Opinion
M. Gessen
The Man
Putin
Couldn’t
Kill
M. Gessen
By M. Gessen
Opinion
Columnist
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/02/opinion/russia-putin-christo-grozev.html
Interpol had
been looking for a disgraced finance executive for weeks when Christo Grozev,
an investigative journalist, found him, hiding in Belarus. Grozev had become
expert at following all but invisible digital trails — black-market cellphone
data, passenger manifests, immigration records — in order to unmask Russian
spies. These were the sleeper cells living in Western countries and passing as
natives, or the people dispatched to hunt down dissidents around the world.
He
identified the secret police agents behind one of the most high-profile
assassination plots of all: the 2020 poisoning of the Russian opposition leader
Aleksei Navalny. That revelation put Grozev in President Vladimir Putin’s cross
hairs. He wanted Grozev killed, and to make it happen the Kremlin turned to
none other than the fugitive financier, who had been recruited by Russian
intelligence. Now the man that Grozev had been tracking began tracking him. The
fugitive enlisted a team to begin the surveillance.
The members
of that team are behind bars now. The financier lives in Moscow, where several
times a week he makes visits to the headquarters of the Russian secret police.
Grozev — still very much alive — imagines the man trying to explain to his
supervisors why he failed in his mission. This gives Grozev a small measure of
satisfaction.
On May 12,
after a lengthy trial, Justice Nicholas Hilliard of the Central Criminal Court
in London sentenced six people, all of them Bulgarian nationals, to prison
terms between five and almost 11 years for their involvement in the plot to
kill Grozev, among other operations. The group had spent more than two years
working out of England, where the ringleader maintained rooms full of false
identity documents and what the prosecution called law-enforcement-grade
surveillance equipment. In addition to spying on Grozev and his writing
partner, the Russian journalist Roman Dobrokhotov, the Bulgarians spied on a
U.S. military base in Germany where Ukrainian soldiers were being trained; they
trailed a former Russian law enforcement officer who had fled to Europe; and
most embarrassingly for Moscow, they planned a false flag operation against
Kazakhstan, a Russian ally.
In the past
two decades England has been the site of at least two high-profile deadly
operations and more than a dozen other suspicious deaths that have been linked
to Russia. Yet the trial of this six-person cell appears to be the first time
in recent history that the authorities have successfully investigated and
prosecuted Russian agents operating on British soil. The trial and its outcome,
then, are victories. They are small ones, however, relative to the scope of the
threat. The Bulgarians seem to be only one part of a multiyear, multicountry
operation to kill Grozev. That in turn is only a small part of what appears to
be an ever-broadening campaign by the Kremlin, including kidnappings,
poisonings, arson and terrorist attacks, to silence its opponents and sow fear
abroad.
The story of
the resources that were marshaled to silence a single inconvenient voice is a
terrifying reminder of what Putin, and beyond him the rising generation of
autocratic rulers, is capable of. The story of how that single voice refused to
be silenced — in fact redoubled his determination to tell the truth, regardless
of the very real consequences — serves as a reminder that it’s possible to
continue to speak and act in the face of mortal danger. But the damage that was
done to Grozev’s own life and the lives of the people around him is a warning
of how vulnerable we are in the face of unchecked, murderous power.
A decade
ago, Grozev, like much of the world, was stunned when a Malaysian passenger
plane was shot down over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people onboard.
Russia and Ukraine immediately blamed each other, Russia unleashed a torrent of
disinformation, and the West seemed confused. At the time, Grozev was living in
Vienna and helping run a company that owned a string of radio stations. But he
had always been afflicted with an insatiable hunger for information. Back when
the Communist government of Bulgaria fell, he broke into one of his country’s
embassies and spent two weeks reading through piles of documents marked “burn
after reading.” (“Everyone in the embassy was snitching on everyone else,” he
later told me.) He stopped only when the police showed up.
When the
Malaysian plane went down in July 2014, he started looking at Flightradar24, an
online service that tracks the movement of aircraft around the world, and he
quickly fell down a rabbit hole.
His
fascination with Flightradar24 set Grozev’s second career in motion. He joined
Bellingcat, an innovative outlet that was practicing a new kind of open-source
investigation. Using geolocation data and a trove of variously sourced videos
and photographs, the Bellingcat team pinpointed the missile launcher used to
shoot down the airplane, traced its route from Russia to eastern Ukraine,
identified senior Russian military intelligence officers who were involved, and
ultimately determined that Russia was responsible for downing the Malaysian
plane, a finding later confirmed by professional investigators and the United
Nations.
In later
investigations, Grozev expanded his tool kit to include black-market databases
such as Russian passport data and cellphone logs, which allowed him to name the
Russian military intelligence officers who most likely poisoned the defector
Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in England in 2018. The following year,
when a former Chechen rebel leader was gunned down in broad daylight in a park
in Berlin, Grozev used passport and travel data, as well as a deep analysis of
Russian government records, to identify the assassin, Vadim Krasikov, a Russian
national who was later convicted of the crime in Germany. And in 2020, when
Navalny, the Russian opposition hero, was nearly killed by poisoning, Grozev
used a massive data set of airline bookings to identify a group of men who had
been trailing Navalny for at least three years, and then traced them to a
chemical weapons research lab run by the secret police in Moscow.
Most great
ventures of Grozev’s life involve Karl von Habsburg, his best friend, who, in a
narrative detail not out of keeping with the novelistic sweep of Grozev’s life,
is the grandson of the last Austro-Hungarian emperor, Charles I. Together
Grozev and von Habsburg once rode into Timbuktu, Mali, with troops that
liberated the city from Islamist rebels. At another time they started the first
all-Ukrainian-language radio station in Ukraine. Around 2020 von Habsburg had
become connected with a group of filmmakers. Grozev’s hunt for Navalny’s
would-be assassins seemed as if it would make a great documentary, so the team
drove to Germany, where Navalny was undergoing rehabilitation.
On Dec. 14,
2020, Bellingcat co-published Grozev’s findings about the people behind the
Navalny attack.
The same
day, the disgraced finance executive who had been recruited by Russian
intelligence hired a team to follow Grozev. That financier was Jan Marsalek,
who had gained international notoriety when his fintech company, Wirecard, was
consumed by one of the biggest financial scandals in European history. Roughly
$2 billion was missing. The company’s chief executive was arrested. Marsalek, a
clean-cut 40-year-old who had served as the company’s chief operating officer,
disappeared.
He was a
logical choice for the Kremlin’s assignment. As a fugitive of the West, he had
a strong incentive to stay in Putin’s good graces, whatever it took. And as a
Vienna-born Austrian, Marsalek knew well the city where his target, Grozev, was
living.
The first
time I met Grozev in person was in 2023, at a New York City screening of
“Navalny,” the documentary that started with his investigation. He appears in
it prominently: all 6-foot-3, 200-odd pounds of enthusiastic nerdiness. It was
later that night that law enforcement informed Grozev his life was in danger
and he should not return home to Vienna. By this point, the Bulgarians had been
tracking him for more than two years. A friend put Grozev up in a Manhattan
townhouse, and he began his life in exile.
A few weeks
later, the producer Geralyn Dreyfous brought him to an event for Amal and
George Clooney’s charitable foundation. As they were walking in, Grozev glanced
at his phone. His sister, who lives in Bulgaria, had texted that she had been
unable to reach their father, who lived in Vienna. “He went pale,” Dreyfous
told me. “And just then George Clooney was there to greet us. Christo stepped
away, I told George Clooney what had happened and he immediately went to
Christo: ‘You can’t go back there. It’s just a ruse to get you to go back
there.’”
The police
found Grozev’s father dead in his house. Two days later, the Metropolitan
Police in London arrested five Bulgarian nationals who, they said, had been
conducting surveillance of Grozev and his writing partner, Dobrokhotov. Despite
the movie star’s wise advice and law enforcement authorities’ stern warning,
Grozev did in fact return to Vienna — “on a cargo plane to a neighboring
country, to not leave a trace,” he texted me. The Austrian authorities did not
conclude that Grozev’s father had been the victim of foul play. The family was
not given access to his body.
Back when he
lived in Russia, Dobrokhotov had lost a couple of journalism jobs apparently
for being too outspoken, one time shouting at Dmitri Medvedev, who was then
Russia’s president, about censorship and “shameful” policies. So in 2013
Dobrokhotov launched his own publication, The Insider, which has grown into a
remarkably comprehensive mix of analysis and investigative stories, many of
them written by Dobrokhotov and Grozev. “They are joined at the hip,” Dreyfous,
the producer, said. They seem to think in unison.
In the
summer of 2021, Russia cracked down on independent journalists in what in
retrospect looks like clearing the deck before the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine. The police seized Dobrokhotov’s electronics and passport. So he left
Russia — on foot, walking through the woods to Ukraine, carrying only a small
backpack with some clothes, an academic book and a bottle of Hennessy Cognac.
His family later joined him and they settled in the Britain.
Around that
time, one of the team of Bulgarians, Vanya Gaberova, a young woman with long
brown hair, added Dobrokhotov as a friend on Facebook. “Roman is very easy to
befriend if you are pretty,” Grozev noted. When the same woman sent Grozev a
friend request, he saw that she had a few connections to people in his network,
so he accepted the request, too.
Orlin
Roussev, the head of the spy cell, and his Moscow-based handler, Marsalek,
discussed using the new Facebook connection to seduce Grozev and perhaps make a
compromising video. “We can definitely record something for Pornhub too,”
Roussev texted. Marsalek advised proceeding with caution. “I hope she does not
fall in love with him. I had that problem before with a honeytrap.” (According
to Grozev’s investigations, Marsalek’s work for Russian intelligence began when
he himself was honey-trapped.)
If Gaberova
did make any attempts to seduce Grozev, he didn’t notice. His son, Chris, a
medical student, casually diagnoses him as both “an A.D.H.D. kid” and
“definitely autistic.” Grozev’s friends describe his uncanny ability to see
connections. “He looks at an Excel table with 300 rows and 90 columns and
immediately spots a pattern that it would take me three hours to identify,”
Maria Pevchikh, who was a close associate of Navalny’s, told me. “He can see
structures that others cannot see,” von Habsburg said. “He is like a truffle
hunter.” But he is often oblivious to the actions and feelings of women,
including his own wife of three decades.
Grozev had
the good sense to marry a woman who is, by all accounts, his temperamental
opposite. (His wife, Stefka Grozeva, declined to talk to me for this story.) In
contrast with her impulsive, risk-loving, restless husband, she is stable, fond
of rules, an introvert. She has worked as an accountant for most of her adult
life.
In the film
“Navalny,” Grozev confesses that he has spent more than $150,000 on
black-market databases and says that if his wife knew, “she wouldn’t be my
wife.” He didn’t seem to consider that she would eventually see the film. And
when the time came for both of them to attend the premiere in Copenhagen, he
neglected to warn her.
At the end
of the screening, she booked a separate cab back to the hotel. Months later,
Grozev told me that his wife was not speaking to him, though she occasionally
agreed to attend events with him. He seemed mystified.
It was more
than a year after that premiere that Grozev told me, excitedly, that he had
figured out what bothered Stefka: That line in the movie had turned her into
the butt of a joke. He started telling interviewers that there was nothing
funny about having deceived his wife. “I figured it out, and I fixed it!” he
told me.
In the
summer of 2023, Grozev made a breakthrough in his own case.
Grozev works
by analyzing massive amounts of data. He might start by trawling through
cellphone records, to draw a picture of a suspected spy’s life: Never starts
work before 10, always calls his parents on a Sunday. Then he can focus on
anomalous phone events, such as a weekend work call, to reconstruct the
chronology of the person’s travels and actions.
As part of
his ongoing project of identifying Russian spies, Grozev had long been looking
at a man named Stanislav Petlinsky. Now in his early 60s, Petlinsky appears to
have been groomed for his job since childhood, like the characters in the
television series “The Americans.” He had spent most of his adult life outside
of Russia, but Grozev noticed that he still had a Russian cellphone number, and
that a person who had access to that number — Petlinsky’s assistant, perhaps? —
was using it to schedule appointments for someone at a medical lab in Moscow.
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Using a
massive leak of Russian medical data, Grozev located the lab’s records and
found several patients who were connected to the number. One of them was
Alexander Ivanovich Schmidt — a conspicuously Germanic surname, he noted.
Schmidt’s record listed a birth date one week away from that of Marsalek, the
fugitive financier. Russian intelligence covers, Grozev had long observed, tend
to use a falsified birth date that falls under the same Zodiac sign as the
person’s real birth date. It was a clue.
According to
the Moscow lab’s records, which he analyzed with the help of his son, Chris,
the patient named Schmidt had been having his blood glucose levels checked.
Another clue: Colleagues at Der Spiegel, the German magazine with which Grozev
frequently collaborates, had confirmed that Marsalek had diabetes.
Grozev also
checked airline logs. An Alexander Schmidt, born on the day listed in the lab’s
medical record, had been using a French passport to travel on Russian airlines
— including, a source told Grozev, on trips to Libya, where Marsalek has
invested in a cement factory.
Grozev knew
he had found Marsalek. And the best part, he told me, was that he had done it
the way he had imagined, as a child, that Sherlock Holmes would have found
someone.
Starting in
winter 2022, Grozev used his many behind-the-scenes connections to help
negotiate what would become the biggest East-West prisoner exchange since the
Cold War: the swap that would free the Wall Street Journal reporter Evan
Gershkovich and 15 others from prisons in Russia and Belarus. Grozev’s primary
goal was to free Navalny, who had been behind bars for a year. Grozev wished
for this outcome so dearly that, for all his analytic brain power, he had even
allowed himself to believe Petlinsky, the superspy, when he said he could help
make it happen. But that was a lie.
In February
2024, Navalny died in a Russian prison.
Grozev and I
met up a couple of days later, in the most depressing of all the odd places
we’d had lunch over the preceding year: the food court in Brookfield Place, an
upscale shopping mall in Lower Manhattan. It was as sterile as the apartment
Grozev was then renting, one of those furnished hotel alternatives.
He was
toggling between two different explanations for what we both assumed had been a
murder. Was Navalny killed to prevent Western negotiators from insisting on his
release? And if so, was Grozev somehow culpable? Or was the murder part of an
escalation of Putin’s attack on dissidents, a sign that he no longer cared
about even a semblance of deniability? “If it’s the beginning of a new wave,
that’s really scary,” he said, “because it will affect people like us.”
He didn’t
have to explain what he meant. My connection to Grozev is more than just
journalistic. We share a bond, along with hundreds of other people, of being
persona non grata in Putin’s Russia. Across the globe, members of this club
live with the suspicion that they could be targeted by Russia for surveillance,
kidnapping or assassination. Around this time, female Russian opposition
journalists and activists living in exile were falling ill, apparent victims of
a series of poisonings. These weren’t fatal, but they produced alarming
effects, including signs of psychosis.
Every time
Putin’s exiles hear about incidents like that, we look for all the ways in
which we are different, all the reasons we’ll be spared: We are not so well
known as to draw attention, or we are too well known to be attacked. We haven’t
been as harsh or as political in our statements, or it’s been long enough since
we left, or we had the good sense to settle in a safe country.
It’s always
a fool’s errand. Investigative journalists work by finding patterns, and terror
works by being random. When two women we knew received confirmation that they
had been poisoned and others experienced alarming symptoms, it started to feel
as if anyone could be a target and everyone was. When other acquaintances
seemed angry, impulsive, not themselves, both Grozev and I wondered if they had
been poisoned, too — as though living in exile with a target on your back
weren’t reason enough to act erratically.
Sitting
there in the shopping mall, Grozev told me that police officers had recently
found text messages in which the Bulgarian spies described breaking into his
Vienna apartment two years earlier. Perhaps to lighten the mood, he read me
some of the texts.
“‘We entered
the apartment, headed straight for the safe.’”
“Wait,” I
interrupted him. “You have a safe?”
“Of course
not.” He did not have a safe. He was forever losing things — his laptop, his
driver’s license.
Grozev heard
about the break-in more than a year after the fact, but when he told his family
about it, his daughter, Sophia, remembered that right around that time they had
seen a man taking photos of the two of them at an Indian restaurant. They both
remembered what he looked like, and Grozev was able to connect him, through
photos on Facebook, to the Bulgarian woman who’d made the friend request.
Sophia picked the man out of a photo lineup, and the police confirmed that he
had indeed been in Vienna the day of the break-in. Thus a sixth suspect was
arrested, and Sophia started thinking about following her father into
investigative journalism.
Grozev was
shaken. “The whole time, my son was playing video games in his room. If he had
just gotten up to pee, they would have killed him.” Beyond that, he was struck
by the extent of the surveillance footage that the police showed him, and the
fact that it included his father’s apartment. “I now think it was 50-50 that he
was killed.”
When he
visited his family, Grozev was now under extremely tight security — “sentries
24/7” was how he described it — and this wasn’t helping his marriage. “Weeks
under house arrest with police on the premises probably showed how
unsustainable it is,” he told me when he returned.
Grozev was
becoming a person without a past. He lived in exile. His parents were both
dead. His adventures with von Habsburg were suspended indefinitely. His
marriage was floundering. His access to the physical objects from his life
before January 2023 was uncertain. All he had was a small black backpack with
his laptop, when he could remember where he left it.
With little
choice in the matter, Grozev started getting used to New York. He developed a
work routine and started shaving again. Marsalek, the former high-flying
finance executive, was settling into an unglamorous life in Russia. Grozev
tracked him to a vacation in a sad tourist trap in the North Caucasus. “And we
are sitting here,” Grozev said to me. It was one of those summer days when all
of New York looks like the setting for a rom-com. We were seated outdoors,
having good food. “Little moments of revenge,” he said.
The trial of
Grozev’s would-be assassins began at the end of November last year at the Old
Bailey, the Central Criminal Court building in London. The plot against Grozev
was deadly serious, but the details, as they emerged in more than 70,000
archived text messages, hours of video and an entire binder of charts
illustrating the timing of operations and the flow of money, were at times
ridiculous. The leaders of the group used the aliases Jean-Claude Van Damme and
Jackie Chan; they referred to the lower-ranking members of the spy ring as the
“minions,” a term to which they were apparently so committed that among the
objects entered into evidence — and passed around to the members of the jury —
was a surveillance camera that had been hidden in the flower of a Minion toy
from the “Despicable Me” movies. The second in command conscripted both his
live-in girlfriend and his mistress into the espionage operation, concealed the
existence of each of them from the other and lied to both about having cancer,
at one point sending a photo of himself with toilet paper wrapped around his
head to convince one of them he was recovering from surgery. She believed him.
He had told
the women that they were working for Interpol, and said the same thing to his
mistress’s ex-boyfriend, when the Bulgarians recruited him. In a police
interview played for the jury, the ex-boyfriend was asked, “Who are Interpol to
you?” “From the movies,” he said. “Just, uh, chasing criminals.” He added,
“Right now, the dumbest thing I have ever done in my life.”
Half the
group pleaded guilty to espionage charges, so in the end only those three — the
two women and the ex-boyfriend, the man whom Grozev’s daughter identified —
stood trial. Gaberova, the youngest defendant, and Bizer Dzhambazov, the second
in command, were arrested when they were in bed together. Gaberova screamed at
her lover, “What have you done?” Her defense attorney pointed to this as
evidence that she herself never considered that she might be doing something
wrong. Gaberova told the court that she thought that Grozev was “a bad
journalist.” All three defendants, it seemed, had been fools for love.
Watching the
trial unfold was a surreal experience for the spies’ targets. On at least one
occasion the group had been able to book an airline ticket for one of their
members in the seat next to Dobrokhotov; using a hidden camera, she captured a
long video of him and noted his phone passcode. Dobrokhotov learned that he had
been under surveillance almost from the moment he walked out of Russia in 2021.
In Vienna, he had rented a room on Grozev’s street. The spies, too, were
renting on that street — directly across from Grozev, a couple of doors down
from a new, remarkably good espresso bar. “We always wondered how it stayed in
business, given that Christo was always the only customer,” Dobrokhotov told
me. The espresso bar closed after Grozev left Austria and the spy ring was
busted.
There is
something profoundly insulting about having your life turned upside down by
people who call themselves Jackie Chan and Van Damme and can be convinced that
toilet paper wrapped around someone’s head is proof of cancer surgery. Even the
amount of money involved, at least in this part of the operation, was
comparatively modest: just a couple of hundred thousand dollars.
The trial
seemed to have an improvised, make-believe quality. Even the usual British
court garb — the lawyers’ black gowns and white wigs, and the judge’s red robe
with white fur cuffs — rather than elevating the proceedings, made it feel that
everyone might just be pretending. Except for the fact that Putin clearly
wanted these two journalists hunted down and killed.
In March, a
jury handed down its verdict: Like the three who offered earlier pleas,
Gaberova, Katrin Ivanova and Tihomir Ivanchev were guilty of espionage. Before
the sentencing, Grozev submitted a two-page victim impact statement. With none
of his usual humor and with little elaboration, he enumerated the devastating
consequences of the Kremlin’s campaign against him: separation from his family,
hypervigilance, anxiety, disrupted sleep, the expense of maintaining two homes.
The
sentencing was televised. Grozev watched from a prosecutor’s office in a
European capital with a group of law enforcement officers. It was, as he has
become fond of saying, surreal. “I loved the delivery,” he said. “The judge
made it clear that he didn’t buy their bullshit that they didn’t know” that
they were working for Russia. The sentences, of five to 11 years, sounded
longer than they were: Under British guidelines, the convicted spies might
spend only half of their nominal sentences behind bars. Gaberova, for example,
will probably be released on parole in a couple of years.
The London
press covered the case as a breakthrough. No longer would Britain look away
while Russian billionaires used the country as their playground and Russian
agents as their killing field. “In the U.K., this is the biggest spy case
they’ve prosecuted since the Cold War,” Grozev said. “They see it as a slap in
the face for Putin. In Russia, it is seen as an embarrassment — the six
Bulgarians were disposable. They even have a term for it: ‘dropy,’ from the
English ‘to drop.’” Nor was the operation a complete failure, from the
Kremlin’s point of view: A trove of surveillance data on Grozev and Dobrokhotov
had been delivered to Russian intelligence. “There will be new attempts,”
Grozev predicted. “Other units will be eager to prove that they can do better.
That’s how they work.”
Before he
left New York for the sentencing, we met up for coffee. He was frustrated that
he did not have access to all the evidence assembled by the Metropolitan
Police. He was certain that he could find information its officers had missed,
clues that would help find others who were involved, enabling him to solve the
biggest case of his life — the case his life may depend on.
It is clear
to Grozev that he, and perhaps even more so Dobrokhotov, who is Russian, face a
risk to their lives wherever they go in Europe. The United States used to be
safe. But even under the Biden administration there were many Russian
dissidents in ICE detention. The Trump administration has threatened to deport
at least one dissident back to Russia, where she would almost certainly be
imprisoned. The F.B.I.’s foreign influence task force, which used to protect
foreign dissidents in the United States, has been disbanded. What if the Trump
administration decided to do something nice for Putin?
Grozev
reminded me that I too could be a nice gift, since Russia has a warrant out for
my arrest. I pointed out that he was even more “wanted.” But where could he go?
“I am disturbed by not knowing where my home is,” Grozev said.
His daughter
is about to graduate from high school and his son is finishing medical school.
For a long time, both had assumed they could join their father in the United
States, but this no longer appeared obvious. Nothing did.
“Is your
wife still your wife?” I asked.
“I believe
so,” Grozev said. “We don’t see each other, but we are very friendly.”
By any
measure, Grozev won this round. He is alive. Marsalek is stuck in Russia, and
his minions are in prison in England. But here was the price Grozev had paid
for surviving: his family, his home and the ability to feel safe anywhere in
the world.


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