ARTICLE
Biden’s decision to pull troops from Afghanistan
risks a major refugee crisis
Kemal
Kirişci and Fulya MemisogluMonday, April 26, 2021
Editor's
Note: President Biden’s decision to bring the remaining U.S. troops home from
Afghanistan by Sept. 11 could potentially launch a mass exodus of refugees
fleeing Afghanistan and spark another migration crisis, argues Kemal Kirişci
and Fulya Memisoglu. Given Biden’s campaign promise to revive U.S. “moral
leadership,” the United States must devise concrete ways to protect Afghan
refugees. This article originally appeared on Just Security.
President
Joe Biden’s decision to bring the remaining U.S. troops home from Afghanistan
by Sept. 11, the 20th anniversary of al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States
that launched America’s longest war, has prompted an array of criticism.
Mainly, commentators argue that the Taliban now has the upper hand, with no
incentive to negotiate with the Afghan government, and that it is unlikely to
respect the fragile gains made on democracy, freedom of expression, and
especially the empowerment of women. Intelligence analysts predict a civil war
and potential resurgence of al-Qaeda, as happened after the U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq.
But these
reactions leave out another potentially catastrophic ramification that is
likely to flow from any of those consequences, and might even occur in
anticipation of the shift: a mass exodus of refugees fleeing Afghanistan that
could spark another migration crisis.
While
perhaps not immediately affecting U.S. security, such mass displacement risks
adversely impacting America’s allies across the Atlantic, especially the
European Union (EU). During the summer of 2015, the arrival in Europe on foot
of more than a million refugees, mostly Syrian, resembled a “new odyssey” and
shook the very foundations of the EU. It would be difficult to ignore a
connection between the decision of the Obama administration to pull U.S. troops
out of Iraq in 2011, the rise of ISIS three years later, the ensuing regional
insecurity marked by its brutal rule over a swath of Iraqi and Syrian territory,
and how this led to additional displacement of Syrians beyond those who had
already fled to neighboring countries. Furthermore, U.S. inaction in the face
of such a displacement crisis, should it occur in the case of Afghanistan,
would further damage U.S. standing in global affairs, especially when Biden is
seeking to reassert U.S. “moral leadership” globally.
As the U.S.
military begins the final phase of its drawdown on May 1, it is urgent to begin
thinking about a potential response to such a mass displacement.
THE
TROUBLED DESTINY OF AFGHANS
Beginning
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Afghan civilians have suffered
a long history of displacement. In the 1980s and 1990s, they constituted by far
the largest refugee population in the world, mostly living in Pakistan and
Iran. Their situation became protracted, as none of the traditional durable
solutions in the form of voluntary return, resettlement, and local integration
were available to them in any significant manner. The Taliban’s arrival in
Afghanistan in 1996 provoked further displacement once it consolidated its
harsh rule over the country.
Only after
the U.S.-led NATO intervention in 2001 and the arrival of some modicum of
stability did Afghans begin to return. And they did so en masse. Since 2002, a
voluntary repatriation program supported by the United Nations Refugee Agency
(UNHCR) facilitated the return of nearly 5.3 million refugees, although the
returns have slowed considerably in recent years.
At the end
of 2019, Afghans still constituted the third-largest forcibly displaced
population in the world, at almost 6 million refugees and internally displaced
people, with some 380,000 added in 2020 alone. Due to persistent insecurity and
instability in Afghanistan, coupled with economic and environmental challenges,
external and internal displacement are often intertwined, as people are forced
to move repeatedly either within the country or across borders. Although the Afghan economy has almost
doubled in size since 2007, Afghanistan still ranks 169th (out of 189
countries) on the U.N.’s 2020 Human Development Index, particularly due to its
fragile education and healthcare systems. As one expert noted, under these
conditions, Afghans have long used mobility as a coping mechanism, “and they
are unlikely to stop any time soon.” Scarce socio-economic prospects in
neighboring Iran and Pakistan, which host 87 percent of Afghan refugees, is
leading to secondary migration by Afghan youth and some desperate families
hoping to find sustainable livelihoods in Europe.
UNKNOWN
DESTINATION
Unsurprisingly,
Afghans are among the top nationalities seeking asylum in the EU or apprehended
by European authorities as irregular migrants, and they were the second-largest
group that traveled to Europe during the 2015-16 migration crisis. But the
number of Afghan arrivals decreased considerably after the implementation of
the EU-Turkey Statement of March 18, 2016, under which Turkey agreed to accept
Syrians returned from the EU and help prevent further migration to the bloc
(via Greece) in exchange for 6 billion euros of financial assistance and a
promise to resettle one Syrian refugee for every irregular migrant Turkey took
back from Greece. As a result, EU arrivals dropped from 37,494 between January
and March 2016 to 2,778 in the following nine months.
But in
2019, Afghan arrivals to the EU doubled. By early 2020, they were the largest
group among all sea arrivals to Greece (36 percent), before numbers once again
declined due to movement restrictions implemented in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Asylum applications in the “EU+” area (30 countries, including 26 of
the 27 EU members and four that use the Schengen visa regime: Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) dropped 43 percent between February and
March 2020 due to such restrictions. In the first two months of that year,
Afghans had constituted the second-largest group of applicants (13,245).
In the
meantime, Turkey has become a destination and a vital hub for Afghans heading
towards Europe. The March 2016 EU-Turkey agreement required the Turkish
government to close its borders to onward irregular migration to be able to
benefit from the EU funds it was promised to support Syrian refugees, leaving
most Afghans with no way forward, even irregularly. According to the Turkish
migration agency, almost half a million Afghan irregular migrants were
apprehended between 2014 and 2020, jumping from 45,259 in 2017 to 100,841 in
2018, and reaching 201,437 in 2019. These figures are only the tip of the
iceberg, as it is very difficult to estimate the actual number of Afghans
irregularly present in Turkey. Afghans also constitute the second-largest group
of asylum-seekers in Turkey, at 116,400 asylum applications. This was driven in
part by increased secondary movements of Afghans from Iran to Turkey due to
Iran’s sharp economic downturn in 2018, following the reimposition of U.S.
sanctions when the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal.
Syrian
refugees enjoy a legally defined status in Turkey and benefit from access to
public services and social assistance, and they feel increasingly settled. But
Afghans, especially those who are undocumented, find that their lives are on
hold in Turkey’s big cities and struggle to earn enough to support themselves
and their families. They also face a constant threat of deportation.
Not
surprisingly, nearly 50 percent of Afghans in a recent survey indicated they
had not reached the end of their migration journey and intended to move onward
to Europe, citing a lack of secure legal status and access to employment in
Turkey. Hence, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in February 2020
carried out his longstanding threat to the EU that “We will open the gates and
send 3.6 million refugees your way” and precipitated a major migration crisis
again, many more Afghans turned up at the Greek border than Syrians.
In a future
exodus from Afghanistan, the migrants would again most likely make their way
West to Iran and Turkey. But unlike in 2015-2016, new mass migration this time
may occur amid a still-raging pandemic, considering the slow pace of
improvement and vaccination in most countries. In Afghanistan, for starters,
the ongoing conflict, a weak healthcare system, an insistence on tradition, and
a general lack of reliable public information has left most Afghans simply
denying the reality of the coronavirus. While a vaccination campaign has begun,
the health ministry hopes to reach only 20 percent of the population by the end
of this year.
The next
likely stop for any Afghan refugee, Iran, has suffered the worst COVID-19
outbreak in the Middle East and has seen its economy crippled by a combination
of U.S. sanctions and the raging pandemic. The country recently implemented a
10-day lockdown with a fourth surge of infections. Turkey’s daily number of
reported cases soared from 5,642 on Jan. 25 to a peak of 63,082 on April 16,
the highest level since the government began to share these figures with the
public at the end of November. Though Turkey’s vaccination campaign had been
proceeding rapidly, delays in the supply of China’s Sinovac inoculation caused
a stumble. Health Minister Fahrettin Koca recently announced that “vaccine
diplomacy” has ramped up to obtain whatever vaccines are available.
In the
meantime, Iran’s less welcoming environment for Afghan refugees and migrants
took a new turn in late 2020 under a draft law targeting undocumented Afghans.
Such a policy may trigger further secondary movements to Europe via Turkey. It
is unlikely that Turkey would be able to stop such an influx. Turkey currently
hosts the largest refugee population globally and could face another wave of
displacement from Syria should Russia give the Syrian regime the green light to
reclaim territory under opposition and Turkish control. Furthermore, the
Turkish economy is doing poorly, and public opposition to the government’s policy
of hosting Syrian refugees is intense.
Under these
circumstances, a new migration crisis is not difficult to imagine. If the EU
and its member, Greece, choose to close the border and use force to repel
Afghan refugees, this would not only provoke a humanitarian catastrophe, but
also lead to a huge standoff pitting Greece, the EU, and Turkey – all U.S.
allies – against each other. With the EU’s own difficulties in bringing the
COVID-19 pandemic under control, the impact of such a combined health and migration
crisis might carry much more serious consequences for the EU’s stability than
the migrant crisis in 2015-16, further undermining EU institutions and fueling
right-wing populism.
WHAT TO DO?
Secretary
Blinken has sought to reassure Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Afghan High
Commission for National Reconciliation Chair Abdullah Abdullah of U.S. support
for “our shared investment in Afghanistan and the importance of preserving the
gains of the last 20 years, especially in building a strong civil society and
protecting the rights of women and girls.” Time will tell whether that pledge
will have meaning. A realistic assumption is that, once U.S. forces depart, the
Taliban may be able to take over once again and reinstate the harsh rule that
made it notorious in the 1990s. It also may again provide fertile ground for
international terrorism threatening the United States and its allies.
Now is the
time to devise concrete ways to protect the hard-won gains that Afghans
achieved with the help of the United States and its allies, before the Afghans
who cherish that progress begin to flee their country in large numbers. There
should be an additional effort made, for example, to accelerate efforts to bring
to the United States those Afghans and their families who assisted Americans
and U.S. institutions there, since they are likely to face heightened risks to
their lives as U.S. forces withdraw.
Additionally,
a proactive dialogue with the EU as well as with transit countries such as Iran
and Turkey will be of paramount importance if a major humanitarian crisis with
severe political consequences is to be avoided. How to render humanitarian
assistance to refugees while preventing further spread of the coronavirus will
be an important part of this dialogue, in addition to exploring ways to ensure
that these refugees do not join the ranks of their predecessors who still live
in limbo.
To do this,
a global comprehensive plan to help resettle Afghan refugees will be needed,
perhaps one akin to the 1989 “Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese
Refugees” that was adopted for the “boat people” fleeing Vietnam in the
aftermath of the 1975 fall of Saigon. But that plan was devised only after
years of mass displacement and after earlier agreements to address the crisis
had failed. The United States and its allies should learn from those
experiences and take proactive steps this time.
Given
Biden’s campaign promise to revive U.S. “moral leadership” in defense of refugees
and a rules-based international order, such an initiative would be imperative.
It would also be in line with the principle of burden-sharing for the
protection of refugees enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, adopted as part of U.S. led post-World War II international
order, and reiterated in the Global Compact on Refugees adopted in December
2018.
The Biden
administration’s recent missteps on increasing U.S. refugee resettlement quotas
are an indicator that a forward-thinking, multilateral response will be
necessary, due to the sharp political divisions facing the U.S. immigration
debate. Afghans, for one, will need more opportunities for resettlement in the
United States than the meagre 16,300 places they were granted between 1987 and
2015. The administration will need to accompany such efforts with a domestic
communication strategy to defuse the all-too-common opposition to immigration
among skeptical Americans and promote the benefits, both in foreign policy and
to the economy, of accepting Afghan – or any – refugees and other migrants.
An America
that actively protects the less fortunate, including by supporting refugees,
would serve its own national security interests by bolstering its economic
dynamism at home, enhancing its reputation in a global “battle of ideas,”
heightening U.S. “soft power,” and helping stabilize countries in the Middle
East and even in Europe that host the majority of migrants. A renewed emphasis
on human rights through supporting refugees would strengthen the hand of an
American administration confronting China, Russia, and other authoritarian
regimes on their rights abuses.
Finally,
and possibly most importantly, such a proactive policy response coinciding with
July’s 70th anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention would demonstrate the
political will and the leadership not to repeat the mistakes the international
community made before World War II, when the United States and others turned
away Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany. Those decisions and their
consequences have been a source of perpetual horror and shame for the United
States and the international community ever since. The Biden administration has
an opportunity to prevent such wholesale neglect of refugees going forward.
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