualification."

This presents a challenge for Germany -- not only for ethical reasons, but also because it also represents an economic loss in the sense that these people aren't working as productively as they could be. "Employers have no excuses for this gap," says Beyer. If Germany wants the positive economic effects of this new wave of immigrants to outweigh the negative effects in the medium and long term, the economist warns, then the state will need to begin investing in refugees as soon as possible.

The question remains as to how the government can best address the current financial burdens created by the refugee crisis in order to at least create the possibility of a net benefit to the country in the future.

Doubts over Schäuble Plan

There are in fact legitimate doubts about the economic sense of Schäuble's plan and its potential consequences, given that the budget surpluses Germany is seeing have been paid in their entirety by current taxpayers. If it's true that the integration of millions of refugees will remain the task for at least an entire generation, there's an argument to be made that it would also be unfair to place this burden entirely on the shoulders of today's taxpayers and let future taxpayers off the hook completely.

Indeed, it would not be difficult to arrange for future generations to cover part of the costs. Rather than financing the integration of the refugees through budget surpluses, Schäuble would simply have to cover the costs through new borrowing. While this would cause Germany's deficit to grow again, it would also mean that future taxpayers would be required to make their own contribution. They would have to cover the interest and pay down the principle.

This, of course, would mean bidding farewell to a balanced budget, which Schäuble has made his chief policy priority as finance minister. After two years of balanced budgets, the idea of new borrowing seems almost outmoded. Many fear that if the finance minister were to borrow fresh money, it would mark the end of Germany's newfound era of budget discipline.

It's not an unjustified concern, but it is still one that can be easily addressed. For example, it would be possible to move the refugee costs into a special budget separate from the normal federal one. All borrowing related to the admission, care and integration of the new arrivals could be pooled there. A special fund like that would have the additional benefit of providing greater transparency that would in turn make it harder for the government to succumb to the temptation of secretly borrowing money for other purposes.

Prominent German Economist Thomas Straubhaar, of the University of Hamburg, also cites another reason. "A fund would allow money to be mobilized immediately," he says, even if he personally would prefer to see the money raised through savings and reallocations within the existing budget. He argues it would make more sense to spend money in the right ways now than to have to pay even more later on to repair mistakes.

Favorable Borrowing Conditions

The debt in the special fund would be serviced through yearly allocations from the federal budget. Depending on the interest rate and amortization, the fund could be paid off in 10, 20 or 30 years' time. And, with interest rates currently at their lowest since World War II, conditions for fresh borrowing are extremely favorable at the moment.
But what happens to the €12 billion that Schäuble has already earmarked for managing the refugee crisis if a special fund is created instead? The money could be used by the federal government to finance an investment program or lower taxes. Both moves would also drive further economic growth.


Besides, there's a political advantage to that approach: It would prevent prejudice against and resentment toward refugees, because it would mean that no one could make the argument that money is available for the asylum-seekers, but not for the normal population. The creation of the special fund would also enable the government to say that migrants, too, will later be helping to pay back some of the debts that were created as a result of their arrival.

Coming (maybe) Brexodus of Eurocrats


Coming (maybe) Brexodus of Eurocrats

Thousands of the Queen’s subjects in Brussels face uncertain professional futures.

By MAÏA DE LA BAUME 3/1/16, 5:30 AM CET Updated 3/1/16, 6:08 AM CET

Back home in Britain, they are known only as footsoldiers in a faceless army of Eurocrats. In Brussels, EU officials like Jonathan Faull, Stephen Quest and Lowri Evans are senior members of an influential community that faces an uncertain or even unemployed future if the U.K. decides to leave the EU.

They and hundreds of other British civil servants in the European institutions must now endure a four-month waiting game ahead of the U.K.’s decisive In or Out referendum on its EU membership. Only after that vote will many of these bureaucrats, political aides, administrators and other officials get an idea of whether they have a professional future in Brussels, or if their jobs will even exist at all.


Swirling around the whole issue are several key questions that would arise after the one on Britain’s EU membership is answered on June 23: If there is going to be a U.K.-EU divorce, when will it be final? Who gets to keep their jobs and who doesn’t? And even for people who do get to stay, just how valuable is a job-for-life in what will suddenly be a “foreign” civil service?

“We wonder what will happen if Britain says ‘No,'” said one Briton working in the European Parliament, who like others declined to speak on the record about what might happen to staff after the referendum. “Will we need a work permit to work in the EU? Won’t they need native speakers at the Commission, where English is the main language? It is a very unusual situation for all of us.”

Hundreds of mid-level civil servants in EU institutions face a future in professional limbo.
Figuring out the answers would be part of a Brexit process scenario that could take as long as 10 years, according to a U.K. government report released this week.

Making the situation even more uncertain is the fact that the main EU institutions — the Commission, the Council and the Parliament — are making no public effort to plan for a Brexit, leaving many British employees to wonder about their fate.

The European Commission, which employs 1,000 U.K. nationals across its various departments, according to official figures, has said publicly it has no “Plan B” if an Out vote wins on June 23. “We are staying away from this discussion,” a Commission official said.

That has left British EU staffers scrambling to figure out what contingency plans they might have to make if and when their country is no longer part of the European Union.

Staff union representatives said many top EU officials in the institutions would be almost certain to lose their high-profile positions once the U.K. left the Union — as there would be little support for having Brits running key departments. And, clearly, Britain would lose its 73 members of the European Parliament and its seat on the European Commission, currently held by Jonathan Hill.

The future is less clear for hundreds of mid-level civil servants who have passed EU exams and signed permanent contracts for jobs in the Eurocracy. While they might be able to keep their jobs, their prospects for future advancement would be dimmed, likely leading to a Brexodus of experienced U.K. professionals from the EU scene.`

“Those who would certainly pay the price of a Brexit are the director-generals and other top management positions,” said Pierre Bacri, president of the European Civil Service Federation, a union that represents staff in the EU institutions. “For people who expect to hold positions with responsibilities, career prospects will be more limited.”

Bacri said he believed that, in the case of Brexit, the U.K. and the EU would find an agreement with “reasonable solutions” to deal with British permanent staff in the institutions, including arrangements for their pensions.

Uncertain timetable

What few answers there are about the Brexit process can be found in Article 50 of the EU treaty, which spells out actions leaders need to take but doesn’t say much about their impact on the institutions.

According to the article, if the U.K. decides to leave the Union it would need to notify other EU member countries in the European Council and then negotiate an agreement with them on the terms of its withdrawal.

During the negotiation phase, British officials would in principle continue to fully exercise their rights within the EU institutions. But they would lose their political champions in the EU, as neither the British prime minister nor British officials in the Council would be allowed to participate in deliberations and decisions affecting their country.

There are currently 1,000 Brits holding positions in the European Commission | Ben Pruchnie/Getty
A thousand British citizens work at the European Commission | Ben Pruchnie/Getty
EU staff unions are mobilizing to try to provide answers to concerned staffers. One of them, the Association of Independent Officials, held a closed-door conference on February 26 for its members entitled “Brexit: potential implications for British colleagues at EU institutions,” including their “status” within the institutions, their salaries, pensions rights, and their residence rights or “free movement.”

An email sent by organizers said the conference was held to explore the “worrying situation” facing hundreds of British officials and contract agents in the EU institutions. A representative of the union declined to provide any further details about the discussion.

Where the Brits are

Even though it is the third most populous EU nation, Britain does not have a commensurate number of employees working in the Commission. The 1,000 British nationals who hold permanent Commission positions put it slightly ahead of Greece, with 921 officials, and behind Poland, with 1,161, in the rankings.

The sheer numbers don’t tell the whole story. While many of those Britons are working in the Commission’s in-house translation service, and in its scientific research department — not considered the most important sections — U.K. nationals hold several of the highest-profile jobs.

British influence at EU level may be most strongly represented in the diplomatic corps.
Of the 34 directors-general plus their deputies in the Commission, six are British citizens. Those posts include the department in charge of financial stability, financial services and Capital Markets Union, which sets policies important to Britain’s banking sector and the City of London.

They also include longtime official Faull, who has held top posts in the Commission’s justice, financial stability and competition departments and who now runs its special task force on the U.K. referendum; Quest, the current director general of Taxation and Customs Union; and Evans, who heads the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries department. Another senior British Commission official, Robert Madelin, holds a senior special adviser post. All have worked for the Commission for more than 20 years.

“The EU will lose a good caliber of people in the institutions,” said James Stevens, a British lobbyist at FleishmanHillard and the chair of the EU committee at the British Chamber of Commerce in Brussels. “There is a strong British imprint on energy, digital single market, trade policy. People in the U.K. don’t recognize that their country is very influential in Brussels.”

Political muscle in Brussels

British influence at EU level may be most strongly represented in the diplomatic corps. In addition to officials recruited from the U.K. civil service and the U.K.’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office in jobs directly related to the EU, more than 130 U.K. nationals work for the European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic arm. That includes 26 who hold management positions.

“With its vast diplomatic network and its status as permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United Kingdom is one of the influential intermediaries of the European positions in the world,” one French official said. “That said, we can anticipate that a British exit from the EU would penalize London more than its European partners.”

The Parliament official said the impact of a British exit on the assembly’s staff had not been explored.
Job losses would be felt more quickly at the European Parliament. The 73 British MEPs — the third largest delegation in the assembly — would presumably be out of a job, along with their British assistants, at the end of their current terms if not before.

“If a British MEP leaves, it means his assistants and other British officials from the group will certainly have to leave,” said a European Parliament official. “But I don’t see why a British MEP would leave before the end of his mandate.”

Less clear is what would happen to an additional 289 British people working for the Parliament’s administration. Like Commission employees, many are on permanent contracts that would be protected even though they would no longer be EU citizens.

The Parliament official said the impact of a British exit on the assembly’s staff had not been explored, but that it was clear some U.K. citizens working for it would get to keep their jobs.

“Once you are a civil servant in the EU, you remain a civil servant of the EU,” the official said. “You have passed an exam, and signed a long-term contract. There aren’t any rules which tell you that if you lose the nationality required by an institution, you should go home.”

Job prospects

The situation affects not only the status of Brits as employees of EU institutions, but also potentially their employability in general on the Brussels job market. One British assistant in the European Parliament said she was looking into how to obtain Belgian citizenship — as have many Britons working in Brussels since the Brexit debate began.

An Out vote would also affect those who gravitate around the EU institutions, including the 9,200 organizations that engage in lobbying activity in Brussels. According to the EU Transparency Register, more than 1,0oo of them, including NGOs, consulting firms, business federations, companies and unions, are registered in the United Kingdom, and more than 100 organizations based in the U.K. have an office in Brussels.

If the U.K. votes to leave the EU, the decoupling process will take years
There is a feeling among many British lobbyists that even if they won’t lose their jobs, the absence of Britain in Brussels will have an impact on their business.

“We fear that not being at the table will be bad for Britain and bad for the EU,” said Stevens. “But for British nationals in Brussels, whether we leave or not, there will be an increasing demand for our skills, our ability to understand and translate between the U.K. and the EU.”

While the Commission insists it is “staying away” from the Brexit discussion and even Faull himself says he won’t address it — “We don’t speculate on the outcome of the referendum,” he told POLITICO — the British government says it will protect the interests of British officials who fear for their jobs in the institutions.

“The government is committed to producing clear information on the outcome of renegotiation, the rights and obligations in EU law, an assessment of alternatives to membership and publishing the process for leaving,” a U.K government spokesperson said.

It’s clear that if the U.K. votes to leave the EU, the decoupling process will take years — giving Brits in Brussels a long transition time in which to deal with the professional fallout. But the uncertainty surrounding the whole question doesn’t make that any easier for EU staffers waiting to know what their future holds.

“For me, it would be very serious,” said a British parliamentary assistant. “My husband is British. I settled here after school, and my life is here.”

Authors:


Maïa de La Baume  

Direito à indignação / RAQUEL HENRIQUES DA SILVA


OPINIÃO
Direito à indignação
RAQUEL HENRIQUES DA SILVA 29/02/2016 - PÚBLICOI

Decidi tomar posição para exprimir a minha profunda indignação pelo modo como António Lamas tem sido enxovalhado.

Por estes dias, tenho estado na expectativa de que a discussão do orçamento de Estado pudesse ser momento adequado para que o Ministro da Cultura (MC) enunciasse as linhas mestras da estratégia política para um sector que, há mais de uma década, não tem linha de rumo consistente. Desejaria, por exemplo, saber se o Conselho Nacional de Cultura vai finalmente ser um órgão com alguma relevância para democraticamente se discutir o campo patrimonial, em primeiro lugar se a problemática DGPC se deve manter no seu gigantismo de pés de barro e na sua escandalosa falta de meios. Pensar este tópico, envolve também o desempenho das Direcções Regionais de Cultura nas suas funções de gestão de museus e monumentos, a passagem da gestão de museus destes organismos para Câmaras Municipais, a gravíssima perda de autonomia dos museus nacionais, o futuro do quase abandonado Forte de Sacavém que, no entanto, é a alma e o corpo da memória patrimonial portuguesa. E pode envolver ainda questões aparentemente menos estruturais, como o preço dos ingressos nos museus que vai da gratuitidade da Colecção Berardo (paga por todos nós) aos valores que considero excessivos da nova bilhética da Fundação de Serralves.

Compensando a ausência do que mais interessaria, o MC tem-se desdobrado em declarações sobre dois tópicos, especialmente mediáticos: a decisão “incontornável” de que “os Mirós” vão ficar em Portugal e a extinção da Estrutura de Projecto para a gestão conjunta do eixo Belém-Ajuda. Neste caso, foi-se percebendo que o MC visou também (ou sobretudo?) afastar António Lamas da direcção do CCB, para ser substituído por “alguém com experiência, bastante mais jovem, com provas dadas, nomeadamente ao nível de responsabilidades públicas num ministério” (Público on line 26 Fev.). Já antes, o Ministro se referira a Lamas como “alguém que não tem legitimidade democrática, que é metido por razões disto ou daquilo” (Expresso, 20 de Fev.).

É com desgosto que refiro este linguajar trauliteiro, infeliz num ministro da nação e, mais, naturalmente, no Ministro da Cultura. Não pretendo neste momento pronunciar-me sobra a extinção da Estrutura de Projecto e sei que, em caso de conflito de personalidades como é o caso, um Ministro dispõe de legitimidade de demitir. Mas decidi tomar posição para exprimir a minha profunda indignação pelo modo como António Lamas tem sido enxovalhado, fazendo tábua rasa do facto incontornável de ele ser um dos mais brilhantes e dedicados gestores culturais em Portugal a que o nosso património muito deve.

Gostaria de perguntar ao MC (que tanto apreciou o Museu Grão Vasco, modernizado pelo arq. Eduardo Souto Moura) se ele sabe que foi António Lamas (sendo Secretária de Estado da Cultura, Teresa Gouveia) que, no final dos anos de 1980, delineou e pôs em movimento a modernização não só do Museu Grão Vasco mas do Museu Soares dos Reis, do Museu de Aveiro, do Museu de Évora, do Museu do Abade Baçal, do Museu Nacional de Arte Contemporânea, convidando para o efeito arquitectos como Fernando Távora, Alcino Soutinho, Hestnes Ferreira, António Portugal e Manuel Maria Reis e Jean Michel Wilmotte, abrindo assim o mais extraordinário período de obras de requalificação dos museus portugueses de todo o século XX. Que envolveu (saberá o Ministro?) o projecto do próprio CCB que nunca existiria sem o rasgo e a determinação do então Presidente do IPPC que tantos contestaram como inútil e faraónica obra que escondia a cenografia estadonovista dos Jerónimos!

Mais recentemente, antes de chegar à direcção do CCB, Lamas foi (saberá o Ministro?) presidente da empresa Parques de Sintra, Monte da Lua que, sob a sua direcção, passou de um organismo inútil (estou a ser benevolente) para a mais inovadora experiência de gestão cultural em Portugal, traduzida em factos: a valorização do Castelo dos Mouros e envolvente, a renovação museológica e museográfica do Palácio da Pena, o restauro integral do Palácio de Monserrate e do Chalet da Condessa de Edla, a aquisição de novas propriedades, o restauro e renovação dos jardins, matas e florestas. Não pense o Ministro (ou os eventuais leitores) que exagero: basta ir e fruir o estado presente daquele património notabilíssimo. E se os proventos das bilheteiras e das lojas galoparam, em função de exponencial crescimento dos públicos, não é possível, como pretenderam alguns, falar de opções mercantilistas: nunca, como a partir de António Lamas, aquele património foi estudado, conservado, ampliado e valorizado.

A minha indignação assenta, portanto, na inaceitável atitude de um recém-chegado Ministro que ainda não provou nada, para com um homem que, há mais de trinta anos, vem servindo com raro brilhantismo e respeito pela coisa pública, o património português. Esta notável herança tem de ser considerada e, mais propositivamente, seria, para qualquer político avisado, um repto para pensar o futuro. Porque, não tenha qualquer dúvida o Ministro, e a estranha equipa que o rodeia, que urge ter ideias, estratégias e linhas de acção, aproveitando, com projectos complexos, inovadores e fundamentados, as parcerias que o Ministério da Ciência, da Tecnologia e do Ensino Superior tem vindo a propor, neste caso com uma consistência que nos enche de esperança.


Professora FCSH-UNL

Que bom que era termos uma Europa mais à inglesa / José Manuel Fernandes


UNIÃO EUROPEIA
Que bom que era termos uma Europa mais à inglesa
José Manuel Fernandes
28/2/2016, OBSERVADOR

Não podemos protestar contra os poderes da Comissão Europeia e, logo a seguir, pedir mais integração e mais “solidariedade” europeia. Nem uma coisa nem outra, precisamos é de uma Europa mais à inglesa

Uma das características do nosso debate público é, com frequência, a sua esquizofrenia. Ou, se preferirmos, a total ausência de preocupação com a defesa de posições que sejam coerentes e consistentes. Pode-se defender qualquer coisa e o seu contrário sem que isso, aparentemente, incomode quem quer que seja.

Por exemplo: é fácil, é barato e dá milhões atacar a Comissão Europeia por querer mandar em Portugal e no nosso Orçamento – fazemo-lo às segundas, quartas e sextas. Ainda agora boa parte do país se dedicou a essa tarefa, com empenho, denoto e acusações de falta de patriotismo aos demais.

Mas também é fácil, barato e dá milhões atacar a Europa por “ceder”, por não se impor, por permitir mais flexibilidade, sobretudo se isso acontecer com um “grande”, como agora se diz que viu com o Reino Unido, a quem o Conselho Europeu concedeu a possibilidade de não aplicar algumas das políticas decididas em Bruxelas. É o que acontece às terças, quintas e sábados.

Aos domingos… logo se vê.

Tal como os interruptores, que umas vezes estão para cima e outras para baixo, não falta quem num dia proteste com o nível de integração europeu, que transferiu para “a Europa” competências que eram do nosso Parlamento e, logo a seguir, se revolte por esse mesmo nível de integração europeu ser insuficiente e a Europa não mostrar para connosco a “solidariedade” de que nos julgamos credores. Num dia falam de soberania e democracia, no outro de “espírito europeu”, sem porventura se aperceberem que estão a ter indignações contraditórias.

É certo que há quem seja coerente. Francisco Assis e Paulo Rangel, apesar de pertencerem a partidos diferentes, defendem ambos mais integração, “mais Europa”, e por isso não contestam o poder que a Comissão tem para nos dar ordens em matéria de política orçamental. Tal como outros, no polo oposto, não aceitam essa “autoridade de Bruxelas” e, por isso, não hesitam em defender que saiamos do euro. É o caso do PCP e de alguns economistas, como João Ferreira do Amaral.

No meu caso devo dizer que estou à vontade – mesmo não concordando nem com uns, nem com outros. Na altura certa – Junho de 2010, ainda Sócrates era e seria primeiro-ministro – insurgi-me contra a ideia de dar a Bruxelas poderes de veto sobre os nossos orçamentos. Chamei mesmo à criação do “semestre europeu” — num texto intitulado A loucura suicidária de “mais Europa” — “um golpe de Estado anti-democrático” que “humilhará os parlamentos nacionais”. O facto de agora ter estado de acordo com as reservas que a Comissão Europeia colocou ao primeiro esboço de orçamento apresentado por António Costa, e de acompanhar a Moody’s quando esta defende que, apesar de tudo, a versão final que acaba de ser votada na Assembleia é menos má do que o projecto inicial, não mudo de ideias. Isto é, continuo a pensar que dar à Comissão Europeia poder de veto sobre o principal instrumento de acção política de qualquer governo, para mais fazendo-o antes de os Parlamentos nacionais se terem sequer pronunciado, é um entorse à democracia e uma violação da soberania nacional que vai além daquela de que Portugal voluntariamente abdicou ao assinar o Tratado de Lisboa.

É por pensar assim que estou contente por David Cameron ter conseguido arrancar dos seus parceiros europeus as pequenas cedências que levou de volta para Londres, tentando com elas evitar que os britânicos votem pela saída do Reino Unido da União Europeia. Gosto especialmente daquele ponto em que se afirma que o caminho da Europa não é obrigatoriamente o da “ever closer union”, isto é, o de uma integração cada vez maior. Mais: não me interessa discutir se o Reino Unido tem ou não razão quando procura limitar os abusos de alguns imigrantes que, vindos de outros países da comunidade, procuram beneficiar do seu generoso “Welfare State” sem contribuir para ele. O que valorizo é o Reino Unido ter conseguido reconquistar poderes que havia perdido, levando-os de volta para Westminster.

Nestas alturas gosto sempre de recordar o que Tony Benn, um histórico deputado trabalhista, e logo da ala mais à esquerda, que em 1991 (há 25 anos!) fez um notável discurso quando anunciou que votaria contra o Tratado de Maastricht. Dirigindo-se aos seus constituintes do círculo eleitoral de Chesterfield, disse-lhes que, “no futuro, serão governados por pessoas que não elegeram e que não poderão demitir. Peço-vos desculpa por isso. Pode ser que essas pessoas vos dêem melhores creches e um horário de trabalho mais reduzido, mas vocês nunca se poderão ver livres delas”.

“Vocês nunca se poderão ver livres delas”: eis uma profecia que, muitos tratados depois, com todas as suas cedências de soberania, parecia inelutável. Mas talvez não, depois do que Cameron conseguiu, o que para já é válido pelo menos para os britânicos. Mas se estes votarem pela permanência na União, como espero que votem, então o precedente agora aberto pode revelar-se da maior importância. Primeiro porque mostra que, ao contrário do mito, a Europa não tem fatalmente de ser uma bicicleta, sempre a pedalar em frente, antes pode evoluir para uma associação voluntária de nações onde não o destino não fatalmente a “ever close union”, pois também se pode fazer marcha-atrás.

Depois, porque as cedências ao Reino Unido abrem a porta a uma ideia de Europa menos uniforme, mais “a la carte”, logo mais capaz de permitir que os eleitorados de cada um dos países façam as suas escolhas e não tenham de seguir sempre a cartilha de Bruxelas.

Tudo isto é anátema para os que sonham com uma qualquer forma de federalismo ou de super-Estado. Tudo isto também é muito mais difícil de alcançar por todos os países que abdicaram de ter moeda própria, ou seja, pelos países do euro, como Portugal. Estes estão como que agrilhoados a regras que são e serão draconianas, pois deram um passo maior do que as suas pernas – sobretudo as pernas dos países periféricos.

É assim que chegamos à esquizofrenia que referi atrás, pois no fundo o que muitos parecem desejar, com destaque para os políticos populistas, é manterem a sua capacidade de satisfazerem as suas clientelas – chamando a isso soberania – e, ao mesmo tempo, assegurarem que alguém paga os seus excessos – o que classificam sendo um dever de solidariedade coerente com o “espírito europeu”. Ou seja, querem mais “soberania” para eles, os que gastam, e menos “soberania” para os outros, os que pagam a factura. É por isso que num dia protestam contra o excesso de autoridade da Comissão Europeu e no dia seguinte lamentam a liberalidade do Conselho Europeu.

Esta esquizofrenia – que no fundo não passa de oportunismo – tende a obscurecer o debate pois não permite ver que, mais do que os humores de Merkel ou de Draghi, o que determinará o nosso futuro é a escolha entre uma Europa mais integrada – a tal “ever close union” – e, por isso, cada vez mais centralizada e com decisões cruciais a serem tomadas bem longe dos parlamentos nacionais, ou uma Europa que, tirando partido do seu imenso mercado interno, permita geometrias variáveis, tal como avanços e recuos, mas mais democrática porque mais dependente da vontade de cada eleitorado e de cada parlamento.


Eu prefiro o segundo caminho, e por isso estou grato a David Cameron por ter criado um precedente que fará história. Sobretudo se o Reino Unido, mantendo-se dentro da União, não permitir que se esqueçam os compromissos agora assumidos e defenda que outros também possam obtê-los. Se o fizer, será mais tarde ou mais cedo um aliado de que necessitaremos. Mais: se o fizer é bem capaz de ter criado a válvula de escape capaz de permitir que, no caldeirão em que a UE se tornou, a pressão diminua, o populismo regrida, os cidadãos sintam que têm de novo o seu destino nas suas próprias mãos e políticos a quem pedir contas sem que eles se desculpem com Bruxelas.

Opinion: Merkel's Humane Refugee Policies Have Failed


Opinion: Merkel's Humane Refugee Policies Have Failed

By Christiane Hoffmann


Last September, Angela Merkel opened Germany's borders to hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly from Syria. Her calculation that the rest of Europe would support her backfired. She now finds herself isolated at home and abroad as conditions worsen for asylum-seekers.

From today's perspective, Sept. 5, 2015, feels like an eternity ago. That was the day when the chancellor made the decision to allow refugees who had been detained in Hungary to come to Germany. It was the day when she decided to adopt a humanitarian refugee policy -- and the beginning of the erosion of Angela Merkel's power.

"The world views Germany as a country of hope and opportunity," she had said only a few days previously, as part of her annual summer press conference. She also evoked the universal civil liberties that are part of the founding principles of the European Union. It was the day when Angela Merkel decided to follow her convictions, to replace pragmatism with idealism and to emphasize the "Christian" in the name of her party, the Christian Democratic Union. It was the first time in a long while that she didn't think things through all the way to the end.
Sept. 5 seems like an eternity ago and yet we are still confronted with the same images today as we were back then. In recent days, thousands of refugees have once again been stranded along the Balkan route, and this time they are being held back by border fences. Desperate men, women and children can be seen camping out in central Athens. And this time there are images that Merkel had hoped to avoid last September: images of a Europe that is placing its bet on partition and deterrence. They are images of defeat for the German chancellor. Merkel's humanitarian approach in the refugee crisis has failed.

Border controls have been reintroduced across large parts of Europe and fences are being erected. It turns out that Merkel deceived herself about the extent of European solidarity. There will be no harmonious distribution of refugees and it is unlikely that Turkey will reliably protect Europe from a further influx of refugees. That's a sad state of affairs. Indeed, nothing is as unseemly as the gloating comments over Merkel's failure one hears these days in Bavaria and Budapest. In Munich, Bavarian Governor Horst Seehofer has alleged that the chancellor's Willkommenskultur for refugees has radicalized the country, and, in Budapest, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán this week accused Merkel of "importing terrorism, crime, anti-Semitism and homophobia" in an interview with the German mass-circulation daily Bild.
But there hasn't been much progress with the plan to combat the root causes of flight, either. There are no prospects for peace in sight in Syria, Libya remains a failed state and Iraq is, despite some territorial gains against Islamic State, still far from establishing peace.

Relent or Relinquish

When a politician experiences a policy failure, their power is jeopardized. They must decide whether to jettison those policies or relinquish power. Merkel appeared ready to put her power at stake with her open arms approach to the refugee policy in much the same way her predecessor Gerhard Schröder did with his Agenda 2010 structural reforms and Helmut Schmidt did with his NATO Double-Track Decision, which allowed the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

But that no longer appears to be the case. The chancellor will relent; in fact, she has already begun. Her policy shift is by no means radical -- it is taking place in many smaller steps, making it more difficult to discern. But in the end, little will be left of the friendly face with which Merkel wanted to welcome migrants when they arrived.

Conditions for refugees are already rapidly deteriorating. Social benefits are being reduced, limits are being placed on family reunification in a way that will lead even more women and children to make the dangerous journey by boat to Europe. The number of countries designated as safe will be increased, allowing for the easier rejection and deportation of asylum applicants. And there will be a forced repatriation of Afghan nationals -- to the very country that Western troops were unable to pacify and is now sinking into civil war.

Currently, significantly fewer refugees are arriving in Germany. This, however, is not the product of Merkel's policies -- it is the result of her failure. Fewer people are coming because Merkel's opponents have closed the borders along the Balkan Route. Even back in the autumn when Hungary erected a border fence, the protest from Berlin was at best cautious. And when Turkey began erecting a wall along the Syrian border, officials expressed understanding behind the scenes.


Now that that Balkan Route is being sealed off, Berlin is declaring it to be the second-best solution. In a government declaration delivered in mid-February, Merkel soberly asked if it was worth while continuing "with our European-Turkish approach" or whether it might be better to just close the Greek-Macedonian border? What we are witnessing today no longer has anything to do with conviction -- it is the return of the ultra-pragmatic Chancellor Merkel, who is paving an escape route from her previous policies.
European refugee policy has always been a mix of asylum and deterrent, principals and pragmatism, altruism and letting people drown. It's not a pretty mix. It never made Europe look very good and, as such, also stood no chance of transforming Angela Merkel into a saint. Still, she could have made an effort to put Europe into the loop before making such a solitary decision.


Now a new division of labor is taking shape: Germany is responsible for humanism and the others for severity. It couldn't be any more cynical: It allows Merkel to come across as ethical while Viktor Orbán is stuck with the dirty work.