The conflict cannot end until Ukraine is part of
the West
The question is not whether Ukraine should become a
part of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, but when and how.
BY IVO
DAALDER
MAY 15,
2023 4:00 AM CET
https://www.politico.eu/article/the-conflict-cannot-end-until-ukraine-is-part-of-the-west/
Ivo
Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is president of the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.”
He traveled to Ukraine as part of a GLOBSEC-organized delegation.
On a recent
trip to Kyiv, the talk along Ukraine’s corridors of power was decidedly
different from those in Washington and European capitals. Far from focusing on
the much-discussed counteroffensive Ukrainian forces are about to launch,
senior government officials were instead more concerned about the country’s
long-term future.
“Ukraine
will survive,” a very seasoned spymaster told a group of former senior
officials who traveled to Kyiv from the United States and Europe. “The most
difficult point will come after the war,” he added.
At its
core, the war in Ukraine is a fight not over territory but over the country’s
future. Russia is determined to control Ukraine’s political destiny — if not
its territory. And in this, Russian President Vladimir Putin is not unique,
representing a historic Russian tradition of seeking security in empire —
which, at a minimum, includes Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.
Even if
Ukraine succeeds in pushing Russia’s military forces all the way back to its
1991 borders, the conflict won’t truly end. Ukrainian intelligence officials
estimate that if the fighting were to stop this year, Russia would already be
able to reconstitute sufficient capabilities to restart the war by 2027-2028 —
even with economic sanctions remaining in place.
So, in
order to truly end the conflict, Russia will have to understand — or be made to
understand — that Ukraine’s future will be decided in Kyiv, not Moscow. And
Kyiv has made it abundantly clear that it sees that future in the West, as an
integral part of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Ultimately,
for Kyiv, finding a guaranteed place in the West is more important than
securing control over all its territory through military means — though it
does, rightly, insist that full independence and sovereignty requires complete
control of all the territory within its 1991 borders.
Thus,
Putin’s strategic failure will only be complete if Moscow comes to understand
that Ukraine is permanently lost — lost physically, economically, politically
and strategically. And ensuring that failure should be the ultimate objective —
not just for Ukraine but for the West too.
There are
many reasons why Ukraine’s future is in the West.
The
political case is straightforward: Ukraine has fought not only for its own
security but for those of its neighbors. It wants to be part of the European
Union and has been invited to start the accession process. It was also promised
NATO membership in 2008 and, having fought against the alliance’s biggest
adversaries, it wants to join history’s most successful security organization
as soon as possible. After all Ukraine has done, after all its citizens have
suffered, they deserve to be part of the West.
Meanwhile,
the strategic case for including Ukraine in the West goes to the core of the
conflict: Without Ukraine’s integration, Putin — and whomever succeeds him —
will continue to believe they have a chance to control it. Indeed, by defeating
him militarily in Ukraine, as well as by integrating the country into the West,
Russia’s strategic failure will be realized. And this will help restore a
degree of order — demonstrating that aggression doesn’t pay — as well as send a
clear signal to Moscow that there’s no future prospect where renewed aggression
would be successful.
There’s a
practical case for Ukraine’s Western integration too, as the alternative would
prolong the conflict and pose new security challenges. Even with all the
military support from the West, postwar Ukraine will be a nation on edge —
facing a neighbor three to four times its size, with the national resources to
reconstitute a formidable military down the road. Left to its own devices,
Ukraine’s society will then become more thoroughly militarized, less open and
more paranoid, preparing for renewed war.
The West
may try to reassure Ukraine by promising to provide it with all the means
necessary to defend itself — as it has to date — but absent Ukraine’s
integration into the Western alliance, the country will become like Israel:
self-reliant, distrustful of its neighbors, singularly focused on its own
security, willing and able to take preemptive action whenever it deems
necessary, even possibly seeking its own nuclear weapons.
A Ukraine
unmoored could become a rogue actor — which would be a security problem in the
middle of Europe. Hence the former intelligence official’s warning: “The most
difficult point will come after the war.”
Security is
at the core of Ukraine’s future. Its economic reconstruction and
transformation, its eventual EU membership — it all depends on the country
being secure. The Marshall Plan couldn’t have succeeded — and the European
Community wouldn’t have been formed — without the creation of NATO. Except for
neutral states, none of the 15 nations that have joined the EU since the Cold
War’s end did so without becoming a NATO member first. Thus, Ukraine’s ability
to emerge as a strong, vibrant, prosperous nation after the war crucially
depends on its security. It’s what this war is about.
Security
support — the commitment to provide Ukraine with the means to defend itself for
as long as necessary — will be vital, both during the current phase of fighting
and once it ends. Led by the U.S., many Western countries are fully dedicated
to providing this long-term support, and those efforts should be detailed in
binding memoranda to be signed with Ukraine.
However, on
its own, security support is not enough, as it may not deter Moscow and is
unlikely to reassure Kyiv. What Ukraine wants — and needs — is real security
guarantees: a commitment to come to its defense under agreed circumstances. But
while NATO membership may be possible in the future, it isn’t likely to be
forthcoming anytime soon, as it’s difficult to see how a nation at war, with
contested borders, would be allowed to join an alliance that commits its
members to come to the aid of any one if them that’s subject to armed attack —
as Ukraine is now.
Yet, it’s
important that NATO countries — individually and collectively — signal to
Ukraine that they not only understand its desire to join the alliance but that
they’re committed to making this a reality as soon as conditions allow. Even
without a formal end to the war, let alone real peace, the U.S. and other NATO
countries need to make clear that they’re committed to Ukraine’s security and
that they will explore interim arrangements — just as they did for Finland and
Sweden — until it becomes a full member.
The debate
about NATO membership risks obfuscating a larger truth: Ukraine’s security lies
with — and in — the West, and the conflict cannot end until Ukraine is part of
it. The question is not whether Ukraine should become a part of the West, but
how and when.

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