Welcome
to the age of anger
The
seismic events of 2016 have revealed a world in chaos – and one
that old ideas of liberal rationalism can no longer explain
by Pankaj Mishra
Thursday 8 December
2016 06.00 GMT
The election of
Donald Trump as president of the United States is the biggest
political earthquake of our times, and its reverberations are
inescapably global. It has fully revealed an enormous pent-up anger –
which had first become visible in the mass acclaim in Russia and
Turkey for pitiless despots and the electoral triumph of bloody
strongmen in India and the Philippines.
The insurgencies of
our time, including Brexit and the rise of the European far right,
have many local causes – but it is not an accident that demagoguery
appears to be rising around the world. Savage violence has erupted in
recent years across a broad swath of territory: wars in Ukraine and
the Middle East, insurgencies from Yemen to Thailand, terrorism and
counter-terrorism, economic and cyberwar. The conflicts, not confined
to fixed battlefields, feel endemic and uncontrollable.
Hate-mongering against immigrants and minorities has gone mainstream;
figures foaming at the mouth with loathing and malice are ubiquitous
on old and new media alike.
There is much
dispute about the causes of this global disorder. Many observers have
characterised it as a backlash against an out-of-touch establishment,
explaining Trump’s victory – in the words of Thomas Piketty –
as “primarily due to the explosion in economic and geographic
inequality in the United States”. Liberals tend to blame the racial
resentments of poor white Americans, which were apparently aggravated
during Barack Obama’s tenure. But many rich men and women – and
even a small number of African-Americans and Latinos – also voted
for a compulsive groper and white supremacist.
The Nobel
prize-winning economist Paul Krugman admitted on the night of Trump’s
victory that “people like me – and probably like most readers of
the New York Times – truly didn’t understand the country we live
in”. Since the twin shocks of Brexit and the US election, we have
argued ineffectually about their causes, while watching aghast as the
new representatives of the downtrodden and the “left-behind” –
Trump and Nigel Farage, posing in a gold-plated lift – strut across
a bewilderingly expanded theatre of political absurdism.
But we cannot
understand this crisis because our dominant intellectual concepts and
categories seem unable to process an explosion of uncontrolled
forces.
In the hopeful years
that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the universal
triumph of liberal capitalism and democracy seemed assured; free
markets and human rights would spread around the world and lift
billions from poverty and oppression. In many ways, this dream has
come true: we live in a vast, homogenous global market, which is more
literate, interconnected and prosperous than at any other time in
history.
And yet we find
ourselves in an age of anger, with authoritarian leaders manipulating
the cynicism and discontent of furious majorities. What used to be
called “Muslim rage”, and identified with mobs of brown-skinned
men with bushy beards, is suddenly manifest globally, among
saffron-robed Buddhist ethnic-cleansers in Myanmar, as well as blond
white nationalists in Germany. Violent hate crimes have blighted even
the oldest of parliamentary democracies, with the murder of the MP Jo
Cox by a British neo-Nazi during the venomous campaign for Brexit.
Suddenly, as the liberal thinker Michael Ignatieff recently wrote:
“Enlightenment humanism and rationalism” can no longer adequately
“explain the world we’re living in.”
The largely
Anglo-American intellectual assumptions forged by the cold war and
its jubilant aftermath are an unreliable guide to today’s chaos –
and so we must turn to the ideas of an earlier era of volatility. It
is a moment for thinkers such as Sigmund Freud, who warned in 1915
that the “primitive, savage and evil impulses of mankind have not
vanished in any individual”, but are simply waiting for the
opportunity to show themselves again. Certainly, the current
conflagration has brought to the surface what Friedrich Nietzsche
called “ressentiment” – “a whole tremulous realm of
subterranean revenge, inexhaustible and insatiable in outbursts.”
By contrast, the
fundamental premise of our existing intellectual frameworks is the
assumption that humans are essentially rational and motivated by the
pursuit of their own interests; that they principally act to maximise
personal happiness, rather than on the basis of fear, envy or
resentment.
The bestseller
Freakonomics is a perfect text of our time in its belief that
“incentives are the cornerstone of modern life,” and “the key
to solving just about any riddle”. From this view, the current
crisis is an irruption of the irrational – and confusion and
bewilderment are widespread among political, business and media
elites. The ordinarily stolid Economist has lately lurched from
dubious indignation over “post-Truth politics” to the Rip Van
Winkle-ish declaration of “The New Nationalism”. Many other
mainstream periodicals now read like parodies of New Left Review, as
they attend belatedly to the failings of global capitalism – most
egregiously, its failure to fulfil its own promise of general
prosperity.
We can now see, all
too clearly, a widening abyss of race, class and education in Britain
and the US. But as explanations proliferate, how it might be bridged
is more unclear than ever. Well-worn pairs of rhetorical opposites,
often corresponding to the bitter divisions in our societies, have
once again been put to work: progressive v reactionary, open v
closed, liberalism v fascism, rational v irrational. But as a
polarised intellectual industry plays catch-up with fast-moving
events that it completely failed to anticipate, it is hard to avoid
the suspicion that our search for rational political explanations for
the current disorder is doomed. All of the opponents of the new
“irrationalism” – whether left, centre, or right – are united
by the presumption that individuals are rational actors, motivated by
material self-interest, enraged when their desires are thwarted, and,
therefore, likely to be appeased by their fulfilment.
This notion of human
motivation deepened during the Enlightenment, whose leading thinkers,
despising tradition and religion, sought to replace them with the
human capacity to rationally identify individual and collective
interests. The dream of the late 18th century, to rebuild the world
along secular and rational lines, was further elaborated in the 19th
century by the utilitarian theorists of the greatest happiness for
the greatest number of people – and this notion of progress was
embraced by socialists and capitalists alike.
After the collapse
of the socialist alternative in 1989, this utopian vision took the
form of a global market economy dedicated to endless growth and
consumption – to which there would be no alternative. According to
this worldview, the dominance of which is now nearly absolute, the
human norm is Homo economicus, a calculating subject whose natural
desires and instincts are shaped by their ultimate motivation: to
pursue happiness and avoid pain.
This simple view
always neglected many factors ever-present in human lives: the fear,
for instance, of losing honour, dignity and status, the distrust of
change, the appeal of stability and familiarity. There was no place
in it for more complex drives: vanity, fear of appearing vulnerable,
the need to save face. Obsessed with material progress, the
hyperrationalists ignored the lure of resentment for the left-behind,
and the tenacious pleasures of victimhood.
And yet modern
history provides enormous evidence for the persistent power of
unreason. It was not so long ago – in the early 19th century –
that French pretensions to a rational, universal, and cosmopolitan
civilisation first provoked resentful Germans into the militant
expression of what we now call “cultural nationalism”: the
assertion of authentic culture rooted in national or regional
character and history.
One revolution after
another since then has demonstrated that feelings and moods change
the world by turning into potent political forces. Fear, anxiety and
a sense of humiliation were the principal motive of Germany’s
expansionist policy in the early 20th century – and it is
impossible to understand the current upsurge of anti-western
sentiment in China, Russia and India without acknowledging the role
played by humiliation.
Yet a mechanistic
and materialist way of conceiving human actions has become
entrenched, in part because economics has become the predominant
means of understanding the world. A view that took shape in the 19th
century – that there is “no other nexus between man and man than
naked self-interest” – has become orthodoxy once again in an
intellectual climate that views the market as the ideal form of human
interaction and venerates technological progress and the growth of
GDP. All of this is part of the rigid contemporary belief that what
counts is only what can be counted and that what cannot be counted –
subjective emotions – therefore does not.
Our current
disregard of non-economic motivations is even more surprising when we
learn that less than a century ago, the Enlightenment’s “narrow
rational programme” for individual happiness had already become
“the butt of ridicule and contempt” – as the Austrian modernist
writer Robert Musil observed in 1922. Indeed, the pioneering works of
sociology and psychology as well as modernist art and literature of
the early 20th century were defined in part by their insistence that
there is more to human beings than rational egoism, competition and
acquisition, more to society than a contract between logically
calculating and autonomous individuals, and more to politics than
impersonal technocrats devising hyper-rational schemes of progress
with the help of polls, surveys, statistics, mathematical models and
technology.
Writing in the
1860s, during the high noon of 19th-century liberalism, Fyodor
Dostoevsky was one of the first modern thinkers to air the suspicion,
now troubling us again, that rational thinking does not decisively
influence human behaviour. He pitted his Underground Man – the
quintessential loser dreaming of revenge against society’s winners
– against the idea of rational egoism, or material self-interest,
then popular in Russia among eager readers of John Stuart Mill and
Jeremy Bentham. Dostoevsky’s protagonist obsessively assaults the
shared rationalist assumptions of both capitalists and socialists:
that human beings are logically calculating animals, driven by
perceived incentives:
Oh, tell me who was
it first announced, who was it first proclaimed, that man only does
nasty things because he does not know his own interests; and that if
he were enlightened, if his eyes were opened to his real normal
interests, man would at once cease to do nasty things, would at once
become good and noble because, being enlightened and understanding
his real advantage, he would see his own advantage in the good and
nothing else?
Dostoevsky defined a
style of thought that was later elaborated by Nietzsche, Freud, Max
Weber and others – who mounted a full-blown intellectual revolt
against the oppressive certainties of rationalist ideologies, whether
left, right or centre. This is an intellectual revolution that is
barely remembered today – but it erupted at an emotional and
political moment that would seem eerily familiar to us: a period of
uneven and disruptive economic growth, distrust of politicians, fear
of change, and anxiety about rootless cosmopolitans, aliens and
immigrants.
This was an era when
the disaffected masses – recoiling from the 19th century’s
prolonged experiment in laissez-faire economic rationalism – had
begun to fall for radical alternatives, in the form of blood-and-soil
nationalism and anarchist terrorism. This anti-liberal political
uprising forced many of those we now regard as central figures of
20th-century intellectual life to question their fundamental notions
of human behaviour, and to discard the positivist nostrums that had
taken root in the previous century.
By the late 1850s,
Charles Darwin had already shattered the notion that human beings
could control how they develop – let alone build a rational
society. Novelists, sociologists and psychologists examining the
turbulent mass societies of the late 19th century concluded that
human actions could not be reduced to single causes, whether
religious and ideological faith, or the rationality of self-interest.
Freud, who lived in
turn-of-the-century Vienna while demagogues were scapegoating Jews
and liberals for the mass suffering inflicted by industrial
capitalism, came to see the rational intellect as “a feeble and
dependent thing, a plaything and tool of our impulses and emotions”.
“One gets the impression,” Freud wrote in The Future of an
Illusion (1927) “that culture is something imposed on a reluctant
majority by a minority that managed to gain possession of the
instruments of power and coercion.” Long before the 20th century’s
explosions of demagoguery, Max Weber, as he observed Germany’s
hectic industrialisation, presciently speculated that individuals,
unmoored by socioeconomic turmoil and alienated by bureaucratic
rationalisation, could become vulnerable to a despotic leader.
The problem for
these critics of Enlightenment rationalism, as Robert Musil defined
it, was not that we “have too much intellect and too little soul”,
but that we have “too little intellect in matters of the soul”.
We suffer even more from this problem today as we struggle to make
sense of the outbreaks of political irrationalism. Committed to
seeing the individual self as a rational actor, we fail to see that
it is a deeply unstable entity, constantly shaped and reshaped in its
interplay with shifting social and cultural conditions. In our own
time, amid what Hannah Arendt described as a “tremendous increase
in mutual hatred and a somewhat universal irritability of everybody
against everybody else”, this fragile self has become particularly
vulnerable to ressentiment.
Ressentiment –
caused by an intense mix of envy, humiliation and powerlessness –
is not simply the French word for resentment. Its meaning was shaped
in a particular cultural and social context: the rise of a secular
and meritocratic society in the 18th century. Even though he never
used the word, the first thinker to identify how ressentiment would
emerge from modern ideals of an egalitarian and commercial society
was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. An outsider to the Parisian elite of his
time, who struggled with envy, fascination, revulsion and rejection,
Rousseau saw how people in a society driven by individual
self-interest come to live for the satisfaction of their vanity –
the desire and need to secure recognition from others, to be esteemed
by them as much as one esteems oneself.
But this vanity,
luridly exemplified today by Donald Trump’s Twitter account, often
ends up nourishing in the soul a dislike of one’s own self while
stoking impotent hatred of others; and it can quickly degenerate into
an aggressive drive, whereby individuals feel acknowledged only by
being preferred over others, and by rejoicing in their abjection. (As
Gore Vidal pithily put it: “It is not enough to succeed. Others
must fail.”)
Such ressentiment
breeds in proportion to the spread of the principles of equality and
individualism. In the early 20th century, the German sociologist Max
Scheler developed a systematic theory of ressentiment as a distinctly
modern phenomenon – ingrained in all societies where formal social
equality between individuals coexists with massive differences in
power, education, status, and property ownership. In an era of
globalised commerce, these disparities now exist everywhere, along
with enlarged notions of individual aspiration and equality.
Accordingly, ressentiment, an existential resentment of others, is
poisoning civil society and undermining political liberty everywhere.
But what makes
ressentiment particularly malign today is a growing contradiction.
The ideals of modern democracy – the equality of social conditions
and individual empowerment – have never been more popular. But they
have become more and more difficult, if not impossible, to actually
realise in the grotesquely unequal societies created by our brand of
globalised capitalism.
The past two decades
of hectic globalisation have brought us closer than ever before to
the liberal Enlightenment ideal of a universal commercial society of
self-interested, rational and autonomous individuals – one that was
originally advocated in the 18th century by such thinkers as
Montesquieu, Voltaire, Adam Smith, and Kant. In the 19th century, it
was still possible for Marx to sneer at Jeremy Bentham for assuming
“the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the
normal man”. In our own time, however, the ideology of
neoliberalism – a market-centric hybrid of Enlightenment
rationalism and 19th-century utilitarianism – has achieved near
total domination in the economic and political realm alike.
The success of this
universal creed can be attested by many innovations of recent decades
that now look perfectly natural. The rational market is expected to
ensure the supply of valuable products and services, while the task
of governments is to ensure fair competition, which produces
“winners” and “losers”. The broad intellectual revolution in
which an all-knowing market judges failure and success has even more
forcefully insisted on the rationality of the individual.
Issues of social
justice and equality have receded along with conceptions of society
or community – to be replaced by the freely choosing individual in
the marketplace. According to the prevailing view today, the
injustices entrenched by history or social circumstances cease to
matter: the slumdog, too, can be a millionaire, and the individual’s
failure to escape the underclass is self-evident proof of his poor
choices.
But this abstract
conception has no room for the emotional situation of real,
flesh-and-blood people – and how they might act within concrete
social and historical settings.
One of the first
people to notice the disturbing complex of emotions we now see among
self-seeking individuals around the world was Alexis de Tocqueville –
who was already worried in the 1830s that the American promise of
meritocracy, its uniformity of culture and manners, and “equality
of conditions” would make for immoderate ambition, corrosive envy
and chronic dissatisfaction. The passion for equality, he warned,
could swell “to the height of fury” and lead many to acquiesce in
a curtailment of their liberties, and to long for the rule of a
strongman.
As De Tocqueville
pointed out, people liberated from old hierarchies “want equality
in freedom, and, if they cannot get it, they still want it in
slavery.”
We witness a
universal frenzy of fear and loathing today because the democratic
revolution De Tocqueville witnessed has spread from its American
centre to the remotest corners of the world. The rage for equality is
conjoined with the pursuit of prosperity mandated by the global
consumer economy, aggravating tensions and contradictions in inner
lives that are then played out in the public sphere.
“To live in
freedom,” De Tocqueville warned, “one must grow used to a life
full of agitation, change and danger.” This kind of life is barren
of stability, security, identity and honour, even when it overflows
with material goods. Nevertheless, it is now commonplace among people
around the world that rational considerations of utility and profit –
the needs of supply chains and the imperatives of quarterly
shareholder returns – uproot, humiliate and render obsolete.
The widespread
experience of the maelstrom of modernity has only heightened the lure
of ressentiment. Many new individuals now “live in freedom”, in
De Tocqueville’s words, even as they are enslaved by finely
integrated political, economic and cultural powers: the opaque
workings of finance capital, the harsh machinery of social security,
juridical and penal systems, and the unrelenting ideological
influence of the media and the internet.
Never have so many
free individuals felt so helpless – so desperate to take back
control from anyone they can blame for their feeling of having lost
it. It should not be surprising that we have seen an exponential rise
in hatred of minorities, the main pathology induced by political and
economic shocks. These apparent racists and misogynists have clearly
suffered silently for a long time from what Albert Camus called “an
autointoxication – the evil secretion, in a sealed vessel, of
prolonged impotence”. It was this gangrenous ressentiment,
festering for so long in places such as the Daily Mail and Fox News,
that erupted volcanically with Trump’s victory.
Rich and poor alike
voting for a serial liar and tax dodger have confirmed yet again that
human desires operate independently of the logic of self-interest –
and may even be destructive of it. Our political and intellectual
elites midwifed the new “irrationalism” through a studied
indifference to the emotional dislocation and economic suffering
induced by modern capitalism. Not surprisingly, they are now unable
to explain its rise. Indeed, their universal assumption, hardened
since 1989, that there are no alternatives to western-style democracy
and capitalism – the famous “end of history” – is precisely
what has made us incapable of grasping the political phenomena
shaking the world today.
It is clear now that
the exaltation of individual will as something free of social and
historical pressures, and as flexible as markets, concealed a
breathtaking innocence about structural inequality and the psychic
damage it causes. The contemporary obsession with individual choice
and human agency disregarded even the basic discoveries of
late-19th-century sociology: that in any mass society, life chances
are unevenly distributed, there are permanent winners and losers, a
minority dominates the majority, and the elites are prone to
manipulate and deceive.
Even the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 left undisturbed the vision in which a global economy
built around free markets, competition and rational individual
choices would alleviate ethnic and religious differences and usher in
worldwide prosperity and peace. In this utopia, any irrational
obstacles to the spread of liberal modernity – such as Islamic
fundamentalism – would be eventually eradicated. Fantasies of a
classless and post-racial society of empowered rational-choice actors
bloomed as late as 2008, the year of the most devastating economic
crisis since the Great Depression.
Today, however, the
basic assumptions of cold war liberalism lie in ruins – after
decades of intellectual exertion to construct flimsy oppositions
between the rational west and the irrational east. The political big
bang of our time does not merely threaten the vanity projects of an
intellectual elite, but the health of democracy itself – the
defining project of the modern world. Since the late 18th century,
tradition and religion have been steadily discarded, in the hope that
rational, self-interested individuals can form a liberal political
community that defines its shared laws, ensuring dignity and equal
rights for each citizen, irrespective of ethnicity, race, religion
and gender. This basic premise of secular modernity, which earlier
only seemed menaced by religious fundamentalists, is now endangered
by elected demagogues in its very heartlands, Europe and the US.
Where do we go from
here? We can of course continue to define the crisis of democracy
through reassuring dualisms: liberalism v authoritarianism, Islam v
modernity, and that sort of thing. It may be more fruitful to think
of democracy as a profoundly fraught emotional and social condition –
one which, aggravated by turbo-capitalism, has now become unstable.
This might allow us to examine the workings of ressentiment across
varied countries and classes, and to understand why ethno-nationalist
supremacy has grown alongside economic stagnation in America and
Britain, even as it flourishes alongside economic expansion in India
and Turkey. Or, why Donald Trump, the flashy plutocrat tormented by
his lowly status among Manhattan’s cultivated liberals, obsessively
baits the New York Times and calls for a boycott of the Broadway show
Hamilton.
That a rancorous
Twitter troll will soon become the world’s most powerful man is the
latest of many reminders that the idealised claims of western elites
about democracy and liberalism never actually conformed to the
political and economic reality at home. A rowdy public culture of
disparagement and admonition does not hide the fact that the chasm of
sensibility between a technocratic elite and the masses has grown.
Everywhere, a majority that was promised growing equality sees social
power monopolised by people with money, property, connections and
talent; they feel shut out from both higher culture and
decision-making.
Many people find it
easy to aim their rage against an allegedly cosmopolitan and rootless
cultural elite. Objects of hatred are needed more than ever during
times of crisis, and rich “citizens of nowhere” – as Theresa
May dubbed them – conveniently embody the vices of a desperately
sought-after but infuriatingly unattainable modernity. And so
globalisation, which promotes integration among shrewd elites, helps
incite ressentiment everywhere else, especially among people forced
against their will into universal competition.
In search of a balm
for these wounds, many intellectuals have embraced nostalgic
fantasies of vanished unity. Earlier this year, the New York Times
columnist David Brooks returned from communist Cuba gushing about
Cubans’ “fierce love of country, a sense of national solidarity
and a confident patriotic spirit that is today lacking in the United
States.” More recently, Simon Jenkins, in this newspaper, and the
intellectual historian Mark Lilla – in a widely circulated New York
Times opinion piece – have urged the rejection of “identity
liberalism” and the necessity of embracing national unity and
common identity. As Trump’s victory was declared, Simon Schama
tweeted that we need a new Churchill to save democracy in Europe and
America.
Such breast-beating
amounts to a truly irrational demand: that the present abolish
itself, making way for a return to the past. Ideally, to the time
when paternalistic white liberals occupied the vital centre, little
disturbed by the needs and desires of history’s forgotten,
humiliated and silenced people.
These lamentations
for simpler times – that all we lack is the right sort of
spine-stiffening democratic leader, or rational culture, or cultural
unity, or patriotic spirit – ignore the fragmented nature of our
politics. Social and technological developments are not liberal or
conservative, democratic or authoritarian; they are as prone to
enshrine LGBT rights as to reinstate torture and disseminate fake
news. Nor does the longing for the good old days adequately respond
to the massive crisis of legitimacy facing democratic institutions
today.
Political antidotes
to the sinister pathologies unleashed by Putin, Erdoğan, Modi,
Brexit and Trump require a reckoning with the bad new days –
something a lot more forward-looking than models of solidarity
inspired by Cuba or Churchill, nationalist pedagogies for the
oppressed, or dauntless faith in globalisation eventually delivering
the promised goods.
This work is
necessary – but it can only proceed with a more sophisticated
analysis of how today’s landscape of hyperrational power has
coerced a new and increasingly potent irrationalism into existence.
And such analyses would require, above all, a richer and more varied
picture of human experience and needs than the prevailing image of
Homo economicus. This intellectual effort – which was first
undertaken more than a century ago by the thinkers cited here –
would necessarily take us beyond liberalism and its faith in the
curative power of economic growth.
What Robert Musil
called the “liberal scraps of an unfounded faith in reason and
progress” have yet again failed modern human beings in their
all-important task of understanding their experience. We once more
confront the possibility, outlined in Musil’s great novel about the
collapse of liberal values, The Man Without Qualities, that the
characteristic desolation of the modern human being – his “immense
loneliness in a desert of detail, his restlessness, malice,
incomparable callousness, his greed for money, his coldness and
violence’ – is “the result of the losses that logically precise
thinking has inflicted on the soul”.
For nearly three
decades, the religion of technology and GDP and the crude
19th-century calculus of self-interest have dominated politics and
intellectual life. Today, the society of entrepreneurial individuals
competing in the rational market reveals unplumbed depths of misery
and despair; it spawns a nihilistic rebellion against order itself.
With so many of our
landmarks in ruins, we can barely see where we are headed, let alone
chart a path. But even to get our basic bearings we need, above all,
greater precision in matters of the soul. The stunning events of our
age of anger, and our perplexity before them, make it imperative that
we anchor thought in the sphere of emotions; these upheavals demand
nothing less than a radically enlarged understanding of what it means
for human beings to pursue the contradictory ideals of freedom,
equality and prosperity.
Otherwise, in our
sterile infatuation with rational motivations and outcomes, we risk
resembling those helpless navigators who, De Tocqueville wrote,
“stare obstinately at some ruins that can still be seen on the
shore we have left, even as the current pulls us along and drags us
backward toward the abyss”.
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