OPINION
Age
of European extremes
Predictions
of EU boom are as hubristic as those of its bust.
“If a new
version of the EU comes into being, the original members, like France
and Germany, will probably become the founding members once again.
They will be joined early on by some East European and Scandinavian
countries. Whether the new EU would be eager to have all
Mediterranean and Balkan countries in their ranks is not certain.”
“A
future European Union is also more likely to be based on economic
interests than common traditions, ideas and emotions. If a new
European Union comes into being it will above all have to investigate
what went wrong with the present attempt, what mistakes were
committed, why it did not stick. These lessons will take time to
learn, but they are an obvious precondition for greater success in
the future.”
By WALTER LAQUEUR,
2/24/16 5:30 AM CET Updated 2/24/16, 7:07 AM CET
A song is heard
these days in Washington, and endlessly repeated across Western
capitals. It begins and ends with the words: Who could have known…
Who could have known
that Europe would be in such poor shape? There are variations: Who
could have known that the Arab Spring that held such promise would
end so badly? Who could have known that so many refugees would try to
enter Europe so suddenly?
The short answer is:
We could have known. In fact, these things were known but considered,
at the time, to be minority opinions.
Not so long ago most
European politicians, academic experts and the media all agreed that
the European Union was a tremendous success. Perhaps it was the
accession of so many countries to the EU that caused such extreme
optimism. Yet there was little readiness on the part of nation states
to surrender any of their traditional prerogatives and proceed
towards greater integration.
There was little
progress on the road towards a common European policy on energy or
foreign affairs. European defense policy was thought to be
unnecessary because military power supposedly no longer counted in
the modern world. What mattered now was only the economy and in this
respect, as well as in modern technology, Europe was considered a
leader.
International
organizations once established have a tendency to survive by sheer
inertia — even if their purpose is no longer obvious.
This extreme
Euro-optimism found its expression in a statement issued by the
presidents and prime ministers of Europe who met in Lisbon in 2000 to
hammer out a plan of action for the EU economy. The mood did not
significantly change in the years thereafter. Even after the economic
crisis of 2008 it was considered bad form to express doubts about
Europe’s leading role in the world.
The crisis was only
a temporary setback, many insisted, predicting in countless articles
and books that the 21st century would be shaped by Europe: The Soviet
Union had collapsed and the European dream of a society more just,
civilized, humane and even more prosperous was gradually replacing
the American dream. China was far away and often ignored. The whole
world was looking up to Europe. The Continent was the model everyone
else wanted to copy.
But was this a true
image of the real state of Europe or was it a fantasy? True, the
Continent overcame the worst consequences of the 2008 economic crisis
and its aftermath. But recovery has been agonizingly slow, and its
effects are still felt even now, eight years later. Gross domestic
product and industrial production in the eurozone both rose by 1
percent during the last quarter of 2015, while unemployment, on
average, hovers around 10 percent. (Not to mention a number of
countries facing acute bankruptcy unless given massive immediate
help).
Those who, like the
present writer, expressed doubts about the European recovery were
derided as ‘”declinists” and prophets of doom and gloom. If
they drew attention to Europe’s political weaknesses it was argued
that military strength counted for nothing in the contemporary world
anyway. We did not understand that the world had changed completely,
our critics said.
Then, quite suddenly
two or three years ago, the mood changed dramatically. The very
people who had maintained Europe was still a superpower — probably
the only superpower — announced that we were “staring in the
abyss.” Europe was not only weak, it was about to collapse. German
Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that the disintegration of Europe
was a definite possibility, as did European Parliament President
Martin Schulz. The French prime minister confirmed that it was not a
distant prospect but could in fact happen quite soon. Commentators in
the academic world pronounced similar opinions. Extreme and
unwarranted Euro-optimism had been replaced by its opposite.
The
idea of Europe as a political superpower was an illusion. But a
disunited Europe would be even more starkly exposed to the harsh
winds of today’s world.
And this switch was
probably equally unwarranted. Why? To begin with, international
organizations once established have a tendency to survive by sheer
inertia — even if their purpose is no longer obvious. Secondly, to
mention but one consequence of dissolving the EU, a return from the
euro to old currencies would be expensive. What would be the economic
benefits of a Europe divided? This is not at all clear. It is far
more likely that considerable damage would be caused by the
imposition of customs and other restrictions.
The idea of Europe
as a political superpower was an illusion. But a disunited Europe
would be even more starkly exposed to the harsh winds of today’s
world, in which military power still counts. If the EU breaks down,
it will in all likelihood be a partial and not a total process. It
will be followed by a learning process, the length of which will
probably vary from country to country. It will depend on the economic
damage suffered and on the political pressure to which the various
countries feel exposed.
If a new version of
the EU comes into being, the original members, like France and
Germany, will probably become the founding members once again. They
will be joined early on by some East European and Scandinavian
countries. Whether the new EU would be eager to have all
Mediterranean and Balkan countries in their ranks is not certain.
Some of the founders
of the original EU argued in retrospect that it would have been
preferable to base the project not on common economic interests
(which happened to be iron and steel at the time) but on a common
European idea. In an ideal world this suggestion would have made
perfect sense. But as past experience has shown, the extent of this
common idea, its depth and potential impact should not be overrated.
A future European
Union is also more likely to be based on economic interests than
common traditions, ideas and emotions. If a new European Union comes
into being it will above all have to investigate what went wrong with
the present attempt, what mistakes were committed, why it did not
stick. These lessons will take time to learn, but they are an obvious
precondition for greater success in the future.
Walter Laqueur is a
historian and author, inter alia, of “Putinism: Russia and Its
Future with the West” (Thomas Dunne Books, 2015).
Authors:
Walter Laqueur
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