Europe
helped Greece in its migration hour of need. Now Italy needs help
Record
numbers of migrants are likely to arrive on Lampedusa. The EU can’t
leave Rome to deal with problem on its own.
By STEFANO
STEFANINI 5/18/16, 5:32 AM CET
As summer
approaches, the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa gears up for yet
another spike in illegal immigration from Libya. A quick glance at
the map will tell you why it has become the favorite port of entry
for migrants hoping to reach European shores.
They trek across the
Sahara in unspeakable conditions and take their chances on shoddy
boats across the Mediterranean. They are desperate. Lampedusa, a dot
in the blue, southwest of Malta, is the closest sliver of EU land to
the Libyan coastline: If you make it to Lampedusa you have made it to
Europe.
Geography is
inexorable. Libya’s turbulent politics have made the country a
highway for African immigration, and Lampedusa its European hub.
Italy cannot insulate itself from Libya.
For a long time the
Italian navy and coast guard saved migrants’ lives; more recently
the EU has joined their efforts with Operation Sophia. Still, an
estimated 3,000 people have perished in the waters between Africa and
Sicily. According to the International Organization for Migration,
the Lampedusa immigration route was by far the most lethal in 2015.
For years Italy has
coped with the challenge alone. In 2015, just over 150,000 people
landed on Italian coasts. This year could set new records: Italian
authorities have estimated that arrivals may reach 270,000 at current
rates. With over 100,000 migrants hosted in Italy, the country’s
resources are already stretched thin.
* * *
Italian Interior
Minister Angelino Alfano suggested last month that, “when
conditions allow,” the EU-Turkey agreement could be “replicated
with Libya.” The idea was dismissed out of hand by the rotating EU
presidency: “Countries facing Italy are different than Turkey,”
Dutch Interior Minister Klaas DijKhoff said. That may be true, but
Alfano is on to something. Like Greece, Italy cannot deal with
permanent mass migration alone.
The Turkish model is
not much help. Turkey is a NATO member and an EU candidate. In the
best case scenario in Libya’s stabilization process it will take
years for the internationally backed Fayez al-Sarraj government to be
in control of its territory and to re-establish a functioning state
to which migrants could be “returned.” The prospect of any
immigration accord, let alone of a Turkish-like trade-off, with Libya
is a medium-long term prospect at best.
Both the
Turkey-Balkan route and the Libyan highway are consequences, not
causes, of conflict.
Nor can migrants
traveling through Libya be compared to those who arrive in Turkey.
The exodus via Turkey is part of the larger wave of refugees escaping
the horrors of Syrian civil war and other conflict-ravaged zones of
the Middle East. The same factors have pushed refugees into Lebanon
and Jordan, and displaced millions of people within Syria. In 2015,
Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis and Pakistanis were by far the top
nationalities of asylum-seekers in the EU. They typically traveled
through Turkey to reach European soil in Greece.
The bulk of migrants
arriving via Libya, meanwhile, are African: Most of them come from
Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Gambia. Fewer than 7,000 Syrians
came to Italy from Libya in 2015. While there are legitimate
asylum-seekers among African migrants — asylum has been granted,
for instance, to a number of Eritreans — the Libya-Lampedusa route
carries mostly “economic” migrants as opposed to refugees. As
such, most cannot make a claim to stay in Europe. They can be
repatriated, but where to? Certainly not Libya.
Very few are, in the
end, sent back. And when they stay, they join the masses of illegal
immigrants roaming inside a borderless, but increasingly divided,
Europe.
* * *
With the Balkan
route closed, migrants are being rerouted through the Ionian and
Adriatic seas to reach the EU. Human trafficking is nothing if not a
flexible business model. With €4 billion estimated annual profits
that are re-invested in illicit activities, including arms trade and
financing terrorism, smugglers will not let it go easily. In April,
as arrivals in Greece dropped dramatically by 90 percent (to 2,700),
three times as many migrants (8,370) reached Italy.
The Italian coast
guard has rescued 900 Syrian and Iraqi refugees arriving by boat from
Egypt, evidence of the spillover effect from the Balkan route. Like
Greece, Italy cannot be expected to shoulder the burden alone —
regardless of whether they are dealing with refugees or economic
migrants.
The contested Dublin
regulation makes a migrant’s country of arrival exclusively
responsible for processing the asylum request. This policy needs a
thorough review. Screening applicants should be entrusted to European
rather than national authorities, and asylum should be shared fairly
among EU members. The European Commission has taken steps in the
right direction, but has not gone far enough.
Economic
immigration, on the other hand, should be met with systematic large
scale repatriation to the countries of origin. To design and enforce
such a program will take diplomacy, leverage and resources. The EU
has the means to put it together, as it did with Turkey. African
countries deserve no less of an effort.
Finding a civilized
solution will be expensive, but less costly than simply continuing to
muddle through. A concrete policy will also send a reassuring message
to edgy public opinions. Without one, worried European governments
are left with no choice but to fiddle with border controls.
* * *
Both the
Turkey-Balkan route and the Libyan highway are consequences, not
causes, of conflict. On the Turkish side, we can point to the Syrian
crisis and the terrorist threat of Islamic State; on the southern
Mediterranean shore, Libyan lawlessness and factional strife.
Stabilizing Libya
must become an EU and NATO priority. ISIL’s presence on Libyan
shores poses a security threat both to Europe and to neighboring
countries like Tunisia. On the military front, Libyan militias are
stepping up efforts against ISIL’s stronghold in Sirte. U.S. and
Western allies have relied on special operations forces to support
the offensive.
The European Union
has to take responsibility for all incoming flows, be it via the
Sicilian Channel, the Aegean islands, or anywhere else they may run.
Politically, it is
imperative to lend full support to the internationally recognized
al-Serraj government in Tripoli, and to encourage it to strengthen
consensus through national reconciliation. A recent meeting in
Vienna, chaired by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Italian
Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni, took a step in the right direction.
Fayez al-Serraj was promised international support, training of
Libyan security forces and an end to the arms embargo. The meeting
also included Libya’s regional neighbors — Egypt, Tunisia, Niger,
Chad and Sudan — all of whose security is also at stake: If Libya
remains a failed state, Boko Haram could join forces with ISIL on the
coast.
At sea, EU Operation
Sophia has a “coercive mandate” to disrupt smuggling routes and
capabilities. It has been criticized, most recently by the British
House of Lords, for not doing enough to counter trafficking. Indeed
the EU’s potential to “identify, capture and dispose” of
traffickers’ vessels is still untapped. NATO should extend its
Aegean patrolling activity to the Western Mediterranean. It could
easily do so by adapting its long running Operation Active Endeavour
to a Mediterranean-wide “maritime situational awareness,”
including human trafficking as well as counterterrorism.
While the EU-Turkey
agreement is still fraught with difficulties, it nevertheless sent a
very clear message. The EU took over responsibility on an issue that
one of its members, Greece, could not handle on its own.
By taking
responsibility, the EU also reassured neighboring Balkan countries,
especially Macedonia, and others that the floodgates are under
European control. If the Balkan route shuts down completely, Hungary,
Austria, Croatia and Slovenia will no longer need to fence themselves
in.
The Lampedusa route
operates under different circumstances — it mostly carries a
different kind of migrant — yet needs no less of an EU commitment
than the Balkan route. Possibly, it needs a greater one. The Libyan
situation entails wider regional security concerns and affects a
significant source of European energy supplies.
The bottom line is
that immigration is an EU problem. Its roads lead to Europe. The
European Union has to take responsibility for all incoming flows, be
it via the Sicilian Channel, the Aegean islands, or anywhere else
they may run.
Stefano Stefanini
was permanent representative of Italy at NATO and diplomatic adviser
to former Italian President Giorgio Napolitano. He is currently a
senior adviser to the Podesta Group and non-resident senior fellow of
the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic
Council, Washington.
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