Mark Rutte is in danger of repeating David Cameron’s mistakes

OPINION

Mark Rutte is in danger of repeating David Cameron’s mistakes

Saying no to more Europe only emboldens Euroskeptics.

By LUUK MOLTHOF 7/22/20, 4:03 AM CET

https://www.politico.eu/article/mark-rutte-is-in-danger-of-repeating-david-cameron-mistakes/

Luuk Molthof is a senior research fellow at d|part, a nonpartisan political think tank based in Berlin.

Mark Rutte has long had a reputation in Europe as a "Mr. No" —  one that has only been reinforced by his new role as the figurehead of the so-called frugal four.

After leading the opposition to the EU recovery plan over the past few weeks, the Dutch prime minister was able to negotiate a favorable compromise at the EU summit on Monday. In doing so, he did not seem to mind being cast as the bad guy, appearing more concerned with not upsetting domestic voters, keeping the Euroskeptic opposition at bay and defending his country's narrow interests.

And yet, Rutte’s less-than-constructive approach to European politics may well be counterproductive to his aims, certainly in the long run. In fact, if he is not careful, he could end up like David Cameron.

The former British prime minister’s failed European strategy offers two important lessons for Rutte.

A large majority of the Dutch population wants to remain in the EU but they not necessarily keen on more Europe — in fact, rather the opposite.

First, consistently saying no to more (money to) Europe is, in the long run, more likely to embolden rather than assuage domestic Euroskepticism.

Over the course of his premiership, Cameron often took an obstructionist position vis-à-vis the EU, both for electoral gains and to take the winds out of the sails of the “real” Euroskeptics.

On some occasions, this approach may well have scored him points domestically, such as when he refused to sign the Fiscal Compact in 2011 and was hailed by the tabloids for sticking up for British interests. At other times, his strategy backfired and led to public scorn, such as when he made a public point of opposing the nomination of Jean-Claude Juncker as European Commission president in 2014, only to be sidelined by his European colleagues.

Whether Cameron’s dealings in Europe were well-received at home or not, in both cases his strategy established the U.K. as “the odd one out” and gave voters the impression that British interests were at odds with European interests. Rather than taking the wind out of the Euroskeptics’ sails, these episodes only gave weight to their position and strengthened their resolve — with known consequences.

Dutch Euroskepticism is not as outspoken as British Euroskepticism, and a large majority of the Dutch population wants to remain in the EU. But the Dutch are not necessarily keen on more Europe — in fact, rather the opposite.

Like Cameron, Rutte has a history of playing into his country’s soft Euroskepticism. He toned down that approach after the Brexit referendum — having realized that a Nexit, while unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out.

But he also seems to have concluded that, in order not to embolden the Euroskeptic opposition any further, he can’t be seen to be supporting any significant increase in the Dutch financial contributions to the EU.

If Rutte’s intention was to cover his Euroskeptic flank, it’s easy to see why his approach during the lead-up to the EU summit has already backfired.

By rhetorically pitting the Netherlands (and the other frugal three) against the rest of the EU, Rutte created the impression that Dutch and European interests are not aligned — whereas in fact the Netherlands has just as much at stake in Europe’s recovery as everyone else.

His hard stance has also made it much easier for the Euroskeptics to attack him and fire up their base now that a deal is done. Had he chosen for a more constructive approach from the beginning, he would have been able to manage expectations and given the Euroskeptics less opportunity to cry foul once he made concessions. Instead, he made it unnecessarily difficult for himself.

The second lesson Cameron’s experience offers Rutte is that while a hawkish European policy may get results in the short term, it also increases the likelihood of political isolation, hindering efforts to effectively pursue national interests in the long term.

In Cameron’s case, it was obvious that his obstructionism made him few friends in Europe. By the time he wanted to negotiate a reform deal, which was meant to secure the U.K.’s stay in the EU, he had already lost a lot of goodwill. As a result, his European partners were not all that keen to help him out of the grave he dug himself.

Rutte risks spiraling down the same path. The Netherlands is in danger of succeeding the U.K. as the EU’s “awkward partner.” Rutte should be careful not to let this happen.

For a small member state, the Netherlands is surprisingly influential in the EU, due mainly to its close relationship with Germany. Yet Rutte’s stubbornness in the recent EU budget negotiations has led to a growing rift between the two countries. In order to be able to effectively represent Dutch interests in the future, he would do well not to let this rift widen.

None of this is to say that Rutte cannot play a little hardball at times or even that the Dutch concerns with the EU recovery plan were entirely illegitimate. Rather, he should be careful that his resistance to European initiatives does not become a pattern.

In the short term, it might get results and domestic approval. But in the long term, he risks both isolation in Europe and emboldening the Euroskeptics at home.

Over the course of his premiership, Cameron only hardened in his obstructionist resolve. It is to be hoped, both for his own and his country’s sake, that Rutte does not take the same route.