Why Europe Is Right to Fear Putin’s Useful Idiots
The
Kremlin’s support for right-wing parties is no game. It’s trying
to subvert the European idea.
BY ALINA
POLYAKOVAFEBRUARY 23, 2016 - 11:28 AM
Scholar Scott
Radnitz recently authored an article with a provocative title:
“Europe’s Extremists Are Not Putin’s Fault.” In this
well-thought-out piece, Radnitz argues that the “elite rhetoric
focused on Russia’s alleged efforts to infiltrate western politics”
by supporting Europe’s far-right parties verges on hysteria.
Vladimir Putin is not a “puppet master,” the author writes; the
Russian president is simply taking advantage of Europe’s political
and economic problems to stir a pot of brewing nationalist sentiment
that is not of his making. According to Radnitz, the U.S. Congress’s
recent call to investigate Russian funding of extremist groups and
pro-Russian NGOs is an overreaction to what is, at its core, a
domestic European phenomenon.
Radnitz is correct
that the far-right surge in Europe is, in many ways, a response to
European Union policies. But his overall conclusion — that
policymakers’ overreaction to the threat posed by the Kremlin is
distracting them from addressing Europe’s problems — is based on
a false logic that confuses correlation with causation and greatly
underestimates the extent to which Moscow uses its band of “useful
idiots” to pursue its foreign policy interests.
First, though,
here’s where the article gets it right. As I write in my book, The
Dark Side of European Integration, the rise of the far right is first
and foremost a cultural backlash against the rapid economic and
political integration of the E.U. over the last 25 years. The core
founding principle of the European project was that economic
interdependence among nations would lead to a Europe whole, free, and
at peace. Indeed, in establishing a common market, eliminating
tariffs, and instituting a common currency, European elites ushered
in an unprecedented era of peace on the war-torn continent.
Yet European
policymakers didn’t stop with economic integration. Over the years,
the E.U. has begun to act more and more like a state.Over the years,
the E.U. has begun to act more and more like a state. Legislative and
executive bodies — the European Parliament and the European
Commission — were founded to centralize decision-making on fiscal
and trade policies; border controls were removed; and a whole set of
state-like symbols (a flag, a capital, and passports) emerged. While
most European citizens supported integration and the E.U.’s
eastward expansion and enjoyed the perks of visa-free travel, this
support, it turns out, was contingent on the E.U.’s ability to
deliver economic prosperity. This is a promise that the E.U. is now
having trouble keeping.
In this context, the
far right’s narrative — that Brussels has castrated national
governments’ ability to make decisions, homogenized national
cultures and traditions, and opened the borders to “external
threats” (i.e. Muslim immigrants) — is gaining momentum. In the
aftermath of the financial crisis, public opinion turned decidedly
against the E.U., signaling that euroskepticism was no longer the
niche purview of the “crazies” on the political fringe. The most
electorally successful far-right parties, such as the French National
Front and even the more openly racist Jobbik in Hungary, have
strategically picked up on growing anti-EU grievances and softened
their anti-minority, racist rhetoric to appeal to broader swaths of
the population (see for example the struggle between Marine Le Pen
and her father). This strategy, many years in the making, is proving
to be the far right’s winning formula. As a result, the far right
has been on a slow but steady rise across Europe for the last decade.
And now we come to
the article’s logical gap, disguised as a clever argument.
Radnitz’s thesis rests on the assertion that, in their
overreaction, policymakers and experts have confused cause and
effect. Russia’s propping up of European extremists, goes the
argument, is the effect, not the cause, of these parties’ success.
The rest of the article aims to correct this alleged fallacy. But, as
observers of European politics know well, the far right has been on a
steady, if slow, rise for some time, and Putin’s support is clearly
not the cause of their success. This argument understates Russia’s
role in shaping Europe’s political discourse to serve its own
purpose — because while far-right parties are nothing new in
Europe, their explicit pro-Russian turn is.
Prior to 2010, one
would be hard-pressed to find public statements in praise of Putin by
far-right leaders. Today, they are commonplace. UKIP’s Nigel Farage
is a self-proclaimed fan of the Russian president. Jobbik’s head,
Gabor Vona, is a frequent invited guest in Moscow. And, of course,
Madame Le Pen, whose party was the beneficiary of a 9.4 million euro
loan from a Russian-owned bank, is a consistent voice of support for
Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and the Middle East. Even Germany,
where the far right has failed to gain a foothold, is not immune to
Moscow’s narrative. Supporters of PEGIDA, the increasingly popular
xenophobic group whose acronym stands for “Patriotic Europeans
Against the Islamization of the West,” often carry Russian flags
and anti-government posters begging for Putin’s help.
As European
far-right leaders openly voice their support for Moscow, it would be
wise to remember that Putin’s Russia is not just another “meddling
power” lobbying for its interests.Putin’s Russia is not just
another “meddling power” lobbying for its interests. It is a
government hostile to the West and the value system — democracy,
freedom of expression, political accountability — that it
represents. For proof, one must look no further than Russia’s
national security strategy, in which the Russian government
explicitly names NATO as a threat and accuses the U.S. and its allies
of operating “military-biological” labs on Russia’s border.
Calling the West’s
response to the love affair between Putin and the far right an
overreaction greatly underestimates the extent to which the Kremlin
and its state-controlled media use support of European politicians to
legitimize Moscow’s explicitly anti-western foreign policy agenda:
far-right politicians not only vote for pro-Kremlin policies in the
EU parliament, they also take part in election observation missions —
most notably the referendum for the annexation of Crimea and the
“elections” in Ukraine’s Russian-controlled “people’s
republics.” The Russian media uses these events and far-right
leaders’ visits to Moscow to tout European support for Putin. Even
Le Pen was an unknown in Russia until the Ukraine crisis and her
outspoken public support for Putin. Now she is paraded as proof that
there is some support for Putin’s policies in Europe.
In addition, Radnitz
assumes that mainstream politicians, U.S. officials, and other
experts who have pointed out the pro-Russian turn of Europe’s far
right aim to discredit such parties through “guilt by association.”
But there is no evidence that these parties’ pro-Putin stance is
hurting them at the polls or that it has discredited them in the eyes
of voters. If anything, their pro-Russian turn has coincided with
their rise in the polls.
Correlation,
however, does not equal causation. The far right’s pro-Putin
rhetoric is a relatively small part of their overall political
platform. In fact, rather than rejecting the far right, the
mainstream right in countries like France and Hungary is increasingly
taking up their rivals’ pro-Putin stance. This is not a strategy of
discrediting such parties through guilt by association; it is simple
acquiescence. Instead of “trumpeting possible Kremlin influence”
to take the wind out of the far right’s sails, the more likely (and
terrifying) outcome is that the center right will follow its lead.
In its efforts to
respond to the economic and refugee crises and to Russian aggression,
the E.U. has forced unpopular policies, such as austerity and refugee
quotas, down its members’ throats. So far, national governments
have, for the most part, fallen in line. But as Moscow builds its
army of useful idiots, European and U.S. policymakers would be well
advised to invest significant resources in research to uncover
Moscow’s methods of influence in Europe. Doing otherwise leaves the
E.U. wide open to Russia’s brand of unconventional warfare — a
vulnerability that Europe, caught in a moment of crisis, can ill
afford to overlook.
In the photo, Marine
Le Pen, president of France’s far-right National Front party,
visits Moscow’s Red Square before a meeting with Russia’s State
Duma speaker Sergei Naryshkin on May 26, 2015.
Photo credit: KIRILL
KUDRYAVTSEV/AFP/Getty Images
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário