Shipowner Linked to Hezbollah's Bank?
Questions Swirl around the Cargo that Destroyed Beirut
The explosion in Lebanon leads back to an abandoned
ship in Beirut that had arrived in the city carrying 2,750 tons of ammonium
nitrate. Reporting by DER SPIEGEL and OCCRP has determined that the ship’s
owner has connections to Hezbollah’s bank.
By Maximilian
Popp, Christoph Reuter und Fritz Schaap
21.08.2020,
13.07 Uhr
In
September 2013, eight Ukrainians and a Russian departed Georgia on a beat-up
freighter, apparently heading for Mozambique. Their ship was already in bad
shape before it even left the Black Sea port of Batumi. Called the Rhosus, the
vessel was leaking, its alarm system was faulty and so was its rescue
equipment.
But the
cargo on board was extremely volatile: 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate in a
highly concentrated variant, the kind used to make explosives, with a nitrogen
enrichment level of almost 35 percent. Seven years later, on August 4, 2020, it
would devastate parts of Lebanon's capital city Beirut, killing around 200
people and injuring thousands.
Since then,
the world has taken an interest in the Rhosus and its history, with
investigators trying to piece together the details of its final voyage. How did
the Rhosus end up in Beirut? And who had really ordered the explosive
chemicals?
Thus far,
the story has been that the ship belonged to a Russian man named Igor
Grechushkin. The cargo was reportedly destined for a company called Fábrica de
Explosivos de Moçambique, or FEM for short, a Mozambican explosives
manufacturer.
But joint
reporting conducted by DER SPIEGEL and the journalism network called the
Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) has now raised doubts
about that narrative. The reporting has found that it was not Russian national
Grechushkin who owned the Rhosus, but rather the Cypriot businessman
Charalambos Manoli, who maintained a relationship with the bank used by
Hezbollah in Lebanon. And a considerable amount of the ammonium nitrate stored
in the port of Beirut appears to have gone missing before the explosion in
August.
Did the
crew of the Rhosus ever even intend to sail the ship to Mozambique? Is it
possible that its explosive cargo was actually destined for Hezbollah, the
Islamist party and militia that operates in Lebanon as a state within a state
and is involved in wars from Syria to Iraq?
Efforts to
Conceal Ownership
In any
case, Manoli made every effort to conceal the ownership of the Rhosus. One of
his companies arranged to have the Rhosus registered in Moldova. Another
company, Maritime Lloyd in Georgia, certified the seaworthiness of the ailing
freighter. Ultimately, Russian national Grechushkin only chartered the ship
through his company Teto Shipping, which is registered in the Marshall Islands.
When
questioned by OCCRP, Manoli initially claimed that the vessel had been sold to
Grechushkin, only to then concede that the Russian had only made an attempt to
buy the ship. He then refused to provide any further information.
Grechushkin
did, in fact, give the orders to the crew on the Rhosus. He also gave the order
that the Rhosus was to make an unscheduled stop in Beirut on its way from
Georgia to Mozambique. The official reason sounds dubious: Grechushkin claimed
that he didn’t have enough money to pay for the Rhosus’ passage through the
Suez Canal. Which is why it needed to pick up additional cargo in Beirut to be
delivered to Jordan. The freight consisted of "12 large trucks, 15 small
ones, one 40-foot container and two 20-foot containers," states a report
by the Lebanese Transportation Ministry.
The fleet
of vehicles was to be stowed on the deck of the Rhosus. But the problems began
during the loading of the very first vehicle, which rammed a door as they tried
to maneuver it onto the deck. The loading procedure was aborted as a
consequence.
Ultimately,
the Rhosus never left Beirut. At least two companies that Manoli owed money to
had the freighter seized, including one that rented generators, from which
Manoli had previously rented a generator for the ship. The Beirut Port
Authority also found that the Rhosus was not seaworthy.
The
Lebanese authorities apparently didn’t know that Manoli was the true owner of
the Rhosus. In any case, his name doesn’t appear in any of the correspondence,
which was voluminous.
In contrast
to Grechushkin, the Russian who chartered the vessel, Manoli did have business
relations in Lebanon. Court records show that Manoli took out a loan back in
2011 for $4 million from the Tanzanian FBME Bank to finance the purchase of
another ship, the Sakhalin.
FBME isn’t
just any bank. American investigators have accused the institution of acting as
a money launderer for Hezbollah. Another of the bank’s customers was a
suspected Syrian front company that had been involved in the country’s chemical
weapons program. It was to this bank that Manoli owed money.
Seized
Holdings
Only one
month after he received the loan, Manoli’s company Seaforce Marine Limited,
based in Belize in Central America, defaulted on the first installment. Manoli
had offered the Rhosus as collateral, but FBME suspected that the shipowner
wanted to sell the vessel and seized Manoli’s real estate holdings in Cyprus.
Internal
FBME documents show that Manoli still owed the bank 962,000 euros in
outstanding debt in October 2014. Manoli denies any connection between his
debts and the fact that the freighter was stopped in Beirut. However, one
investigator notes that FBME is notorious for pressuring defaulting borrowers
into doing favors for dubious customers like Hezbollah.
The
official buyer of the ammonium nitrate, FEM in Mozambique, was also a subject
of investigations. Spanish authorities conducted an investigation into the
company Moura Silva e Filhos, which holds 95-percent ownership of FEM, in
connection with the Islamist terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004. Even though
they didn’t ultimately obtain a conviction for aiding terrorists, investigators
determined that 785 kilograms of explosives were not listed in the company’s
books.
Moura Silva
e Filhos clearly isn’t squeamish when it comes to choosing his business partners.
American arms smuggling expert Kathi Lynn Austin says the company maintains
close contacts with the ruling clique in Mozambique, among others.
However,
FEM never claimed the 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate that was stranded in
Beirut on the Rhosus, even though the chemicals were at no point officially
confiscated by the Lebanese authorities.
In 2015,
the broker for the ammonium nitrate had a lawyer request that the Lebanese
authorities inspect the quality and quantity of the cargo. Oddly, though, the
court records do not show any attempt by the broker to recover the cargo, which
had an original value of $700,000.
Manoli
likewise didn’t make any efforts to reclaim his ship, which eventually sank
outside the port in February 2018. Purported Rhosus owner Grechushkin could not
be reached for comment.
Abandoned
Ultimately,
the ammonium nitrate was an abandoned freight: No one admitted to having paid
for it and no one tried to recover it.
In the end,
the highly explosive chemicals were stored for six years in Hall 12 at the Port
of Beirut. The authorities, particularly customs officials, warned repeatedly
that the ammonium nitrate needed to be removed from the port. But the petitions
were sent to the wrong court so persistently that it is difficult for lawyers
involved to believe in mere incompetence. Is it possible that the intent was
for the ammonium nitrate to remain in Hall 12?
Another
inspection of the cargo in spring 2020, this time by the Lebanese state
security, raised doubts as to whether all 2,750 tons of the ammonium nitrate
were still there. One of the warehouse’s gates was missing and there was a
large hole in the south wall, they warned. "If a theft were to occur, the
perpetrators could use these goods as explosives." But the state security
officials apparently didn’t count or measure the exact amount of ammonium
nitrate that was still left in the warehouse at the time.
Their
warning that the warehouse needed to be secured didn’t reach Lebanon’s
prosecutor general until June. In mid-July, state security also sent the report
to the president and the prime minister. But no action was taken.
It’s still
unclear today how much ammonium nitrate was detonated in the August 4
explosion. European intelligence officials involved in the investigation assume
it was between 700 and 1,000 tons.
But where
did the rest, the much larger quantity of the explosive chemicals, go? That’s
one of the many questions investigators will now need to answer.
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário