The United Kingdom was always a fragile illusion
– but what will replace it?
Alex Niven
There’s an astonishing lack of thinking about how to
address the radical implications of Britain’s disintegration
‘Many think the UK in its current form is probably
doomed, and that the break up of the union is inevitable.’
Thu 3 Jun
2021 09.00 BST
There is a
famous quote from the Italian writer Antonio Gramsci: “The old is dying and the
new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms
appear.”
His
argument could equally apply to the United Kingdom. Many think the UK in its
current form is probably doomed, and that the break up of the union is
inevitable. But outside the various nationalist causes, few people seem to have
a clear idea about what should replace the dying dream of unionism.
With a
pro-independence majority installed in the Holyrood parliament, it seems almost
certain that Scotland will achieve independence in the near-ish future. Meanwhile,
spurred on by Brexit and the destabilising impact of Covid-19, Northern
Ireland’s place in the union looks increasingly precarious — with a majority of
its citizens expecting Irish reunification in the next 25 years. Even in Wales,
where opposition to the UK is modest by comparison, calls for independence are
growing louder by the year.
In stark
contrast, the unionist cause is beleaguered. While Scottish, Irish and Welsh
nationalist movements have gained in strength, underlined by the SNP’s decisive
breakthrough in the May elections, the union has become a hazy, marginal idea
that is rarely articulated with much confidence or sense of belief.
Part of the
problem is that British unionism has always been a fragile concept, underpinned
by confused, overly broad notions of Englishness. The series of conquests and
treaties that paved the way for the formation of the UK were almost all led by
England (even if, as with the 1707 Act of Union that joined Scotland with
England and Wales, there was often the pretence of an equal partnership).
Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the rise of an “Anglo-British” state
benefited English interests enormously, while more partial gains were awarded
to its fellow nations.
But in the
longer term, England’s ambiguous role within the union and its empire was a
problem when it came to more fundamental questions of identity. In order to
absorb the surrounding nations of the British Isles, and then other territories
throughout the world as the empire grew, England had to sacrifice its sense of
self to the much vaguer notion of Britishness – an identity so wide and loose
it could be applied to almost the entire world.
Underneath
it all, instead of a coherent nation state with a written constitution lay the
United Kingdom – a pragmatic trade venture held together for three centuries by
the astonishing material success of the British empire (not to mention, of
course, the often brutal actions of its armed forces).
Fast
forward to the 21st century, when the empire is a distant memory, and most
people find it difficult to make a case for the union without resorting to
vague cliches about tradition and togetherness (sometimes joined, at the
liberal end of the spectrum, by well-meaning, but equally vague, talk of multiculturalism).
While more
coherent Scottish, Welsh and Irish identities have developed in opposition to
the hollowed-out, post-imperial UK, confusion reigns in England about our
constitutional future and the union’s place within it. Many in the liberal centre
– like some of the celebrities who signed a letter in 2014 opposing Scottish
independence – are affluent English people who simply like the idea of being on
the same geopolitical team as Scotland and Wales (often, it would seem, because
of distant family ties or fond memories of holidays in picturesque parts of
these countries).
A more
nuanced approach is taken by older unionist establishment figures across the
British Isles. The former prime minister Gordon Brown has talked recently about
the “everyday benefits” of the union – making a strong case for constitutional
reforms to the UK that would prevent it from breaking apart entirely. Yet this
latter-day New Labour strategy, whose support is strongest among the sorts of
free-market voices Brown indulged when he was running the millennial economy,
seems unlikely to succeed at a time when the ideals of the Blair years are
widely seen as yesterday’s news.
Meanwhile,
ironically, the electorally dominant Conservative and Unionist party seems to
have accepted deep down that the union is a busted flush, and adapted to this
new political reality. While some in the Johnson government, such as Michael
Gove, have made token attempts to bang the drum for unionism, the Tory grandee
Chris Patten was probably right to claim recently that the Conservatives are
now an “English nationalist” party in all but name. With a large majority based
almost entirely in English seats, and mindful of the SNP’s continuing
stranglehold on Scotland, it makes sense for the Tories to consolidate their
power base in England.
Like that
other failed unionism of recent times – the campaign for Britain to remain in
the European Union – support for the United Kingdom is hampered by association
with a status quo that many people in the British Isles feel has not worked for
them. And when arguments for unionism have cut through, as in the 2014 Scottish
independence referendum, they have tended to rely on anxieties about the
alternative (“project fear”) rather than deep-seated optimism about the UK
itself.
As the
union limps on – for a while – with the aid of such small-c conservatism, there
is an astonishing lack of thinking, especially in England, about how to respond
to the rising tide of nationalism in the British Isles. While the Conservatives
seem likely to retain unionism’s traditional symbols (monarchy, patriotism, imperial
nostalgia) in a rump UK encompassing England and perhaps Wales, far too many
people on the English left simply haven’t stopped to consider the radical
implications of the imminent break-up of Britain – namely, the risk of an
eternally conservative Greater England rushing into the gap. In progressive
circles, a sort of somnolent unionism founded in distaste for nationalism is
still too often a default stance.
Those on
the radical left are sometimes fond of invoking the dream of a world with “no
borders”. There is much to be said for this idea in the abstract, but it will
not be much help as we look for a workable future for the British Isles beyond
the UK. Should that future be based on a reimagining of England on federal
lines, or even actual independence for its constituent parts? Should we start
to plan for a more modern, informal version of unionism in the event of
Scottish independence and Irish reunification? The time to answer these urgent
questions is now, because the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland is heading for the history books.
Alex Niven
is a lecturer in English literature at Newcastle University and the author of
New Model Island
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