Starmer can’t dodge the Europe question for ever.
In office, the economy will answer it for him
Martin
Kettle
Closer alignment between a Labour government and the
EU is a certainty. But the divisive binary choices of 2016 are ancient history
Thu 18 Apr
2024 06.00 BST
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/apr/18/keir-starmer-europe-economy-labour-eu
“Who do you
think will lead the Labour government’s revolt on Europe?” asked my walking
companion, steeped in politics, as we battled a cold morning headwind on a
Chiltern hillside this week, the hedgerows around us suddenly in full leaf
again and the chalkland remarkably dry after that pitiless early April rain,
before he added: “And when will it come?”
These are
both good questions. But they are hard to answer in a fierce wind and going
uphill. Back in the dry, I have mulled them more carefully. The revolt on which
my companion and I speculated would be a revolt to push Keir Starmer to go
further on Europe than he says he is willing to go. The answer is that the
pivotal factor may not be geopolitical- and security-related, as some may
assume amid the increasingly dire conflict with Russia in Ukraine. More
probably, it would be the state of the economy over which Labour finds itself
presiding as Starmer’s government reaches its midterm point.
At present,
Labour is keen to lock a future government’s relations with Europe in the
pre-election long-stay car park. Starmer wants the forthcoming contest to be
about Conservative economic failure, not about Brexit. Even Labour’s most
passionate pro-Europeans have accepted that getting elected must come first.
The party’s reluctance to air the European question too loudly before that is
understandable. But this does not mean the question is going to go away in
government.
One thing
can be said with complete confidence. The change in the UK-EU relationship if
Labour returns to power will be complicated not simple, evolutionary not
explosive, and contextual not doctrinaire. It will not be a stark in-out
choice, as it was in 2016. In many ways it would be crazy if it was, in the
light of the civic and practical damage that the referendum and its aftermath
inflicted on our still wounded country. A second-referendum moment is still at
least another decade away, and it quite possibly will never come.
But a
changing and closer relationship with Europe is nevertheless a certainty if
Labour is elected. The threat from Russia matters here, of course, as do the
climate and migration crises. But Britain’s relationship with Europe cannot
avoid being a key dynamic of any long-term national renewal project for Britain
of the kind that Starmer promised to the Labour conference last year. Repair
with Europe cannot be dodged indefinitely, whether in the context of domestic
politics, international security or the economy.
Many
variables, some highly volatile, will have an impact. Domestic politics cannot
be ignored. The election result itself will be crucial, especially if it is
close. Likewise if the Conservatives and Reform do better than expected in the
pro-Brexit “red wall” seats. A period of electoral unpopularity for Labour –
surely a when not an if factor – may foster caution about Europe, too. Any
signs of a Conservative revival, especially under a fanatical leave leader or
with Nigel Farage brought on board, will do the same. If Donald Trump is in the
White House, Labour will be even more between a rock and hard place.
Europe’s
own political context is also a source of volatility. The picture differs from
one country to another. A better disposed Britain will not be automatically
welcomed by all. June’s European elections in the EU’s 27 member states will
give a snapshot of the public mood about the continent’s current trajectory. A
big shift towards the nationalist right will dampen Labour ambitions. But the
political makeup of the new European Commission that will follow the elections
could be more lastingly significant. This commission will be in office until
2029, the entire period of what Starmer hopes will be only his own first term.
Whether it will be a partner with which a Labour government can do the useful
business that it hopes to do remains to be seen.
This week,
the shadow foreign secretary, David Lammy, set out his case for a Labour
foreign policy centred on “progressive realism”. He repeated that Brexit is
“settled” and that Labour will not seek to rejoin the EU, the single market or
the customs union. Instead, he advocated what he called a more “formal means of
cooperation” with Europe. One reading of this is that Lammy wants to negotiate
for Britain to attend meetings of the EU foreign affairs council on a regular
basis.
Central to
this strategy would be a security pact with the EU. Note that this is not a
proposal for a pact with Nato, of which the UK is a founding member. In fact,
it would not primarily be a defence pact as such. Instead, in Lammy’s words,
the EU pact would embrace “a wide variety of military, economic, climate,
health, cyber and energy security issues”. Later, he adds that “there are
plenty of pragmatic steps we can take to rebuild trust and cooperation and
reduce barriers to trade”. In other words, it is potentially an
across-the-board deal on everything short of formal membership.
Lammy’s
phrases are capacious. It is not hard to see that they could imply extremely
close alignment of rules on some very large issues such as emissions trading,
critical raw materials and even migration. All have genuine security
dimensions. Potentially, the list could be even longer, extending to things
such as data, pharmaceuticals, student mobility, science research and some
industrial products and standards.
Once Labour
is talking to the EU in detail about issues such as these, and assuming – which
may be over-ambitious – that the EU is equally willing to talk in detail with
the UK in return, this is a process with a lot of momentum. It will be hard to
keep it from bumping up against Britain’s position outside the EU. It is at
that point that the questions we posed on a windblown Chiltern hillside would
become very real indeed.
The answers
to them depend more than anything else on Britain’s economic performance over
the next three or so years. Suppose growth has become strong and the forecasts
in 2026-27 are even better. In that case, as the 2028-29 general election comes
into view, Labour will be more inclined to sit tight, strengthening its
agreements with the EU where it can but determined not to contemplate going
further.
Yet
suppose, on the other hand, that growth is more faltering, that forecasts
remain modest and that public-realm renewal and green-energy transformation are
still lagging behind. In that case, and especially amid global instability of
the kind being faced in 2024, the pressure for smoother links with Britain’s
closest and largest trading market will grow louder. If circumstances of that
kind apply, then the argument in favour of, for example, putting customs union
membership on the agenda will revive. But it will not be led by the diplomats,
the military or the scientists or by the ministers who represent their
interests. It will be led by economic interest, and thus by the chancellor of
the exchequer, Rachel Reeves.
Martin
Kettle is a Guardian columnist
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