Marine Le Pen Looks Like the Mainstream Because
the Mainstream Looks Like Her
April 20,
2022
By
Rim-Sarah Alouane
Ms. Alouane
is a researcher at the Toulouse 1 Capitole University who writes often about
French politics and culture.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/opinion/le-pen-france-election.html
TOULOUSE,
France — In 2017, we thought we’d seen the worst French politics could offer.
Marine Le
Pen, the far-right leader, had made it through to the second round of the
country’s presidential elections. For the first time since 2002, a far-right
figure was in the runoff to become president — and with considerably more
support. When Ms. Le Pen lost to Emmanuel Macron, albeit with a worrying 34
percent share of the vote, we breathed a collective sigh of relief. Many hoped
Ms. Le Pen, after falling at the final hurdle, would fade into obscurity.
It was not
to be. Ms. Le Pen never went away, instead biding her time and preparing for
the next tilt at power. She now has more chance of winning it than ever: After
taking 23 percent in the first round, she’s within eight points of Mr. Macron
in the second, on April 24. She’s benefited from the presence of the even more
hard-line Éric Zemmour, whose lurid reactionary persona made Ms. Le Pen seem,
by contrast, more reasonable. Yet she’s also embarked on a comprehensive effort
to soften her image, renaming her party, downplaying the harsher elements of
her platform and presenting herself as a warm, even folksy woman who loves her
cats.
But no one
should be fooled. At the head of a party that long housed Nazi collaborators,
Ms. Le Pen is an authoritarian whose deeply racist and Islamophobic politics
threaten to turn France into an outright illiberal state. She may pretend to be
a regular politician, but she remains as dangerous as ever. For the good of
minorities and France itself, she must not prevail.
If Ms. Le
Pen looks more mainstream now, it’s because the mainstream looks more like her.
In the years running up to the last election, she ran on a hard-right platform,
stoking antagonism toward immigrants and French Muslims under the guise of
protecting public order. She especially targeted minorities, “to whom,” she
said bitterly, “everything is due and to whom we give everything.” In response
to her success in 2017, nearly every party on the political spectrum —
centrist, traditional right wing and even socialist — used the talking points
of her party, now named National Rally (formerly National Front).
The tenor
of political discussion, as a result, has shifted substantially to the right.
There is now barely any space in French politics to advocate for French
citizens who don’t look, behave, pray or eat the way “traditional” French
people are supposed to — let alone to champion the rights of immigrants and
refugees. In this environment, Ms. Le Pen can turn her attention to more
everyday issues, such as rising energy bills and the cost of living, safe in
the knowledge that on immigration, citizenship and “national identity,” she’s
already won the argument.
That
success didn’t happen overnight. For more than 30 years now, French political
debate has centered itself around issues of identity at the expense of more
pressing topics such as health care, climate change, unemployment and poverty.
The far right has led the way. Exploiting feelings of decline at the end of the
1960s — as France shed its colonial empire, lost the war in Algeria and
submitted to American domination of Western Europe — the far right became a
potent political force. It used its influence to defend its conception of
French identity, evoking a thousand-year-old European Christian civilization
threatened by North African Muslim immigration.
This was
the foundation upon which the National Front was created in 1972 by Ms. Le
Pen’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. As people from France’s former colonies
migrated to the metropole, the party focused obsessively on the supposed
dangers of immigration. Mr. Le Pen’s tone was often apocalyptic: “Tomorrow,” he
infamously said in 1984, “immigrants will stay with you, eat your soup and
sleep with your wife, your daughter or your son.” Such rancorous resentment
found some sympathy in certain quarters of French society, where the
homogenizing effects of globalization and the increased visibility of Islam
among French-born citizens were held to be stripping France of its essential
character.
This
antipathy took in many targets, among them French Jews. Mr. Le Pen was
notorious for his antisemitic remarks — for which he was condemned by the
courts multiple times — and the party created in his image trafficked in
antisemitic ideas, tropes and images. Though Ms. Le Pen claimed to be moving
past her father’s fixation on Jews, she continued to fan the flames — refusing
in 2017 to accept France’s culpability for the Vichy regime’s role in the
Holocaust and even, in a campaign poster this April, appearing to make a
gesture associated with neo-Nazis. Capped by Mr. Zemmour’s open embrace of the
Vichy regime, antisemitism has re-entered the political mainstream.
Muslims
have similarly borne the brunt of bigotry. Initially considered a threat from
elsewhere — supposedly coming to France to deprive the native-born of jobs —
Muslims have in recent decades been viewed as an internal threat. With the rise
of Islamist terrorism, Muslims were seen to be practicing an inherently violent
religion that required containment by public authorities. To be a Muslim was to
be guilty until proved innocent.
The past
decade has taken this equation to a new level. The widespread fear now is not
that a handful of people among nearly six million Muslims might pose a danger
to public safety, but that all French Muslims by their very existence threaten
the cultural identity of “traditional France.” It is, for some voters, an
existential fear. In response, politicians have pushed measures to curb Islam’s
purported infringement on French life, such as banning religious attire in
public schools, full-face coverings in public spaces and burkinis on public
beaches, and passing a bill that gives the state power to monitor Muslim
religious observance and organizations.
To justify
such moves, politicians weaponized the liberal concept of laïcité — effectively
state-backed secularism — to restrict freedom of religion and conscience in the
interests of an anti-Muslim agenda. This process, crucially, has made it
possible for Ms. Le Pen to turn from radical firebrand to reasonable
truth-teller. But underneath the sheen of normalcy, the brutally racist ideology
her party pioneered over the past 30 years is very much intact.
Her
manifesto, for example, promises to amend the Constitution to prohibit the
settlement of a “a number of foreigners so large that it would change the
composition and identity of the French people” — a rewording of the
white-supremacist “Great Replacement” theory. She also plans to legally
distinguish between “native-born French” and “others” for access to housing,
employment and benefits, and allow citizenship only to people who have “earned
it and assimilated.” Completing the picture, Ms. Le Pen has said she would ban
the wearing of the head scarf in public spaces.
In these
promises as well as the company she keeps — she has associated with Vladimir
Putin, Bashar al-Assad and Viktor Orban — Ms. Le Pen has made clear her
intention to reshape France at home and abroad. Her administration would echo
those in Brazil, India and other countries where a similar rightward slide has
taken hold. For minorities, immigrants, dissidents and democracy itself, it
would be a disaster. Though her momentum appears to have stalled in recent
days, Ms. Le Pen is not going away, no matter what happens on Sunday. As a
French Muslim citizen born and raised here, I fear for my country.
And it is
my country, as much as it is Ms. Le Pen’s or Mr. Macron’s. At a time when
politicians and pundits are demanding Muslims “abide by republican values” if
they want to be part of the country, it’s instructive that voters may elect a
politician whose core ideology violates the values of liberty, equality and
fraternity that France has long championed. In that irony lies the gap between
what France could be and what it is.
Rim-Sarah
Alouane (@RimSarah) is a Ph.D. candidate and a researcher in comparative law at
Toulouse 1 Capitole University in France. Her research focuses on civil
liberties, constitutional law and human rights in Europe and North America.


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