OPINION
Why
Belgium is not Europe’s jihadi base
Belgium
bashing is unfounded and only dilutes our collective sense of
responsibility.
By THOMAS RENARD
3/31/16, 6:20 AM CET Updated 3/31/16, 8:47 AM CET
An attack on Belgium
was not a matter of “if” but “when,” experts and officials
warned. And still, the tragic events of March 22 came as a shock to
us all — the counter-terrorism community included. These were the
first large-scale suicide bombings coordinated in our country.
Now the question on
everyone’s mind is: How could this have happened? It is still too
early to give an answer, but we know that we will inevitably discover
mistakes were made.
In the meantime,
international experts and journalists have resorted to
Belgium-bashing and finger-pointing. They call Belgium a “failed
state,” our police and intelligence services “incompetent.” But
such accusations are overly simplistic, and essentially misplaced.
Brussels is not the
jihadi base they claim, nor is Belgium’s counter-terrorism track
record unsuccessful.
* * *
Belgium can hardly
be accused of ignorance or inexperience when it comes to dealing with
terrorism. The country has gone through a number of terror waves
since the early 1970s, which notably involved far-left terrorist
organizations like the Communist Combatant Cells, and nationalist
ones like Kurdish groups. According to the Global Terrorism Database,
two-thirds of attacks since 1970 took place in the 1970s and 80s,
with 100 attacks and a total of 30 victims. In the mid-1980s, the
attention of the intelligence services began to turn toward the
threat of violent Islamism when political Islam movements started to
crop up across Europe. A dedicated unit was set up in the former
gendarmerie.
In the 1990s, the
work of Belgian police and intelligence services was initially
focused on so-called “national-Islamist” groups, more
specifically the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which had
created support cells in Belgium in charge of fundraising,
propaganda, and recruitment.
A much more
globalized threat surfaced in Belgium, and in neighboring European
countries, a few years later, and kickstarted a new era of
counter-terrorism focused on jihadi groups. In 1998, Belgian services
conducted a major joint operation with their British and Italian
counterparts to dismantle the so-called Mellouk network, an
international al Qaeda affiliate. During these years, Belgium engaged
in a number of successful counter-terrorism operations, and shared
valuable information with foreign services.
Molenbeek
cannot explain it all: such pockets of extremism exist elsewhere in
Europe.
The Islamic State
has now replaced al Qaeda as Belgium’s main terrorist threat.
Officials raised the alarm about the danger of “foreign fighters”
as early as 2012 when the first young people departed for Syria. The
chief of intelligence shared his concerns publicly in early 2013, as
the number of radicalized young men and women leaving to join the
jihad every month started to increase. A year later, these concerns
turned into reality. Belgium became the first victim of an attack
perpetrated by a “returnee” when French national Mehdi Nemmouche
killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels.
So Belgium is not
new to this. The country has long been aware of the threat of
terrorist attacks, including those related to ISIL. Authorities
haven’t been naive. Mistakes were made, surely, but some nuance is
in order.
* * *
A lot has been said
about Belgium over the past few months: Belgium’s institutional
complexity apparently makes it a breeding-ground for terrorism, while
Molenbeek is painted as a no-go area. Admittedly, there is some truth
here. The many layers of governance — the “institutional lasagne”
as it’s known here — complicate efforts to develop a
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy and get in the way of
successful implementation. But Belgium is not the only federal state
in the world, and a number of practical solutions have been developed
to facilitate coordination.
Similarly, Belgium’s
recent history of terrorism is far from unique in Europe. A handful
of Belgian towns and citizens have regularly appeared in the latest
terror investigations — but the towns and citizens of other
countries have figured prominently in previous investigations too.
The
problem in Belgium is not one of competence, but of means and
resources.
It now appears
increasingly likely the Paris and Brussels attacks were organized by
either one cell or two connected cells mostly based in Belgium. But
the work of one cell does not make Belgium a base for the entire
jihadist movement in Europe. Besides, the cell’s degree of autonomy
vis-à-vis ISIL leadership in Syria — the real jihadi base —
remains far from clear.
Molenbeek has also
become the target of heavy international criticism. It is undeniably
not Brussels’ most attractive neighborhood. It has a long way to go
in terms of socioeconomic development, social cohesion and security.
A significant “pocket of radicalization” (85 individuals to date)
has taken root there, and is now at the heart of the problem.
But again, Molenbeek
cannot explain it all: such pockets of extremism exist elsewhere in
Europe, not least because radicalization grows through networks of
kinship and old friendships, and create a sort of “snowball effect”
in particular neighborhoods. Let us not blame the activities of a
group of citizens on a neighborhood’s systemic problems.
So what went wrong?
Part of the answer
has to do with the failure of Belgium’s prevention policies. With
the highest ratio of “foreign fighters” per capita, the
authorities clearly gave networks actively involved in radicalization
and recruitment too much leeway. Nor was enough effort devoted to
prevent young men and women from leaving for Syria. The scope of the
threat is unprecedented, a major challenge for a small country like
Belgium with limited intelligence and police resources.
According to
officials, there are approximately 900 individuals on the
intelligence services’ watch list. A number of them are still in
Syria, while others have returned with unknown intentions (estimated
to number 130). Close to a third are considered “radicalized” or
“sympathizers,” but have not yet waged jihad. To deal with this
threat, Belgium has two intelligence agencies — civilian and
military — one overarching intelligence agency, and two specialized
police units, in addition to its local police, whose focus is much
broader.
Although ISIL is now
a main priority, these forces also deal with other urgent issues such
as other forms of terrorism and extremism, proliferation, organized
crime, counter-espionage or cyber-security. Their capabilities are
stretched. The exact size of the force is not known to the public,
but we can estimate that, excluding local police and administrative
staff, the number of people working on the ISIL threat is well below
1,000.
The
current terrorist threat is not constrained to national borders, and
blame cannot therefore rest of any one country.
The ratio between
security services and potential terrorists is therefore roughly of
1:1 — at best. Needless to say, there are not nearly enough people
to properly monitor every dangerous individual. Authorities are
forced to prioritize and make judgement calls. The likelihood of
mistakes multiplies. The current situation is the result of a chronic
lack of investment in national security services over the years,
despite increases in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the Madrid
and London bombings.
The problem is
widely acknowledged, but budgetary restrictions, which were in effect
until 2015 due to difficult economic conditions, exacerbated the
situation. In this context, and in order to anticipate future
threats, the government urgently needs to strengthen its national
security services. It’s not a magical solution, but it’s a first
step — especially if followed by other measures across the entire
counter-terrorism spectrum, notably in terms of prevention.
Yes, Belgium’s
ability to anticipate and prevent the Brussels attacks was severely
limited. But this should not completely overshadow what has been
achieved so far. In the aftermath of the attacks against Charlie
Hebdo in January 2015, special forces dismantled a terrorist cell in
Verviers, in the eastern part of Belgium. Surveillance materials and
a thorough investigation showed that its members had been planning an
imminent attack. Last year, two major trials against networks related
to the radicalization and recruitment of young Belgians led to the
condemnation of several key figures — although too many in
absentia.
The problem in
Belgium is not one of competence, but of means and resources.
* * *
In its narrow focus
on Belgium, recent criticism misses three essential points.
First, Belgium is
far from the sole target of terrorism and, unfortunately, attacks
occurred elsewhere. New York, Madrid, London, Paris, but also Ankara,
Beirut or Ouagadougou are examples of the fact that when a critical
number of trained radicals are determined to carry out an attack,
they will most likely find a way to succeed.
Second, the current
terrorist threat is not constrained to national borders, and blame
cannot therefore rest on any one country. In the investigations into
the Paris and Brussels attacks, connections have emerged between
individuals (mentors, recruiters, other facilitators) and hideouts
across Europe, from Germany to Greece and Italy. Europe’s national
security is a collective responsibility. International cooperation is
indispensable. When terrorists cross borders, so should our
counter-terrorism efforts.
Some have floated
the idea of a European CIA, but what we need are more pragmatic
solutions and real police and judicial cooperation at the European
level. Cooperation between France and Belgium has intensified and is
in fact already quite effective. Efforts should also be increased in
the context of the international coalition against ISIL in Iraq and
Syria, to which Belgium already contributes modestly.
And lastly, the
Brussels plot is not just an attack against Belgium. It is an attack
against Europe and, more broadly, against our democratic values and
societies. And as such it is also proof of our collective failures of
prevention and intelligence — not only Belgium’s. Our response
should be to stand firm together. Belgium-bashing only serves to
create divisions and dilute the sense of responsibility. And what we
— collectively — desperately need to do is take responsibility.
Thomas Renard is a
senior research fellow at the Egmont Institute and an adjunct
professor at Vesalius College in Brussels. He is also a
counter-terrorism consultant for the Belgian public broadcaster,
RTBF.
Authors:
Thomas Renard
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