Is
the world economy having a 2008 moment?
Nouriel Roubini
Wednesday 2 March
2016 14.11 GMT
Two dismal months
for financial markets may give way in March to a relief rally for
assets such as global equities
The question I am
asked most often nowadays is this: are we back to 2008 and another
global financial crisis and recession?
My answer is a
straightforward no, but that the recent episode of global financial
market turmoil is likely to be more serious than any period of
volatility and risk-off behaviour since 2009. This is because there
are now at least seven sources of global tail risk, as opposed to the
single factors – the eurozone crisis, the Federal Reserve “taper
tantrum,” a possible Greek exit from the eurozone, and a hard
economic landing in China – that have fuelled volatility in recent
years.
First, worries about
a hard landing in China and its likely impact on the stock market and
the value of the renminbi have returned with a vengeance. While China
is more likely to have a bumpy landing than a hard one, investors’
concerns have yet to be laid to rest, owing to the ongoing growth
slowdown and continued capital flight.
Second, emerging
markets are in serious trouble. They face global headwinds (China’s
slowdown, the end of the commodity super cycle, the Fed’s exit from
zero policy rates). Many are running macro imbalances, such as twin
current account and fiscal deficits, and confront rising inflation
and slowing growth. Most have not implemented structural reforms to
boost sagging potential growth. And currency weakness increases the
real value of trillions of dollars of debt built up in the last
decade.
Third, the Fed
probably erred in exiting its zero-interest-rate policy in December.
Weaker growth, lower inflation (owing to a further decline in oil
prices), and tighter financial conditions (via a stronger dollar, a
corrected stock market, and wider credit spreads) now threaten US
growth and inflation expectations.
Fourth, many
simmering geopolitical risks are coming to a boil. Perhaps the most
immediate source of uncertainty is the prospect of a long-term cold
war – punctuated by proxy conflicts – between the Middle East’s
regional powers, particularly Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran.
Fifth, the decline
in oil prices is triggering falls in US and global equities and
spikes in credit spreads. This may now signal weak global demand –
rather than rising supply – as growth in China, emerging markets,
and the US slows.
Weak oil prices also
damage US energy producers, which comprise a large share of the US
stock market, and impose credit losses and potential defaults on net
energy exporting economies, their sovereigns, state-owned
enterprises, and energy firms. As regulations restrict market makers
from providing liquidity and absorbing market volatility, every
fundamental shock becomes more severe in terms of risk-asset price
corrections.
Sixth, global banks
are challenged by lower returns, owing to the new regulations put in
place since 2008, the rise of financial technology that threatens to
disrupt their already-challenged business models, the growing use of
negative policy rates, rising credit losses on bad assets (energy,
commodities, emerging markets, fragile European corporate borrowers),
and the movement in Europe to “bail in” banks’ creditors,
rather than bail them out with now-restricted state aid.
Finally, the
European Union and the eurozone could be ground zero of global
financial turmoil this year. European banks are challenged. The
migration crisis could lead to the end of the Schengen Agreement, and
(together with other domestic troubles) to the end of German
chancellor Angela Merkel’s government.
Moreover, Britain’s
exit from the EU is becoming more likely. With the Greek government
and its creditors once again on a collision course, the risk of
Greece’s exit may return. Populist parties of the right and the
left are gaining strength throughout Europe. Thus, Europe
increasingly risks disintegration. To top it all off, its
neighborhood is unsafe, with wars raging not only in the Middle East,
but also – despite repeated attempts by the EU to broker peace –
in Ukraine, while Russia is becoming more aggressive on Europe’s
borders, from the Baltics to the Balkans.
In the past, tail
risks were more occasional, growth scares turned out to be just that,
and the policy response was strong and effective, thereby keeping
risk-off episodes brief and restoring asset prices to their previous
highs (if not taking them even higher). Today, there are seven
sources of potential global tail risk, and the global economy is
moving from an anemic expansion (positive growth that accelerates) to
a slowdown (positive growth that decelerates), which will lead to
further reduction in the price of risky assets (equities,
commodities, credit) worldwide.
At the same time,
the policies that stopped and reversed the doom loop between the real
economy and risk assets are running out of steam. The policy mix is
suboptimal, owing to excessive reliance on monetary rather than
fiscal policy. Indeed, monetary policies are becoming increasingly
unconventional, reflected in the move by several central banks to
negative real policy rates; and such unconventional policies risk
doing more harm than good as they hurt the profitability of banks and
other financial firms.
Two dismal months
for financial markets may give way in March to a relief rally for
assets such as global equities, as some key central banks (the
People’s Bank of China, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of
Japan) ease more, while others (the Fed and the Bank of England) will
remain on hold for longer. But repeated eruptions from some of the
seven sources of global tail risk will make the rest of this year –
unlike the previous seven – a bad one for risky assets and anaemic
for global growth.
• Nouriel Roubini,
a professor at NYU’s Stern school of business and chairman of
Roubini Global Economics
Copyright: Project
Syndicate, 2016
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