 |
Rui Machete, ex-Presidente da Fundação Luso-Americana para o
Desenvolvimento, em Lisboa.
O plano para afastar Rui Machete.
Telegrama confidencial acusa Rui Machete, ex-presidente da
FLAD, de gastos sumptuários e de se recusar a prestar contas à embaixada dos
EUA.
Luísa Meireles (www.expresso.pt)
17:11 Terça feira, 1 de março de 2011
É um retrato arrasador e um desentendimento antigo.
Sucessivos embaixadores americanos em Lisboa acusam Rui Machete, ex-presidente
da Fundação Luso-Americana (FLAD), de má gestão e aproveitamento pessoal do
cargo e consideram que ele deve sair.
"Chegou a hora de decapitar Machete", escreve o
embaixador Thomas Stephenson em 2008, que propunha "lançar uma nova
campanha para mudar a direcção da FLAD". Em 1992, um outro diplomata,
Everett Briggs, já referia que "enquanto Machete estiver lá, só
marginalmente a FLAD nos pode ser útil".
É num extenso telegrama datado de 15 de dezembro de 2008
("Problemas na Fundação Luso-Americana"), que o primeiro daqueles
embaixadores traça um retrato impiedoso de Machete, ao ponto de sugerir ao seu
Governo que reconsidere a sua participação na instituição.
O diplomata afirma que Rui Machete "obteve o cargo como
prémio de consolação depois de ter perdido o lugar de ministro numa mudança de
Governo em 1985" e que "tem sido há muito um crítico dos EUA, que
sempre resistiu à intervenção da embaixada". Sem contemplações, afirma que
"tem ligações nos dois maiores partidos", sendo "suspeito de
atribuir bolsas para pagar favores políticos e manter a sua sinecura".
Machete sempre se opôs a uma supervisão independente, prestação de contas
profissional e uma revisão transparente dos programas da instituição, acusa.
Stephenson relata que, em 1992, as despesas de funcionamento
da FLAD eram de 60% dos seus rendimentos e apenas 40% se destinavam à
programação. "Hoje", escreve, "este número é um pouco melhor,
mas a FLAD continua a gastar 46% do seu orçamento de funcionamento nos seus
gabinetes luxuosos decorados com peças de arte, pessoal supérfluo, uma frota de
BMW com motorista e 'custos administrativos e de pessoal' que incluem por vezes
despesas de representação em roupas, empréstimos a baixos juros para os
trabalhadores e honorários para o pessoal que participa nos próprios programas
da FLAD".
Os americanos consideram que os 111,9 milhões de dólares
(cerca de 81,6 milhões de euros) que doaram a Portugal entre 1985 e 92 para
criar a fundação lhes dão um "direito de supervisão responsável"
sobre a gestão. Era o dinheiro dos "contribuintes americanos".
Percebe-se que, desde o princípio, há duas visões sobre a
FLAD. Enquanto os americanos a encaram como um meio de ajudar Portugal a
desenvolver-se económica e culturalmente, inicialmente com um tempo limite de
sete anos, desde cedo Rui Machete a vê como um instrumento mais amplo. "Os
americanos nunca perceberam que a fundação é uma instituição portuguesa, que
como tal defende os seus interesses, que em grande parte até coincidem com os
americanos", disse o ex-presidente da FLAD ao Expresso. Esse
desentendimento de base vai levar a que as relações oscilem, dependendo dos
embaixadores, muitos dos quais não são de carreira. "Praticamente desde o
início dos anos 90 todos os embaixadores americanos pediram a Machete para
cumprir com os seus deveres de lealdade ou afastar-se, mas sem resultado",
escreve Stephenson.
Outro dos pontos de discórdia era "a tática favorita de
Machete", segundo diz, de distribuir ao conselho diretivo documentos-chave
apenas com dias ou horas de antecedência para "evitar discussões que
possam ir contra os seus objetivos". Segundo os estatutos, a fundação tem
um conselho diretivo de nove membros, sendo sete nomeados pelo
primeiro-ministro e dois pelo embaixador americano. Quanto ao presidente do
conselho executivo (três membros), também é nomeado pelo PM. Um dos membros é
apontado pelos americanos.
Com o andar dos tempos e o avolumar da crise, as campainhas
começam a tocar mais fortemente. Em 2008 e 2009, Stephenson apela
"repetidamente" a uma reforma da FLAD e a cortes no orçamento, que
considera "irrealista e insustentável". Aponta, em 2008, casos concretos
de gastos inúteis: "10 mil euros para um seminário sobre inovação nas
instalações da FLAD; 89 mil para uma conferência sobre Franklin Roosevelt nos
Açores; 15 mil por trimestre para uma empresa de relações públicas com ligações
políticas" (a contratação da LPM para dar assessoria de comunicação). Tudo
casos que também não foram pacíficos na fundação. Por último, o embaixador
aponta uma conferência na África do Sul, "sem relação discernível com os
Estados Unidos ou as relações bilaterais". As relações com África,
valorizadas pelo antigo presidente como "essenciais para Portugal",
nunca foram aceites pelos americanos.
Quanto a Machete, considera que há um "ataque
pessoal" e que as acusações não têm fundamento: "são factos que
objetivamente se podem provar que não são exatos", nomeadamente quanto ao
património. As contas da FLAD atestam, de facto, que os seus ativos alcançam (a
1.1.2010) cerca de 155 milhões de euros. No final do seu mandato, eram de 130,5
milhões (sem contar com a sede). Quanto à coleção de arte, hoje em depósito em
Serralves, as suas mil peças custaram 180 mil contos (quase 900 mil euros) e
valem, para efeitos de seguro, seis milhões de euros. O investimento de oito
milhões nas energias renováveis, muito contestado, rendeu, em 2010, mais valias
de 24 milhões. Machete gaba-se da "total independência" com que
exerceu o cargo e assume que acabou por sair "cansado dos aborrecimentos
com embaixadores". Despediu-se com uma festa onde esteve presente Cavaco
Silva.
Este é o telegrama integral divulgado pelo Wikileaks:
C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 002780 SIPDIS E.O. 12958:
DECL: 12/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], AMGT [Management
Operations], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], OEXC [Educational and Cultural
Exchange Operations], SCUL [Cultural Affairs], PO [Portugal; Azores; Madeira
Islands]
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: PROBLEMS AT THE LUSO-AMERICAN FOUNDATION
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS STEPHENSON, FOR REASONS
1.4B AND D.
1. (C) SUMMARY: In 1985, with the USAID mission to Portugal
closing its doors, the U.S. and Portuguese governments created the
Luso-American Development Foundation (FLAD) in Lisbon to address Portugal’s
development challenges and to promote U.S.-Portuguese cooperation. The USG
subsequently contributed some $111 million to FLAD, but during the past two
decades the Embassy’s efforts to exercise responsible oversight over FLAD’s
financial management have been thwarted by the foundation’s leadership,
creating deep and continuous friction between FLAD and the Embassy. We propose
to wage another campaign to change FLAD’s direction, but failing that, we must
consider whether our continued participation in this institution is in the
USG’s interest. End Summary. FLAD’S EARLY YEARS ——————
2. (U) In 1983, Portuguese PM Balsemao and President Reagan
announced the creation of the Luso-American Development Foundation (FLAD) in
Lisbon. The announcement grew out of the imminent closure of the USAID mission
in Portugal and the recognition of the importance of carrying on development
and bilateral cooperation projects. In 1985 FLAD opened its doors as the USG
provided an initial endowment of $38 million. USG contributions to FLAD
eventually totaled $111 million, much of which was in the form of Economic
Support Funds (ESF) that the U.S. provided to Portugal through 1992. When ESF
funding ended in 1992, FLAD no longer received any external financing and its
revenue then derived solely from its endowment and investments.
3. (SBU) FLAD’s stated mission is to contribute “to the
economic and social development of Portugal through the promotion of
scientific, technical, cultural, educational, commercial, and business
cooperation between Portugal and the United States.” It was envisioned as a
short-term program to help boost Portugal to a development level commensurate
with the rest of the EU, which Portugal joined in 1986. Thus, FLAD’s goal was
to spend 75 percent of its available funds each year on grants for development,
education and science projects.
4. (C) In 1987, then-Prime Minister (and now President)
Cavaco Silva reorganized the foundation in a move likely aimed at tightening
GOP control over its programming and budget. Key authorities were moved from
the Board of Directors (where the U.S. Ambassador has a seat) to the day-to-day
executive council (where he does not). U.S. Ambassador Rowell objected to this
and other decisions and suspended his participation on the Board. According to
our files, the foundation stopped holding Board meetings altogether in the late
1980s, effectively shielding itself from all oversight.
5. (C) In 1990, U.S. Ambassador Briggs tried a different
approach. Although it was largely a symbolic gesture since the Board had not
met in years, Briggs formally resigned from the Board because of his role in
negotiating the new bilateral agreement regarding U.S. use of Lajes Air Base in
the Azores (which he viewed as presenting a conflict with his FLAD duties).
Shortly after, a member of the U.S. Congress contacted the Embassy requesting
information about FLAD’s management and oversight, but FLAD Director Rui
Machete refused to respond, saying FLAD operations were “none of your
business.”
6. (C) The tension came to a head in 1992 when the Embassy
directly approached Prime Minister Cavaco Silva seeking clarification of
reports that FLAD Director Rui Machete had offered FLAD business to companies
in which he had a stake. Machete admitted no wrongdoing but did terminate one
key contract. Separately in 1992, the USG’s sunsetting of Portugal’s ESF
program ended all U.S. funding to FLAD. While the decision to cut off ESF
funding was objectively based on Portugal’s national development levels, the
GOP evidently believed it was a response to allegations of mismanagement.
Shortly after the dustup over the Congressional inquiry and a separate
independent study of FLAD’s management, the foundation resumed its semi-annual
Board meetings, and the U.S. Ambassador returned to the Board of Directors. On
the nine-member Board, the U.S. ambassador holds one seat and the right to
nominate a second director. THE LAST MAN STANDING ———————
7. (C) Rui Machete, a lawyer and politician who held cabinet
positions in the 1983-85 Portuguese government (including Minister of Justice
and Deputy Prime Minister) has been FLAD’s director since 1988, getting the job
as a consolation prize after he lost his cabinet post in the change of
government in 1985. Machete has long been critical of the U.S. and has resisted
embassy participation at every turn. He is wired into both major political
parties and is suspected of disbursing FLAD grants to curry political favor and
maintain his sinecure. Machete has historically opposed all efforts at
independent oversight, professional accounting practices, and transparent review
of FLAD’s programs. Since the early 1990s, nearly every U.S. ambassador has
urged Machete to carry out his fiduciary duties or step aside, but to no avail:
– (C) In 1992, Ambassador Briggs reported that, “As long as Machete is there,
FLAD can only be marginally useful to us.” The foundation’s overhead then was
60% of revenue, leaving only 40% for actual programming. Today, this figure is
only somewhat better as FLAD continues to spend 46% of its budget on overhead
for its luxurious art-adorned offices, bloated staff, fleet of chauffeured
BMWs, and on “personnel and administrative costs” that has included at times
wardrobe allowances, low-interest loans to staff, and honoraria for staffers
participating in FLAD’s own programs. – (C) The Boris Report, a 1993
independent review conducted in the U.S., noted that the Board of Directors was
excluded from planning and was given inadequate briefing materials before their
semi-annual meetings. (Comment: this is a favorite Machete tactic and continues
to this day: key documents for the Board’s consideration are distributed by
Machete only days, and in some cases hours, before Board meetings to avoid
informed discussions that might run counter to his objectives.) The Boris
Report also recommended that FLAD develop investment goals and restructure its
endowment portfolio to guarantee its long-term viability; this has not been
done. – (C) In June 2006,
in response to Ambassador Hoffman’s criticisms, Machete
suddenly announced that he had approached Prime Minister Socrates with proposed
changes to FLAD’s bylaws that would grant the GOP full control over the
foundation and wholly eliminate the U.S. ambassador from the Board. Ambassador
Hoffman protested to then-Foreign Minister Amaral, who was our designated GOP
contact on the issue. Serendipitously, FM Amaral resigned a week later for
unrelated health reasons and Machete’s plan was quietly shelved. – (C) Since
late 2007, in
Board meetings and in private discussions Ambassador Stephenson has repeatedly
called on FLAD to reform itself and cut overhead, pointing out that the 2008
and 2009 budgets were unrealistic and unsustainable, given difficult market
conditions, and would result in a diminished endowment. Both budgets were
approved by the Board over the Ambassador’s objections. Another Board member,
who shares our concerns, points out that not only is the budget built on
excessive overhead and unrealistic forecasts for the endowment, but Machete’s
promises to improve the accounting and transparency underlying the budget process
have not been met.
8. (C) In 2008, beyond its overhead costs, FLAD spent 1.5
million euros on actual grants to fund projects such as: 10,000 euros for an
Innovation Seminar held at FLAD’s offices; 89,000 euros for a conference about
Franklin Roosevelt in the Azores; and 15,000 euros per quarter to a
politically-connected public relations firm. Previous foundation boondoggles
have included a conference in South Africa with no discernable connection to
the United States or bilateral relations.
9. (C) Ambassador Stephenson had a frank conversation last
week with FLAD Director Rui Machete, who appeared to accept the Ambassador’s
grim diagnosis of the foundation’s ills, even speculating aloud about the
challenge of cutting staff under Portuguese labor laws. Machete confided that
he is stepping down in 2010, on FLAD’s 25th anniversary, and would like to make
progress on reforms before then. Machete said that the issue should be first
raised privately with Prime Minister Socrates, who could provide political
cover and possibly assistance in addressing labor and other vexing issues.
Ambassador Stephenson tentatively agreed to participate in a meeting with the
Prime Minister –if the Ambassador is still here after January 20. COMMENT: TIME
FOR MACHETE TO GET THE AXE —————————————–
10. (C) FLAD’s portfolio in November 2007 was 122 million
euro. By November 2008 this had shrunk to 106 million euro. At this pace, FLAD
could burn through the entire endowment by about 2014. While this money is no
longer on the USG’s books, it originally came from the U.S. taxpayer with the
goal of strengthening bilateral cooperation and supporting development
projects. In spite of our long-running and high-level best efforts, we believe
the current FLAD management is unable and unwilling to face economic reality
and will fritter away the endowment — preferring to go over a cliff with the
status quo rather than make the wrenching reforms necessary to put the
foundation on the path to solvency and responsible planning. Two decades of the
current leadership have not been good for FLAD, and its alienation from the US
Embassy is both a cause and a symptom of the disease.
11. (C) The Embassy proposes to wage one more campaign to
change FLAD’s direction via pressure on Machete and discussions with the
highest level of the GOP. We are somewhat encouraged by Machete’s acceptance at
last week’s meeting of the need for deep, immediate reforms, but he has made
many empty promises to many U.S. Ambassadors over the years. We will believe in
changes at the foundation only when we see them, and failing that, we must
consider whether our continued participation in this institution remains in the
USG’s interest. STEPHENSON
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário