“Like
any liberal hegemon would, Merkel now wonders whether these costs are
still worth bearing. Perhaps it would be better to close the Bavarian
borders and exercise Germany’s right under the Dublin regulation to
turn back refugees who have crossed other safe countries in Europe.
There
are historical precedents for a change of mind of this magnitude.
After World War II, the U.S. guaranteed stable exchange rates under
the Bretton Woods agreement. In 1971, as U.S. costs rose due to
speculation against the dollar, President Nixon decided to abandon
his promise — the rest of the world called it the “Nixon shock.”
It is high time for the rest of Europe to get ready for the “Merkel
shock.”
THORSTEN BENNER
OPINION
Europe’s
lonely liberal hegemon
Angela
Merkel’s migration policy isn’t driven by morality.
By THORSTEN BENNER
2/3/16, 5:30 AM CET
BERLIN — For
Oxford economics professor Paul Collier things are crystal clear:
“Angela Merkel is responsible for the refugee crisis. Who else?”
It would be easy to
dismiss Collier if he were not part of a growing chorus that sees
Germany’s refugee policy as a morality play — with Merkel in the
lead, chasing redemption for Germany’s historical sins.
The late Lord
Weidenfeld talked about a German public enthralled by its naïve
welcome to refugees “as if that was a way to redeem the sins of the
grandparents.” Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán accused
Merkel of “moral imperialism.”
Merkel’s
supporters are equally tempted to qualify her refugee policy in terms
of morality. In an address to the German parliament, Holocaust
survivor Ruth Klüger expressed her admiration for Merkel for opening
the doors to Syrian refugees, saying her “heroic” position had
“won Germany the applause of the world.”
Whether seeing it in
an favorable light or not, considering Merkel’s stance on refugees
as a moral issue does not reflect what really motivates the German
chancellor and will determine her decisions in the coming months.
At the heart of
Merkel’s refugee policy is a concern for Europe. Ahead of many of
her peers, Merkel argued that the migration issue posed a more severe
challenge than did the eurozone debt crisis. She saw how woefully
unprepared the EU was for the massive influx.
Merkel
is under no illusions that the German electorate is any more virtuous
than those of its European neighbors.
The EU was ignoring
the deplorable living conditions of refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and
Jordan; its unsecured external borders and ramshackle asylum systems
in Greece and elsewhere; the safe haven for human traffickers in
Turkey and other Mediterranean countries. There was no Europe-wide
solidarity mechanism for the distribution of refugees, and populist
politicians fueled anti-Muslim hatred — some, like Orbán, even
from the prime minister’s perch.
As the situation
spiraled out of control last summer, Merkel was clear-sighted about
the dangers faced by Europe, and Germany in particular as the country
that benefited most from European integration. A humanitarian
catastrophe brewed at the heart of the Continent, tensions rose in
the Balkans, and the Schengen passport-free travel zone threatened to
implode.
Merkel concluded
that Germany was the only EU country in a position to provide
emergency relief: It has a strong economy (lending itself to the
narrative that Germany’s labor market can easily absorb refugees),
a favorable media environment, and the absence of a powerfully
organized right-wing populist movement.
Merkel opened the
doors to the refugees Hungary didn’t want because she accepted
Germany’s role as Europe’s default liberal political hegemon —
redemption and moral superiority were not driving factors. Germany’s
willingness to act as a temporary “protection giver of last resort”
reflected its desire to avert a humanitarian disaster at the heart of
the EU and buy the Continent time to come up with a multilateral
solution to the crisis.
A political gamble
on home turf
It was always clear
that this move would come at a high cost. Merkel is under no
illusions that the German electorate is any more virtuous than those
of its European neighbors. But she was willing to invest her
political capital and temporarily bear the political costs at home.
In doing so, she has pursued unsentimental realpolitik.
Merkel
opened the doors to the refugees Hungary didn’t want because she
accepted Germany’s role as Europe’s default liberal political
hegemon.
Merkel has advocated
securing Europe’s external borders and establishing so-called “hot
spots” in the EU’s border states, denying refugees the right to
choose their country of asylum within Europe. She supports expanding
the list of “safe countries of origin” and cutting deals with
Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and questionable regimes from
Algeria to Eritrea (where she sent her development cooperation
minister in December).
At the same time,
she has tried to pressure other European countries to agree to fair
distribution of refugees within Europe. But many EU states appear to
relish the fact that Germany struggles with a refugee problem they
see as German, not European — payback, perhaps, for German
hectoring and lack of solidarity on other political issues.
For Merkel, the
political cost is rising rapidly, with the right-wing populist
Alternative for Germany (AfD) polling at more than 10 percent
nationwide and likely to enter three regional parliaments during
state elections in March.
Like any liberal
hegemon would, Merkel now wonders whether these costs are still worth
bearing. Perhaps it would be better to close the Bavarian borders and
exercise Germany’s right under the Dublin regulation to turn back
refugees who have crossed other safe countries in Europe.
There are historical
precedents for a change of mind of this magnitude. After World War
II, the U.S. guaranteed stable exchange rates under the Bretton Woods
agreement. In 1971, as U.S. costs rose due to speculation against the
dollar, President Nixon decided to abandon his promise — the rest
of the world called it the “Nixon shock.” It is high time for the
rest of Europe to get ready for the “Merkel shock.”
Thorsten Benner is
director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.
.webp)
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