Betrayal
of the local Brexit voter
Leave
supporters thought they were voting against globalization. But in
Theresa May’s Britain, they’ll likely get more.
By
Vernon Bogdanor
7/31/16, 7:17 AM CET
When Britain voted
last month by a narrow but decisive margin to leave the European
Union, it was, in essence, a popular protest against globalization.
Voters who felt left
behind by globalization and under pressure from immigration expressed
a desperate desire for protection from the buffeting forces of
economic liberalism. Sadly, in the United Kingdom’s current
political and economic climate, their cry for help is likely to go
unaddressed.
The principle that
there can be no superior lawmaking body to Westminster is deeply
entrenched in British history. When Britain became a member of the
European Economic Community in 1973, the idea of a supranational
legal entity — with the power to supersede parliament — struck a
discordant note among the country’s citizenry.
Concerns over
sovereignty came to a dramatic head in the aughts, when a massive
wave of migration — amounting to over 2 million people — followed
the admission of ex-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe
to the EU in 2004.
This migration might
have been successfully absorbed had it not been for the credit crunch
of 2008, a crisis that fundamentally altered the politics both of
Britain and the Continent.
The Conservative
government is likely to encourage enterprise by lowering corporation
tax, and perhaps personal taxation as well.
Up until then,
politics had been largely dominated by economics, and by arguments
about the role of the state in economic affairs. Post-2008, however,
questions of identity came to the fore.
Ed Miliband, former
leader of the U.K. Labour Party, had hoped that 2008 would prove a
social democratic moment, that resentment over the role of bankers
and financiers in the crisis would help the moderate left gain
political traction. But, in Britain, as on the Continent, it proved a
nationalist moment.
Indeed, the only two
parties to make significant gains in the 2015 general election in
Britain were UKIP, dedicated to taking Britain out of the EU, and the
Scottish National Party, dedicated to taking Scotland out of the U.K.
Both emphasize
issues of identity over economics. They don’t complain that their
political opponents are insufficiently left-wing or right-wing, but
that they are insufficiently British or Scottish.
Concerns about
identity are felt most strongly by the disadvantaged and insecure —
victims of social and economic change who feel alienated from a
banking and financial establishment that appears to have weathered
the crisis with far less difficulty.
Fifty years ago,
most school-leavers could move immediately into a job. For many, that
is no longer the case. Communities who suffered from the
manufacturing industry’s decline are neither socially nor
geographically mobile; 60 percent of the British population live
within 20 miles of where they grew up. They do not share the
multicultural perspective of Londoners, who welcome immigration and
favor the EU.
Britain’s elite,
by contrast, is internationalist. It is more comfortable in Brussels
than in Blackpool or Burnley.
It is the elite that
has primarily benefited from immigration. The appeal was less obvious
for those struggling to make ends meet. The social effects of
immigration hit them hardest, and they watched with growing dread as
their communities were transformed beyond their control.
The referendum vote
was in essence a cry of rage by the victims of globalization. In
voting Leave, they sought protection against market forces which, so
they believed, were costing them their jobs and holding down their
wages. They wanted, above all, restrictions on immigration from the
EU.
Once again, however,
they are unlikely to get what they want. Most Brexit campaign leaders
outside UKIP were Conservatives with an entirely different agenda.
They sought Brexit
for Thatcherite reasons, to ensure a more effective version of the
market economy, freed from the restrictions of Jacques Delors’
Social Europe. They oppose not globalization, but social protection.
Far from gaining
shelter from world economic forces, average Brexit voters will find
themselves even more exposed.
This economically
liberal view is likely to prevail in Prime Minister Theresa May’s
Britain — not the populist view of those who voted for Brexit.
Indeed, it must, if Britain is to survive economically.
Surviving will
require becoming more competitive, opening up markets and embracing
free trade. It will mean a radical shrinking of the state, something
that is likely to disadvantage those same voters who believed Brexit
would protect them from the excesses of globalization.
The Conservative
government is likely to encourage enterprise by lowering corporation
tax, and perhaps personal taxation as well. This will have to be
financed by reducing public spending, and will put further pressure
on social and welfare expenditure, already reeling from six years of
austerity.
Far from gaining
shelter from world economic forces, average Brexit voters will find
themselves even more exposed. They will have no choice but to sink or
swim in a far harsher economic climate.
Vernon Bogdanor is
professor of government at King’s College, London.
Authors:
Vernon Bogdanor
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