DEFENSE
France pulls out of NATO naval mission in the
Mediterranean
Paris feels it wasn’t given alliance support after
clash with Turkey.
By RYM
MOMTAZ
07/01/2020
12:29 PM EDT
PARIS —
France is temporarily pulling out of a NATO naval operation in the
Mediterranean, in a move that indicates there was not enough support from the
alliance following an aggressive encounter with Turkish ships last month.
French
Ambassador to NATO Muriel Domenach sent a letter on Tuesday to NATO
Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg notifying him of the decision to pull out of
Operation Sea Guardian, meant to control an arms embargo on Libya.
In it she
said a NATO report into an incident between a French ship and a Turkish ship in
mid-June "did not establish the facts," according to a French defense
ministry official. The report is classified and has not been made public.
NATO did
not confirm the letter — which was first reported by French paper L'Opinion —
or France’s temporary withdrawal, and a spokesman referred questions to the
French government.
The
alliance’s political leaders have struggled to maintain a display of unity in
recent years amid at times vicious infighting, including loud gripes by U.S.
President Donald Trump over meager military spending and criticism from French
President Emmanuel Macron over lack of coordination and Turkish unilateral
actions.
"It’s
a very clear political move that shines a light on the fundamental ambiguity of
an anti-smuggling operation that includes smugglers," the French official
said in reference to Turkey. "What we are asking for is a clarification of
the rules of behavior."
France,
which has received little public support from NATO allies in its escalating
conflict with Turkey, is making its return to Operation Sea Guardian
conditional on four demands: that NATO allies reaffirm their commitment to the
arms embargo; outlaw the use of NATO call signs when ships are on national
operations; improve coordination between Sea Guardian and the EU Operation
IRINI (which is also meant to enforce the Libya embargo); and the setting up of
a mechanism to defuse conflict and avoid incidents among allies.
Turkey has
been blocking NATO-EU coordination in the enforcement of the embargo in the
Mediterranean and is accused of using the NATO call sign while its ships escort
cargo transporting vast amounts of weapons to the U.N.-recognized government
led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, in contravention of a U.N. arms embargo.
On June 10,
the French frigate Le Courbet, operating under NATO command, attempted to
inquire about the intended destination of a Tanzanian-flagged cargo ship, the
Cirkin, but was aggressively barred from doing so by three Turkish naval ships
escorting the Cirkin, according to French officials.
The Cirkin
was suspected by NATO Maritime Command of transporting weapons to Libya.
According
to French officials, the Turkish ships went as far as flashing their radar
lights three times in the space of a few seconds, a manoeuvre that usually
precedes the firing of weapons. They also said Turkish sailors were seen
wearing bullet-proof vests and standing behind their weapons.
But Turkey
disputes that version of events and says the NATO investigation does not back France's
claims.
"According
to the information that I have [the NATO report] is not conclusive,"
Turkish Ambassador to France Ismaïl Hakki Musa told a French Senate hearing on
Wednesday. "It appears the NATO experts aren't reaching the same
conclusion [as the French]."
On June 17
and 18, French Defense Minister Florence Parly lodged a complaint at a NATO
ministerial meeting and only got the support of eight allies out of a total of
30, for its criticism of Turkey's behavior. The U.S. and U.K. notably were not
among its supporters.
David M.
Herszenhorn contributed reporting.
This
article was published in 1/1/20, 4:02 AM CET Updated 1/3/20
How rogue can Turkey go?
Ankara’s estrangement from the West could have violent
consequences.
By PAUL
TAYLOR 1/1/20, 4:02 AM CET Updated 1/3/20, 7:13 AM CET
Paul
Taylor, a contributing editor at POLITICO, writes the Europe At Large column.
Fasten your
seatbelts for more trouble with Turkey in 2020.
In the last
12 months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has:
— Launched
a unilateral military offensive into northeast Syria against Kurdish forces
allied with the West to counter ISIS;
—
Threatened to send millions of Syrian refugees to Europe if the European Union
objects to his plan to resettle them in a buffer zone inside Syria;
— Begun
installing Russian air defense missiles in defiance of NATO partners and the
United States, prompting Washington to shut Turkey out of the F-35 advance
fighter program;
— Shipped
arms to Libya in breach of a U.N. embargo and offered to send troops to support
the embattled government in Tripoli;
— Agreed
with Libya on new sea borders in the eastern Mediterranean, claiming waters
that Greece and Cyprus consider their own;
—
Threatened to veto NATO defense plans for the Baltic states and Poland unless
the alliance branded Syrian Kurdish forces “terrorists,” before backing down at
the NATO summit in London in early December;
— Stepped
up drilling for gas, guarded by Turkish warships, in Cyprus' exclusive economic
zone;
— and
intercepted an Israeli research vessel and forced it to leave Cypriot waters.
Erdoğan’s
confrontation course has left officials in Brussels and Washington wondering
just how far he might take strategic estrangement from the West and
rapprochement with Russia.
“The
Kremlin is openly using Turkey as a crowbar to divide NATO from inside” — Marc
Pierini, former EU ambassador to Turkey
The
religious nationalist leader is steadily reversing Ankara’s Western orientation
that began almost a century ago under Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern,
secular Turkish Republic. That direction was anchored after World War II by the
country’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO and its candidacy to
join the European Union.
Some fear
Erdoğan could withdraw from NATO’s military command in a gesture of nationalist
grandeur, as France did in 1966 under General Charles de Gaulle, and perhaps
even expel Western forces from Turkish soil. NATO has its land forces command
and a forward base for its airborne warning, surveillance and control (AWACS)
planes in Turkey.
With the
U.S. Congress pressing President Donald Trump to impose sanctions on Turkey for
buying Russian military equipment, Washington has strengthened military ties
with Athens. Under a defense cooperation agreement signed in October, the U.S.
gained the use of three strategic air bases in mainland Greece and upgraded
naval facilities at Suda Bay in Crete, in what looks like a fallback in case it
is denied use of the İncirlik base in southern Turkey that is vital for its
operations in the Middle East.
Other
diplomats think Erdoğan may keep Turkey in the Atlantic alliance but act
increasingly as a Trojan Horse, obstructing decision-making that requires a
consensus. In addition to its attempt to take the updated Baltic defense plans
hostage, Ankara frequently gums up NATO exercise-planning over its air and sea
space disputes with Greece.
“The
Kremlin is openly using Turkey as a crowbar to divide NATO from inside,” said
Marc Pierini, a former EU ambassador to Turkey now at the Carnegie Europe think
tank.
Some
diplomats and military analysts worry that Erdoğan may provoke an armed
incident with Greece or its political adversary France in disputed air or sea
space to rally nationalist support at home.
The French
navy regularly patrols the east Mediterranean off Syria and Lebanon, where it
has historic interests. France and Italy have sent warships into Cypriot waters
recently, with port visits to Larnaca, to uphold freedom of navigation in
Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone, where the French and Italian oil companies,
Total and ENI, hold exploration licenses.
This has
raised tensions between Erdoğan and French President Emmanuel Macron, the most
vocal critic of Turkey’s incursion into northeastern Syria. The Turkish navy
will take delivery of its first helicopter carrier and amphibious assault ship
next year, giving it power projection capability across the Mediterranean
region.
When I
asked a Western admiral serving in the Mediterranean what kept him awake at
night, the risk of an escalating maritime incident with Turkey off Cyprus was
near the top of his list, second only to fear of a jihadist massacre on a
cruise liner.
As
Erdoğan’s domestic position has weakened with big-name defections from his
Justice and Development Party (AKP) and a bumpy end to Turkey’s long economic
boom, the authoritarian president has resorted increasingly to military and
rhetorical muscle-flexing.
Since he
returned empty-handed from the December NATO summit, the Turkish president has
upped the ante on two fronts, offering to send troops to Libya to combat rebels
backed by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Russia, and deploying drones to
Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus to support drilling activities the EU has
branded illegal. On December 26, Erdoğan said that parliament would vote in
January on sending troops to Libya after the government in Tripoli requested
it.
From
Ankara’s viewpoint, these actions are legitimate responses to its Western
allies’ unwillingness to acknowledge the danger to its security posed by Syrian
Kurdish fighters allied with the outlawed separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK).
Erdoğan,
left, with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia | Pool photo by
Sergei Chirikov/AFP via Getty Images
“We do not
question the validity of Article V,” Gülnur Aybet, a senior adviser to Erdoğan,
told a security conference in London in early December, referring to NATO’s
mutual defense clause. “On the contrary, a NATO that was fit for purpose would
recognize this existential threat to Turkey.”
Ankara is
also furious about U.S.-backed collaboration among Greece, Cyprus, Israel and
Egypt to exploit east Mediterranean gas reserves while shutting Turkey out.
Aybet
played down Ankara’s growing ties with Moscow as “a largely pragmatic,
compartmentalized relationship where we cooperate where we can and leave areas
of dispute outside the door.”
Turkey’s
official line is that it bought the S-400 top-of-the-range Russian air defense
missile system after the U.S. refused to sell it Patriot missiles and European
countries also refused to transfer advanced missile defense technology. Western
officials say the S-400 is not only incompatible with NATO’s integrated air
defense system but its sophisticated target acquisition radar, staffed by
Russian technicians, could be used to spy on Western air forces throughout the
region.
There is no
mechanism for expelling an errant NATO member. The alliance in the past turned
a blind eye to military regimes in Greece and Turkey. But diplomats say
pragmatic ways would be found to work around Ankara if it cannot be persuaded
to mothball the Russian air defense system.
A more
potent check on Turkish disruption, at least in the short term, could be
Erdoğan’s own ambitions.
On the
political front, the EU could in theory pull the plug on Turkey’s accession
negotiations, which are going nowhere given Erdoğan’s assault on judicial
independence, media freedom and civil rights since he survived a failed 2016
military coup. But to do so would risk triggering another refugee influx into
Europe and do severe damage to an economic relationship important for both
sides. Germany would strongly oppose any such move.
A more
potent check on Turkish disruption, at least in the short term, could be
Erdoğan’s own ambitions.
The Turkish
leader needs to maintain a regular flow of foreign investment to steady the
economy and reassure the urban middle class that his first decade of prosperity
helped to swell.
His
political dream is to crown two decades of AKP rule by refounding the Turkish
Republic as the new Atatürk on the 100th anniversary of its creation in 2023.
That gives
Western officials reason to hope that Erdoğan will hold off escalating his
confrontations to the point of crisis. For now, anyway.
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