Erdoğan,
the new Atatürk
A
nearly century-old reverence for the father of modern Turkey is being
replaced by a doctrine shaped by and centered on its president.
By ZIA
WEISE 12/26/16, 5:34 AM CET Updated 12/26/16, 9:06 AM CET
ISTANBUL — At the
beginning of December, Turkey’s president felt compelled to shift
the focus of his speeches from the near-daily diatribes against
political opponents, critics and terror to the economy. The Turkish
lira, already unsteady after a year of domestic turmoil, was hitting
a new record low every day.
The reasons for the
national currency’s decline are not difficult to grasp: months of
bombings, an attempted coup d’état, friction with the European
Union and worsening repression have sent Turkey’s economy spiraling
downward. After Donald Trump won the U.S. election, badly affecting
emerging markets, the lira fared worse than even the Mexican peso.
Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, however, had a different view. “Someone,” he declared,
“is trying to force this country to its knees by economic
sabotage.” With the president’s words, the economic troubles
became entangled in the narrative the government had pushed since
this summer’s coup attempt — that shadowy powers were conspiring
to bring Turkey down.
It’s such often
bellicose rhetoric that has further raised investors’ doubt and
European unease over Turkey. But much of it is intended for domestic
consumption only: This tale of a nation under attack from sinister
outside forces — be they terrorists, coup-plotters or the
often-invoked “interest rate lobby” — casts Erdoğan as the
only leader capable of defending Turkey, cementing his power.
This narrative also
serves as the backbone to a dramatic shift in Ankara, helping replace
Turkey’s century-old official ideology — Kemalism, named after
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern republic — with
an ideology shaped by and centered on Erdoğan.
“Kemalism was a
guideline for the whole nation, as it was put. That era has, by and
large, ended. People still give lip service to Atatürk. But the
hegemony of Kemalism has ended,” said Turkish author and columnist
Mustafa Akyol. “It’s being replaced by Erdoğanism.”
The face of Mustafa
Kemal, whose honorific “Atatürk” translates to “father of the
Turks,” adorns coins and lira notes, homes and offices, schools and
public squares; it’s illegal to insult his memory. He defined the
modern Turkish nation as secular and Westernised, abolishing the
caliphate and replacing the Arabic alphabet with Latin letters, among
a series of sweeping reforms.
Erdoğan has long
held ambitions to supplant Atatürk as the country’s most revered
leader, distancing himself from the founder’s ideals and
emphasizing Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic heritage over its more
recent secular history.
“The
national mythos that’s been created since July 15 is that this is
the second war of independence. Erdoğan, Turkey, it’s merged into
this national mythology” — Asli Aydintasbas
Erdoğan, too, made
consequential reforms over the years — transforming the economy,
reducing the power of the military, granting long-denied political
and cultural rights to the Kurdish minority — but his narrative
lacked a founding myth that Turks could rally behind, a grand victory
akin to Atatürk’s successful war of independence.
This changed on July
15 when Turks marched against tanks and defeated a military coup. The
attempted putsch, Erdoğan seemed to understand, was “a gift from
God,” the symbol-laden victory that would allow him to reshape the
country.
The coup became a
unifying force, at least before the sweeping sackings and arrests of
regime opponents soured the mood. The images of flags, tanks, and
martyrs were plastered across the pro- and anti-government media for
weeks, the nation mourning its dead and celebrating the coup’s
failure. Even the opposition rallied behind Erdoğan’s
democratically-elected government.
“The national
mythos that’s been created since July 15 is that this is the second
war of independence,” said Asli Aydintasbas, a fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations. “Erdoğan, his survival, the
expansion of Turkey, the independence of Turkey — it’s merged
into this national mythology.”
It’s the narrative
that had been missing from Erdoğan’s ambitions for a “New
Turkey,” his vision for a prosperous country with him as its
executive president. Along with the notion of a “war of
independence,” the Erdoğan ideology shares another strong
similarity with Kemalism — its strong cult of personality.
There the
similarities end. While Atatürk westernized Turkish society, Erdoğan
views the West and its socio-economic order with suspicion. Erdoğan
encourages Ottoman nostalgia, which Atatürk despised. And unlike
Atatürk, who presided over a one-party system, Erdoğan does see his
state as a multi-party democracy — albeit one without independent
institutions, where winning the vote is all that’s needed to rule.
Islamism is a strong
factor, too. The Kemalists, Turkey’s secular elite, long repressed
overt expression of religion, for instance banning the wearing of
religious insignia in public and forbidding headscarved women from
entering universities. Erdoğan, who was briefly imprisoned in 1999
for reciting an Islamic poem, not only gave a voice to the country’s
pious citizens when he came to power; he turned the tables and made
them the ruling elite.
But besides the
Islamic element, the Erdoğan ideology is not unique. “This idea of
a strong leader taking the support of people who weren’t
traditionally at the center of power, dethroning the elite,
establishing control, making himself the embodiment of the nation —
you see that elsewhere,” Akyol, the Turkish columnist, said. “It’s
mainly a story of populism.”
“Erdoğan’s
Achilles heel is the economy” — Mustafa Akyol
And it’s popular
in Turkey. After the coup, Erdoğan’s popularity level soared to
new heights; he’s now confident that if a referendum on whether to
establish an executive presidency and extend his powers is held soon,
he would win comfortably. This month, the government put forward a
proposal for a new constitution and suggested a plebiscite could be
held the coming summer.
But the rhetoric has
its side effects. For one, Erdoğan’s Ottoman nostalgia and disdain
for the current world order occasionally takes on an aggressive
nature: his laments about being forced to give up Ottoman lands have
enraged neighbors like Greece and Iraq.
Investors aren’t
impressed, either: Each time Erdoğan blames outside forces or high
interest rates, the lira tumbles a little further. This tumultuous
year may have raised the president to Atatürk-like levels in the
minds of many Turks, but the floundering economy threatens Erdoğan’s
success and possibly hold on power.
“Erdoğan’s
popularity rests on several pillars — his ideology and Islam, but
also because he raised the life standards of the ordinary Turk,”
Akyol said. “His Achilles heel is the economy.”
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