Visa liberalisation
Europe’s
murky deal with Turkey
The
EU is gambling its reputation to secure its borders
May 28th 2016 |
BRUSSELS AND ISTANBUL
IT WAS meant to be a
game-changer. When a deal between the European Union and Turkey was
struck in March with the aim of limiting the numbers of
asylum-seekers coming to Europe, many in Brussels felt cautiously
optimistic. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, claimed it offered
a “sustainable, pan-European solution”. In exchange for visa-free
travel for some of its citizens, €6 billion ($7 billion) in refugee
aid and revived talks on possible future accession to the EU, Turkey
was to take back migrants who had made their way to Greece and try to
secure its borders. Faced with perhaps another million refugees
making their way to Europe this year, it appeared to be the only way
to bring some order to the chaos.
The number of
refugees coming to Europe has indeed dropped (see chart). Yet the
agreement is looking more and more murky. It risks undermining both
the reputation of the EU and its relationship with Turkey, from whose
shores hundreds of thousands of refugees set off last year on their
journey to Europe.
Since the agreement
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, has become even more
openly and arrogantly autocratic, as if to show that he can flout
European norms with impunity. On May 22nd he replaced the prime
minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who was the engineer of the migrant deal,
with a loyalist, Binali Yildirim. The ousting was as smooth as it was
ruthless. Save for a few vague references to party unity, no one in
the ruling Justice and Development party bothered to offer a reason
for Mr Davutoglu’s departure.
Mr Yildirim pledged
to enshrine Mr Erdogan’s status as the party’s leader and
executive president. Two days earlier Turkey’s parliament lifted
the immunity of its members, opening the way for 50 of 59 MPs from
the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party to face prosecution,
mostly on spurious terror charges. Mr Erdogan accuses them of
peddling propaganda for the Kurdistan Workers Party, an outlawed
militia—an accusation they strenuously deny.
Mr Erdogan has also
clamped down more forcefully on the press and potential dissidents.
According to a report in May, nearly 900 Turkish journalists have
lost their jobs in the first four months of the year, and 33 were
detained. Prosecutors have opened more than 1,800 cases against
people suspected of insulting Mr Erdogan since he was elected
president in 2014. His reach even extends beyond Turkey. In April he
exploited a German prohibition on insulting foreign heads of state to
demand that Jan Böhmermann, a comedian, be prosecuted for reading a
satirical poem on television that depicted Mr Erdogan in various
obscene acts.
All this has spooked
officials in Brussels. On May 23rd Mrs Merkel admitted that visa-free
travel would not happen by July, as had been agreed on (somewhat
unrealistically) in March. Turkey still needs to meet the EU’s
final seven conditions (out of 72). These include issuing biometric
passports; cracking down on corruption; becoming more co-operative
with extradition requests; and, most controversially, narrowing the
broad anti-terror laws it has used to harass journalists, academics
and politicians. The EU’s Council of Ministers is developing new
rules that would make it easier for Europe to suspend visa
liberalisation for six months, or rescind it altogether, if
circumstances change. Such contortions may make visa-free travel more
politically palatable to Europeans wary of illegal immigration from
Turkey. But they also make the deal look cynical.
The problem, says
Marc Pierini of Carnegie Europe, a Brussels think-tank, is that the
issues of visa liberalisation, EU accession and immigration should
not have been mixed up in the first place. Turkey has been seeking
visa-free travel for years. Including it in the refugee deal makes it
a reward for doing Europe’s dirty work, rather than a way of
granting Turkey more equal footing with the EU. The deal also gives
Mr Erdogan a bargaining chip: if no visa-free travel is forthcoming,
he could let refugees through to Europe once more. Even a few
thousand would cause chaos: Greece is still overwhelmed by the 50,000
refugees stuck there since March.
If visa
liberalisation does go ahead, Europe could lose much of its leverage
over Turkey. “Europeans overstate the attraction of what they are
offering,” says Hugh Pope of the International Crisis Group, an
NGO. The idea of accession is less of a draw than it was in the
mid-2000s, when Turkey was pushing through reforms. Support for the
EU has increased: according to one poll 62% of Turks want to join the
EU, up from 42% in 2015. But nearly seven out of ten believe Turkey
will never be allowed in.
Most damaging,
European leaders seem to be lowering standards in order to make the
deal work. Few spoke out when the offices of Zaman, a formerly
critical newspaper, were seized by the government in March. Other
abuses, including the shelling of residential neighbourhoods during
clashes with Kurdish insurgents, have been raised only hesitantly.
If visa
liberalisation is granted after Turkey merely tweaks its laws, that
would further undermine the EU. Many in Brussels are unhappy that it
has sacrificed its principles to such an extent, says Marietje
Schaake, a Dutch MEP. It sends the message that “if we need you
badly enough, then everything can be talked about”. Yet it is not
clear the EU can get a better deal. The message this one sends may be
accurate.
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário