China's Housing Conundrum
Sep 29,
2021
KENNETH
ROGOFF
The Chinese government may yet succeed in insulating
the broader market from the financial crisis at real estate giant Evergrande.
But the larger challenge is to rebalance an economy that has depended for far
too long on the bloated housing market for jobs and growth.
CAMBRIDGE –
The impending bankruptcy of Chinese real estate giant Evergrande, with its $300
billion in debt, has roiled global investors. Analysts have focused mainly on
whether the Chinese government will succeed in ring-fencing the problem, so
that it does not spill over into a broader Western-style financial crisis.
Given the
government’s deep pockets, including over $3 trillion in foreign-exchange
reserves, and its ability to dictate restructuring terms without long court
delays, few would bet against such an outcome. But concentrating only on
near-term financial stability misses China’s larger challenge: rebalancing an
economy that has depended for far too long on its massive real estate
investment sector for jobs and growth.
The outsize
share of real estate and related services in Chinese GDP – a staggering 25%,
and only slightly less after adjusting for net exports – is even larger than
the property sector’s share of the Spanish and Irish economies at its pre-2008
peak. Because of its knock-on effects on other sectors, a significant slowdown
in China’s real-estate sector could easily cut 5-10% from cumulative GDP growth
over the ensuing few years.
Moreover,
real estate is by far the most important savings vehicle in an economy where
capital controls constrain citizens’ ability to invest abroad. Any significant
decline in real estate prices would lead not only to widespread disaffection,
but also to a potentially significant pullback in consumption of other goods
and services.
Can’t the
Chinese real estate machine just keep running full speed ahead, given the need
to house the country’s 1.4 billion people? Maybe. But China has been rapidly
building houses and apartment buildings for decades, not just in its top-tier
cities but also in less-desired third- and fourth-tier cities, where prices are
much lower and vacancy rates are high.
As a
result, China’s total housing supply, measured in square meters per person, has
already reached the levels of much wealthier economies such as Germany and
France. Although average housing quality in China is lower and there is
potential to upgrade, the massive current level of real estate production has
to be unsustainable. With the housing vacancy rate in urban China now at 21%,
the authorities fully understand the need to shift productive resources into
other sectors.
But
engineering a slow, controlled deflation of China’s real estate bubble will not
be easy. With the banking sector having lent heavily to residential projects
(Evergrande alone has borrowed from almost 300 banks and financial firms), a
sharp drop in housing prices could prove painful and cascade catastrophically
into other sectors. In principle, banks are protected by substantial down
payments, often amounting to 30% or more of the purchase price. But given
China’s epic house-price boom in the twenty-first century, 30% may prove not
nearly enough when a collapse comes. (After the 2008 financial crisis, US
housing prices dropped by 36%, and by significantly more in some regions.)
Besides,
making housing more affordable has been an important goal of President Xi
Jinping’s government, so there are limits to how much one can expect
policymakers to prop up prices.
Many
believe that the Evergrande housing crisis is part of the government’s general
squeeze on the Chinese elite, which has included taking down internet giants,
making it more difficult for wealthy parents to get private tutoring for their
children, and insisting that firms give back much more to their communities.
According to this line of thinking, policymakers can always recalibrate if
their efforts to rein in housing debt, and Evergrande in particular, prove too
destabilizing. But as the government is well aware, this risks making the
eventual reversal of the real estate and construction boom all the more
painful.
Real estate
slowdowns, even real estate-related financial crises, do not tend to happen on
their own, but rather in the context of a slowing economy. The Chinese economy
came roaring out of the pandemic, and for a while was the envy of the world,
thanks in part to the government’s zero-COVID strategy. But the future looks
much less rosy. In addition to headwinds from an aging population and slowing
productivity growth, the Delta variant is proving far more difficult to
contain.
On top of
all that, the almost daily rash of new government decrees has made it
exceedingly difficult for the private sector to plan ahead. The resulting
policy uncertainty would put a damper on growth even without the other issues.
In such an environment, a housing market slowdown can significantly amplify any
economic downturn, as I showed in a 2020 paper with Yuanchen Yang of Tsinghua
University.
After
nearly four decades of extraordinary economic expansion, one should not
underestimate the Chinese authorities’ ability to maintain growth despite all
obstacles. Nevertheless, as impressive as China has been at building roads,
bridges, and houses, its real estate construction boom is coming to an end, and
there is no reason to expect a smooth landing.
Chinese
financial regulators may yet succeed in insulating the broader market from
Evergrande’s crisis, and convincing everyone that this is an anomalous case.
But given China’s decades-long over-reliance on the real estate sector for
growth, particularly during general downturns, the biggest challenges may be
yet to come.
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário