Review
Can
Friedrich Merz Save Conservatism?
Germany’s
new chancellor is in a race to change Germany so it has a chance to remain the
same.
By John
Kampfner, the author of Why the Germans Do It Better: Notes from a Grown-Up
Country.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/23/can-friedrich-merz-save-conservatism/
May 23,
2025, 2:00 PM
Few world
leaders have taken up the job so late in life yet have so little experience.
Few can have won an election and been so unpopular even on victory. Few can
have faced the enormity of the challenges that Friedrich Merz faces with so
little confidence among his citizens that he can meet them.
Germany’s
10th postwar chancellor is only weeks into office, but judgments were being
made about him even before he took over. Most of these are influenced by a
national propensity to see the glass as half-empty. Yet, at the age of 69, Merz
knows he doesn’t have long to make a mark.
Who exactly
is he? A spate of biographies, published early in the election campaign, shed a
little light. A new book adopts a different approach. Mariam Lau, a journalist
at the weekly Die Zeit and one of the most authoritative experts on German
conservatism, takes a thematic approach in Merz: Auf der Suche nach der
verlorenen Mitte. She seeks to explain how Merz will deal with the likes of
Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and how he’ll try to kick-start the
German economy. She asks whether he has a problem with women (he has been
accused of being patronizing or sexist) and whether he would be ready to wage
war for his country.
Lau begins
by probing his past and a grandfather whose prominent support for the Nazis is
being increasingly chewed over in the media; it is making the requirement even
more urgent that Merz succeeds in the task he has set himself—to distance his
Christian Democrat-led government from the far-right Alternative for Germany
(AfD) while differentiating it from the legacy of former Chancellor Angela
Merkel.
The picture
emerging of Merz is of a man whose flaws are open for all to see but whose
resilience is underestimated. The subtitle of Lau’s book—“The Search for the
Lost Center Ground”—makes clear that this is the direction in which he wishes
to head. Yet, if that is so, he sometimes has a strange way of showing it. As
Lau writes, Merz has a track record of getting himself in trouble. “One could
almost speak of the ‘Merz Disease,’” she writes, “airing a resentment, doubling
down on it when faced with headwinds, only to have to give in at some point.”
The author
seeks to disentangle two extraordinary U-turns that Merz took during the
election period. Having said he would never deal with the AfD, in late January
he submitted a motion in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, advocating a
clampdown on immigration, knowing that the only way it would pass would be with
support from the far right. The bid failed because of a rebellion from furious
MPs within his own ranks.
A few weeks
later, having insisted that he would not contemplate loosening the “debt brake”
that severely restricted public borrowing, he did just that. By a sleight of
hand, he used the outgoing parliament to pass a constitutional change allowing
for a huge injection of money for spending on defense and public
infrastructure. He was now denounced by all sides as untrustworthy, too. Lau
contends that he had little choice but that he could have acted earlier. The
execution may have looked unprincipled, but Germany has ended up in a better
place—finally giving itself the tools to grow and modernize.
The first
about-turn had no such caveats. It was an unmitigated disaster, one that has
left a lingering suspicion about his relationship to the AfD. Some of Merz’s
allies want to remove the “firewall” that rules out cooperation with the party
at the regional and national levels. He insists he will not do so.
Instead, he
wants to weaken the appeal of the far right by dealing with its signature
issue—immigration. On day one of his leadership, he instructed Interior
Minister Alexander Dobrindt to impose border checks and to turn asylum-seekers
away at the border. Whether it succeeds in bringing down illegal migration or
increases confidence in the state’s ability to control overall figures—rather
than being purely performative (there’s little stopping people trying again and
again to get in)—is another matter. His partners in the coalition, the Social
Democrats, are prepared to go along with it.
Far more
open is the approach to the economy. The Social Democratic Party has watered
down Merz’s commitments to cut Germany’s generous welfare payments or to
countenance other radical reforms to the tax code or pensions system. As Lau
notes, the entire structure of modern Germany was based on stability and on
removing the opportunities for leaders to seize untrammeled power. The Basic
Law (the constitution enacted in 1949) ensured that coalitions were required to
be formed at all levels of government; power was shared, only involving
moderate parties, and the regional states enjoyed considerable autonomy.
Leaders such as Konrad Adenauer, Germany’s first postwar chancellor, “stood for
a break with all things ideological, as well as for stability, reconciliation,
a longing for normality and democratic boredom.”
It was in
that spirit that Merkel also navigated her 16 years in power, seeing the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as the party of small steps. She and Merz fell
out early—each accusing the other of undermining them. She publicly attacked
his parliamentary flirtation with the AfD. He has regular trashed her legacy
and what he calls her “asylum-hugging” and “green-hugging.” Merkel recently
tried a gesture of reconciliation, appearing as a visitor to the Bundestag to
watch Merz’s confirmation as chancellor, only to witness him suffering the
ignominy of becoming the first candidate to be voted down. By the time he was
elected in a second ballot a few hours later, she was gone.
Lau quotes
another writer on conservatism, Edmund Fawcett: “‘[C]onservatives have largely
created and learned to dominate a liberal modern world in which they cannot
feel at home.’” She continues: “The question of how the insistence on tradition
and attachment to one’s homeland are compatible with creative destruction,
without which there would be no prosperity and no free market economy, for
example, is one that an economic liberal like Friedrich Merz must ask himself.”
This goes to the heart of the Merz problem, indeed a problem facing all
mainstream center-right parties: How do they reconcile traditionalism with the
need for change?
With the
British Conservatives languishing in fourth place in opinion polls, and similar
parties floundering, is the only route to success the one taken by the likes of
Trump—a mix of maximum economic and democratic disruption alongside a so-called
return to traditional social values?
Until
recently, Lau notes, Merz hated being called a conservative. If he was to be
given that moniker, he demanded that the word “progressive” be added to it.
Anything else would be seen as “unsafe” or tending toward the extreme. Now, she
says, it has gone from a term of abuse to a badge of pride. At the same time,
he must run a centrist coalition (roughly where all German governments end up),
leaving him open to pushback from the left and fury from the right.
There may be
a way through, she suggests, one that can align the different factions: “Merz
is also an enthusiastic modernist, in the technological sense. Fusion reactors,
carbon dumping in the ground, space travel, mRNA vaccines—the CDU leader is an
enthusiastic supporter of the idea that a country like Germany, which is poor
in raw materials, should draw much more growth from its wealth of inventions.”
This will
not be easy. Old habits, such as a reluctance to embrace digitization and an
overreliance on bureaucracy, are embedded. Will Merz take risks to modernize
the country? In his speeches so far, he seems to have tended in both
directions: in some, seeking to reassure, in others, not shying away from
controversy—such as suggesting workers don’t put in enough hours.
Lau also
notes a very German set of cliches associated with Merz that will likely always
pose a democratic obstacle: “The old white man; the rich, ruthless man; the
neoliberal; the unpopular man—behind this dreary folklore lies the rock-solid
conviction of many Germans that it is ultimately simply not OK to be
right-wing, politically relevant, and then also rich.”
Merz may
well do what other leaders have done when confronted by domestic
resilience—devote most of their tenure to foreign affairs. He certainly has
much on his plate and has already shown dexterity. He has responded quickly to
the denunciations of Germany and Europe by senior figures in the Trump
administration by making clear the need not just for rearmament but for a new
approach to European self-reliance. His overtures to Paris, London, and Warsaw
were striking, and the continent’s new security inner core has shown
commendable unity toward Ukraine.
Far less
certain, and far less commendable, has been Germany’s refusal to countenance
any significant criticism of Israel’s near-destruction of Gaza. Merz is
following Merkel and others in their guilt-laden paralysis on the issue;
indeed, his embrace of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is all the
more pronounced.
Lau
concludes with the following exhortation: Merz, she says, “is a conservative in
an era of authoritarians who must earn the title ‘conservative’ again and again
because he occasionally squanders it.” The German business model, with cheap
energy from Russia, the Chinese sales market, and the U.S. security guarantee,
has hit the wall. The rules-based international order is in tatters; military
experts call the current phase “prewar.” She quotes him as saying, “The
political center is capable of solving problems.”
With the
center cracking all over the Western world, the task the new German chancellor
faces is unenviable.
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John
Kampfner is the author of Why the Germans Do It Better: Notes from a Grown-Up
Country.
This article is more than 2 months old
Germany has
swung to the right. What does that mean for the country – and Europe? Our panel
responds
Mon 24 Feb
2025 11.38 CET
Fatma
Aydemir
Fatma
Aydemir
Guardian
Europe columnist and Berlin-based journalist, novelist and playwright
Now is the
time to move closer together. The historic success of the far right in
Germany’s federal election is a threat not only for all disadvantaged groups in
this country – including women, immigrants, queer people, people of colour,
Jewish people, disabled people – it is a threat to democracy that should
concern everyone.
Still, it is
those groups that will be most affected by a mood shift that comes with the
reality that one in five voters are in favour of a party whose co-leader, Alice
Weidel, announced last night on live TV: “We will hunt them down!”. Reviving a
line once proclaimed by an AfD co-chair in 2017, when the party first entered
parliament, this was ostensibly a warning to other political parties. But
Weidel’s intentional wording of course provokes all of us who the AfD sees as
opponents. And it doesn’t even cause a scandal any more. We know who they are
and what they are up to. The question is: who else will join them in rhetoric
and actions?
On Sunday
night, when the counting of the election results had just started, I stopped by
an “election party for the plural democracy” in Berlin. The non-partisan event,
billed as a “public screaming”, took place only a few metres away from the
chancellery. Gathered under the umbrella of an anti-fascist consensus, artists,
activists, journalists and academics came together in short panels to share
their hopes and fears for the coming years, while the audience was having pizza
and dancing to hip-hop band the Swag’s uplifting performances in between. It
felt good to be among people who dressed up and left the house, instead of
mourning at home. The victories of conservative and far-right parties had been
widely expected, so we celebrated the small victories instead: the pro-business
FDP and the anti-immigrant populist party BSW didn’t make it into parliament;
the Left tripled its votes since polls from December, from 3% to almost 9%.
The
important conclusions of the night were: we have to organise and strengthen our
resistance against the right-leaning majority, we have to spread this energy
outside Berlin and we have to watch out for each other and leave all bitterness
arising from intra-left conflicts aside. The priority has to be to protect our
civil and human rights. None of these strategies are new, of course, but it’s
important to reassure each other again and again, especially after a night of
results that felt like a turning point for progressive forces. And it certainly
helps to do so under a giant disco ball.
Alice Weidel
had reason to be elated: the AfD can’t be ignored now
Katja Hoyer
Katja Hoyer
German-British
historian and author of Beyond the Wall: East Germany, 1949–1990
Germany’s
election could almost convince outside observers that consensus politics is
alive and well in Berlin. There is a clear winner: the conservative CDU/CSU,
whose leader, Friedrich Merz, looks set to be the next German chancellor. The
incumbent, Olaf Scholz, conceded immediately and congratulated his challenger.
There were no concerns of civil unrest nor suspicions of electoral fraud.
But
underneath the surface, deep cracks have appeared in Germany’s political
landscape. After the second world war, the conservatives vowed that there must
never be a successful party to the right of them. Now, it’s obvious that
they’ve failed in that ambition. The anti-immigration AfD has doubled its
support from 2021, coming second with about a fifth of the vote share.
The AfD
leader, Alice Weidel, was visibly elated. Understanding that this electoral
breakthrough has made her party impossible to ignore, she told reporters:
“We’re now firmly anchored as a Volkspartei” – or “people’s party”, a term once
used exclusively for the CDU/CSU and Olaf Scholz’s SPD as the big beasts of
German politics.
Weidel
didn’t hold back in demonstrating what will likely become the AfD’s strategy:
breaking down the so-called firewall that’s keeping it out of power. All other
parties have vowed never to work with the AfD. As Merz begins the difficult
task of assembling a coalition that forces his centre-right party to turn to a
centre-left coalition partner, Weidel reminds him that her door is open too,
“so that the will of the people might be implemented”.
She was
alluding to Merz’s election promise to restrict irregular immigration, which is
something polls say the majority of Germans want. His likely coalition partner,
the SPD, is very uneasy about that, not least because the AfD might vote with
it, which many see as a breach of the firewall.
Meanwhile,
as the main opposition party, the AfD won’t have to dirty its hands with messy
election results and compromise politics. It doesn’t have to find answers to
complicated questions. All it has to do is point to conflict between Germany’s
centrist parties in their quest for solutions, knowing a fifth of the German
electorate lends a lot of weight to the battering ram hammering the firewall.
If there are
clear winners of Germany’s 2025 election, it’s the political fringes.
80% voted
for liberal democracy – Merz should govern for them
Cas Mudde
Cas Mudde
Stanley Wade
Shelton UGAF professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia
It was a
typical western European election for the 21st century: the centrist parties
scored historically bad results, the far right gained, and the party system
fragmented further.
Although the
results showed a Rechtsruck, a swing to the right, it was much smaller than
expected – particularly in light of a campaign focused on immigration and the
role of the far right, which is a combination that has proved to be the perfect
breeding ground for recent far-right victories in western Europe, for example
Sweden in 2022 and the Netherlands in 2023.
True, a
small majority of Germans did vote for anti-immigration parties, but all of
them underperformed. The conservative CDU/CSU won the most seats but did not
top 30%, its second-worst result in history; the far-right AfD came second
nationally but, at just over 20%, fell short of its performance in state
elections a few months ago. The left-conservative BSW failed to win enough
seats to enter the Bundestag at all, despite a year of media hype about its
prospects.
Rather than
declaring the minority that voted for the far right to be “the” German people,
the centrist parties should accept and address the pluralism of Germany’s
population. With a stagnating economy and a new global reality, the country
needs a strong democratic government, as the chancellor-to-be, Friedrich Merz,
noted in his conciliatory victory speech.
His
government should neither cater to the far right nor define itself in
opposition to it. Rather, it should constitute a broad, grand coalition with
the Social Democrats and the Greens, around a necessarily minimal but
nevertheless positive agenda that situates Germany at the heart of a liberal
democratic Europe. Like so many centrist campaigns before, the anti-immigrant
campaigns of both centrist parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) did not win over any
far-right voters. Nor did they inspire their core voters. To do that, they will
need their own ideas and priorities, which means looking beyond immigration
(which was only the third most important issue for voters, despite the
disproportionate media and political attention) and a constructive focus on
socioeconomic issues (the most important issue for CDU/CSU and SPD voters), as
well as ensuring peace in an increasingly hostile world (the second biggest
issue for SPD voters, fourth for CDU/CSU voters).
In other
words, they should govern for the 80% who voted for liberal democracy rather
than for the 20% who voted against it.
Merz is
caught between conservatism and authoritarianism, at home and abroad
Mariam Lau
Mariam Lau
Political
journalist with Die Zeit
In a
somewhat sombre mood, Germany’s Christian Democrats celebrated their victory on
Sunday night after a country in turmoil had, in huge numbers (an 83% turnout,
unmatched since German reunification), gone to the polls. Even though their own
score was underwhelming – the CDU/CSU had expected a solid third of the votes,
and got only 28.5% – Friedrich Merz is set to fulfil a life-long dream: at the
age of 69, after several failed attempts, he is expected to become chancellor
of the Federal Republic.
A business
lawyer who has done quite well for himself during a decade outside professional
politics, Merz has never actually governed. But even without that experience,
the future chancellor knows what challenges he faces. The country, though still
the world’s third-largest economy, is in the third year of recession. Political
tensions have mounted, in particular after a succession of killings in public
places in which the suspects were refugees or Islamists. The AfD, Germany’s far
right, has now doubled its strength and will sit to Merz’s right in the German
Bundestag with a mind-boggling 152 seats, reflecting the votes of about 20% of
the electorate. The AfD, not the Social Democrats, came in second.
Merz, a
cultural conservative and a liberal in his economics, has often expressed his
personal disgust vis-à-vis members of the AfD. He does not greet them, even
when caught alone with one of their midst in an elevator. And yet the
chancellor-to-be recently granted them an unnecessary triumph when bringing a
motion into parliament concerning migration that would only be passed with the
AfD’s consent.
Merz’s
CDU/CSU finds itself in a quandary: while the Social Democrats (whom he will
have to govern in coalition with) paint him as a rightwing populist who is
paving the way for the far right, the AfD recently yelled at him in the
Bundestag: “We are the future, Herr Merz! Follow us if you still have any
strength left.” Many in the CDU/CSU fear that this will be their last chance:
“If the centre parties don’t manage to solve our country’s problems, the next
elections will be lost,” Merz said at many campaign stops. “And the elections
after that will be those of 2033. Imagine that.”
But the
central pitch of his campaign has been a global one. Merz, a staunch
transatlanticist and pro-European, sees Germany at the forefront of the
worldwide clash between democracies and authoritarians. It was a shock for him
and his party to see how Elon Musk, the US president’s right-hand man and owner
of the platform X, blatantly interfered with the elections in favour of the
AfD, a party with many anti-American instincts. Merz openly vented his anger
and annoyance at JD Vance’s Munich intervention in the same vein. It is this –
the palpable and existential difference between conservatism and
authoritarianism – that will mark his reign, one way or the other.
Germany’s
mainstream parties legitimised the far right
Tarik
Abou-Chadi
Tarik
Abou-Chadi
German
political scientist and professor of European politics at the University of
Oxford
In many
ways, it was a relatively normal election. With an incredibly unpopular
government and a dire economic outlook, voters decided to support opposition
parties instead of those that made up the previous coalition. All members of
the outgoing coalition made up of the SPD, Greens and FDP lost votes – with
bigger losses for the SPD and FDP than for the Greens. The conservative
opposition CDU/CSU came out on top.
However,
even in this relatively normal election, some things stand out. Above all, the
dramatic electoral success of the far-right AfD, which almost doubled its vote
share and came out with more than 20% of the vote. The AfD has massively
benefited from immigration being the dominant issue in the campaign. Over
recent years, nearly all other parties have moved further to the right on
immigration. As we know from extensive research on this phenomenon, such
accommodation normalises and legitimises the far right.
As in many
other European countries, the behaviour of the mainstream left and mainstream
right has strongly contributed to the success of the far right in Germany. Only
a few weeks ago, the CDU/CSU tried to pass a law with the support of the AfD –
a historic precedent in the Bundestag. This clearly did not help the CDU/CSU
electorally. It lost close to a million voters to the AfD. But this strategy
has moved the AfD from the fringes to the centre of German politics. While the
AfD will very likely not be part of the next German government coalition, this
election and the behaviour of other German parties have lifted them into a new
position of power.
The second
remarkable result comes from the leftwing Die Linke. It had been written off as
a dead party that was very likely not to make it into the Bundestag again after
Sahra Wagenknecht broke away to form her own movement. However, the Linke
strongly increased its support in the last weeks of the campaign. Many believe
that the party managed to attract progressive voters who were alienated by the
SPD and Greens, especially on migration and Gaza.
While many
progressives turned their backs on the SPD a long time ago, the Greens seemed
like the natural home for these voters. However, as part of a government that
pushed through draconian measures against asylum seekers, and running a
campaign strongly focused on the centre, the Greens did not manage to gain
these voters’ support. Their biggest losses were among younger voters – their
former stronghold. Die Linke saw huge gains among these voters and it has also
come out as the strongest party in Berlin.
It should be
a lesson for left and progressive parties in Europe that moving right can be a
costly strategy, because progressive voters will look for a new home.
Europe needs
German leadership to save Nato and the EU
Paul Taylor
Paul Taylor
Senior
visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre
As Donald
Trump rushes to carve up Ukraine with Vladimir Putin over the heads of the
Ukrainians and Europeans, Europe urgently needs a stronger Germany to give its
voice more weight. Berlin has been largely absent from diplomacy over the
future of the EU and Nato, because its government was weak and divided long
before it collapsed last year, and its economy is in the doldrums after two
years of recession. With France also in political crisis, there is a power
vacuum at the heart of Europe just when strong leadership is vital.
Conservative
Friedrich Merz, who will be the next chancellor after his party topped Sunday’s
poll, is determined to provide that leadership. He sounds bolder and less
cautious than the outgoing Social Democratic chancellor, Olaf Scholz. On Sunday
night, Merz said his absolute priority would be “to strengthen Europe so that
we can achieve step-by-step real independence from the US”, adding that it was
not clear “whether we will still be able to talk about Nato in its current
form” after Trump’s rapprochement with Russia. The lifelong Atlanticist has
said Europe can no longer rely on American protection, and called for talks
with the UK and France on sharing their nuclear deterrent with Germany and
Europe.
Yet it
remains unclear how far Merz will be able to overcome Germans’ deep-seated
aversion to all things military, boost defence spending substantially by
loosening the country’s borrowing straitjacket, or agree to borrow jointly with
European partners to procure key defence systems. Sunday’s result gives him a
chance to form a two-party coalition with the Social Democrats. However, even
with support from the Greens, he will not have the necessary two-thirds
majority in parliament to reform the constitutional debt brake, unless he can
win votes from the opposition hard-left Die Linke or the far-right AfD. It will
take two months to form a new government, and, as Merz put it, “the world will
not wait for us, but Europe is waiting for Germany”.
To give the
ailing EU a new impulse, the conservative leader has pledged to restore
Germany’s strained relations with Paris and Warsaw, and to draw Britain into a
security partnership with the main European powers. It will take skill to
surmount tensions with France over German support for more EU free trade
agreements, notably with South America, and with Poland over its longstanding
demand for reparations for destruction dating back to the second world war.
Germany’s
voice will be crucial in shaping how far the EU pauses or slashes energy and
environment regulations in its quest to restore economic competitiveness.
German conservatives also lead the European Commission (Ursula von der Leyen)
and the largest group in the European parliament (Manfred Weber of the European
People’s party), so Merz is well placed to press his deregulation agenda.
However, von der Leyen was the architect of the EU’s Green Deal legislation to
fight climate breakdown, and she may resist a drastic rollback.
The new
chancellor faces daunting challenges in Europe, but his partners are yearning
for a more proactive Germany.
This was a
bad result for progressives, but Merz lacks a strong mandate
Dominic
Schwickert
Dominic
Schwickert
Executive
director of the independent thinktank Das Progressive Zentrum
Yes, the
result is certainly not a good one for progressive forces. As in most
industrialised countries, the population is massively dissatisfied with the
current federal government. Furthermore, the centre-left alliance was far too
often preoccupied with internal disputes even before its collapse in November.
As a result, the conservative CDU/CSU and the far-right AfD have been stable
leaders in the polls for more than a year. Progressive forces, meanwhile, find
themselves in an unfamiliar position: instead of being in favour of change, the
SPD and Greens are currently generally perceived as being in favour of
extending the status quo – which the majority does not want.
And yet:
Friedrich Merz and his party do not have a strong mandate. Given the high level
of dissatisfaction with the coalition government, the CDU/CSU cannot be
satisfied with a meagre gain of four percentage points and the second-worst
result in its history.
Either way,
Merz does not have much time to form a stable government – which is what is
needed now, taking into account the global political situation. The CDU/CSU’s
ideal scenario – only needing one partner and being able to choose from two –
has not materialised. The CDU/CSU is dependent on the SPD.
The good
news: if a black-red coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is formed, Germany will have a
stable, centrist government – with a strong Green party in the opposition.
However, as a junior partner, the SPD would once again be faced with the
difficult task of ensuring stability in the country through compromises with
the CDU/CSU – and at the same time renewing itself. The Greens, who have lost
the least among the coalition forces, are facing a crucial analysis: is Robert
Habeck’s course, which has brought the Greens out of their niche as an
ecological party, still the right one – or did it cost them more votes in the
leftwing milieu than could be won in the centre? This question will determine
the internal party discussion over the next few weeks.
What is
important for the next federal government in terms of its agenda? The top
priority must be for Germany to expand its defence and security policy
capabilities even more decisively and, in close coordination with Poland and
France, to assume a leading role in a Europe that must defend itself against
Russian imperialism and the anti-western course of the Trump administration.
This requires an end to small-mindedness in fiscal policy: a reform of the debt
brake to enable urgently needed investment in German defence capabilities,
competitiveness and infrastructure. Anticipating the uncertain majority
situation in the new parliament, such a programme should be initiated under and
together with the Scholz government.
Finally, the
new federal government must manage to bring the migration debate back to an
objective level and find a face-saving solution for all parties involved.
Contrary to what Merz suggested during the election campaign, this can only be
dealt with by a Europe-wide policy solution.
This is
precisely why the coalition negotiations must be finalised quickly – so that
Germany does not continue to be gripped by its internal issues, but rather, in
view of the changed global political situation, it ensures that Europe is
self-confident and capable of acting in the battle of the great powers, and not
shredded by it.
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