How the E.U. Allowed Hungary to Become an
Illiberal Model
After years of complacency and wishful thinking, Brussels
is finally trying to rein in the country’s pugnacious leader, Prime Minister
Viktor Orban.
By Steven
Erlanger and Benjamin Novak
Jan. 3,
2022
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/world/europe/hungary-european-union.html
BRUSSELS —
After long indulging him, leaders in the European Union now widely consider
Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary an existential threat to a bloc that
holds itself up as a model of human rights and the rule of law.
Mr. Orban
has spent the past decade steadily building his “illiberal state,” as he
proudly calls Hungary, with the help of lavish E.U. funding. Even as his
project widened fissures in the bloc, which Hungary joined in 2004, his fellow
national leaders mostly looked the other way, committed to staying out of one
another’s affairs.
But now Mr.
Orban’s defiance and intransigence has had an important, if unintended, effect:
serving as a catalyst for an often-sluggish European Union system to act to
safeguard the democratic principles that are the foundation of the bloc.
Early this
year, the European Court of Justice will issue a landmark decision on whether
the union has the authority to make its funds to member states conditional on
meeting the bloc’s core values. Doing so would allow Brussels to deny billions
of euros to countries that violate those values.
The bloc
has consistently worked on political consensus among national leaders. But Mr.
Orban has pushed Brussels toward a threshold it had long avoided: making
membership subject to financial punishments, not merely political ones.
The new
frontier could help solve an old problem — what to do about bad actors in its
ranks — while creating new ones. Not least, it could invite the European Commission,
the bloc’s executive branch, to exercise a new level of interference in the
affairs of member states.
How Mr.
Orban has forced the European Union to such a juncture, and why it seemed
helpless to stop him for so long, says much about the bloc’s founding
assumptions and why it has stumbled in the face of populist and nationalist
challenges.
Interviews
with over a dozen current and former European officials show how sentiments
toward Mr. Orban and his illiberal project evolved from complacency and
incomprehension to a recognition that he had become a serious internal threat —
despite Hungary’s having fewer people than the Paris metropolitan area and a
language so esoteric that it bears no relationship to those of its neighbors.
The willful
neglect was encapsulated neatly in 2015 at a meeting, when Jean-Claude Juncker,
then the European Commission’s president, saw Mr. Orban arriving and said, “The
dictator is coming,” before greeting him with “dictator,” and giving him a
friendly pat on the face.
No one in
power wanted to confront Mr. Orban over issues like rule of law and corruption
— especially not his fellow national leaders, who each have a seat on the
powerful European Council.
“At the
council myself I felt the reluctance of Orban’s peers to deal with these kind
of issues,” said Luuk van Middelaar, an aide to Herman Van Rompuy when he was
council president. He added that the council was “like a club, where Viktor is
just one of them — and they are political animals, and they respect each other
for the simple fact of having won an election.”
The leaders
“prefer not to deal with hot potatoes or each other’s business when they can
avoid it,” Mr. van Middelaar said.
Mr. Orban
faces new elections this spring against a formally united but extremely diverse
set of opposition parties. But he has become a model for the politics of
identity and religion, not just in Poland but in the United States, as well.
On Monday,
former President Donald J. Trump endorsed Mr. Orban for re-election, pledging
“complete support.” Mr. Orban was an early supporter of Mr. Trump, endorsing
him in the summer of 2016 and again in 2020. Mr. Orban, said Mr. Trump, was
“probably, like me, a little bit controversial, but that’s OK.”
Some
European lawmakers recognized early on that Mr. Orban was trampling on
democratic norms but were stymied by national leaders, particularly those from
the European People’s Party, the powerful center-right political grouping that
has dominated the European Parliament for the past decade.
Among those
conservatives who protected Mr. Orban was Angela Merkel, the chancellor of
Germany at the time. German companies had major investments in Hungary, and Ms.
Merkel saw the Hungarian leader as a political ally in Brussels. One prominent
member of the European People’s Party said Ms. Merkel and her aides brushed off
complaints about Mr. Orban, saying that he could be difficult, but that it was
important to keep him in the family.
“The
biggest failing — the one that we are still paying the price for today — is the
European Council,” said Rui Tavares, a former European legislator who helped
write a report on Hungary’s violations adopted in 2013. “The European Council
did nothing.”
When Mr.
Orban proposed — and later introduced — a new Constitution that violated
European principles, Didier Reynders, then Belgium’s minister of foreign and
European affairs, said he tried to raise the problem in a meeting with E.U.
leaders in 2011 but was shut down.
“The
reaction was that this is not an issue for the member states,” said Mr.
Reynders, who is now the E.U. commissioner for justice, adding that “maybe the
commission, maybe the court” should deal with it.
“But now
it’s a permanent discussion,” he said.
Ivan
Krastev, a Bulgarian analyst of Europe, said Mr. Orban was careful for several
years after his election in 2010 “not to cross Brussels’s red lines but to
dance along them in what he called ‘the peacock dance.’”
Mr. Krastev
said many European leaders assumed that the nations that joined the bloc in
2004 would be grateful, relatively compliant partners and miscalculated how
“countries like Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic felt later that you have
to assert your own identity and reject Brussels to differing degrees.”
Mr. Orban’s
party adopted the new Constitution and a new media law that curbed press freedom.
It overhauled the country’s justice system, removed the head of its Supreme
Court and created an office to oversee the courts led by the wife of a
prominent member of the governing party, Fidesz. Election laws were changed to
favor the party.
External
factors strengthened Mr. Orban as well, including in 2015 when a record number
of migrants made their way to Europe and when the right-wing Law and Justice
party of Jaroslaw Kaczynski came to power in Poland. He suddenly had an ally
there, and his tough stance against migrants won him support elsewhere, too.
“What
liberated Orban was 2015 and the migration crisis,” said Mark Leonard, the
director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “He was suddenly
standing for more than Hungary but for wider issues of migration, with support
in Germany and Austria and the other Central European states, and that gave him
power.”
A sharper
inflection point came in May 2018 at a meeting between Mr. Orban and the
leaders of the European People’s Party: Joseph Daul, the party president, and
Manfred Weber, the German Christian Democrat who ran Parliament.
They warned
him that his party risked being expelled from the parliamentary grouping. Fresh
from another electoral victory the month before, Mr. Orban “felt he was on
steroids” and struck back, according to an official who was immediately briefed
about the meeting.
“If you try
to kick me out, I’ll destroy you,” Mr. Orban said, according to the official.
It would
take 10 months before Fidesz would be suspended. Two years after that, in
March, Mr. Orban quit the conservative alliance when it became clear that it
was going to oust his party.
Mr. Weber
still regrets the loss of Fidesz. “On one level, it is a relief,” he said. “But
Orban leaving is not a victory, but a defeat” in the effort to hold the
center-right together as “a broad people’s party.”
It has
helped Mr. Orban that the European Union has few and ineffective instruments
for punishing a backsliding nation. Even the Lisbon Treaty, which gave enhanced
powers to the European Parliament, has essentially one unusable tool: Article
7, which can remove a country’s voting rights, but only if passed by unanimity.
In 2017,
Frans Timmermans, then the European Commission first vice president responsible
for the rule of law, initiated the article against Poland. The European
Parliament did the same against Hungary in 2018.
But both
measures inevitably stalled because the two countries protect each other.
The treaty
also allows the commission to bring infringement procedures — legal charges —
against member states for violating E.U. law. But the process is slow,
involving letters and responses and appeals, and final decisions are up to the
European Court of Justice. Most cases are settled before reaching the court.
But
according to studies by R. Daniel Kelemen of Rutgers University and Tommaso
Pavone of the University of Oslo, the commission sharply reduced infringement
cases after the addition of new member states in 2004. José Manuel Barroso, a
former commission president, “bought into this to work more cooperatively with
governments and not just sue them,” Mr. Kelemen said. Mr. Barroso declined to
comment.
Attitudes
have shifted. With taxpayer money at stake, the next seven-year budget in the
balance and the disregard for shared values shown by Mr. Orban and Mr.
Kaczynski on leaders’ minds, Brussels may have finally found a useful tool to
affect domestic politics, with a mix of lawsuits charging infringement of
European treaties combined with severe financial consequences.
A marker
has finally been laid down, Mr. Reynders said.
The big
moment comes this month, when the European Court of Justice issues its ruling.
If Hungary
and Poland lose the case, as expected, it is unclear what will happen if both
countries simply refuse to comply. The European Union will be thrust deeper
into unknown territory.
Shane
Goldmacher contributed reporting from New York.
An earlier
version of this article described incorrectly the population of Paris when
compared with Hungary’s population. Hungary’s population is smaller than the
population of the Paris metropolitan area, not the population of Paris.
Steven
Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels. He
previously reported from London, Paris, Jerusalem, Berlin, Prague, Moscow and
Bangkok. @StevenErlanger
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