How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a
Devastating Attack
Israeli officials completely underestimated the
magnitude of the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas, shattering the country’s once
invincible sense of security.
Before the attack by Hamas on Oct. 7, Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu and top Israeli security officials believed the greatest
threats to Israel were Iran and Hezbollah.
Ronen
BergmanMark Mazzetti Maria Abi-Habib
By Ronen
Bergman, Mark Mazzetti and Maria Abi-Habib
Ronen
Bergman reported from Tel Aviv and the Gaza-Israel border, Mark Mazzetti from
Washington and Maria Abi-Habib from London.
Oct. 29,
2023
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-intelligence-hamas-attack.html
It was 3
a.m. on Oct. 7, and Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s domestic security service,
still could not determine if what he was seeing was just another Hamas military
exercise.
At the
headquarters of his service, Shin Bet, officials had spent hours monitoring
Hamas activity in the Gaza Strip, which was unusually active for the middle of
the night. Israeli intelligence and national security officials, who had
convinced themselves that Hamas had no interest in going to war, initially
assumed it was just a nighttime exercise.
Their
judgment that night might have been different had they been listening to
traffic on the hand-held radios of Hamas militants. But Unit 8200, Israel’s
signals intelligence agency, had stopped eavesdropping on those networks a year
earlier because they saw it as a waste of effort.
As time
passed that night, Mr. Bar thought that Hamas might attempt a small-scale
assault. He discussed his concerns with Israel’s top generals and ordered the
“Tequila” team — a group of elite counterterrorism forces — to deploy to
Israel’s southern border.
Until
nearly the start of the attack, nobody believed the situation was serious
enough to wake up Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to three Israeli
defense officials.
Within
hours, the Tequila troops were embroiled in a battle with thousands of Hamas
gunmen who penetrated Israel’s vaunted border fence, sped in trucks and on
motorbikes into southern Israel and attacked villages and military bases.
The most
powerful military force in the Middle East had not only completely
underestimated the magnitude of the attack, it had totally failed in its
intelligence-gathering efforts, mostly due to hubris and the mistaken
assumption that Hamas was a threat contained.
Despite
Israel’s sophisticated technological prowess in espionage, Hamas gunmen had
undergone extensive training for the assault, virtually undetected for at least
a year. The fighters, who were divided into different units with specific
goals, had meticulous information on Israel’s military bases and the layout of
kibbutzim.
The
country’s once invincible sense of security was shattered.
More than
1,400 people were killed, including many women, children and old people who
were murdered systematically and brutally. Hundreds are held hostage or are
still missing. Israel has responded with a ferocious bombardment campaign on
Gaza, killing more than 8,000 Palestinians and wounding thousands more,
according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The Israeli military on Sunday
signaled a heavier assault on Gaza, saying it had expanded its ground incursion
overnight.
Israeli
officials have promised a full investigation into what went wrong.
Even before
that inquiry, it is clear the attacks were possible because of a cascade of
failures over recent years — not hours, days or weeks. A New York Times
examination, based on dozens of interviews with Israeli, Arab, European and
American officials, as well as a review of Israeli government documents and
evidence collected since the Oct. 7 raid, shows that:
Israeli
security officials spent months trying to warn Mr. Netanyahu that the political
turmoil caused by his domestic policies was weakening the country’s security
and emboldening Israel’s enemies. The prime minister continued to push those
policies. On one day in July he even refused to meet a senior general who came
to deliver a threat warning based on classified intelligence, according to
Israeli officials.
Israeli
officials misjudged the threat posed by Hamas for years, and more critically in
the run-up to the attack. The official assessment of Israeli military
intelligence and the National Security Council since May 2021 was that Hamas
had no interest in launching an attack from Gaza that might invite a
devastating response from Israel, according to five people familiar with the
assessments who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive
details. Instead, Israeli intelligence assessed that Hamas was trying to foment
violence against Israelis in the West Bank, which is controlled by its rival,
the Palestinian Authority.
The belief
by Mr. Netanyahu and top Israeli security officials that Iran and Hezbollah,
its most powerful proxy force, presented the gravest threat to Israel diverted
attention and resources away from countering Hamas. In late September, senior
Israeli officials told The Times they were concerned that Israel might be
attacked in the coming weeks or months on several fronts by Iran-backed militia
groups, but made no mention of Hamas initiating a war with Israel from the Gaza
Strip.
American
spy agencies in recent years had largely stopped collecting intelligence on
Hamas and its plans, believing the group was a regional threat that Israel was
managing.
Overall,
arrogance among Israeli political and security officials convinced them that
the country’s military and technological superiority to Hamas would keep the
terrorist group in check.
“They were
able to trick our collection, our analysis, our conclusions and our strategic
understanding,” Eyal Hulata, Israel’s national security adviser from 2021 until
early this year, said during a discussion last week in Washington sponsored by
the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank.
“I don’t
think there was anyone who was involved with affairs with Gaza that shouldn’t
ask themselves how and where they were also part of this massive failure,” he
added.
Many senior
officials have accepted responsibility, but Mr. Netanyahu has not. At 1 a.m.
Sunday in Israel, after his office was asked for comment on this article, he
posted a message on X, formerly Twitter, that repeated remarks he made to The
New York Times and blamed the military and intelligence services for failing to
provide him with any warning on Hamas.
“Under no
circumstances and at no stage was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned of war
intentions on the part of Hamas,” the post read in Hebrew. “On the contrary,
the assessment of the entire security echelon, including the head of military
intelligence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas was deterred and was
seeking an arrangement.”
In the
resulting furor, Benny Gantz, a member of his war cabinet, publicly rebuked Mr.
Netanyahu, saying that “leadership means displaying responsibility,” and urged
the prime minister to retract the post. It was later deleted, and Mr. Netanyahu
apologized in a new one.
On Sunday,
Shin Bet promised a thorough investigation after the war. The I.D.F. declined
to comment.
The last
time Israelis’ collective belief in their country’s security was similarly
devastated was 50 years earlier, at the start of the Yom Kippur War, when
Israel was caught off guard by an assault by Egyptian and Syrian forces. In an
echo of that attack, Hamas succeeded because Israeli officials made many of the
same mistakes that were made in 1973.
The Yom
Kippur War was “a classic example of how intelligence fails when the policy and
intelligence communities build a feedback loop that reinforces their prejudices
and blinds them to changes in the threat environment,” Bruce Riedel, a former
top Middle East analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote in a 2017
research paper about the 1973 war.
In an
interview this month, Mr. Riedel said that Mr. Netanyahu was reaping the
consequences of focusing on Iran as the existential threat to Israel while
largely ignoring an enemy in his backyard.
“Bibi’s
message to Israelis has been that the real threat is Iran,” he said, using Mr.
Netanyahu’s nickname. “That with the occupation of the West Bank and the siege
of Gaza, the Palestinian issue is no longer a threat to Israel’s security. All
of those assumptions were shattered on Oct. 7.”
Ignored Warnings
On July 24,
two senior Israeli generals arrived at the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, to
deliver urgent warnings to Israeli lawmakers, according to three Israeli
defense officials.
The Knesset
was scheduled that day to give final approval to one of Mr. Netanyahu’s
attempts to curb the power of Israel’s judiciary — an effort that had convulsed
Israeli society, ignited massive street protests and led to large-scale
resignations from the military reserves.
A growing
portion of the Air Force’s operational pilots was threatening to refuse to
report to duty if the legislation passed.
In the
briefcase of one of the generals, Aharon Haliva, the head of the Israeli
Defense Forces’ Military Intelligence Directorate, were highly classified
documents detailing a judgment by intelligence officials that the political
turmoil was emboldening Israel’s enemies. One document stated that the leaders
of what Israeli officials call the “axis of resistance” — Iran, Syria, Hamas,
Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad — believed this was a moment of Israeli
weakness and a time to strike.
Hezbollah’s
leader, Hassan Nasrallah, according to one of the documents, said that it was
necessary to prepare for a major war.
General Haliva was ready to tell the coalition leaders
that the political turmoil was creating an opportunity for Israel’s enemies to
attack, particularly if there were more resignations in the military. Only two
members of the Knesset came to hear his briefing.
The
legislation passed overwhelmingly.
Separately,
Gen. Herzi Halevi, the military’s chief of staff, tried to deliver the same
warnings to Mr. Netanyahu. The prime minister refused to meet him, the
officials said. Mr. Netanyahu’s office did not respond to a request for comment
about this meeting.
Only two
members of the Israeli parliament went to a briefing with Gen. Aharon Haliva,
the head of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Military Intelligence
Directorate.Credit...Dan Balilty for The New York Times
The
generals’ warnings were in large part based on a series of provocations on
Israel’s northern border.
In February
and March, Hezbollah had sent explosive-laden drones toward Israeli gas rigs.
In March, a militant climbed over the border fence from Lebanon into Israel,
carrying several powerful bombs, weapons, phones and an electric bike on which
he traveled to a major northern intersection. He then used a powerful charge,
apparently trying to blow up a bus.
On May 21,
Hezbollah staged for apparently the first time war games at one of its training
sites in Aaramta in south Lebanon. Hezbollah launched rockets and flew drones
that dropped explosives on a simulated Israeli settlement.
Israeli
officials believed that Hezbollah was leading the planning for a coordinated
attack against Israel, but not one that would prompt an all-out war.
The
officials’ concerns grew through August and September, and General Halevi went
public with his concerns.
“We must be
more prepared than ever for a multi-arena and extensive military conflict,” he
said at a military ceremony on Sept. 11, just weeks before the attack.
Mr.
Netanyahu’s allies went on Israeli television and condemned General Halevi for
sowing panic.
In a series
of meetings, Shin Bet gave similar warnings to senior Israeli officials as
General Halevi. Eventually, Mr. Bar also went public.
“From the
investigations we are doing we can say today that the political instability and
the growing division are a shot of encouragement to the countries of the axis
of evil, the terrorist organizations and the individual threats,” Mr. Bar said
in a speech.
Mr.
Netanyahu’s government also ignored warnings from Israel’s neighbors. As the
custodian of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, Jordan has traditionally been an
important mediator between Palestinians and Israel’s government on the Aqsa
Mosque compound, the third most holy site in Islam. The mosque compound has
seen repeated raids by Israeli forces over the years, and Hamas has said that
it launched this month’s attack in part as retaliation for those acts.
But Jordan
found that when Mr. Netanyahu formed a government late last year, the most far
right in recent history, it was less receptive to their warnings that the
incidents at the Aqsa Mosque compound was stirring up sentiment inside
Palestinian territories that could boil over into violence, according to two
Arab officials with knowledge of the relationship.
The Wrong Focus
While
security and intelligence officials were right about a coming attack, their
intense focus on Hezbollah and Iran had a tragic effect: Far less attention was
paid to the threats from Gaza. Since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 and Hamas’s
evolution from a purely guerrilla organization into the governing power of Gaza
in 2007, Hamas had only periodic skirmishes with the Israeli military.
Under four
different prime ministers, Israel repeatedly decided that reoccupying Gaza and
crushing Hamas would cost too many lives and do too much damage to Israel’s
international reputation.
Israel knew
that Hamas, which Iran supports with funding, training and weapons, was growing
stronger over time. But officials thought they could contain Hamas with an
extensive network of human spies, sophisticated surveillance tools that would
deliver early warnings of an attack and border fortifications to deter a Hamas
ground assault. They also relied on the Iron Dome air defense system for
intercepting rockets and missiles launched from Gaza.
The
strategy, confirmed by multiple Israeli officials, bore some fruit. Over the
years, Israel’s investment in penetrating Hamas’s inner circle in Gaza allowed
Israel to uncover the group’s attack plans and occasionally led to
assassinations of Hamas leaders.
Strengthening Hamas
Publicly,
Mr. Netanyahu used blunt rhetoric about Hamas. His election slogan in 2008 was
“Strong Against Hamas,” and in one campaign video at the time he pledged: “We
will not stop the I.D.F. We will finish the job. We will topple the terror
regime of Hamas.”
Over time,
however, he came to see Hamas as a way to balance power against the Palestinian
Authority, which has administrative control over the West Bank and has long
sought a peace agreement in Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state.
Mr.
Netanyahu told aides over the years that a feeble Palestinian Authority lowered
the pressure on him to make concessions to Palestinians in negotiations,
according to several former Israeli officials and people close to Mr.
Netanyahu. An official in Mr. Netanyahu’s office, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity, denied this had been the prime minister’s policy.
But there
is no question that Israeli officials viewed Hamas as a regional threat, not a
global terrorist organization like Hezbollah or the Islamic State. This view
was shared in Washington, and American intelligence agencies dedicated few
resources to collecting information on the group.
Some parts
of the American government even believed that Hamas operatives could be
recruited as sources of information about terrorist groups considered more
urgent priorities in Washington.
Jonathan
Schanzer, a former Treasury Department official and now the senior vice
president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, recalled a
meeting he had in 2015 with American intelligence and law enforcement officials
about suspected Hamas operatives inside the United States.
During the
meeting, he recalled, the officials told him they were trying to turn the Hamas
operatives into “assets” in the fight against the Islamic State.
in the
Middle East.Credit...Samar Abu Elouf for The New York Times
The Invincibility of the Wall
Israeli
officials firmly believed that “The Barrier” — a nearly 40-mile-long reinforced
concrete wall above and below ground, completed in 2021 — would hermetically
seal off Gaza. There was also a surveillance system at the border based almost
exclusively on cameras, sensors and remote-operated “sight-shooter” systems,
four senior Israeli military officers told The Times.
Senior
Israeli military officials believed that the combination of remote surveillance
and machine-gun systems with the formidable wall would make it almost
impossible to infiltrate Israel, and thus reduce the need for a large number of
soldiers to be stationed at the bases.
But Hamas’s
attack exposed the fragility of that technology. The group used explosive
drones that damaged the cellular antennas and the remote firing systems that
protected the fence between Gaza and Israel.
To get
around Israel’s powerful surveillance technology, Hamas fighters also appeared
to enforce strict discipline among the group’s ranks to not discuss its
activities on mobile phones. This allowed them to pull off the attack without
detection, one European official said.
The group
most likely divided its fighters into smaller cells, each probably only trained
for a specific objective. That way, the rank and file did not understand the
scale of the attacks they were preparing for and could not give away the
operation if caught, a European official said, based on his analysis of how the
attack unfolded and from the videos the group disseminated from the operation.
Hamas may
have learned such operational discipline from Hezbollah, which has long
confused Israeli forces on the battlefield by dividing its fighters into
smaller units of friends or relatives, according to Lebanese officials with
ties to the group. If the fighters speak openly on cellphones to coordinate
military operations, Lebanese officials with ties to the group said, part of
their code is to speak in childhood memories — for example, asking to meet up
in a field where they once played together.
Hamas
claimed that 35 drones took part in the opening strike, including the Zawari,
an explosive-laden drone.
“We started
receiving messages that there was a raid on every reporting line,” testified
one soldier, who was at the Gaza Division base on the day of the invasion, in a
conversation with the “Hamakom Hachi Ham Bagehinom” (“The Hottest Place in
Hell”) website.
“On every
reporting line, swarms of terrorists were coming in,” the soldier added. “The
forces did not have time to come and stop it. There were swarms of terrorists,
something psychotic, and we were simply told that our only choice was to take
our feet and flee for our lives.”
In a
conversation with military investigators two weeks after the attack, soldiers
who survived the assault testified that the Hamas training was so precise that
they damaged a row of cameras and communication systems so that “all our
screens turned off in almost the exact same second.” The result of all this was
a near total blindness on the morning of the attack.
After the
fighting had stopped, Israeli soldiers found hand-held radios on the dead
bodies of some of the Hamas militants — the same radios that Israeli
intelligence officials had decided a year ago were no longer worth monitoring.
Farnaz
Fassihi contributed reporting from New York, and Eileen Sullivan from
Washington.
Ronen
Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv.
His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s
Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman
Mark
Mazzetti is a Washington investigative correspondent, and a two-time Pulitzer
Prize winner. He is the author of "The Way of the Knife: the C.I.A, a
Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth." More about Mark Mazzetti
Maria
Abi-Habib is an investigative correspondent based in Mexico City, covering
Latin America. She previously reported from Afghanistan, across the Middle East
and in India, where she covered South Asia. More about Maria Abi-Habib
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