GEOPOLITICS
The
Turkey-Russia reset
Erdoğan
needed a friend after the failed coup, so he headed to Russia.
By AYKAN ERDEMIR AND
BORIS ZILBERMAN 8/10/16, 5:30 AM CET
The failed coup in
Turkey pushed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan into the arms of a man he now
hails as a “valuable friend” but who was until recently a bitter
enemy.
Russo-Turkish
relations had reached a new low following Turkey’s downing of a
Russian jet in November 2015 — as Vladimir Putin coldly reminded
his Turkish counterpart during their meeting in St. Petersburg
Tuesday, Erdoğan’s first trip abroad since the military attempt to
remove him.
Trying to break his
country out of its international isolation, the Turkish president
took steps in June to normalize relations with Moscow, while also
repairing ties with Israel and the UAE. The existential threat posed
by July’s coup attempt appears to have strengthened his resolve to
do this, and pushed him back toward Russia.
The coup attempt
also provided Erdoğan with an invaluable opportunity to reshape the
Turkish public’s hostile attitudes toward Russia. Although Erdoğan
had proudly endorsed the downing of the jet in November, since the
coup his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government has begun to reframe the incident as conspiracy by
putschists to damage Russo-Turkish relations.
In contrast to
Turkish jubilance, the St. Petersburg summit was met with skepticism
by a Russian public exposed to intense anti-Turkish propaganda since
November.
Turkey’s
pro-government media published blatant conspiracy theories, even
going as far as to accuse President Obama of being the coup’s
mastermind.
Earlier this year, a
poll showed that Russians listed Turkey as their country’s
third-greatest enemy after the U.S. and Ukraine.
The rapid rise of
anti-Turkish sentiment among Russians is not surprising given the
strength of the Kremlin’s state-controlled propaganda machine.
Almost immediately after the November incident, state TV started
broadcasting documentaries on the bloody Russo-Ottoman wars of
centuries past, and cautionary tales about the Turks’ historical
treachery.
Now, Erdoğan hopes
Putin’s messaging machine can spin in reverse — in order to
launch a new era of cooperation.
* * *
Key to this dramatic
turnaround of events is the worsening relationship between Turkey and
the U.S. in the aftermath of the abortive coup. A majority of Turkish
citizens believe that Fethullah Gülen, a U.S.-based Sunni cleric in
self-imposed exile, was behind the attempt.
Erdoğan’s
campaign to extradite Gülen to Turkey has been accompanied by
rampant anti-Americanism. Turkey’s pro-government media published
blatant conspiracy theories, even going as far as to accuse President
Obama of being the coup’s mastermind.
Erdoğan has also
been unhappy about what he sees as tepid support from the U.S. and
the E.U. following the coup. During Tuesday’s press conference, he
emphasized his gratitude to Putin for being the first leader to call
him. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu earlier thanked
Moscow, noting that Ankara had received “unconditional” support
from Russia — “unlike other countries.”
This is not the
first time Ankara has turned to Moscow to hedge against a potential
fallout with Washington. In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson threatened Turkey
against a military intervention in Cyprus, and Ankara quickly
approached the Soviet Union.
The subsequent
Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1967 paved the way
for robust bilateral cooperation that led to Russian investments in
steel and aluminum plants and an oil refinery in Turkey. The
cooperation, however, remained limited to economic issues, as Ankara
continued to play a crucial role in NATO missions around the world.
Erdoğan’s current
dialogue with Moscow is similarly economically focused, remaining
purposefully silent on the thornier issues of Syria, the Kurds and
Islamist terror.
Overall, the Turkish
president’s major concession to Putin seems to be the provision of
“strategic investment” status to the Russian nuclear project in
Akkuyu and the decision to revive the Turkish Stream gas pipeline
along with a vague reference to defense cooperation.
In St. Petersburg,
Putin seemed cautious and reserved while Erdoğan appeared
enthusiastic.
Previous rumors of
Russian-Turkish defense cooperation included procurement of air
defense systems and a Russian presence at Turkey’s İncirlik air
base. Still, issues of NATO interoperability and lack of consensus on
the Syria question will likely stifle such developments.
* * *
The last time
Erdoğan reached out so warmly to Putin was in November 2013, also in
St. Petersburg. Erdoğan was growing frustrated with the slow-moving
and demanding EU accession process, and appealed to Putin to allow
Turkey into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
It was exactly two
years after that appeal that Turkey downed the Russian jet, leading
to a seven-month crisis in bilateral ties. It is therefore no wonder
that in St. Petersburg, Putin seemed cautious and reserved while
Erdoğan appeared enthusiastic.
Putin is keenly
aware of Erdoğan’s economic, political and psychological
desperation. Having learned his lesson with the Turkish president,
the Russian leader will undoubtedly proceed with caution. He will,
however, also be keen to exploit the opportunity presented by an
anxious Erdoğan.
Russia’s president
knows that getting his Turkish counterpart to pivot to Moscow on
geopolitics and economics will go a long way towards undermining the
E.U. and NATO. Turkey, after all, can be of greater service to Putin
as a rogue NATO ally than a Russian satellite.
Aykan Erdemir is a
former member of the Turkish parliament, and a senior fellow at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Boris Zilberman is the deputy
director of congressional relations.
Authors:
Aykan Erdemir and
Boris Zilberman
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