Orbán problem pushes EU towards ‘coalitions of the willing’ on Ukraine

 

Analysis

Orbán problem pushes EU towards ‘coalitions of the willing’ on Ukraine

Jennifer Rankin

in Brussels

As crisis talks loom, Trump and the bloc’s own populist spoilers have driven it away from its old quest for unanimity

 

Sun 2 Mar 2025 16.40 CET

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/02/orban-problem-pushes-eu-towards-coalitions-of-the-willing-on-ukraine-russia

 

A fortnight after Vladimir Putin sent his troops to attack Ukraine, the 27 leaders of the EU gathered at the palace of Versailles and condemned Russia’s invasion, pledged support to the people of Ukraine – “we will not leave them alone” – and vowed to “take more responsibility for our security”.

 

Three years later, EU leaders are under pressure as never before to live up to those promises. After a summit hosted by Keir Starmer on Sunday, the EU27 leaders will gather in Brussels on Thursday for crisis talks. But trouble is ahead: Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has called on the EU to follow Trump’s example and open direct talks with the Russian president.

 

Orbán also wants the EU to junk a summit text intended to challenge Trump’s unilateralism. “There can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine,” states the EU draft text seen by the Guardian that Orbán objects to. “[Nor] negotiations that affect European security without Europeans’ involvement.”

 

EU diplomats say nothing surprises them about the Hungarian government. Only last week, Hungary joined the US, Russia and Belarus in voting against a UN general assembly resolution – drafted by European countries – that called for “a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”.

 

At a time when far-right parties are basking in attention from the Trump White House, Orbán is not the only would-be spoiler. Slovakia’s populist prime minister, Robert Fico, echoes Hungary’s pro-Moscow view on the Ukraine war, having previously threatened to cut off humanitarian aid to Ukraine in a row over Russian gas. The Czech Republic could also fall into that category if Andrej Babiš, a billionaire populist allied with Orbán, is re-elected prime minister this autumn, as opinion polls suggest.

 

As geopolitical storm clouds descend, EU member states are increasingly interested in “coalitions of the willing”, rather than seeking unanimity of all 27.

 

One senior EU diplomat said they expected future military aid to Ukraine to be led by a coalition of the willing as “we are moving more into the voluntary contribution part”. The diplomat was referring to an initiative from the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, seeking to drum up billions in military aid for Ukraine in 2025.

 

But the idea is also relevant when looking at European countries’ willingness to send troops to Ukraine, as a peacekeeping or deterrent force. The UK (outside the EU) and France are in, Poland is out and Germany, at the start of coalition negotiations, remains a question mark.

 

“The EU at 27 is highly dysfunctional,” said Jana Puglierin, the head of the Berlin office at the European Council on Foreign Relations. She expects Germany’s most likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, will break with the approach of his Christian Democrat predecessor Angela Merkel of “moving everybody along in lockstep”, an approach that often led to “the lowest-common denominator”.

 

Janis Emmanouilidis, the deputy chief executive at the European Policy Centre, said the EU had too often pursued “a hollow unity” at the expense of ambition.

 

An EPC paper he co-authored outlines a “supra-governmental avant garde” operating on chosen topics like a mini-EU with binding rules and the involvement of EU institutions. One area ripe for this approach, it is suggested, is European defence cooperation funded by joint borrowing.

 

In the draft summit communique being blocked by Orbán, EU leaders would call for proposals for “additional funding sources for defence at EU level”. The document makes no reference to common borrowing. Instead it mentions other proposals: loosening the EU’s fiscal rules; greater flexibility in spending EU regional development funds, and expanding the remit of the European Investment Bank, which is barred from lending for weapons or ammunition.

 

The pressure to find €500bn (£410bn) over the next decade for defence spending – the European Commission’s estimate – means the common fund idea remains a talking point.

 

Mujtaba Rahman, the managing director for Europe at the Eurasia Group, expects EU leaders to agree “ a common facility” worth between €100bn and €200bn by June when a summit meeting earmarked for decisions on defence takes place.

 

In a note to investors on Friday, Rahman wrote that the facility was more likely to be intergovernmental, rather than EU. This set-up would get round central European spoilers, assuage the qualms of EU countries outside Nato, and open the door to the participation of non-EU countries, including the UK, Norway and Turkey.

 

Coalitions of the willing are not a panacea. EU sanctions against Russia can only be agreed and extended by unanimity. Emboldened by Trump, Orbán is threatening to veto the rollover later this month of EU sanctions against more than 1,000 Russian officials and business people, including Putin.

 

Creating coalitions of the willing also prompts awkward questions about who deserves to join the club. Some EU countries question whether Spain and Italy should be included in any new borrowing club, as they have not met the 2% GDP Nato target.

 

But against the harsh reality of a US president trashing the 80-year-old transatlantic alliance, the EU will probably be forced to experiment with new formats. “It is politically risky, maybe even legally risky,” Emmanouilidis said. “But we are at a moment where it is increasingly difficult to follow the old logic.”