‘She’s totally lost it’: inside story of the
unravelling of Liz Truss’s premiership
Approaching one year on from the start of her tenure,
a look back on how it all fell apart within 49 days
by Aubrey
Allegretti Senior political correspondent
Fri 1 Sep
2023 07.00 EDT
When Liz
Truss addressed the nation from Downing Street in her first speech as prime
minister, she promised “action this day, and action every day”. It was meant to
be a Churchillian call to arms demonstrating her determination to solve the
intractable issues facing Britain. Instead, it foreshadowed the most chaotic
period in recent political history.
As the sole
survivor through the cabinets of the three previous Conservative-led
governments, Truss was used to putting pragmatism above principles. But that
approach was cast aside when she swept in to No 10.
In her
first week in office, an aide suggested she should “be like Blair” and avoid
immediately rocking the boat. He was slapped down. Truss told him to stop
talking – and the aide was said to have been cut out of further meetings.
Such
single-mindedness quickly collided headlong with the realities of government.
With an inexperienced team in No 10, and a divided party, the foundations of
her administration were shaky from the start. Within 49 extraordinary days, it
had fallen apart.
‘Things got off to a bad start on day one’
The early
omens were hardly encouraging. On Tuesday 6 September, Truss flew to Scotland
to meet Queen Elizabeth, who would formally invite her to form a new
government. Thick fog delayed her plane’s landing at Aberdeen airport. Finally
arriving at Balmoral, Truss shook hands with the smiling monarch. The bad
weather persisted, delaying Truss’s return to Downing Street.
As she was
driven towards No 10 on the last leg of her round trip, the car made several
detours to wait for a break in the rain in which Truss could make a speech,
while a bin bag was temporarily used to protect the waiting, sodden podium.
Truss
eventually made a hurried address lasting four minutes and five seconds. She
warned of “severe global headwinds” but insisted Britain would “ride out the
storm”.
That
evening, she appointed a new cabinet, but she left Wendy Morton, the chief
whip, and Thérèse Coffey, the deputy prime minister, to conduct junior
ministerial hirings and firings.
“It was
silly of Liz not to squeeze every ounce of goodwill out of people by being the
one to appoint them, so things got off to a bad start on literally day one,”
said one of those appointed that day.
Instead,
Truss was putting the finishing details to a package to protect people from
spiralling energy costs. The plan had been worked on in secret during the
leadership race as millions fretted about whether they could afford their bills
come winter. Though she had railed during the leadership campaign against
“handouts”, Truss relented.
The energy
price guarantee was relatively well received, with no observable wobbles in the
markets despite the intervention’s £100bn price tag. But 55 minutes into a
Commons debate on the issue on 8 September, a cabinet colleague appeared at
Truss’s side with news that any prime minister would dread. Nadhim Zahawi, the
chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, handed her a note saying the queen’s
health was deteriorating.
It was a
moment for which officials had been preparing for years. When the queen’s death
was announced at 6.30pm, Operation London Bridge was activated – and the cogs
in the British political system ground to a halt.
For 10
days, most officials were diverted to help with preparations for the queen’s
lying in state and funeral.
‘There was basically zero institutional memory left’
For Truss’s
newly assembled team of political aides, it was a chance to get to know each
other. The group included special advisers who had worked with Truss at the
Foreign Office, and a handful from the Boris Johnson and Theresa May eras.
Among others were public affairs executives and lobbyists.
“It would
have been the perfect moment for some team bonding, but we couldn’t even go to
the pub,” recalled one aide.
The
lobbyist Mark Fullbrook was brought in as No 10 chief of staff, with Ruth
Porter, a public affairs executive, designated as his deputy. Jason Stein, a
former media aide to several cabinet ministers and to Prince Andrew, was bought
back in as a special adviser. Adam Jones was appointed as head of political
communications.
An
overwhelming number of the senior figures brought into the administration had
limited experience running a Whitehall department, let alone the country. The
entire legislative affairs team – in charge of drafting and timetabling bills –
was replaced too.
“It was
like she’d stripped off all the wallpaper, then the paint and floorboards too.
There was basically zero institutional memory left,” one Truss-era cabinet
minister said.
As the
mourning period for the queen wore on, Truss set about with changes behind the
closed door of No 10, setting up her main office in the cabinet room and
ordering a full-scale desk reorganisation in which the policy unit was evicted
and moved into the Cabinet Office.
In the
corridors of power, proximity is everything. Looking back, a No 10 source
admitted the move meant there were “fewer people in-house to quality-check”.
Mini-budget: disaster strikes
Truss was
determined to overhaul the high-tax, high-spend approach she had accused Rishi
Sunak of adopting in his No 11 days. She ordered the new chancellor, Kwasi
Kwarteng, to remould the economy.
The
mini-budget was pencilled in for Friday 23 September, the final sitting day of
the Commons before recess. Labour’s autumn conference would begin two days
later and Truss thought the statement would “blow them out of the water”,
leaving the opposition facing uncomfortable questions about whether they would
support this tax cut or that.
Kwarteng’s
team privately feared that the size of the statement was ballooning. At first,
it was a vehicle to implement Truss’s campaign promises of reversing the
planned national insurance and corporation tax rises. But new measures kept
being added at Truss’s behest: investment zones, scrapping the cap on bankers’
bonuses and – most controversially – abolishing the top rate of income tax.
This last
measure had been discussed by Truss and Kwarteng over the summer, but they had
not intended to announce it so soon. Truss was keen to use the honeymoon period
that she thought would be afforded to them to “go big”, but there was disbelief
among Tory MPs when the details emerged.
Jitters had
already set in because of the refusal to formally badge the announcement as a
budget. This was a deliberate tactic taken by No 10 because doing so would have
involved the Office for Budget Responsibility producing its own analysis and
forecasts on the plans. Truss viewed the OBR as part of the “economic
establishment” and had already sacked the most senior civil servant in the
Treasury, Tom Scholar.
Kwarteng
delivered the statement to the Commons in 26 mesmerising minutes. The
significance of the event did not sink in straight away. Most MPs sat in
shellshock. Only one Tory dared to raise a concern. Mel Stride, the Treasury
select committee chair, decried the “vast void” at the centre of Kwarteng’s
statement, namely the lack of OBR scrutiny.
Kwarteng’s
team was brimming with confidence. Chris Philp, the chief secretary to the
Treasury, fired out a tweet at 10.17am saying it was “great to see sterling
strengthen on the back of the new UK growth plan”, with a graph showing a rise
in the pound’s value against the US dollar.
Less than
half an hour later, the pound had fallen to a 37-year low.
Kwarteng
had expected some market backlash and still headed off that evening to the Two
Chairmen pub in Westminster to celebrate. The real backlash would come two days
later. In an incredibly inflammatory move, on the Sunday Kwarteng took to a BBC
studio to declare: “There’s more to come.”
The markets
duly went into a frenzy. It sparked a run on the pound and fears of sharply
higher borrowing costs. Worse, it precipitated a crisis in the UK pensions
industry.
Comparisons
with Black Wednesday in 1992 and fears of a 2008-style financial crash forced
the Bank of England to step in. The Bank’s governor, Andrew Bailey, complained
of being blindsided by the mini-budget’s £45bn of seemingly unfunded tax cuts,
prompting Threadneedle Street to buy up to £65bn of UK government bonds.
Truss’s
initial instinct was to say nothing. She “pathologically hated backing down”,
an aide recalled. But after a meeting with Kwarteng that was said to have
descended into a shouting match, she agreed to the Treasury issuing a statement
on Monday designed to calm the markets. It reassured the City that forecasts by
the OBR would be published and there would be a further announcement in the
autumn on plans to avoid debt spiralling out of control.
Truss went
back into hiding. No 10 aides feared that the markets could “smell our nerves”
and the silence only made things worse.
In an
attempt to avoid looking like Downing Street had descended into full-scale
panic, eight BBC local radio interviews were set up. “They were, objectively, a
disaster,” said one of her senior team. Over the course of an hour,
interviewers from the radio stations in Leeds (where she grew up), Norfolk (she
is the MP for South West Norfolk), Kent, Lancashire, Nottingham, Tees Valley,
Bristol and Stoke-on-Trent unleashed the pent-up anger of millions of nervous
Britons.
She was cut
down to size within minutes by the first presenter, who asked Truss bluntly:
“Where’ve you been?”
What
followed was ritual humiliation for the prime minister. The questions kept
relaying fury from listeners. One asked pointedly: “Are you ashamed of what you
have done?”
Seemingly
not. “She was wounded, but that only made her more angry and defiant,” said one
aide. “The belief was we just needed to explain better and harder.”
The U-turns begin
Truss stuck
to her stance on the opening day of the Tory party conference in Birmingham,
which began a few days later, on Sunday 2 October. Settling into her seat in
the BBC studio for the traditional leader’s sitdown, she was determined to
appear unfazed.
Truss
brushed off the backlash to the mini-budget, saying she stood by the measures.
But there was a hint of contrition. “I do accept we should have laid the ground
better,” was the most she could muster.
Michael
Gove sat opposite the prime minister, ready to savage her answers on live
television. “It’s still the case that there is an inadequate realisation at the
top of government of the scale of change required,” he said.
Nevertheless,
Truss launched a charm offensive to try to woo her critics. She invited those
viewed as “persuadable” up to her hotel suite aiming to win them over,
succeeding with the likes of Greg Hands, a former chief secretary to the
Treasury who afterwards dutifully tweeted out a defence of the mini-budget.
Others, such as John Glen, were unconvinced.
The number
of Tory MPs who were threatening to vote against the mini-budget began to
mount. Jake Berry, the Conservative party chair, added to the febrile
atmosphere by saying those who did so would lose the party whip.
With
support ebbing away, Truss realised she might not have the numbers to get her
plans through parliament. Such a defeat would have been treated as a vote of no
confidence.
With the
tide turning against her, Truss relented. Late on the evening of Sunday 2
October, she told Kwarteng to U-turn on the abolition of the top tax rate.
A planned
visit and interview with Truss the following morning were scrapped and a wider
malaise quickly set in. Penny Mordaunt, the leader of the Commons, declared
“our comms is shit” at a late-night reception, while another minister, Conor
Burns, tipped Kemi Badenoch as “the future of our party” – much to Truss’s
fury.
Meanwhile,
Grant Shapps strolled around the party conference hotel boasting about his
spreadsheet containing a list of unhappy MPs and their grievances. He had felt
slighted by her at the start of the leadership election, and when he was passed
over for a cabinet job became one of the leading figures in the fight to remove
her.
What
started as a slight polling deficit for the Tories became a gulf. Labour’s lead
soared to more than 30 points and ministers privately began putting Truss on
notice.
The unravelling
The greater
the criticism of Truss became, the more she isolated herself. Not only did the
pool of allies she would speak to narrow, but others struggled to contact her
to relay their concerns or offer support after her phone was hacked.
The
incident took place during the summer leadership race but did not publicly
emerge until after she had left No 10, meaning many remained in the dark about
how to get hold of her.
Government
ground to a halt (again) and the sole focus of Truss’s team turned to trying to
shore up support. David Canzini, a political strategist brought in during the
dying days of Johnson’s government, was drafted back to run a “war room”
operation in No 10.
It started
strongly, with Berry chairing the morning meetings in the Pillared Room and
Hands brought in to handle MP relations. “But people slowly dropped out as they
saw which way the wind was blowing, until the point you looked around the room
and realised it was basically empty,” said one of those present.
Adam Jones,
Truss’s political communications director, took some time off after the party
conference for his wedding and honeymoon and never returned. Jason Stein
stepped into his place and in an email to staff joked: “I’ll try not to break
anything.”
By
mid-October, MPs were whispering that Truss had until Christmas to turn things
around. But that was about to change.
Fresh from
a disastrous party conference, Truss arrived at committee room 14 on a dusty
corridor in parliament to face a grilling from the 1922 Committee of Tory
backbenchers. Every question was hostile. Mark Harper, Kevin Hollinrake, James
Cartlidge – who would all become ministers in the Sunak government – were among
those who voiced their concerns.
Robert
Halfon went one step further and directly blamed Truss for trashing the
Conservative party brand. The unhappiness of the parliamentary party was
becoming increasingly stark, emboldening MPs to think the unthinkable: that
they might be about to defenestrate a second prime minister in just over a
month.
Meanwhile,
Kwarteng faced an awkward showdown of his own in Washington. He had flown out
for an annual gathering hosted by International Monetary Fund after it issued a
stern slapdown of the mini-budget. Though he attended some talks, he was
scrambled home a day early, boarding an overnight flight.
No one
believed the official explanation from the Treasury that it was to work on the
upcoming medium-term fiscal plan. News of his imminent sacking leaked and
Kwarteng found out via Twitter as he was being driven to Downing Street to be
told the news personally.
The
conversation with Truss was short. She told him he was being sacked, and
Kwarteng cooly replied that he already knew.
When
Kwarteng exited the cabinet room, an observer remarked his shirt was hanging
out at the back: “It literally looked like he was leaving with his tail was
between his legs.”
Jeremy Hunt
was asked to take the job. Normally affable, on this occasion he was solemn –
he requested that no pictures of him smiling be released by in-house government
photographers. Hunt was now running the show, and Truss’s supporters felt the
entire policy platform on which she had entered No 10 was about to be ripped to
shreds.
Truss made
one last effort to steady the ship, calling a press conference that afternoon.
It lasted less than nine minutes but had been intended to go on much longer.
She announced a second U-turn, that the planned national insurance rise she had
vowed to cancel would go ahead.
While Truss
said she was “absolutely determined” to stay in post, insiders said this was
the moment she knew her time in No 10 was up. After taking just three
questions, Truss hurried off stage – to shouts of “aren’t you going to
apologise?” from the remaining reporters.
The final week
Truss’s
premiership had become a tinderbox. There was no need for ministerial
resignations or no-confidence letters – the sense of inevitability that she
could survive for only a few more days was overwhelming.
Truss
became ever less involved. She dodged an urgent question in parliament on
recent economic turmoil and was mocked when Mordaunt, who stepped in to answer
on her behalf, insisted Truss was not hiding “under a desk”.
Critics
began speculating who would last longer – the prime minister, or a lettuce. In
an effort to stay out of the fray, Truss delegated decisions to her most ardent
supporter, Coffey.
Wednesday
19 October started worse than terribly. A gruelling prime minister’s questions
left uncomfortable grimaces on the faces of the Tory MPs behind Truss.
Amid the
uncertainty, another, almost forgotten scandal: Suella Braverman, the home
secretary, was forced out for breaching the ministerial code by sending an
official document from her personal email to a fellow MP.
But the
most bizarre twist of events was yet to come. That afternoon, Labour tabled a
craftily worded motion. It would have guaranteed parliamentary time for a bill
to ban fracking. The business secretary, Jacob Rees-Mogg, was in favour of
reviving the controversial drilling practice but many Tory MPs were not. To
avoid a mass revolt, the chief whip, Wendy Morton, determined that it would be
treated as a confidence vote – meaning anyone who defied the whip would face
ejection from the parliamentary party.
Towards the
end of the debate, communications broke down. On the floor of the Commons, with
less than 10 minutes until the division bells started ringing, the energy
minister, Graham Stuart, announced that the confidence vote had been called
off. Mayhem broke out. Coffey was accused of manhandling a Tory MP to force
them to vote with the government, while Morton and her deputy, Craig Whittaker,
felt so undermined that they tried to resign on the spot.
Both were
dissuaded from doing so in the hours that followed, but it was clear their
authority had vanished – and that Truss had lost control of the government and
her party.
‘That’s when I thought she’s totally lost it’
Immediately
after that mess had unfurled in parliament, half the parliamentary party
drifted across to a reception to mark the 100th anniversary of the Carlton
Club. Swilling champagne at the private members’ club situated on the edge of
Mayfair, each peered at their phones for updates on the government’s imminent
collapse.
Gallows
humour started to percolate through the room. Hunt and the foreign secretary,
James Cleverly, gave speeches from the grand central staircase, alluding to the
chaos. Mingling in the crowd were members of the 1922 Committee executive – the
so-called men in grey suits whose job it was to tell Truss she could go quietly
or be pushed. “You had the assassins and the about-to-be-assassinated milling
around in black tie – it was like a game a Cluedo,” said one of those who was
present.
Those who
had been leading the campaign to oust Truss knew the moment had arrived. One
told Graham Brady, the chair of the 1922 Committee, that there were now enough
no-confidence letters from colleagues poised to be submitted to trigger a
no-confidence vote. And so on Thursday morning, Brady traipsed across to No 10
to tell Truss she had lost the support of the parliamentary party.
Truss
decided not to fight on and summoned her aides to the cabinet room. “There was
no round of applause or tears, just an emotionless and exhausted room of
people,” recalled one of those present.
In the days
before she formally stepped down, Truss held farewell parties for her
supporters at the prime ministerial grace-and-favour mansion of Chequers. Even
then, she defended everything she had sought to achieve, saying she had “the
right policies at the wrong time”.
“That’s
when I thought ‘she’s totally lost it’,” said a former aide.
One year on
from Truss taking office aiming to remould the economy, interest rates and
mortgage costs have risen, inflation is uncomfortably high and growth,
meanwhile is practically nonexistent.
Her
successor, Sunak, is still struggling to draw a line under what some Tory MPs
call the “Trusterfuck” that they believe will cost them their seats and the
party its majority at the next election.
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