The long read
Yanis
Varoufakis: Why we must save the EU
The
European Union is disintegrating – but leaving is not the answer
by Yanis Varoufakis
Tuesday 5 April 2016
06.00 BST
The first German
word I ever learned was Siemens. It was emblazoned on our sturdy
1950s fridge, our washing machine, the vacuum cleaner – on almost
every appliance in my family’s home in Athens. The reason for my
parents’ peculiar loyalty to the German brand was my uncle
Panayiotis, who was Siemens’ general manager in Greece from the
mid-1950s to the late 1970s.
A Germanophile
electrical engineer and a fluent speaker of Goethe’s language,
Panayiotis had convinced his younger sister – my mother – to take
up the study of German; she even planned to spend a year in Hamburg
to take up a Goethe Institute scholarship in the summer of 1967.
Alas, on 21 April
1967, my mother’s plans were laid in ruins, along with our
imperfect Greek democracy. For in the early hours of that morning, at
the command of four army colonels, tanks rolled on to the streets of
Athens and other major cities, and our country was soon enveloped in
a thick cloud of neo-fascist gloom. It was also the day when Uncle
Panayiotis’s world fell apart.
Unlike my dad, who
in the late 1940s had paid for his leftist politics with several
years in concentration camps, Panayiotis was what today would be
referred to as a neoliberal. Fiercely anti-communist, and suspicious
of social democracy, he supported the American intervention in the
Greek civil war in 1946 (on the side of my father’s jailers). He
backed the German Free Democratic party and the Greek Progressive
party, which purveyed a blend of free-market economics with
unconditional support for Greece’s oppressive US-led state security
machine.
His political views,
and his position as the head of Siemens’ operations in Greece, made
Panayiotis a typical member of Greece’s postwar ruling class. When
state security forces or their stooges roughed up leftwing
protesters, or even killed a brilliant member of parliament, Grigoris
Lambrakis, in 1963, Panayiotis would grudgingly approve, convinced
that these were unpleasant but necessary actions. My ears are still
ringing with the rowdy exchanges he often had with Dad, over what he
considered “reasonable measures to defend democracy from its sworn
enemies” – reasonable measures that my father had experienced
first-hand, and from which he would never fully recover.
The heavy footprint
of US agencies in Greek politics, even going so far as to engineer
the dismissal of a popular centrist prime minister, Georgios
Papandreou, in 1965, seemed to Panayiotis an acceptable trade-off:
Greece had given up some sovereignty to western powers in exchange
for freedom from a menacing eastern bloc lurking a short driving
distance north of Athens. However, on that bleak April day in 1967,
Panayiotis’s life was turned upside down.
He simply could not
tolerate that “his” people (as he referred to the rightist army
officers who had staged the coup and, more importantly, their
American handlers) should dissolve parliament, suspend the
constitution, and intern potential dissidents (including rightwing
democrats) in football stadia, police stations and concentration
camps. He had no great sympathy with the deposed centrist prime
minister that the putschists and their US puppeteers were trying to
keep out of government – but his worldview was torn asunder,
leading him to a sudden spurt of almost comical radicalisation.
A few months after
the military regime took power, Panayiotis joined an underground
group called Democratic Defence, which consisted largely of other
establishment liberals like himself – university professors,
lawyers, and even a future prime minister. They planted a series of
bombs around Athens, taking care to ensure there were no injuries, in
order to demonstrate that the military regime was not in full
control, despite its clampdown.
For a few years
after the coup, Panayiotis appeared – even to his own mother – as
yet another professional keeping his head down, minding his own
business. No one had an inkling of his double life: corporate man
during the day, subversive bomber by night. We were mostly relieved,
meanwhile, that Dad had not disappeared again into some concentration
camp.
My enduring memory
of those years, in fact, is the crackling sound of a radio hidden
under a red blanket in the middle of the living room in our Athens
home. Every night at around nine, mum and dad would huddle together
under the blanket – and upon hearing the muffled jingle announcing
the beginning of the programme, followed by the voice of a German
announcer, my own six-year-old imagination would travel from Athens
to central Europe, a mythical place I had not visited yet except for
the tantalising glimpses offered by an illustrated Brothers Grimm
book I had in my bedroom.
Deutsche Welle, the
German international radio station that my parents were listening to,
became their most precious ally against the crushing power of state
propaganda at home: a window looking out to faraway democratic
Europe. At the end of each of its hour-long special broadcasts on
Greece, my parents and I would sit around the dining table while they
mulled over the latest news.
I didn’t fully
understand what they were discussing, but this neither bored nor
upset me. For I was gripped by a sense of excitement at the
strangeness of our predicament: that, to find out what was happening
in our very own Athens, we had to travel, through the airwaves, and
veiled by a red blanket, to a place called Germany.
My enduring memory
is the crackling sound of a radio hidden under a red blanket in the
middle of the living room
The reason for the
red blanket was a grumpy old neighbour called Gregoris. Gregoris was
known for his connections with the secret police and his penchant for
spying on my parents; in particular my Dad, whose leftwing past made
him an excellent target for an ambitious snitch. Strange as it may
sound today, tuning in to Deutsche Welle broadcasts became one of a
long list of activities punishable by anything from harassment to
torture. So, having noticed Gregoris snooping around inside our
backyard, my parents took no risks. Thus the red blanket became our
defence from Gregoris’s prying ears.
A few years later,
it was from Deutsche Welle that we learned what Panayiotis and his
colleagues had been up to – when the radio announced that they had
all been arrested. Dad would joke for years to come about the
pathetic inability of these bourgeois liberals to organise an
underground resistance group: only a few hours after one of the
Democratic Defence members was accidentally caught, the rest were
also rounded up. All the police had to do was read the first man’s
diary – where he had meticulously listed his comrades’ names and
addresses, in some cases including a description of each subversive
“assignment”. Torture, court martial and long prison sentences –
in some cases the death sentence – followed.
A year after
Panayiotis’s capture, the military police guarding him decided to
relax his isolation regime by allowing me, a harmless 10-year-old, to
visit him once a week. Our already close bond grew stronger with
boy-talk that allowed him a degree of escapism. He told me about
machines I had never seen (computers, he called them), asked about
the latest movies, described his favourite cars.
In anticipation of
my visits, he would use matchsticks and other materials that prison
guards would let him keep to build model planes for me. Often, he
would hide inside his elegant artefacts a message for my aunt, my
mother, on occasion even for his colleagues at Siemens. For my part,
I was proud of my new skill of disassembling his models with minimal
damage, retrieving the message, and putting them back together.
Long after
Panayiotis’s death, I discovered the last of these: a matchstick
model of a Stuka dive-bomber in my old family home’s attic. Torn
between leaving it intact and looking inside, I decided to take it
apart. And there it was. His last missive was not addressed to anyone
in particular.
It was a single
word: “kyriarchia”. Sovereignty.
A tank outside the
parliament building in Athens during the military coup in 1967.
A tank outside the
parliament building in Athens during the military coup in 1967.
Photograph: Bettmann/Corbis
It was almost 50
years after those childhood evenings under the red blanket that I
made my first official visit to Berlin as finance minister of Greece,
in February 2015. My first port of call was, of course, the federal
finance ministry, to meet the legendary Dr Wolfgang Schäuble. To
him, and his minions, I was a nuisance. Our leftwing government had
just been elected, defeating a sister party of the Christian
Democrats – New Democracy – on an electoral platform that was, to
say the least, a form of inconvenience for Schäuble and Chancellor
Angela Merkel, and their plans for keeping the eurozone in order.
Our success was,
indeed, Berlin’s greatest fear. Were we to succeed in negotiating a
new deal for Greece that ended the interminable recession gripping
the nation, the Greek leftist “disease” would almost certainly
spread to Portugal, Spain and Ireland, all of which had general
elections looming.
Before I arrived in
Berlin, and only three days after I had assumed office as minister, I
received my first high-ranking visitor in my Athens office:
Schäuble’s self-appointed envoy, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch
finance minister and president of the Eurogroup of finance ministers.
Within seconds of meeting, he asked me whether I intended to
implement fully and unwaveringly the economic programme that previous
Greek governments had been forced by Berlin, Brussels and Frankfurt –
the seat of the European Central Bank (ECB) – to adopt.
Given that our
government had won a mandate to renegotiate the very logic of that
disastrous programme (which had led to the loss of one third of
national income and increased unemployment by 20%), his question was
never going to be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.
For my part, I
attempted a diplomatic reply that would be my standard line of
argument for the months to follow: “Given that the existing
economic programme has been an indisputable failure, I propose that
we sit down together, the new Greek government and our European
partners, and rethink the whole programme without prejudice or fear,
designing together economic policies that may help Greece recover.”
My modest plea for a
modicum of national sovereignty over the economic policies imposed on
a nation languishing in the depths of a great depression was met with
astonishing brutality. “This will not work!”, was Dijsselbloem’s
opening line. In less than a minute he had laid his cards on the
table: if I were to insist on any substantial renegotiation of the
programme, the ECB would close down our banks by the end of February
2015 – a month after we had been elected.
The Greek finance
ministry’s office overlooks Syntagma Square and the House of
Parliament – the very stage on which, in April 1967, the tanks had
crushed our democracy. As Dijsselbloem spoke, I caught myself looking
over his shoulder out to the broad square teeming with people and
thinking to myself: “This is interesting. In 1967 it was the tanks,
now they are trying to do the same with the banks.”
The meeting with
Dijsselbloem ended with a tumultuous press conference in which the
Eurogroup’s president lost his cool when he heard me say that our
government was not planning to work with the cabal of technicians the
troika of lenders habitually sent to Athens to impose upon the
elected government policies destined to fail. The die had been cast
and the battle for reclaiming part of our lost sovereignty was only
beginning. Berlin, where I was to meet the troika’s real master,
beckoned.
As the car that was
driving me from Berlin’s Tegel airport approached the old
headquarters of Goering’s air ministry – now the home of the
federal ministry of finance – I wondered whether my host, Schäuble,
could even begin to imagine that I was arriving in Berlin with my
head full of childhood memories in which Germany featured as an
important friend.
Once inside the
building, my aides and I were ushered briskly into a large lift. The
lift door opened up into a long, cold corridor at the end of which
awaited the great man in his famous wheelchair. As I approached, my
extended hand was refused and, instead of a handshake, he ushered me
purposefully into his office.
While my
relationship with Schäuble warmed in the months that followed, the
shunned hand symbolised a great deal that is wrong with Europe. It
was symbolic proof that the half-century that had passed since my red
blanket days, and those prison visits to Siemens’ man in Athens,
had changed Europe to no end.
I have no idea what
role Siemens played in securing my uncle’s release some time in
1972, two years before the regime’s collapse. What I do know is
that my parents were convinced that the German company had played a
decisive role. For that reason, every time I saw the word “Siemens”
around our home, I felt a warm glow. It is the same kind of warmth I
still feel when I hear the words Deutsche Welle. Indeed, back then,
in the exciting, bleak years of my childhood, Germany featured in my
imagination as a dear friend, a land of democrats that, under
Chancellor Willy Brandt, did what was humanly possible to help Greeks
rid ourselves of our ugly dictatorship.
Returning home to
Athens from my first official visit to Berlin, I was struck by the
irony. A continent that had been uniting under different languages
and cultures was now divided by a common currency, the euro, and the
awful centrifugal forces that it had unleashed throughout Europe.
A week after our
first bilateral meeting in Berlin, Schäuble and I were to meet again
across the long, rectangular table of the Eurogroup, the eurozone’s
decision-making body, comprising the common currency’s finance
ministers, plus the representatives of the troika – the ECB, the
European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund. After I had
recited our government’s plea for a substantial renegotiation of
the so-called “Greek economic programme”, which had the troika’s
fingerprints all over it, Dr Schäuble astounded me with a reply that
should send shivers up the spine of every democrat: “Elections
cannot be allowed to change an economic programme of a member state!”
he said categorically.
In the exciting,
bleak years of my childhood, Germany featured in my imagination as a
dear friend, a land of democrats
During a break from
that 10-hour Eurogroup meeting, in which I had struggled to reclaim
some economic sovereignty on behalf of my battered parliament and our
suffering people, another finance minister attempted to soothe me by
saying: “Yanis, you must understand that no country can be
sovereign today. Especially not a small and bankrupt one like yours.”
This line of
argument is probably the most pernicious fallacy to have afflicted
public debate in our modern liberal democracies. Indeed, I would go
as far as to suggest that it may be the greatest threat to liberal
democracy itself. Its true meaning is that sovereignty is passé
unless you are the United States, China or, maybe, Putin’s Russia.
In which case you might as well append your country to a
transnational alliance of states where your parliament is reduced to
a rubber stamp, and all authority is vested in the larger state.
Interestingly, this
argument is not reserved for small, bankrupt countries such as
Greece, trapped in a badly designed common currency area. This same
noxious dictum is today being peddled in the UK – supposedly as a
clinching argument in favour of the remain campaign. As a supporter
of Britain remaining in the EU, nothing upsets me more than the
enlistment to the “yes” cause of an argument that is as toxic as
it is woolly.
The problem begins
once the distinction between sovereignty and power is blurred.
Sovereignty is about who decides legitimately on behalf of a people –
whereas power is the capacity to impose these decisions on the
outside world. Iceland is a tiny country. But to claim that Iceland’s
sovereignty is illusory because it is too small to have much power is
like arguing that a poor person with no political clout might as well
give up her right to vote.
To put it slightly
differently, small sovereign nations such as Iceland have choices to
make within the broader constraints created for them by nature and by
the rest of humanity. However limited these choices might be,
Iceland’s citizens retain absolute authority to hold their elected
officials accountable for the decisions they have reached (within the
nation’s external constraints), and to strike down every piece of
legislation those elected officials have decided upon in the past.
An alliance of
states, which is what the EU is, can of course come to mutually
beneficial arrangements, such as a defensive military alliance
against a common aggressor, coordination between police forces, open
borders, an agreement to common industry standards, or the creation
of a free-trade zone. But it can never legitimately strike down or
overrule the sovereignty of one of its member states on the basis of
the limited power it has been granted by the sovereign states that
have agreed to participate in the alliance. There is no collective
European sovereignty from which Brussels could draw the legitimate
political authority to do so.
One may retort that
the European Union’s democratic credentials are beyond reproach.
The European Council comprises heads of governments, while Ecofin and
the Eurogroup are the councils of finance ministers (of the whole EU
and of the eurozone respectively). All these representatives are, of
course, democratically elected. Moreover, there is the European
parliament, elected by the citizens of the member states, which has
the power to send proposed legislation back to the Brussels
bureaucracy. But these arguments demonstrate how badly European
appreciation of the founding principles of liberal democracy has been
degraded. The critical error of such a defence is once more to
confuse political authority with power.
A parliament is
sovereign, even if its country is not particularly powerful, when it
can dismiss the executive for having failed to fulfil the tasks
assigned to it within the constraints of whatever power the executive
and the parliament possess. Nothing like this exists in the EU today.
For while the
members of the European Council and the Eurogroup of finance
ministers are elected politicians, answerable, theoretically, to
their respective national parliaments, the Council and the Eurogroup
are themselves not answerable to any parliament, nor indeed to any
voting citizens whatsoever.
Moreover, the
Eurogroup, where most of Europe’s important economic decisions are
taken, is a body that does not even exist in European law, that keeps
no minutes of its procedures and insists its deliberations are
confidential – that is, not to be shared with the citizens of
Europe. It operates on the basis – in the words of Thucydides –
that “strong do as they please while the weak suffer what they
must”. It is a set-up designed to preclude any sovereignty derived
from the people of Europe.
While opposing
Schäuble’s logic on Greece in the Eurogroup and elsewhere, at the
back of my mind there were two thoughts. First, as the finance
minister of a bankrupt state, whose citizens demanded an end to a
great depression that had been caused by a denial of our bankruptcy –
the imposition of new unpayable loans, so payments could be made on
old unpayable loans – I had a political and moral duty to say no to
more “extend-and-pretend” loan agreements. My second thought was
the lesson of Sophocles’s Antigone, who taught us that good women
and men have a duty to contradict rules lacking political and moral
legitimacy.
Political authority
is the cement that keeps legislation together, and the sovereignty of
the body politic that engenders the legislation is its foundation.
Saying no to Schäuble and the troika was an essential defence of our
right to sovereignty. Not just as Greeks but as Europeans.
How ironic that this
should also have been the last missive I received from Siemens’
long forgotten man in Athens.
Supporters of a no
vote in Greece’s referendum on its bailout, outside the Greek
parliament in Athens last summer. Photograph: Nicolas
Koutsokostas/Demotix/Corbis
Coming into the
highest level of European decision-making from the academic world,
where argument and reason are the norm, the most striking realisation
was the absence of any meaningful debate. If this was not bad enough,
there was an even more painful realisation: that this absence is
considered natural – indeed, considered a virtue, and one that
newcomers like myself should embrace, or face the consequences.
Prearranged
communiques, prefabricated votes, a solid coalition of finance
ministers around Schäuble that was impenetrable to rational debate;
this was the order to the day and, more often, of the long, long
night. Not once did I get the feeling that my interlocutors were at
all interested in Greece’s economic recovery while we were
discussing the economic policies that should be implemented in my
country.
From the day I
assumed office I strove to put together sensible, moderate proposals
that would create common ground between my government, the troika of
Greece’s lenders and Schäuble’s people. The idea was to go to
Brussels, put to them our own blueprint for Greece’s recovery and
then discuss with them their own ideas and objections to ours.
My own Athens-based
team worked hard on this, together with experts from abroad,
including Jeff Sachs of Columbia University, Thomas Meyer, a former
chief economist at Deutsche Bank, Daniel Cohen and Matthieu Pigasse,
leading lights of the French investment bank Lazard, the former US
treasury secretary Larry Summers, and my personal friend Lord Lamont
– not exactly a group of leftist recalcitrants.
Soon we had a
fully-fledged plan, whose final version I co-authored with Jeff
Sachs. It consisted of three chapters. One proposed smart debt
operations that would make Greece’s public debt manageable again,
while guaranteeing maximum returns to our creditors. The second
chapter put forward a medium-term fiscal consolidation policy that
would ensure the Greek government would never get into deficit again,
while limiting our budget surplus targets to levels low enough to be
credible and consistent with recovery. Finally, the third chapter
outlined deep reforms to public and tax administration, product
markets, and the restructure of a broken banking system as well as
the creation a development bank to manage public assets at an arm’s
length from politicians.
I am often asked:
Why were these proposals of your ministry rejected? They were not.
The Eurogroup and the troika did not have to reject them because they
never allowed me to put them on the table. When I began speaking
about them, they would look at me as if I were singing the Swedish
national anthem. And behind the scenes they were exerting pressure on
the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, to repress these proposals,
insinuating that there would be no agreement unless we stuck to the
troika’s failed programme.
What was really
going on, of course, was that the troika could simply ignore our
proposals, tell the world that I had nothing credible to offer them,
let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and
then force the prime minister to acquiesce on everything –
including a massive new loan that is at least double the size Greece
would have required under our proposals.
Tragically, despite
our prime minister’s acceptance of the troika’s terms of
surrender, and the loss of another year during which Greece’s great
depression is deepening, the same process is unfolding now. Only a
few days ago WikiLeaks revealed the troubling transcript of a
telephone conversation involving the International Monetary Fund’s
participants in the Greek drama. Listening to their discussion
confirms that nothing has changed since I resigned last July.
Once I put it to
Schäuble that we, as the elected representatives of a continent in
crisis, can not defer to unelected bureaucrats; we have a duty to
find common ground on the policies that affect people’s lives
through direct dialogue. He replied that, in his perspective, what
matters most is the respect of the existing “rules”. And since
the rules can only be enforced by technocrats, I should talk to them.
Whenever I attempted
to discuss rules that were clearly impossible to enforce, the
standard reply was: “But these are the rules!” Once, while I was
pushing hard for the argument, resulting from our team’s policy
work, that primary budget surplus targets of 4.5% of Greece’s
national income were impossible, and undesirable even from the
creditors’ perspective, Schäuble looked at me and asked me,
perhaps for the first and last time, an economic question. “So,
what would you like that target to be?” At last, I rejoiced, a
chance to have a serious discussion.
In an attempt to be
as reasonable as possible, I replied: “For the target of the
government budget primary surplus to be credible and realistic, it
needs to be consistent with our overall policy mix. The budget
surplus number, when added to the difference between savings and
investment, must equal Greece’s current account balance. Which
means that we can strive for a higher budget primary surplus if we
also put in place a credible strategy for boosting investment and
delivering more credit to exporters.
“So, before I can
answer your question, Wolfgang, on what the primary surplus target
ought to be, it is crucial that we link this number to our policies
on non-performing bank loans (that impede credit to exporters) and
investment flows (which are reduced when we set the primary budget
surplus target too high, scaring investors off with the implicit
threat of higher future taxes). What I can tell you at this point is
that the optimal target cannot be more than 1.5%. But let’s have
our people study this together.”
Schäuble’s
response to my point, addressing the rest of the Eurogroup while
avoiding my eyes, was remarkable: “The previous government has
committed Greece to 4.5% primary surpluses. And a commitment is a
commitment!”
A few hours later,
the media was full of leaks from the Eurogroup, claiming that “the
Greek finance minister infuriated his colleagues in the Eurogroup by
subjecting them to an economics lecture”.”
There is a reason
why I began this piece with the story of my Uncle Panayiotis. That
reason is a question asked by a journalist towards the end of the
press conference after my first meeting with Wolfgang Schäuble in
Berlin.
The question was
about Siemens and a scandal that had broken out some years earlier,
when an investigation initiated in the US found evidence that a
certain Michalis Christoforakos, a successor of Panayiotis, was
actively pushing bribes into the hands of Greek politicians to secure
government contracts on behalf of Siemens. Soon after the Greek
authorities began investigating the matter, the gentleman absconded
to Germany, where the courts prevented his extradition to Athens.
“Did you,
minister,” asked the journalist, “impress upon your German
colleague” – that would be Wolfgang Schäuble – “the German
state’s obligation to help the Greek government snuff out
corruption by extraditing Mr Christoforakos to Greece?” I tried to
honour the question with a reasonable answer. “I am sure,” I
said, “that the German authorities will understand the importance
of assisting our troubled state in its struggle against corruption in
Greece. I trust that my colleagues in Germany understand the
importance of not being seen to have double standards anywhere in
Europe.” Looking terribly put out, Schäuble mumbled that this was
not a matter for his finance ministry.
On the aeroplane
back to Athens, my mind travelled to the late 1970s. After his
release from prison, Panayiotis returned to the helm of Siemens
Greece. He was happy in that job, as he kept telling me, and proud of
his work. Until he stopped being proud of it – so much so that he
resigned in anger.
I remember asking
him why he had resigned. His answer still resonates. He told me that
he was facing pressure from his superiors in Germany to pay bribes to
Greek politicians to ensure that Siemens would maintain its dominant
position in Greece, getting the lion’s share of contracts related
to the lucrative digitisation of the Greek telephone network.
There is a touching
faith in the European north that Europe comprises ants and
grasshoppers – and that all the frugal and cautious ants live in
the north, while the spendthrift grasshoppers have congregated
mysteriously in the south. The reality is much more muddled. A mighty
network of corrupt practices has been laid over all of our countries
– and the collapse of democratic checks and balances, due in part
to our receding sovereignty, has helped hide it from public view.
As legitimate
political authority retreats, we fall in the lap of brute force,
inertia and demonisation of the weak. Indeed, by the end of June of
2015, the ECB had shut our banks, our government was divided, I
resigned my ministry, and my prime minister capitulated to the
troika.
The crushing of the
Athens spring was a serious blow for an already wounded Greece. But
it was also a wholesale defeat for the idea of a united, humanist,
democratic Europe.
Our European Union
is disintegrating. Should we accelerate the disintegration of a
failed confederacy? If one insists that even small countries can
retain their sovereignty, as I have done, does this mean Brexit is
the obvious course? My answer is an emphatic “No!”
Here is why: if
Britain and Greece were not already in the EU, they should most
certainly stay out. But, once inside, it is crucial to consider the
consequences of a decision to leave. Whether we like it or not, the
European Union is our environment – and it has become a terribly
unstable environment, which will disintegrate even if a small,
depressed country like Greece leaves, let alone a major economy like
Britain. Should the Greeks or the Brits care about the disintegration
of an infuriating EU? Yes, of course we should care. And we should
care very much because the disintegration of this frustrating
alliance will create a vortex that will consume us all – a
postmodern replay of the 1930s.
It is a major error
to assume, whether you are a remain or a leave supporter, that the EU
is something constant “out there” that you may or may not want to
be part of. The EU’s very existence depends on Britain staying in.
Greece and Britain are facing the same three options. The first two
are represented aptly by the two warring factions within the Tory
party: deference to Brussels and exit. They are equally calamitous
options. Both lead to the same dystopian future: a Europe fit only
for those who flourish in times of a great Depression – the
xenophobes, the ultra-nationalists, the enemies of democratic
sovereignty. The third option is the only one worth going for:
staying in the EU to form a cross-border alliance of democrats, which
Europeans failed to manage in the 1930s, but which our generation
must now attempt to prevent history repeating itself.
This is precisely
what some of us are working towards in creating DiEM25 – the
Democracy in Europe Movement, with a view to conjuring up a
democratic surge across Europe, a common European identity, an
authentic European sovereignty, an internationalist bulwark against
both submission to Brussels and hyper-nationalist reaction.
The EU’s very
existence depends on Britain staying in
Is this not utopian?
Of course it is! But not more so than the notion that the current EU
can survive its anti-democratic hubris, and the gross incompetence
fuelled by its unaccountability. Or the idea that British or Greek
democracy can be revived in the bosom of a nation-state whose
sovereignty will never be restored within a single market controlled
by Brussels.
Just like in the
early 1930s, Britain and Greece cannot escape Europe by building a
mental or legislative wall behind which to hide. Either we band
together to democratise – or we suffer the consequences of a
pan-European nightmare that no border can keep out.
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