It’s
Time for Turkey and Europe to Face Reality
Turkey
is not going to join the EU. And that’s OK.
BY BENJAMIN
HADDADMAY 23, 2016 - 11:40 AM
The surprise
resignation of moderate Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
earlier this month has once again cast doubt on the future of the
refugee deal signed in March between Turkey and the European Union.
But, whether it moves forward or not, the agreement is just one
aspect of the broader Turkish-European relationship. And, in light of
political developments in both Ankara and Brussels, it’s high time
to rethink what that relationship should look like.
Under domestic
pressure to do something about the refugee crisis, Chancellor Angela
Merkel gave in to a series of demands from Turkey’s strongman
president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in exchange for the refugee deal.
Among these demands — in addition to 6 billion euros and the
introduction of visa-free travel to Europe for Turkish citizens —
was the promise to open a new chapter in Turkey’s long-delayed
accession process to the European Union.
The prospect of
Turkish accession is still remote, so Merkel’s promise was viewed
as a mostly symbolic gesture that helped sweeten the deal for
Erdogan. But given Turkey’s evolution under his rule, and the
country’s unpopularity in Europe, it was still a very unfortunate
one. It’s time to pull the plug for good on Turkey’s EU candidacy
and think seriously about alternatives.It’s time to pull the plug
for good on Turkey’s EU candidacy and think seriously about
alternatives.
Though Turkey first
applied to join the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic
Community, in 1987, the two parties did not enter the protracted
accession negotiations until 2005. Candidates for EU membership must
comply with a detailed list of rules, divided into 35 chapters, that
deal with issues ranging from free movement of goods to judicial
independence to norms of competition. Each chapter can only be opened
and closed (when the candidate meets the requirements) with the
approval of all EU member states. So far, Turkey has managed to open
15 chapters and to close only one.
The rationale for
Turkish accession is well known: it would more firmly bind the Muslim
democracy and NATO ally to the West while boosting political and
economic reforms at home. The prospective candidacy of a large
country, jealous of its sovereignty, also appealed to countries like
the U.K. that want to ensure the European Union remains a free trade
area instead of turning into a more integrated political entity. U.S.
presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama also supported Turkey’s
bid, furthering the notion that NATO and EU membership should go hand
in hand. (A former French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, spoke for
many exasperated Europeans when he suggested, in response, that
perhaps Mexico should join the United States.)
But domestic
developments in Turkey have not fulfilled the hopes of the country’s
supporters. Erdogan’s tightening hold on power and his plans for
constitutional changes that would further strengthen the presidency
have gone hand in hand with crackdowns on the opposition and the
media. In a 2015 report, Freedom House denounced “several years of
decline” of freedom of the press in Turkey.Freedom House denounced
“several years of decline” of freedom of the press in Turkey.
While the accession
process did spur some progress in the early 2000s, it seemed to have
little effect when it didn’t suit Erdogan’s domestic agenda. His
ruling party complied with EU rules when it came to weakening the
army’s role in politics, but instead of allowing a newly empowered
civil society to become a check on its authority, it has only
consolidated its power while weakening the country’s hard-won
secular tradition.
Furthermore, Turkey
still refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member, and
occupies the northern half of the country with about 30,000 troops,
more than it has ever committed to NATO operations.
In violation of its
customs agreement with the EU, Turkey refused to trade with Cyprus.
To punish Turkish noncompliance, the Council of the European Union
shelved talks on key accession chapters in 2006. And despite the
hurdle this issue has already placed in Turkey’s path, Erdogan has
been further hardening his views in recent years.
Beyond the
disturbing rise of political authoritarianism in the country, many
Europeans question Turkey’s European orientation on geographic and
cultural grounds. Only 3 percent of Turkey’s territory is, strictly
speaking, in Europe — and its GDP per capita is less than a third
of the European average. A Muslim country with 75 million citizens,
bordering Syria, Iraq, and Iran, Turkey would soon become the EU’s
most populated country it if joined.
Public opinion polls
in Europe show that an ever-larger majority of voters oppose Turkish
accession. Indeed, the issue has come to symbolize the gulf between
Brussels, which is seen as trying to push accession, and actual
Europeans, who are more than skeptical. In 2014, 69 percent of
Germans opposed Turkey’s membership bid (up from 52 percent in
2005) while only 26 percent were in favor. The same year, 83 percent
of the French were opposed. Even in the U.K., whose diplomats have
long supported the Turkish bid, only 34 percent of the population did
in 2014.
And here comes the
dirty little secret of the negotiations: Turkish accession is
unlikely to ever happen. At every stage, the next step must be
approved unanimously by all EU member states, with the possibility of
referendum in some countries. It is highly doubtful a consensus could
be reached. (Consider that voters in the Netherlands recently
rejected closer ties with Ukraine, a Christian, undoubtedly European
country.)
Yet the talks with
Ankara keep going, like a bureaucratic zombie, because the various
European participants expect someone else — probably the French or
Germans — to cast the final veto and take the blame. In the midst
of a refugee crisis, some might be tempted to argue for keeping up
the charade, if only to secure greater cooperation. But this does
more harm than good. The process is the worst of two worlds: it’s
going nowhere, but can still be used as a scarecrow by anti-European
populists. Though unrelated to the subject at hand, the prospect of
Turkey’s accession was brandished by fear-mongering opponents of
the failed EU constitution during the French and Dutch referendum
campaigns in 2005. Brexit partisans are trying to do the same today.
The situation is understandably a source of resentment for many
Turks, whose once-strong support for EU accession has waned.
In addition, the
conditionality of the EU accession process — long seen by the
Europeans as a means of leverage — is becoming more of a burden
than an asset in the case of Turkey. Feeling that he has the upper
hand, Erdogan is not inclined to make concessions on his
authoritarian ways, forcing the EU to either overturn its principles
to get a refugee deal, or to look for another solution. As a
disillusioned EU diplomat recently told me: “We used to see
accession talks as a strength, now it’s a constraint on us.”“We
used to see accession talks as a strength, now it’s a constraint on
us.”
Divorces are always
messy, but there is no clear path to Turkish accession to the
European Union. Kicking the can down the road will only poison
relations further and encourage voices of discord in both Europe and
Turkey.
This doesn’t mean
European leaders should seek confrontation with Turkey. The EU is
Turkey’s number one trade partner, with nearly half of Turkish
exports going to Europe. Furthermore, from energy diversification to
the fight against terrorism and instability in the Middle East,
Turkey’s strategic importance to Europe’s southern flank is
considerable — there’s a reason it’s a NATO ally. But a
military alliance is not the same thing as political union. Besides,
from its dithering on stopping jihadi fighters from crossing into
Syria to its exploitation of the refugee issue to blackmail Europe
into concessions, Ankara has not proven to be a consistent partner.
As an EU member in full standing, Turkey would get a veto on Europe’s
collective foreign policy decisions — an unacceptable outcome.
At heart, the
Turkish case speaks to Europe’s inability to see its neighborhood
though any lens other than “enlargement.” There is legitimate
reason for that. Despite the current trend of Euro-gloom and
democratic backsliding in countries like Hungary and Poland, it is
undeniable that EU enlargement has been an extraordinary force for
stability and democracy on the European continent. The long and
excruciating integration process, with its extensive demands on rule
of law and free market norms, has greatly contributed to cementing
the transitions of central and eastern countries after the fall of
the Berlin Wall.
But enlargement
prospects can’t be used as a foreign policy tool forever. European
leaders should start contemplating alternatives to accession for
Turkey such as making the country a “strategic partner,” an
option long favored by Angela Merkel herself: this could spur
progress in a number of areas without promising, or demanding, the
impossible. It’s time for the EU to recognize its stable borders
and develop an ability to defend them, reinforcing the notion that
the continent can act as a political power rather than an
ever-expanding international organization.
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