OPINION
GUEST ESSAY
The West and Russia Are Locked in a Spiral. It’s
Time for Them to Talk.
July 27,
2022, 1:00 a.m. ET
By Samuel
Charap and Jeremy Shapiro
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/27/opinion/ukraine-russia-us-diplomacy.html
Samuel
Charap is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Jeremy Shapiro
is the research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
In the five
months since Russia launched its war in Ukraine, the United States has pledged
about $24 billion in military aid to Ukraine. That’s more than four times
Ukraine’s 2021 defense budget. America’s partners in Europe and beyond have
pledged an additional $12 billion, according to the Kiel Institute for the World
Economy.
And yet
these tens of billions still fall short of the Ukrainian government’s wish list
for weapons, which President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government announced last
month. This divergence between what Ukraine wants and what its Western partners
are prepared to give reflects the reality that Western leaders are pulled in
two directions. They are committed to helping Ukraine defend itself against
Russia’s aggression, but they are also trying to prevent the conflict from
escalating into a major power war.
But
escalation, though incremental and thus far contained in Ukraine, is already
underway. The West is providing more and more powerful weapons, and Russia is
unleashing more and more death and destruction. For as long as both Russia and
the West are determined to prevail over the other in Ukraine and prepared to
devote their deep reserves of weapons to achieve that goal, further escalation
seems almost preordained.
The United
States and its allies should certainly continue providing Ukraine with the
matériel it needs, but they should also — in close consultation with Kyiv —
begin opening channels of communication with Russia. An eventual cease-fire
should be the goal, even as the path to it remains uncertain.
Starting
talks while the fighting rages would be politically risky and would require
significant diplomatic efforts, particularly with Ukraine — and success is
anything but guaranteed. But talking can reveal the possible space for
compromise and identify a way out of the spiral. Otherwise, this war could
eventually bring Russia and NATO into direct conflict.
The current
U.S. approach assumes that would happen only if the Ukrainians are given
particular systems or capabilities that cross a Russian red line. So when
President Biden recently announced his decision to provide Ukraine with the
multiple-launch rocket system that Kyiv says it desperately needs, he
deliberately withheld the longest-range munitions that could strike Russia. The
premise of the decision was that Moscow will escalate — i.e., launch an attack
against NATO — only if certain types of weapons are provided or if they are
used to target Russian territory. The goal is to be careful to stop short of
that line while giving the Ukrainians what they need to “defend their territory
from Russian advances,” as Mr. Biden said in a statement in June.
The logic
is dubious. The Kremlin’s focus is precisely on making advances on Ukrainian
territory. The problem is not that providing Ukraine with some specific weapon
could cause escalation but rather that if the West’s support of Ukraine
succeeded in stemming Russia’s advance, that would constitute an unacceptable
defeat for the Kremlin. And a Russian battlefield victory is equally
unacceptable to the West.
If Russia
continues to push farther into Ukraine, Western partners would likely provide
yet more and better weapons. If those weapons allow Ukraine to reverse Russia’s
gains, Moscow may feel compelled to double down — and if it is really losing,
it might well consider direct attacks against NATO. In other words, there’s no
mutually acceptable outcome right now. But talks could help identify the
compromises needed to find one.
The
determination of both the West and Russia to do whatever it takes to prevail in
Ukraine is the main driver of escalation. Western leaders should understand
that the risk of escalation stems from the complete incompatibility of their
goals with the Kremlin’s; carefully calibrating Western military support to
Ukraine might be sensible, but it is probably beside the point. The impact of
those weapons on the war, which is nearly impossible to know in advance, is
what matters.
The lack of
precise Russian red lines might mean that supplying the longer-range munitions
Biden is withholding would not be as problematic as feared. But even if no
specific weapon system will itself cause a major escalation, simply throwing
more and better weapons into the mix is unlikely to solve the problem. Western
weapons have clearly sustained the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, but
the Russians have been willing to counter with whatever level of resources and
destruction will be necessary to win or at least not to lose.
We are
witnessing a classic spiral in which both sides feel compelled to do more as
soon as the other side begins to make some progress. The best way to prevent
that dynamic from getting out of control is to start talking before it’s too
late.
Samuel
Charap (@scharap) is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation.
Jeremy Shapiro (@JyShapiro) is the research director at the European Council on
Foreign Relations.
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