terça-feira, 9 de junho de 2026

AfD, Vox mingle with ex-US Border Patrol chief, white nationalist leader at ‘remigration summit’

 


AfD, Vox mingle with ex-US Border Patrol chief, white nationalist leader at ‘remigration summit’ 

Gregory Bovino and Jared Taylor flew in to support activists once deemed too toxic even by European far-right parties.

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The United States’ former Border Patrol chief Gregory Bovino was a VIP guest at the tightly controlled event that also included elected officials from Spain's Vox and Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD). | Marion Solletty/POLITICO

May 31, 2026 10:36 am CET

By Marion Solletty

https://www.politico.eu/article/afd-vox-mingle-with-ex-us-border-patrol-chief-white-nationalist-leader-at-remigration-summit/

 

PORTO, Portugal — European far-right activists who advocate the mass deportation of immigrants and their descendants are getting a boost from the Trump administration’s embrace of their key catchword: remigration.

Some 500 activists and influencers gathered south of Porto on Saturday to discuss the concept, once a fringe term only whispered in far-right circles. The United States’ former Border Patrol chief Gregory Bovino and American white nationalist Jared Taylor were VIP guests at the tightly controlled event, which also included elected officials from Spain’s Vox and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) parties.

Other leading European far-right parties, most prominently France’s National Rally, have avoided the term or rejected the policy as too extreme because it targets migrants based on their ethnicity or religion. But U.S. President Donald Trump’s use of the word and the American State Department’s pledge to create an office for remigration put wind in the sails of longtime advocates of the policy in Europe.

“When the word is acknowledged by the president of a major power … one can no longer say that it is marginal,” Jean-Yves Le Gallou, a former MEP for the French far right under Jean-Marie Le Pen, said at Saturday’s summit.

The gathering took place in the coastal city of Figueira da Foz, 135 kilometers south of Porto, and welcomed activists from all over Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

“I am very happy to come over and lend some expertise to the Europeans” to tackle “illegal aliens destroying European culture,” said Bovino at an impromptu press conference at the gate.

In an interview with a far-right website ahead of the summit, Bovino — who didn’t wear his controversial coat — referenced Nazi Germany’s lead general Erwin Rommel as an inspirational figure and offered his help to end what he described as a “creeping horror,” echoing racist terms used by far-right extremists to describe migrants.

“If there is inspiration gained from the U.S. Border Patrol model and method, then fantastic,” added the former Border Patrol chief, who was dismissed from his position after agents under his command killed a 37-year-old nurse in Minneapolis.

Sellner’s moment

The Porto summit was co-organized by Austrian far-right activist Martin Sellner, who first came into the spotlight in 2024 after holding a secretive meeting in Potsdam, Germany, where he discussed the remigration concept with AfD politicians. News of the Potsdam gathering triggered large-scale protests in Germany at the time, with many pointing to parallels with early

plans for the mass deportation of Jews during World War II.

Martin Sellner speaks during a protest in Vienna on April 13, 2019. | Michael Gruber/Getty Images

Two years later, a confident Sellner made himself available to journalists for interviews at the remigration summit, dwelling on concepts that he says are now going mainstream.

“We have a very neurotic relationship to our own ethnicity, our own ethno-cultural identity and I think we need to overcome that,” Sellner told reporters at the summit, calling on Europeans to overcome their “guilt complex” and “self-loathing” stemming from “post-war consensus.”

At least three AfD politicians attended the event, including Kay Gottschalk, a member of the Bundestag and one of the party’s cofounders. Gottschalk said he was there “to listen” as “a visitor.” Lena Kotré, an AfD member and representative in the Brandenburg state legislature, spoke on stage. Sven Tritschler, a member of the North Rhine-Westphalia parliament, also was in attendance.

Vox MPs Rocío de Meer and Carlos Quero featured on the summit’s speakers list. Activist Sammy Woodhouse, a supporter of U.K. right-wing party Restore Britain, was also among the speakers.

Tensions emerged when reporters who had been accredited to cover the event were not allowed in and instead were confined to the parking lot. At one point, a drone buzzed over the press pack making repeated, aggressive moves toward a female journalist there.

Queuing for selfies

By contrast, multiple right-wing influencers equipped with high-tech gear were welcomed inside, with the summit’s social media channels boasting “enormous” interest partly thanks to Bovino’s presence.

Among the speakers were Dries Van Langenhove, a former Belgian MP twice convicted for hate speech, and far-right Dutch activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek, a promoter of the so-called great replacement conspiracy theory, according to which mainstream and political elites are conspiring to bring in large numbers of non-white migrants to replace white populations. The theory was referenced in the event’s promotional material.

Far-right Dutch activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek was among the speakers at the summit. | Marion Solletty/POLITICO

Attendees also queued to take selfies with Taylor, the U.S. white nationalist who is a high-profile promoter of racialist ideology. “The United States influences Europe more than the other way around,” Taylor said outside the venue. “But among dissidents and identitarians, at least, there is a great deal of interest in Europe.”

Organizers and speakers whom POLITICO talked to at the venue all denied the accusations of racism that hang over the movement.

“I don’t consider myself a hateful person,” said Canadian activist Daniel Tyrie, who was on one of the panels. “I don’t go around spitting on people of color because they’re in my country.”

“I just don’t think they belong here.”

 

Remigration: The Rise of a Fringe Idea into the Political Mainstream

 


Report

January 20, 2026

https://www.csohate.org/2026/01/20/remigration/

 

Remigration: The Rise of a Fringe Idea into the Political Mainstream

 

This report traces how “remigration” evolved from a fringe far-right concept into mainstream political discourse, mapping its spread across Europe and the US (2010–2025).

 

Introduction

Once a word that commonly referred to the return migration of individuals to their countries of origin, “remigration” has been redefined and politically weaponized to advance an ethnonationalist agenda. On November 28, 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security posted on X, “The stakes have never been higher, and the goal has never been more clear: Remigration now.” Earlier in the day, President Donald Trump had likewise included the phrase “REVERSE MIGRATION” in a post on Truth Social. These two posts, published only hours apart,v signify the growing popularity of the term “remigration” and its associated policy proposals.

 

The concept of remigration originates from French author Renaud Camus, who also infamously coined the Great Replacement theory — a population replacement conspiracy which alleges that leftist politicians and the “globalist” elite are deliberately undermining birth rates in Western countries through increased non-white immigration levels in order to tip the demographic balance. Remigration, in parallel, refers to the mass deportation of non-white immigrants, regardless of their citizenship status. The phrase has become the latest call to action, viewed as a solution to the alleged denigrating effects of the Great Replacement. For the far-right, the Great Replacement is considered the diagnosis for society, while remigration is the prognosis.

 

The term was quickly adopted by European far-right activists, specifically the pan-European Identitarian Movement, inspired by Camus’ writings during the 2010s. De facto Identitarian Movement leader Martin Sellner, author of the book Remigration: A Proposal, describes the enactment of a remigration agenda in Europe targeting migrants categorized into three different groups: illegal migrants (including applicants under the asylum process and temporary protection status); legal non-citizen migrants who hold a residence permit and/or work visa (but are considered “an economic, criminal, or cultural burden”); and “non-assimilated” migrants who have obtained citizenship (and are seen as “maintaining loyalty to foreign nations or radical religions,” i.e., Muslim-majority countries and Islam, respectively). Sellner proposes a centralized “assimilation monitor” database that includes details of migration backgrounds, crime rates, and social welfare benefits claims.

 

The remigration procedure is divided into three corresponding phases, tailored toward each target group. The first phase, occurring over a period of five years, calls for an immediate end to the asylum system and comprises strict border security measures, the repatriation of “illegal” migrants, political pressure on countries of origin, and the creation of “remigration cities” in North Africa to relocate asylum seekers. The second phase, spanning 10 years, focuses on immigration reform, including the termination of naturalization, a stringent review of visa holders, and the enforcement of a quota system. Taking place over the span of about thirty years, the third and final phase aims to secure long-term restoration of national and European pride and the reversal of the Great Replacement, including efforts towards “de-Islamization” (e.g., bans on minarets and the cessation of the foreign financing of mosques), and implementing return programs that offer migrants financial incentives for repatriation as well as the establishment of “remigration centers.”

 

A once obscure concept, remigration has quickly gained traction in European — and, more recently, American — far-right circles, although its target groups and phases of adoption vary across these contexts. Nonetheless, the concept of remigration has become increasingly salient, particularly as a catch-all term signifying support for mass deportation, repatriation, and forced emigration. Remigration began appearing online in the 2010s but did not gain popularity until 2023–2024, subsequently reaching widespread visibility in 2025.

 

In 2025, remigration gained momentum within both grassroots and formal political arenas. The former is suitably encapsulated by the Remigration Summit held in Italy in May, featuring far-right activists and politicians attending from Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, France, Ireland, the U.K., and the U.S. In September, the Unite the Kingdom rally in London (which became an impromptu memorialization of the recently assassinated Turning Point USA founder Charlie Kirk), leveraged longstanding anti-immigrant rhetoric by displaying calls for remigration among attendees.

 

Remigration as a policy has also been backed by far-right parties across Europe in recent electoral campaigns. Notable examples include its embrace by the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in September 2024, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the German election in February 2025, and the Forum for Democracy (FvD) and Conservative Liberals (JA21) in the October 2025 Dutch elections. Remigration is additionally supported by Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) in Belgium, League (Lega) in Italy, Vox in Spain, Alternative for Sweden (AfS) in Sweden, Finns Party in Finland, and Reconquest (Reconquête) in France. The euphemistic nature of the term has allowed it to be taken up more freely by these political parties, especially in Germany and Austria, where there is a strong association of the term “mass deportation” with the Holocaust. Crucially, these political parties lend normalcy to the concept and the proposed enactment of remigration in their manifestos, which is then legitimized by the democratic electoral process.

 

In the U.S., the Trump administration has likewise embraced a remigration agenda in both foreign and domestic policy by expanding the capacities of the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security. The swift institutional capture of a far-right idea with European origin signifies the development of a truly transnational movement rooted in shared anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian principles.

 

Against this backdrop, this report traces how the term remigration first appeared online in 2010 and rose in prominence over the subsequent fifteen years before gaining mainstream visibility in 2025. This analysis draws on a social listening tool to provide an overview of online posts mentioning remigration and the narratives driving engagement around the term. We observed that X (formerly Twitter) emerged early as the dominant platform for social media conversations about remigration. The platform’s affordances — e.g., algorithmic amplification, quote-tweeting, trending topics, and public engagement metrics — promote a performative environment in which content that generates outrage and public signaling is rewarded. Mentions of remigration often include sensationalist or fear-mongering discourse that creates a sense of urgency, frequently amplified by high-profile accounts on the platform.

 

We then compare these insights with a purposive sample of key Telegram accounts that align with the most influential accounts on X posting about remigration. In contrast, Telegram provides encrypted or semi-encrypted channels, asymmetrical broadcast structures (from administrators to followers), and minimal moderation, resulting in tightly curated ideological micro-publics. These differences in platform architecture influence not only the circulation of narratives but also the extent to which far-right actors strategically adapt their messaging to align with specific platform vernaculars. Through this cross-platform comparison, we demonstrate that Telegram operates as a medium to test the saliency of concepts like remigration, whereas X serves a strategic role in building broad support for the term across audiences in Europe and the U.S.

 

Key Findings

Remigration narratives portray Muslim migrants as a demographic threat to white European societies, framing them as incompatible with Western culture and values. These narratives link Muslim migration to fears of “Islamization” and Islamist terrorism, promoting moral panics about an existential threat to Europe.

Interpretations of remigration have evolved to adapt to different geographical contexts, especially from Europe to the U.S. where remigration is most often directed towards (particularly undocumented) migrants and used as justification for ongoing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deportation efforts. The transnational architecture of social media has made the exchange of ideas around remigration highly visible and rapidly scalable.

Mentions of remigration first began appearing online in 2010, with Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders an early adopter in 2012. It did not receive significant traction until 2016, coinciding with the emergence of ISIS and the refugee crisis in Europe. Thereafter, there were 32,000 mentions of remigration from 2016 to 2022 on X.

Between 2023 and 2025, the volume of posts referring to remigration significantly increased, with the largest surge in activity occurring between September 2024 and December 2025, with 498,000 mentions originating from 198,000 unique authors on X.

The first major spike in mentions of remigration since the term first appeared online occurred in October 2023, with 13,000 total mentions originating from 9,822 unique authors on X. This can be attributed to two separate incidents: a viral tweet claiming that Sweden was building “re-migration centers across the country”; and high-profile accounts posting in support of a staged demonstration by Identitarian Movement activists outside the European Parliament calling for remigration.

2024 witnessed a dramatic surge in online activity referring to remigration, with 467,000 total mentions originating from 133,000 unique authors. The term’s virality peaked in 2024 from September to October, with the largest volume of posts correlating with the Austrian Freedom Party’s (FPÖ) election victory.

In 2025, remigration gained mainstream visibility. Throughout the year, it had received 952,000 total mentions originating from 303,000 unique authors. The biggest spikes in mentions occurred in three waves: January to February (43,000 mentions), September to October (243,000 mentions), and late November to December 2025 (172,000 mentions).

The highest number of online mentions of remigration ever recorded occurred in the week of September 1-8, 2025, totaling over 71,000. This surge in overall volume of content can be attributed to a few high-profile figures posting in succession on the same day: X CEO Elon Musk, Dutch far-right activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek, and Flemish far-right activist and former Vlaams Belang politician Dries Van Langenhove. Their viral posts collectively promoted the idea that the public sphere is dangerously overrun by violent “foreigners” committing crimes against the white majority population, and remigration is a necessity for public safety.

 

Methodology

The report uses a mixed-methods approach to content analysis to examine how the term remigration has evolved over time. We examine the use and amplification of the term across online sources from 2010 to 2025 using a social listening tool, drawing on purposive sampling from X (Twitter) and Telegram. Data was collected using a keyword-based query that captured explicit mentions of remigration as well as related framing keywords. The following keyword search was used to identify narrative trends and patterns associated with remigration:

 

( “remigration” | “re migration” | “re-migration” | “reimmigration” | “re-immigration” | “remigrations” | “re-migrations” | “remigrate” | “remigrieren” | “remigratie” | “total remigration” | “mass remigration” | “forced remigration”) + (“great replacement” | “replacement” | “population replacement” | “illegal” | “illegal migrant” | “illegal migrants” | “non-assimilated” | “asylum seekers” | “migrants” | “non-white migrants” | “mass migration” | “invasion” | “naturalization” | “naturalized” | “delinquent” | “criminal foreigners” | “foreign offenders” | “imported crime” | “rape” | “Islam” | “Islamization” | “de-Islamization” | “Deislamisierung” | “no go zone” | “summer, sun and reimmigration” | “deportation airline” | “migrant flights” | “deport” | “deportation” | “repatriation” | “reverse migration” | “European again” | “eliminate multiculturalism” | “Save America” | “Save Europe” | “Save Germany” | “Make Europe Great Again” | “Office of Remigration” | “re-immigration ministry” | “Vision remigration” | “Junge Tat” | “Globalist agenda” | “AfD” | “Identitäre Bewegung” | “Action Radar Europe” | “generation remigration” | “refugee resettlement” | “reconquest” | “Reconquista” | “ethnic cleansing” | “white genocide” | “Boer lives matter”)

 

Although non-English translations of remigration (e.g., the German “remigrieren” and the Dutch “remigratie”) were included, we found that an overwhelming majority of posts consistently used the English term remigration. Based on our analysis, we interpret this choice to be a deliberate strategy to mainstream the term across diverse linguistic contexts, as discussed in our findings below.

 

Quantitative data were examined from 2010 onwards, marking the earliest appearance of the term remigration in the dataset. Aside from several noteworthy social media mentions between 2016 to 2022, the term became more prominent from 2023 to 2025. Observed spikes were analysed in-depth to assess discourse formation and amplification dynamics. To complement these findings on X, we conducted a qualitative analysis of six public Telegram accounts associated with far-right and Identitarian actors, each featured as the top accounts by engagement on X posting about remigration. To conduct a cross-platform analysis, a custom Python scraper using the Telegram API was used to collect posts from each channel, from the earliest available to the most recent (as of November 30, 2025). The dataset was then filtered by time frame and manually coded using the same keyword-based query.

 

Our aim was to examine narrative shifts within each Telegram channel, including frequently used keywords used in conjunction with remigration, as well as how Telegram posts correlated with spikes in activity on X. This type of cross-platform comparison of selected accounts provides key insights, which are discussed below. Our approach ensured analytical consistency across platforms, providing insight into how different platforms, in this case, Telegram and X, contribute to the framing of remigration over the period under analysis.

 

Analysis

EARLY PHASES OF ADOPTION (2010-2022)

 

The term remigration first began appearing online in the early 2010s in websites and chat forums, although its use was extremely rare and not yet clearly linked to the Identitarian movement, which promotes a far-right ideology rooted in ethnonationalism that frames immigration as an existential threat to European cultural and demographic identity. The initial concept of remigration was developed after the publication of Renaud Camus’ book Le Grand Remplacement (The Great Replacement) in 2011, which continues to be a central guiding text for the Identitarians.

 

One of the earliest proponents of remigration was Dutch far-right politician and leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders, whose 2012–2017 election manifesto included the statement: “Daarom moeten we stoppen met de immigratie van mensen uit islamitische landen. Remigratie is een schone zaak” (That’s why we must stop the immigration of people from Islamic countries. Remigration is a clean business). Soon thereafter, the term began to circulate in Dutch-language counter-jihad chat forums in the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as in right-wing alternative media op-eds and the comment sections of online newspaper articles, with this usage continuing into the mid-2010s.

 

In 2014, social media posts containing the term remigration began to emerge, although they were extremely limited in number and reach.

 

That same year, the leading American conservative outlet National Review notably reported on an anti-immigrant protest in Paris — attended by Camus himself — which featured signs that read “Immigration — Islamisation, Demain la Remigration!” (“Immigration — Islamization, Tomorrow the Remigration!”).

 

Only a few weeks later, the Lyon branch of the Identitarian Movement in France organized a social gathering featuring a self-defense workshop that aimed to train women and men to protect themselves from Muslim male migrants. The event was shared online by supporters, including on the world’s largest neo-Nazi internet forum Stormfront in a post on the Croatia subforum that expressed admiration for the Identitarians’ strategy to push for greater visibility of remigration. The uptake of the term within street demonstrations was also documented in the Netherlands, where the neo-Nazi Dutch People’s Union (NVU) party marched with banners that read “Nederland is overvol, geen immigratie maar remigratie” (The Netherlands is overcrowded, no immigration but remigration).

 

Throughout 2015 and 2016, the rise of ISIS and ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks coincided with the refugee crisis in Europe, creating conditions in which the idea of remigration began to gain momentum. In March 2015, the Belgian far-right Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) party pioneered a so-called “remigration campaign” 20 targeting “radical” Muslims by offering ten one-way plane tickets for “those who yearn for the Islamic caliphate.”

 

Remigration began circulating more visibly on Twitter in 2016 and 2017, with posts originating from bot accounts that promoted narratives linking Muslim migrants with “Islamization” and calling for their remigration. During this critical period, the term became closely associated with perceptions of Muslim migrants as a demographic threat to white European societies, framed as fundamentally incompatible with Western culture and values.

 

 

The term also circulated across North America during this period. In a notable offline incident, the far-right group Atalante Quebec displayed banners bearing “#remigration” at several sites housing asylum seekers across Quebec City and Montreal in August 2017. Around the same time, prominent American white supremacist and alt-right movement leader Richard Spencer posted that “remigration is possible” in response to a news article reporting that Germany was offering financial incentives for migrants to return to their countries of origin.

 

Although mentions of remigration had been increasing gradually since 2016, the term remained relatively dormant until small spikes in activity in March and June 2018. These increases coincided with court trials related to the ongoing “grooming gangs” scandal in the U.K., which had drawn heightened attention from far-right groups. Narratives portraying British Pakistani men as perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation — primarily targeting young white British girls — circulated widely, framing Muslim men as rapists and criminals. Such discourse reinforced pre-existing Great Replacement narratives that represent Muslim and non-white migrants as hypersexualized, violent, and predatory. These characterizations would later shape discussions of remigration in relation to grooming gangs.

 

A key figure in debates surrounding remigration, Martin Sellner, posted the term on Telegram for the first time in 2018, writing:

 

“So after destroying communities through mass immigration and multiculturalism, which in turn acted as a breeding ground for terrorism, it is now these same, broken communities that are supposed to be able to stop it? #Remigration defeats Terrorism!” (Telegram, November 16, 2018)

 

At this point, the discourse reflects the adoption of securitized framing in which Muslim migrants are associated not only with demographic anxieties and conspiratorial messaging of “Islamization,” but also with the perceived threat of Islamist terrorism. In the wake of several ISIS-inspired attacks in Europe since 2015, ascribing such incidents as preventable risks to public safety acted as a mechanism of legitimacy while simultaneously promoting anti-Muslim hostility and stigmatization.

 

Meanwhile, a number of reactionary far-right political parties emerged in Europe in 2018, with stated opposition to Islam and immigration. This wave of newly founded or reformed parties quickly seized on the concerns of voters disaffected with the political establishment and claimed issue ownership on both immigration and integration. While remigration had not yet been widely incorporated into policy proposals, broader socio-cultural conditions and years of far-right digital activism laid the groundwork for its eventual adoption.

 

Later in 2019, one week after the Christchurch terrorist attack, the Identitarian Movement — whose ideology had influenced the shooter — held a demonstration protesting the Great Replacement and calling for remigration.

 

Despite efforts to distance itself from the Christchurch shooter, whose manifesto was titled “The Great Replacement,” as well as proclaiming that the organization “reject[s] any form of political violence or terrorism,” the Great Replacement theory had been circulating widely among far-right networks, largely due to the Identitarian Movement’s activism. The group subsequently shifted its focus to promoting remigration as a solution to the Great Replacement, framing it as a fully legal approach. By arguing that remigration could be achieved through nations’ exercise of sovereignty over their borders, the Identitarian Movement reframed the concept as a moderate and pragmatic proposal grounded in legal enforcement, obscuring its conspiratorial foundations.

 

From 2019 to 2022, mentions of remigration remained minimal, though relatively consistent. Usage of the term was primarily amplified by far-right accounts across Europe and the U.K., such as posts by Dutch PVV party leader Geert Wilders and the British Homeland Party, as well as several anonymous propaganda bot accounts.

 

Narratives associated with remigration continued to promote moral panics centered on defending Europe against the purported existential threat of Islam, which is presented as an “imported” problem resulting from migration. Similarly, discourse surrounding the grooming gangs scandal in the U.K. persistently misrepresented perpetrators as “Islamic child groomers,” thereby conflating pedophilic behavior with religious practices. Together, these fear-mongering narratives equate male migrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia with the imminent dangers of Islamist extremism, sexual and physical violence, and organized crime.

 

Significantly, in the run up to the French presidential election in April 2022, Éric Zemmour —  candidate and founding leader of the far-right Reconquest (Reconquête) party — proposed a Ministry of Remigration with the aim to repatriate at least 100,000 “unwanted foreigners” annually.

 

 

This marked the first time a political party officially adopted remigration as a policy while proposing a dedicated government agency to implement it. The party’s name itself invokes the historical Reconquista, the period of Christian campaigns against Muslim rule on the Iberian Peninsula. A longtime proponent of the Great Replacement theory, Zemmour warned that “France will be a Muslim country by 2060” if current migration levels continued. While Zemmour ultimately lost the presidential bid, his proposal established the template for institutionalizing remigration through dedicated government infrastructure.

 

RISE IN POPULARITY (2023-2024)

The first major spike in mentions of remigration since the term first appeared online occurred in October 2023, with 13,000 total mentions originating from 9,822 unique authors on X. This surge can be attributed to two key events: first, a viral but unsubstantiated tweet by Swedish far-right journalist Peter Imanuelsen, an early proponent of remigration since 2018, claiming that Sweden was building “re-migration centers across the country”; and second, positive reactions from high-profile accounts to a staged demonstration by Identitarian activists outside the European Parliament in Brussels, who called for “Remigration Now. Deport Terrorists.”

 

The discourse surrounding remigration reinforces the portrayal of migrants as criminals and terrorists deliberately seeking to “invade” Europe and “import conflict” from their countries of origin. Migrants from Muslim-majority countries are depicted as fundamentally incompatible with Western culture and societies due to alleged non-assimilationist behaviors and are framed as an imminent security threat of Islamist terrorism. Subsequently, Identitarian activists consistently blame the European Union for creating permissive immigration policies that prevent individual nation-states from exercising control over their borders due to the Schengen agreements.

 

That same October, pseudo-intellectual magazine The American Conservative published an article on “re-immigration” aspirations in Europe, introducing the concept to its U.S.-based audience. The article compares both the United States and Europe as facing “massive invasions by immigrants,” though it distinguishes between the two contexts. In the American case, immigrants were described as Christian, Latin American refugees from socialist countries with the potential to assimilate. In contrast, the article described “Moslems pouring across the Mediterranean into Europe” who are allegedly commanded by a religion that prohibits acculturation. “Re-immigration” is thus heralded as a solution promoted by European right-wing parties to “preserve European civilization” from “invaders.”

 

Overall, discourse about remigration in 2023 remained largely confined to far-right activists in Europe who promoted the concept in tandem with calls for urgency to end the Great Replacement and secure borders. However, the platform environment had shifted significantly. Following Musk’s acquisition and rebranding of Twitter to X at the end of 2022, content moderation weakened under the banner of “free speech,” while previously banned figures such as Martin Sellner returned to the platform. Coupled with algorithmic changes that amplified hateful and sensationalist content, these conditions resulted in the perfect storm for fear-driven messaging.

 

By comparison, 2024 witnessed a dramatic surge in online activity referring to remigration, with 467,000 total mentions originating from 133,000 unique authors.

 

A spike occurred in January 2024, when protesters gathered across cities in Germany following the publication of an investigative report by media outlet Correctiv. The report revealed that members of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party’s Potsdam branch had secretly met with Identitarian Movement activists, including Martin Sellner, to discuss “remigration” plans to deport not only migrants but also German citizens with migrant backgrounds back to their ancestral countries. Despite widespread public backlash and the protests — some of which drew hundreds of thousands of participants — the AfD would eventually adopt remigration into its election manifesto for the 2025 federal election, likely emboldened by state-level election victories in September 2024.

 

During this period, we observed that transnational support for remigration began accelerating, indicated by increased posts from far-right political party, activist, and commentator accounts based in the U.K. and the U.S.

 

The same narratives expressing anti-migrant and anti-Muslim hostility pervaded. However, a subtle but significant shift emerged: the discourse increasingly focused on naturalized citizens of immigrant background, who were now also framed as threats. The notion of revoking citizenship based on ethnonationalist conceptions of loyalty not only establishes a dangerous precedent but also calls into question the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the rule of law.

 

A significant number of posts during this period also include the phrase “mass deportation(s),” which had not commonly appeared in conjunction with remigration in posts until 2024. The adoption and circulation of this phrase — given the association of mass deportations with the Holocaust — was initiated by prominent Anglosphere accounts before being embraced by European actors.

 

Our analysis reveals spikes in cross-posting about mass deportation between X and Telegram at key periods, namely, in January, May, and late September. Although these spikes do not always correlate across the platforms, it demonstrates that there a periods in which we see waves of similar activity. Thus, high-profile Telegram channels help drive the same conversation on X during spikes. Often, discourse begins to trend on Telegram prior to X. For instance, British far-right activist Tommy Robinson emerged as a key proponent of mass deportation, beginning to post the term on Telegram in 2022. Robinson singularly mentioned mass deportations 94 times between August 2024 and November 2025 on his channel. However, not until June 2025 did mass deportation reach widespread use with its articulation by President Trump in the context of ongoing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids in the United States.

 

In general, mentions of remigration remained consistent before increasing once again online during the Southport riots across the U.K. from late July to early August 2024. During the riots, European Identitarian activists promoted a campaign titled “European Lives Matter” alongside photos of the victims of the Southport attack, proclaiming that “remigration saves lives.” Rampant misinformation surrounding the attack, combined with escalating anti-immigrant sentiment, created a flashpoint for mobilization, with remigration serving as a rallying narrative. 

 

The term’s virality peaked in 2024 from September to October due to corresponding events. Most notably, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) secured victory in the national election while openly campaigning on a platform favoring remigration. The largest volume of posts in 2024 correlated with the FPÖ’s election victory at the end of September.

 

The Identitarian Movement branch in Austria attributed the election outcome to years of strategic engagement and building popular support for the party’s agenda:

 

💪The FPÖ’s election victory is the fulfillment of 5 years of education, action and resistance. All the patriots who spoke out, who took to the streets in the freezing cold against the corona dictatorship, have contributed to this.

 

 Street and parliament, party and movement have won. Austria must become the country of reconquista and remigration.” (Telegram, September 29, 2024)

 

The Identitarians’ strategy relied on metapolitical activism focused on shifting public attitudes over the long term by emphasizing salient social and cultural issues in the realm of digital activism. The concept of remigration had thus emerged from sustained grassroots mobilization into fruition within the formal political arena — a development the movement lauded as a success.

 

At this stage, remigration had become a transnational far-right phenomenon. Tommy Robinson generously used the term, cross-posting the same message on X and Telegram in support of FPÖ. Meanwhile, the far-right news aggregate website Visegrád 24 reported that Sweden was implementing a remigration policy, claiming that migrants would receive financial incentives for repatriation.

 

Only a couple of days after Visegrád 24 reported on news of the Swedish policy, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump and his political advisor Stephen Miller both posted their support for remigration in the run-up to the U.S. general election. Immigrants were positioned as unwelcome “invaders” intent on destroying the American cultural fabric of small, rural communities. Notably, mentions of Islam or Muslim migrants were omitted, indicating that remigration is a concept that can be recontextualized to fit differing interests and priorities. Within the MAGA movement, targets of remigration comprise broad groupings of immigrants who are collectively portrayed as a threat to white Americans. Thus, over the course of one year, the idea of remigration gained trans-Atlantic resonance, popularized through influential European and American figures. 

 

MAINSTREAM PROMINENCE (2025)

In 2025, remigration gained mainstream visibility. Throughout the year, it had received 952,000 total online mentions originating from 303,000 unique authors. Three key significant spikes in posting activity occurred throughout the year: January to February (43,000 mentions), September to October (243,000 mentions), and late November to December 2025 (172,000 mentions).

 

The German federal election on February 23, which resulted in a 20.8% vote share (the highest ever received) for the AfD, openly championing a remigration policy, accounts for the first spike, generating over 43,000 mentions. Social media posts celebrated AfD leader Alice Weidel’s openly stated commitment to close the country’s borders, restrict benefit claims for asylum seekers, and enact “mass remigration” efforts within the first 100 days in government. Video clips of the statements originated from the leader’s speech at the party conference in January, which marked the first time Weidel openly used the word “remigration” in public. Only a couple of days beforehand, Elon Musk livestreamed a chat with Weidel on X, using the social media platform to amplify the AfD’s message ahead of the election, including the narrative that Germany’s open borders allowed mass, uncontrolled migration into the country and the subsequent need for deportations.

 

Notably, we observed spikes in activity on Telegram channels prior to spikes in activity on X. For instance, Martin Sellner’s Telegram account mentioned remigration 24 times in early January, whereas a spike on X occurred in late January and early February. In the run-up to the German election, remigration became a mobilizing narrative on Telegram before it featured prominently on X. Thus, we contend that Telegram serves as a platform for in-group identity and community building in which mobilizing narratives are tested and reinforced among members of a channel with extremist views, whereas X is used for mainstreaming and achieving broader visibility aimed for public engagement. The strategic use of different platforms for cross-messaging relies on platform-specific affordances for ideological diffusion and engagement.

 

Between March and August 2025, mentions of remigration fluctuated between 5,000 to 16,000 posts monthly. Recurrent themes included depicting migrants as criminals or rapists, portraying Islam as an existential threat, and blaming politicians for enabling demographic destruction — collectively presenting a dystopic reality. By employing sensationalist tones and invoking moral panics, these posts by far-right activists and commentators call for urgent action in the form of remigration as a solution.

 

The descriptor “invasion” and its variant “invaders” were frequently employed across these posts, simultaneously dehumanizing migrants while invoking a sense of crisis. Within the United States, this discourse was appropriated to fixate on the constructed threat of rampant illegal immigration. In May, the Trump administration announced that the U.S. Department of State would create an ‘Office of Remigration,’ aimed at coordinating the return of non-citizens to their countries of origin. The proposed branch of the federal agency has yet to be fully implemented, but reflects a broader policy agenda of the administration that aligns with transnational European far-right interests, echoing Zemmour’s proposed Ministry of Remigration from three years earlier.

 

The second major spike in activity in 2025 occurred between September and October, with the highest number of mentions of remigration ever recorded in the week of September 1-8, totaling over 71,000. This surge in overall volume of content can be attributed to a few high-profile figures posting in succession on the same day: X CEO Elon Musk, Dutch far-right activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek, and Flemish far-right activist and former Vlaams Belang politician Dries Van Langenhove.

 

These viral posts share a common premise: that the public sphere is dangerous and fundamentally unsafe, allegedly overrun by violent “foreigners” intent on committing crimes against the white majority population. By constructing a narrative of collective victimhood rooted in fear, the posts deploy an emotional appeal that channels outrage and demands accountability. Within this framework, remigration is touted as a “logical” and necessary solution to perceived public safety threats.

 

Following this initial surge, the term remigration remained consistently high throughout the remainder of the year, at times exceeding 45,000 mentions in a single week. Peaks in activity corresponded with the widespread circulation of sensationalist stories involving young white European girls allegedly subjected to sexual assault or violence by migrant Muslim men. These incidents — frequently presented as “evidence” — are leveraged to justify conspiratorial narratives such as the Great Replacement and the notion of “cultural decay”—a phrase cross-posted by Eva Vlaardingerbroek on Telegram and X. While many of these posts originated from European-based accounts, they were amplified by high-profile American users, significantly generating visibility for the term and its associated discourse.

 

Notably, during this period, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security posted a single word on X: “Remigrate.”

 

Although largely unfamiliar to most viewers, posting about remigration served a dual purpose. First, it acted as a signaling mechanism to an online MAGA base already familiar with far-right discursive norms, reinforcing a shared in-group identity. Second, because the post originated from an official government agency account, it functioned to cultivate public support for the administration’s actions and to legitimize national security operations through institutional authority.

 

Within the U.S., mentions of remigration persisted throughout the off-year election period. As documented in our report on Islamophobic attacks and rhetoric targeting New York City mayoral-elect Zohran Mamdani, the term surfaced on X in calls for his deportation and denaturalization. These posts depicted Mamdani as a Muslim terrorist and portrayed him as a national security threat, deploying the language of counter-terrorism to justify his violent removal from the United States.

 

Toward the end of the year, a third spike emerged following November 26 in Washington D.C., in which an Afghan refugee wounded two National Guard soldiers, one of whom later died. Despite reporting that the perpetrator had previously served in a CIA-operated elite counter-terrorism unit and entered the U.S. through the Operation Allies Welcome resettlement program, President Trump and senior administration officials posted in open support of remigration in the immediate aftermath of the attack.

 

The administration moved swiftly, pausing issuance of visas for Afghan nationals, suspending decisions on pending asylum applications, and initiating a review of previously approved refugee status cases. These actions were legitimized through a remigration approach, framed not only as necessary national security measures, but as efforts to defend “Western civilization.” Within this discourse, primarily Muslim immigrants were constructed as fundamentally incompatible with American values, reinforcing civilizational binaries that cast migration as an existential threat.

 

Finally, the end of the year saw a renewed reinforcement of remigration messaging when the U.S. Department of Homeland Security posted on X: “All America wants for Christmas is remigration.” The post links to a government webpage containing information about the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Home Mobile App, which is targeted at undocumented migrants who can choose “voluntary self-departure.” The app is described by the DHS as “a historic opportunity for illegal aliens to receive cost-free travel, forgiveness of any failure to depart fines, and a $1,000 exit bonus to facilitate travel back to their home country or another country where they have lawful status.” Individuals who submit documentation through the app indicating intent to depart the U.S. are allegedly deprioritized by ICE for detention and removal prior to their scheduled departure.

 

The humorous tone of the post sanitizes a concept often interpreted as a form of ethnic cleansing, trivializing policies that result in the dehumanization and mass expulsion of migrants. Soon thereafter, the message solidified as a meme, with prominent Belgian far-right activist Dries Van Langenhove posting the same day: “All I want for Christmas is remigration.” Similarly, the men’s nationalist club Second Sons Canada held a demonstration in Ontario with a banner reading “All I want for Christmas is remigration” while chanting “Ho ho ho, they have to go.” This rapid uptake illustrates how state-issued messaging can be easily absorbed into — and amplified by — transnational far-right ecosystems, further blurring the line between official policy communication and extremist propaganda.

 

Once a fringe concept circulating primarily among European far-right activists, remigration had, by the end of 2025, reached peak popularity in the U.S. From there, the term was re-exported back into European far-right ecosystems, reshaped through new rhetorical forms and political contexts.

 

In 2024, online conversations surrounding remigration largely centered on political developments within Europe, including electoral outcomes such as the Austrian Freedom Party’s victory. Over the course of the year, the term gained traction within far-right networks, where its usage functioned as an ideological signal, indicating shared alignment and in-group belonging to the respective audience.

 

By contrast, remigration discourse in 2025 shifted away from country-specific European developments (with the exception of the German election) and instead toward a more generalized narrative structure. Posts increasingly relied on keywords commonly associated with remigration rhetoric, including “immigrants,” “invaders,” and “foreigners” to describe target groups, alongside terms such as “raped” and “victims” to relate high-profile allegations of sexualized violence. While anti-migrant and Islamophobic tropes have long circulated within far-right discourse, the uptake of “remigration” serves a symbolic purpose: consolidating these narratives into a singular call to action that can be readily applied across disparate national and political contexts.

 

Conclusion

This report documents the emergence and rapid rise in popularity of the term “remigration.” Originating among European far-right ideologues in the early 2010s, the concept gradually expanded into a transnational phenomenon over the course of the 2020s before reaching peak visibility in 2025.

 

Our analysis of online content spanning the past fifteen years demonstrates that the term’s proliferation is driven by recurring narratives that depict migrants as criminals or rapists, frame Islam as an existential threat, and portray political leaders as complicit in demographic destruction. These narratives tend to intensify during moments of political salience (e.g., AfD’s success in Germany) or following violent incidents in Europe or the United States (e.g., cases of alleged sexual assault). These incidents are presented as “evidence” to support conspiratorial claims such as the Great Replacement theory. Remigration is consequently heralded as a radical yet necessary policy response to thwart perceived Western civilizational collapse. The positioning of remigration within a national security framework further imbues the concept with a sense of urgency and institutional legitimacy.

 

As a euphemism, “remigration” connotes a fundamentally anti-democratic and dehumanizing worldview. While the term originally developed as an expression of anti-Muslim hostility — galvanized by decades of Islamophobic mobilization — it has since evolved and adapted to new contexts to serve as a flexible tool of weaponization against other marginalized groups.

 

In Europe and the U.K., the primary target out-group continues to be Muslims with migrant backgrounds. Although the targeted communities vary by country, they largely encompass populations from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, which are collectively conflated as an imminent threat of Islamist extremism, sexual and physical violence, and organized crime. In the U.S., by contrast, remigration is most often directed towards (particularly undocumented) migrants crossing the southern border — though this framing is not exclusive, as demonstrated by the response to the Afghan refugee incident. Within segments of the MAGA movement, especially among white nationalist adherents, any non-white migrant is considered validly exposed to remigration efforts. Despite these differing interpretations, political actors have increasingly weaponized the concept of remigration to advance policy agendas, often at the behest of a highly engaged grassroots base.

 

To date, remigration has primarily functioned as a central mobilizing narrative within far-right movements across the Global North. However, its adaptability suggests the potential to spread to the Global South as well. In parts of Southeast Asia, for example, exclusionary and dehumanizing rhetoric targeting Rohingya refugees continues to proliferate, creating fertile ground for remigration narratives. As this report demonstrates, the term’s malleability allows it to be easily recontextualized to suit new contexts. The transnational architecture of social media has made the exchange of ideas around remigration not only possible but highly visible and rapidly scalable.

 

Ultimately, this report serves as a case study in how a concept migrates from the margins to the mainstream. The concept of remigration may still be abstract to the general public, but its adoption and exponential embrace within political discourse is deeply concerning. The term’s uptake symbolizes an ascendent, globally connected far-right movement promoting an ethnonationalist vision that seeks to leverage the full power of the state in order to violently target and vilify migrants. Once a fringe concept, remigration has entered the highest levels of political office through deliberate strategies of repetition, institutional validation, and algorithmic amplification. Its ascent underscores the urgent need to scrutinize not only extremist actors, but the discursive pathways through which exclusionary ideas are rendered governable.

Reconquista (grupo extremista português) / Reconquista (Portuguese extremist group)

 


Reconquista (grupo extremista português)

História

Fundação

de 2023

 

Quadro profissional

Tipo

grupo de interesse
movimento político
organização

Domínio de atividade

grupo ativista

Sede social

Lisboa

País

 Portugal

 

Organização

Orientação política

nacionalismo étnico
tradicionalismo

Posicionamento político

extrema-direita

Website

www.recon.pt

editar - editar código-fonte - editar WikidataDocumentação da predefinição

Reconquista é um grupo ultranacionalistasupremacista e nacionalista branco português, fundado em junho de 2023 e liderado por Afonso Gonçalves e Alexandre Gazur. O grupo tem vindo a se destacar como um dos principais grupos militantes da extrema-direita em Portugal, em particular no discurso de ódio contra a imigração, de cariz marcadamente misóginohomofóbico e transfóbico.

Caracterização

O foco do grupo é a "retoma" de Portugal dos não-portugueses étnicos e a expulsão de estrangeiros, tomando o nome da Reconquista Cristã, termo usado para descrever a expulsão dos mouros da Península Ibérica, concluída com a conquista de Granada em 1492.[1]

O grupo tem sido descrito como ultranacionalista[2] e supremacista branco,[1] articulando-se frequentemente com o Grupo 1143, do neonazista Mário Machado, nos spaces do Twitter, espaços de debate em áudio daquela plataforma amplamente utilizados por ambos os grupos. A misoginia é uma das marcas mais distintivas deste grupo, que tem vindo com o tempo a explorar outras pautas, como a “ideologia de género”, focando-se posteriormente com maior intensidade na imigração. Segundo Gonçalves, o objetivo do Reconquista é “radicalizar a política em Portugal” e “formar a elite do futuro” de Portugal.[2]

Tanto o Reconquista como o Grupo 1143 têm Adolf Hitler como uma das suas inspirações, tendo Afonso Gonçalves feito um ensaio fotográfico com um bigode a imitar o ditador alemão e a legenda “Weimar conditions require Weimar solutions”, em referência ao período anterior à ascensão do Partido Nazi na Alemanha.[2]

Apesar de Gonçalves descrever o movimento como "sem qualquer filiação partidária", e por esse motivo sem enquadramento na extrema-direita,[3] é apoiante e participante ativo nas campanhas do partido Chega.[2] O grupo mantém uma relação próxima, embora por vezes conflituosa, com a Juventude Chega. Líderes da Juventude Chega têm mostrado apoio ao novo movimento, como o líder da Juventude Chega de Coimbra, João Antunes,[1] igualmente descrito como supremacista branco,[2] que twittou uma foto posando com Gonçalves com o texto “Reconstruir Portugal #Reconquista”. Também o líder da Juventude Chega do Porto, Francisco Araújo, usou o seu canal no Telegram para promover o próximo congresso e convencer o seu público a comprar ingressos para o evento. Outros membros da Juventude Chega têm participado de eventos no YouTube com Gonçalves, embora alguns tenham sido repelidos pela misoginia de Gazur e Gonçalves. João Antunes, que regularmente defende o alegado traficante humano Andrew Tate, escreveu em resposta a um vídeo publicado por Gazur de um personagem de jogos de vídeo que continuamente espanca uma personagem feminina que “isso não representa o meu tipo de direita”. Do mesmo modo, Antunes sentiu-se obrigado a defender as mulheres depois de Gonçalves afirmar que uma “mulher que não chega ao casamento virgem não tem valor como esposa”. Joana Pinto Azevedo, líder da Juventude Chega de Braga, denunciou publicamente Gonçalves pelos seus comentários nos quais defende a noção de que “mulheres não deveriam ter redes sociais nem votar”.[1]

Após as eleições legislativas de 2024, e da vitória alcançada com a eleição de 50 deputados do Chega, o Reconquista tem vindo a pressionar a radicalização do partido na área da imigração, usando como estratégia o termo "remigração", eufemismo para deportação em massa, nomeadamente de imigrantes não brancos e seus descendentes, ideia que tem vindo a ser difundida por membros da juventude do Chega nas redes sociais.[2][4]

Segundo o cientista político Vicente Valentim, autor do livro "O Fim da Vergonha", referindo-se a grupos como o Reconquista, é comum partidos políticos terem pessoas ou grupos para divulgar o discurso mais extremista, sem que estejam formalmente filiados, ou pertencendo a uma hierarquia mais baixa do partido, transmitindo de forma mais extremista o que a cúpula do partido diz de modo ambíguo.[2] Por outro lado, segundo o politólogo Riccardo Marchi, Afonso Gonçalves, tal como Mário Machado, por mais que discordem do Chega em relação à identidade nacional, viram no seu líder André Ventura “uma janela de oportunidade nunca vista em Portugal para fazer avançar um certo tipo de ideia”, apelando abertamente ao voto no Chega. Segundo Marchi, tais grupos não representam minimamente um perigo para ninguém e mesmo as tentativas iniciais de integrarem o Chega, por exemplo, foram travadas imediatamente pela própria direção do partido ainda em 2019. Já Heidi Beirich, investigadora e cofundadora do projeto GPHAE, afirma que os grupos apresentam riscos, o maior deles na forma de crimes de ódio e terrorismo, habitualmente dirigidos contra imigrantes e outras pessoas por eles visadas e humilhadas, podendo também ameaçar os Direitos Humanos em geral através da sua influência na política.[2]

Segundo Cátia Moreira de Carvalho, investigadora de extremismo e radicalização, os jovens em formação de personalidade são “mais predispostos” a aderirem a movimentos extremistas como o Reconquista, devido à perceção de ameaça e de ataque à identidade, tomando a equidade de género como ameaça à perceção de dominância do patriarcado, fazendo com que não se sintam confortáveis com estes novos papéis pouco definidos e pouco conformes aos seus padrões mentais. Moreira de Carvalho vê a situação como perigosa, especialmente para as mulheres, fazendo ressurgir na agenda política e no debate público temas que "há muito deviam estar arrumados numa gaveta e deviam ser consensuais na sociedade", questionando os direitos conquistados pelas mulheres a muito custo, com potencial de minar o futuro das mulheres mais jovens.[2]

O Reconquista, tal como o 1143, está na mira das autoridades portuguesas, tendo sido referenciado no Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna (RASI) 2023, no qual se diz que "foram criados projetos e organizações por jovens que estendem o alcance da mensagem extremista a uma nova geração com um perfil distinto […] e projetos com convergência ideológica com a extrema-direita mesmo que, por vezes, perpassem a sua versão clássica com ideias patriarcais e misóginas.”[2]

Fundadores e liderança

De acordo com o Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (GPAHE), que em outubro desse ano incluiu a organização no seu relatório sobre o ódio e grupos extremistas de extrema-direita em Portugal, Gonçalves "é um supremacista branco e misógino, que se apresenta como um líder autoritário", descrevendo-se a si próprio como transfóbicoultranacionalistaracista e xenófobo. Começou militando nas redes sociais em 2022, inspirado pela entrada de André Ventura no parlamento em 2019, estreando o canal de Telegram com um vídeo intitulado “o feminismo é uma doença”. Outra das suas primeiras publicações foi uma foto em que simulava dar uma bofetada na deputada Inês Sousa Real, do PAN.[2] Gonçalves é particularmente conhecido pela sua misoginia, assim como pelas suas críticas ao Sufrágio femininosexo casual e mulheres sentadas em público, referindo-se às mesmas como “prostitutas” e “baratas”. Gonçalves argumenta que mulheres que se divorciam não deveriam “ter direito a receber dinheiro/bens” dos maridos, e deveriam ser obrigadas a “pagar pelos danos causados à família”. Considera o aborto um crime contra a humanidade, pedindo que mulheres que realizem esse procedimento recebam a pena de morte. Segundo Gonçalves, “famílias não tradicionais” são uma “aberração”, “80% de todos os divórcios são iniciados por mulheres” e pessoas de ascendência africana estão criando uma “substituição populacional” de pessoas de ascendência europeia. Argumentou que “homens afro-americanos têm 12 vezes mais probabilidade de cometer assassinato do que homens brancos”.[2] Gonçalves afirmou que “a imigração brasileira e as suas consequências são a principal ameaça à sobrevivência de Portugal”, associando frequentemente as mulheres brasileiras à prostituição, assim como qualquer mulher que frequente um ginásio, use as redes sociais ou tenha qualquer opinião.[2] O caráter extremo dos seus preconceitos levou o Twitter a suspender tanto a sua conta principal quanto a secundária, por “comportamento abusivo”, tendo já sido, desde então, restituída.[1][5][6]

O outro membro fundador, Alexandre Lima Gazur, engenheiro informático[2] natural de Viseu, é um YouTuber de extrema-direita, funcionando como coorganizador e promotor dos protestos da Reconquista. É militante do Chega, tendo servido como delegado na 5.ª Convenção Nacional do partido, realizada na sua cidade natal. É conhecido por seu antissemitismo, acreditando no “controle judeu” do mundo. Em resposta à publicação do relatório sobre Portugal da GPAHE, Gazur acusou a organização de ser finaciada por George Soros, um tema recorrente entre grupos antissemitas e conspiracionistas. Gazur é conhecido por comentários racistas e polémicos, como os feitos em resposta a um vídeo no Twitter sobre as políticos Katar Moreira e Ossanda Liber,[1] ou os ataques ao próprio deputado do Chega, Marcus Santos, que descreveu como "preto africano, que fala brasileirês".[2] Tal como Gonçalves, Gazur acredita que há uma “substituição populacional” em andamento do povo português, em referência à teoria da conspiração da “Grande Substituição”, argumentando que “deportar todos os imigrantes” que usam o serviço de saúde “gratuitamente” resolveria 90% de todos os problemas do sistema. Pediu que os jovens que participam de eventos do Orgulho LGBT+ sejam “presos pelo Estado”. No seu canal de Telegram, compartilha regularmente mensagens do supremacista branco americano negador do Holocausto Nick Fuentes e do neonazi Andrew Anglin. Após Elon Musk comprar o Twitter teve a conta restaurada, sendo posteriormente suspensa.[1][2]

Antibrasileirismo é um dos conceitos mais disseminados por vários membros do Reconquista. Além de afirmar que a imigração brasileira representa um elevado perigo à preservação da identidade portuguesa, o grupo sustenta, explorando o facto de o Brasil ser um dos países mais violentos do mundo,[7] que os brasileiros, como um todo, são naturalmente mais propensos à violência, com um índice de homicídios per capita 46 vezes superior ao dos portugueses.[8]

Militância

A maioria dos adeptos da Reconquista são homens brancos de ascendência portuguesa. Participantes identificados pela GPAHE de seus canais no Telegram incluem Nita, tradwife que participou da manifestação no SEF; Miguel Morato, skinhead nacionalista ligado ao Grupo 1143, e ao canal mantido por Mário Machado, “Racismo contra Europeus”, que compareceu tanto à manifestação antimuçulmana quanto ao protesto no SEF; e Carlos José Martelo Pagará, candidato do partido de extrema-direita Ergue-Te por Évora em 2022, que apareceu na manifestação de 4 de julho. Ricardo Camões Coutinho, descrito pelo GPAHE como supremacista branco, membro do Chega e delegado por Aveiro na 5.ª convenção do partido, também participou da manifestação.[1] A média de idade dos membros é de 23 anos, sendo o alinhamento com a misoginia um dos requisitos.[2]

O grupo alia o ativismo de rua com um grande foco na internet, misturando os dois tipos de ações. As atividades na rua, como protestos e instalação de faixas e autocolantes com frases xenófobas em locais públicos, são filmadas e fotografadas, sendo depois criadas comunicações para as redes como o Telegram e o TikTok, onde atingem uma camada mais jovem da população.[2] Segundo o RASI 2023, o crescimento da extrema-direita entre as gerações mais jovens "deveu-se, em grande parte, ao esforço desenvolvido na esfera virtual, tornando-a o seu principal veículo de disseminação de propaganda e motor de radicalização e contribuindo, assim, para a proliferação das narrativas extremistas, que atingem um público mais alargado e diversificado.”[2]

Com o passar dos meses e o aumento no número de militantes, o grupo profissionalizou-se, com a contratação de um web designer. Os vídeos iniciais, gravados sem microfone e sem edição, deram lugar a produções mais elaboradas, com linguagem padronizada e estratégias de marketing bem delineadas. A estratégia de comunicação passa igualmente pela articulação nacional e internacional entre grupos com ideias semelhantes, como a página Invictus Portucale, com quase cem mil seguidores nas redes sociais, ou a Rádio Genoa, plataforma digital internacional de notícias falsas e descontextualizadas sobre imigração, parceira da Reconquista e do Grupo 1143.[2]

O alcance da narrativa tem sido limitado pelos mecanismos de moderação das plataformas, que levaram o YouTube a derrubar o canal inicial da Reconquista durante as exibições dos primeiros vídeos da série "A Grande Invasão". Os perfis no Twitter/X foram banidos, embora já tenham retornado.[2]

A Grande Invasão

O grupo produziu uma série de 18 vídeos intitulada A Grande Invasão, considerada pelo Diário de Notícias um dos melhores exemplos de propaganda anti-imigração com o objetivo de atuar no viés de confirmação da população. A produção baseia-se na teoria da conspiração nazifascista e nacionalista branca da Grande Substituição, já referida várias vezes por André Ventura e uma das bases do grupo europeu Identidade e Democracia (ID), do qual o Chega faz parte. De acordo com Gonçalves, os objetivos foram “tornar a substituição populacional em tema de debate nacional” e “levar esta realidade a todos os lares Portugueses antes das eleições”. Ao serem divulgados nas redes sociais, todos os posts foram acompanhados da hashtag #Chega, sendo amplamente partilhados por militantes desse partido. A publicação desenrolou-se precisamente até às eleições legislativas de 10 de março de 2024, sugerindo que o seu objetivo terá sido efetivamente criar um ambiente favorável ao Chega nessas eleições.[9]

Cada um dos vídeos foi filmado num distrito do país, iniciando-se pelo Porto, contando estórias que vão ao encontro da narrativa do Chega, de que os imigrantes são criminosos, que não trabalham e que vivem de subsídios, levando-o a incluir no seu programa eleitoral medidas inconstitucionais como a criação do crime de residência ilegal e a proibição do acesso a apoios sociais nos primeiros cinco anos de residência. Gonçalves descontextualizou as informações recolhidas, editando-as para ocultar respostas, não tendo informado os participantes do objetivo real das entrevistas, induzindo as respostas pretendidas aos imigrantes, a maior parte dos quais não falava português ou apresentava mesmo dificuldades em entender inglês. Participantes que esconderam o rosto e pediram para não ser filmados, incluindo requerentes de proteção internacional, foram expostos. Gonçalves entrou em hotéis e pousadas de juventude onde os requerentes de asilo ficam temporariamente instalados, tal como previsto na lei e de acordo com as regras da União Europeia, apresentando sempre os hóspedes como “pessoas a viver à custa do Estado”, fazendo muitas vezes publicações em que ridicularizava aqueles cidadãos.[2][9]

Segundo Gonçalves, a produção custou 4,5 mil euros, paga com doações conseguidas via pedidos nas publicações, nas quais se disponibilizam números de MB WAYPayPal e bitcoin, para quem não quisesse deixar registo da doação.[2]

Histórico

O grupo surgiu em junho de 2023, quando os líderes Afonso Gonçalves e Alexander Gazur deslocaram-se a Évora com o propósito de “invadir e interromper de maneira muito agressiva” o evento anual do Mês do Orgulho da cidade, o “Pride dos pequeninos”. Gonçalves tentou interromper o evento por 10 a 15 minutos, gritando em um alto-falante, sendo detido por uma barreira de polícias e participantes do Pride. Embora apenas três a cinco pessoas se tenham reunido para o protesto, a cobertura dada pelos órgãos de comunicação social atraiu a atenção de apoiadores do partido político de extrema-direita Chega, alguns dos quais já haviam assediado membros do Mês do Orgulho de Évora no início da semana, e que expressaram apoio às suas ações. O novo grupo angariou um conjunto de novos apoiadores com processo de inscrição formal, criando a Reconquista como um movimento.[1]

A 4 de julho, o grupo organizou uma manifestação na Praça Martim Moniz, em Lisboa com o lema “Não há Portugal B”, variação do lema ambientalista “não há planeta B”. A 29 de julho, a Reconquista reuniu-se novamente, agora no Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF), para protestar contra o plano de regularização de cerca de 170.000 imigrantes, que aguardavam num limbo legal a renovação das suas residências devido à pandemia de Covid-19. Embora o plano não implicasse trazer mais imigrantes para Portugal, mas sim a regularização dos que já se encontravam no país, o grupo reuniu-se frente ao escritório vazio do SEF em Lisboa para protestar contra o que considerou evidência da “substituição populacional”, frase que ecoa a teoria da conspiração nacionalista branca “Grande Substituição”.[1]

Em setembro de 2023, invadiram a apresentação pública do livro "No meu bairro", de Lúcia Vicente, numa livraria de Lisboa, levando a múltiplas reações de condenação, incluindo do então Presidente da Assembleia da RepúblicaAugusto Santos Silva.[10]

Em outubro de 2023, Gonçalves planeava o lançamento oficial do seu grupo numa espécie de congresso que seria realizado em Lisboa a 21 desse mês, dia em que o D. Afonso Henriques tomou Lisboa “aos muçulmanos”. A plataforma do partido pede a deportação em massa de imigrantes não europeus e a promoção do retorno de emigrantes portugueses, o fim do aborto legal, o fim dos divórcios sem culpa, a proibição de “partidos marxistas” e da promoção do feminismo, e a “terminação e expropriação de todos os institutos e organizações que promovem o ódio a Portugal”.[1]

Em janeiro de 2024, iniciou uma série de 18 vídeos intitulada A Grande Invasão, propaganda anti-imigração visando atuar no viés de confirmação da população, baseiada na teoria da conspiração nazifascista e nacionalista branca da Grande Substituição.[2]

A 25 de abril de 2024, por ocasião das comemorações dos 50 anos da Revolução dos Cravos, cerca de 20 membros do Reconquista manifestaram-se na Praça do Comércio, escoltados pela polícia,[3] defendendo, entre outras ideologias, a teoria conspiracionista da Grande Substituição.[11]

 

Referências

1.        Kirsten (18 de outubro de 2023). «Portuguese Far Right Sprouting New Organizations». Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (em inglês). Consultado em 16 de maio de 2024

2.        Lima, Amanda (11 de maio de 2024). «Grupos de ódio mobilizaram campanha do Chega e "preparam o terreno" para que partido tome ações mais radicais». Diário de Notícias. Consultado em 16 de maio de 2024

3.        Lima, Licínio (25 de abril de 2024). «Movimento nacionalista Reconquista manifesta-se no Terreiro do Paço». O Novo

4.       Agência Lusa (31 de agosto de 2024). «"Grande marcha pela remigração" em Lisboa só juntou cerca de 30 nacionalistas». observador.pt. Consultado em 5 de janeiro de 2025

5.       Barros, Cátia (20 de outubro de 2023). «Rede social X suspende 15 contas portuguesas com ligações à extrema-direita por espalharem ódio online». Expresso. Consultado em 17 de maio de 2024

6.       «Rede social X suspende pelo menos 15 contas de incentivo ao ódio portuguesas». CNN Portugal. 20 de outubro de 2023. Consultado em 17 de maio de 2024

7.     Aline Ribeiro (18 de julho de 2024). «Mortes violentas caem, mas Brasil é o 18º país com maior índice de letalidade do mundo, aponta Anuário de Segurança». O Globo. Consultado em 5 de janeiro de 2025

8.     Vicente Nunes (8 de janeiro de 2024). «Brasil reforça a democracia; Portugal vê extremismo disparar». Consultado em 5 de janeiro de 2025

                 9. Gorjão Henriques, Joana (12 de maio de 2024). «Autoridadades identificam recrutamento de jovens pela extrema-direita». Público

10. Tomás, Carla (24 de setembro de 2023). «"Inaceitável": Santos Silva reage a invasão de nacionalistas em lançamento de livro. "Foi uma tentativa de silenciamento", diz autora». Expresso. Consultado em 17 de maio de 2024

11. «Manifestação de extrema-direita: "Existe uma tentativa deliberada de substituição progressiva do povo português"». SIC Notícias. 25 de abril de 2024. Consultado em 17 de maio de 2024

 

 


Reconquista (Portuguese extremist group)

History

Foundation

 2023

 

Professional staff

Type

Interest Group Political
Movement
Organization

Domain of activity

Activist group

Registered office

Lisbon

Country

 Portugal

 

Organization

Political orientation

ethnic nationalism
traditionalism

Political positioning

far-right

Website

www.recon.pt

edit - edit source - edit WikidataPreset documentation

Reconquista is a groupultranationalist,supremacistewhite nationalist Portuguese, founded in June 2023 and led by Afonso Gonçalves and Alexandre Gazur. The group has been standing out as one of the main groupsMilitantsoffar-rightin Portugal, in particular in theHate speechagainst theImmigration, markedlyMisogynist,homophobiceTransphobic.

Characterization

The group's focus is the "retaking" of ethnic non-Portuguese from Portugal and the expulsion of foreigners, taking its name from the Christian Reconquest, a term used to describe the expulsion of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula, completed with the conquest of Granada in 1492.[1]

The group has been described asultranationalist[2]eWhite supremacist,[1]frequently articulating with theGroup 1143, the neo-NaziMário Machado, wespacesof theTwitter, spaces for audio debate on that platform widely used by both groups. AMisogynyis one of the most distinctive marks of this group, which has been exploring other agendas over time, such as "Gender ideology", focusing later with greater intensity on theImmigration. According to Gonçalves, the objective of Reconquista is to "radicalize politics in Portugal" and "form the elite of the future" of Portugal.[2]

Both Reconquista and Grupo 1143 haveAdolf Hitleras one of his inspirations, with Afonso Gonçalves doing a photo shoot with a moustache imitating the German dictator and the caption“Weimar conditions require Weimar solutions”, in reference to thePrevious periodto the rise of theNazi PartyatGermany.[2]

Although Gonçalves describes the movement as "without any party affiliation", and for this reason without a framework in the extreme right,[3] he is a supporter and active participant in the campaigns of the Chega party.[2] The group maintains a close, although sometimes conflicting, relationship with Juventude Chega. Leaders of Juventude Chega have shown support for the new movement, such as the leader of Juventude Chega de Coimbra, João Antunes,[1] also described as a white supremacist,[2] who tweeted a photo posing with Gonçalves with the text "Reconstruir Portugal #Reconquista". The leader of Juventude Chega do Porto, Francisco Araújo, also used his Telegram channel to promote the next congress and convince his audience to buy tickets for the event. Other members of Juventude Chega have participated in YouTube events with Gonçalves, although some have been repelled by the misogyny of Gazur and Gonçalves. João Antunes, who regularly defends alleged human trafficker Andrew Tate, wrote in response to a video posted by Gazur of a video game character  who continually beats up a female character that "that doesn't represent my kind of right." Likewise, Antunes felt obliged to defend women after Gonçalves stated that a "woman who does not reach virgin marriage has no value as a wife". Joana Pinto Azevedo, leader of Juventude Chega de Braga, publicly denounced Gonçalves for his comments in which he defends the notion that "women should not have social networks or vote".[1]

After the 2024 legislative elections, and the victory achieved with the election of 50 Chega deputies, Reconquista has been pressuring the radicalization of the party in the area of immigration, using the term "remigration"  as a strategy, a euphemism for mass deportation, namely of non-white immigrants and their descendants, an idea that has been spread by members of the Chega youth on social networks.[2][4]

According to the political scientistVicente Valentim, author of the book "The End of Shame", referring to groups such as Reconquista, it is common for political parties to have people or groups to disseminate the most extremist discourse, without being formally affiliated, or belonging to a lower hierarchy of the party, transmitting in a more extremist way what the party leadership says in an ambiguous way.[2]On the other hand, according to thePolitical scientist Riccardo Marchi, Afonso Gonçalves, like Mário Machado, as much as they disagree with Chega in relation to national identity, saw in their leaderAndré Ventura"a window of opportunity never seen in Portugal to advance a certain type of idea", openly calling for a vote for Chega. According to Marchi, such groups do not represent a danger to anyone in the slightest and even the initial attempts to integrate Chega, for example, were immediately stopped by the party's own leadership in 2019. Heidi Beirich, researcher and co-founder of the GPHAE project, says that the groups present risks, the biggest of which is in the form ofHate crimeseTerrorism, usually directed against immigrants and other persons targeted and humiliated by them, and may also threatenHuman Rightsin general through its influence on politics.[2]

According to Cátia Moreira de Carvalho, a researcher of extremism and radicalization, young people in personality formation are "more predisposed" to join extremist movements such as Reconquista, due to the perception of threat and attack on identity, taking gender equality as a threat to the perception of dominance of patriarchy, making them not feel comfortable with these new roles that are poorly defined and not in accordance with their mental standards. Moreira de Carvalho sees the situation as dangerous, especially for women, resurfacing on the political agenda and in the public debate issues that "should have been stored in a drawer for a long time and should be consensual in society", questioning the rights conquered by women at great cost, with the potential to undermine the future of younger women.[2]

Reconquista, like 1143, is in the sights of the Portuguese authorities, having been referenced in the Annual Report on Internal Security (RASI) 2023, in which it is said that "projects and organizations were created by young people that extend the reach of the extremist message to a new generation with a different profile [...] and projects with ideological convergence with the extreme right, even if they sometimes permeate their classic version with patriarchal and misogynistic ideas."[2]

Founders and leadership

According to theGlobal Project Against Hate and Extremism(GPAHE), which in October of that year included the organization in its report on hate and extremist groups offar-rightin Portugal, Gonçalves "is aWhite supremacisteMisogynist, who presents himself as an authoritarian leader", describing himself asTransphobic,ultranationalist,racistexenophobic. He began militating in theSocial mediain 2022, inspired by the entry ofAndré Venturain Parliament in 2019, debuting theTelegramwith a video entitled "TheFeminismit's a disease." Another of his first publications was a photo in which he simulated slapping the deputyInês Sousa Real, thePAN.[2]Gonçalves is particularly known for hisMisogyny, as well as for his criticism of theWomen's suffrage,casual sexand women sitting in public, referring to them as "prostitutes" and "cockroaches". Gonçalves argues that women whodivorcethey should not "have the right to receive money/goods" from their husbands, and should be obliged to "pay for the damage caused to the family". Consider theabortionaCrime against humanity, asking that women who undergo this procedure receive thedeath penalty. According to Gonçalves, "non-traditional families" are an "aberration", "80% of all divorces are initiated by women" and people of African descent are creating a "population replacement" of people of European descent. It argued that "African-American men are 12 times more likely to commit murder than white men."[2]Gonçalves stated that "theBrazilian immigrationand its consequences are theprincipalthreat to the survival of Portugal", often associating Brazilian women with theProstitution, as well as any woman who attends aGym, use social media or have any opinions.[2]The extreme character of his prejudices led theTwitterto suspend both her main and secondary account, for "abusive behavior", having since been reinstated.[1][5][6]

The other founding member, Alexandre Lima Gazur,Computer Engineer[2]natural ofViseu, is aYouTuberof the extreme right, functioning as a co-organizer and promoter of the Reconquista protests. He is a militant of Chega, having served as a delegate at the party's 5th National Convention, held in his hometown. It is known for itsAntisemitism, believing in "Jewish control" of the world. In response to the publication of GPAHE's report on Portugal, Gazur accused the organization of being funded byGeorge Soros, a recurring theme among anti-Semitic and conspiracy groups. Gazur is known for racist and controversial comments, such as those made in response to a Twitter video about the womenKatar MoreiraeOssanda Liber,[1]or the attacks on the deputy of Chega himself,Marcus Santos, whom he described as "black African, who speaks Brazilian".[2]Like Gonçalves, Gazur believes that there is an ongoing "population replacement" of the Portuguese people, in reference to the "Great Replacement" conspiracy theory, arguing that "deporting all immigrants" who use the health service "for free" would solve 90% of all the system's problems. He asked that young people who participate in events of theLGBT+ Pridebe "imprisoned by the State". On his Telegram channel, he regularly shares messages from the American white supremacistHolocaust denier Nick Fuentesand theNeo-Nazi Andrew Anglin. AfterElon Muskbuy Twitter had its account restored, and was later suspended.[1][2]

OAnti-Brazilianismis one of the most disseminated concepts by several members of Reconquista. In addition to stating that Brazilian immigration represents a high danger to the preservation of Portuguese identity, the group argues, exploiting the fact that Brazil is one of theMost violent countries in the world,[7]that Brazilians, as a whole, are naturally more prone to violence, with a per capita homicide rate 46 times higher than that of the Portuguese.[8]

Militancy

Most of the supporters of the Reconquista are white men of Portuguese descent. Participants identified by GPAHE from their Telegram channels include Nita,tradwifethat he participated in the demonstration at SEF; Miguel Morato,skinheadnationalist linked to the 1143 Group, and to the channel maintained by Mário Machado, "Racism against Europeans", which attended both the anti-Muslim demonstration and the protest at the SEF; and Carlos José Martelo Pagará, candidate of the far-right partyRisebyÉvorain 2022, which appeared at the July 4 demonstration. Ricardo Camões Coutinho, described by GPAHE as a white supremacist, member of Chega and delegate forAveiroAt the 5th party convention, he also participated in the demonstration.[1]The average age of the members is 23 years old, with alignment with misogyny being one of the requirements.[2]

The group combines theActivismwith a strong focus oninternet, mixing the two types of actions. Street activities, such as protests and the installation of banners and stickers with xenophobic phrases in public places, are filmed and photographed, and communications are then created for networks such as theTelegramand theTikTok, where they reach a younger layer of the population.[2]According to RASI 2023, the growth of the far right among the younger generations "was largely due to the effort made in the virtual sphere, making it its main vehicle for the dissemination of propaganda and engine of radicalization and thus contributing to the proliferation of extremist narratives, which reach a wider and more diverse audience."[2]

As the months went by and the number of militants increased, the group became professional, with the hiring of a web designer. The initial videos, recorded without a microphone and without editing, gave way to more elaborate productions, with standardized language and well-designed marketing strategies  . The communication strategy also involves national and international articulation between groups with similar ideas, such as the Invictus Portucale page, with almost one hundred thousand followers on social networks, or Rádio Genoa, an international digital platform for fake and decontextualized news about immigration, a partner of Reconquista and Grupo 1143.[2]

The reach of the narrative has been limited by the moderation mechanisms of the platforms, which led YouTube to take down the initial channel of the Reconquista during the exhibitions of the first videos of the series "The Great Invasion". The Twitter/X profiles were banned, although they have since returned.[2]

The Great Invasion

The group produced a series of 18 videos entitled The Great Invasion, considered by Diário de Notícias to be one of the best examples of anti-immigration propaganda with the aim of acting on  the confirmation bias of the population. The production is based on the Nazi-fascist  and white nationalist conspiracy theory of the Great Replacement, already mentioned several times by André Ventura and one of the bases of the European group Identity and Democracy (ID), of which Chega it's part of it. According to Gonçalves, the objectives were "to make population replacement a topic of national debate" and "to bring this reality to all Portuguese homes before the elections". When disseminated on social networks, all posts were accompanied by the hashtag #Chega, being widely shared by militants of this party. The publication took place precisely until the legislative elections of March 10, 2024, suggesting that its objective was effectively to create a favorable environment for Chega in those elections.[9]

Each of the videos was filmed in a district of the country, starting with Porto, telling stories that meet Chega's narrative, that immigrants are criminals, that they do not work and that they live on subsidies, leading it to include in its electoral program unconstitutional measures  such as the creation of the crime of illegal residence and the prohibition of access to social support in the first five years of residence. Gonçalves decontextualized the information collected, editing it to hide answers, not having informed the participants of the real purpose of the interviews, inducing the intended answers from the immigrants, most of whom did not speak Portuguese or even had difficulties in understanding English. Participants who hid their faces and asked not to be filmed, including applicants for international protection, were exposed. Gonçalves entered hotels and youth hostels where asylum seekers are temporarily stayed, as provided for by law and in accordance with the rules of the European Union, always presenting guests as "people living at the expense of the State", often making publications in which he ridiculed those citizens.[2][9]

According to Gonçalves, the production cost 4.5 thousand euros, paid for with donations obtained through requests in the publications, in which numbers ofMB WAY,PayPaleBitcoin, for those who did not want to leave a record of the donation.[2]

History

The group emerged in June 2023, when leaders Afonso Gonçalves and Alexander Gazur traveled to Évora with the purpose of "invading and interrupting in a very aggressive way" the  city's annual Pride Month event  , the "Pride of the little ones". Gonçalves tried to disrupt the event for 10 to 15 minutes, shouting into a loudspeaker, and was stopped by a barrage of police and Pride attendees. Although only three to five people gathered for the protest, the media coverage  attracted the attention of supporters of the far-right political party Chega, some of whom had already harassed members of Évora's Pride Month earlier in the week, and who expressed support for their actions. The new group raised a set of new supporters with a formal registration process, creating Reconquista as a movement.[1]

On July 4, the group organized a demonstration in Martim Moniz Square, in Lisbon, with the slogan "There is no Portugal B", a variation of the environmentalist motto  "there is no planet B". On July 29, Reconquista met again, this time at the Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF), to protest against the regularization plan of about 170,000 immigrants, who were waiting in legal limbo for the renewal of their residences due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the plan did not involve bringing more immigrants to Portugal, but rather the regularization of those already in the country, the group gathered in front of the empty SEF office in Lisbon to protest against what they considered evidence of "population replacement", a phrase that echoes the  white nationalist conspiracy theory "Great Replacement".[1]

In September 2023, they invaded the public presentation of the book "No meu bairro", by Lúcia Vicente, in a bookstore in Lisbon, leading to multiple reactions of condemnation, including from the then President of the Assembly of the Republic, Augusto Santos Silva.[10]

In October 2023, Gonçalves planned the official launch of his group at a kind of congress that would be held in Lisbon on the 21st of that month, the day D. Afonso Henriques took Lisbon "from the Muslims". The party's platform calls for the mass deportation of non-European immigrants and the promotion of the return of Portuguese emigrants, the end of legal abortion, the end of no-fault divorces, the prohibition of "Marxist parties" and the promotion of feminism, and the "termination and expropriation of all institutes and organizations that promote hatred of Portugal".[1]

In January 2024, he began a series of 18 videos entitled The Great Invasion, anti-immigration propaganda aimed at acting on the confirmation bias of the population, based on  the Nazi-fascist  and white nationalist conspiracy theory of the Great Replacement.[2]

On April 25, 2024, on the occasion of the commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the Carnation Revolution, about 20 members of Reconquista demonstrated in Praça do Comércio, escorted by the police,[3] defending, among other ideologies, the conspiracy theory of the Great Replacement.[11]

 

References

1.        Kirsten (October 18, 2023). «Portuguese Far Right Sprouting New Organizations». Global Project Against Hate and Extremism. Retrieved May 16, 2024.

2.        Lima, Amanda (May 11, 2024). "Hate groups have mobilized Chega's campaign and "prepare the ground" for the party to take more radical actions. Diário de Notícias. Retrieved May 16, 2024.

3.        Lima, Licínio (April 25, 2024). «Nationalist movement Reconquista manifests itself in Terreiro do Paço». The New

4.       Lusa Agency (August 31, 2024). "The Great March for Remigration" in Lisbon only brought together about 30 nationalists. observador.pt. Retrieved January 5, 2025.

5.       Barros, Cátia (October 20, 2023). "Social network X suspends 15 Portuguese accounts with links to the far right for spreading hate online". Expresso. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

6.       "Social network X suspends at least 15 Portuguese hate speech accounts". CNN Portugal. October 20, 2023. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

7.     Aline Ribeiro (July 18, 2024). "Violent deaths fall, but Brazil is the 18th country with the highest lethality rate in the world, according to the Security Yearbook." O Globo. Retrieved January 5, 2025.

8.     Vicente Nunes (January 8, 2024). "Brazil strengthens democracy; Portugal sees extremism skyrocket». Retrieved January 5, 2025.

                 9. Gorjão Henriques, Joana (May 12, 2024). «Authorities identify recruitment of young people by the extreme right». Audience

10. Tomás, Carla (September 24, 2023). «"Unacceptable": Santos Silva reacts to the invasion of nationalists at a book launch. " It was an attempt to silence it," says the author." Expresso. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

11. "Far-right demonstration: "There is a deliberate attempt to progressively replace the Portuguese people". SIC Notícias. April 25, 2024. Retrieved May 17, 2024.