How Mitch McConnell killed the US Capitol attack
commission
The story of how Republicans undermined the 6 January
inquiry is informed by eight House aides, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity
Hugo Lowell
in Washington
Sat 29 May
2021 14.47 BST
Days before
the Senate voted down the creation of a 9/11-style commission to investigate
the Capitol attack, the Senate Republican leader, Mitch McConnell, was adamant:
he would oppose the bill, regardless of any amendments – and he expected his colleagues
to follow suit.
The
commission that would have likely found Donald Trump and some Republicans
responsible for the insurrection posed an existential threat to the GOP ahead
of the midterms, he said, and would complicate efforts to regain the majority
in Congress.
McConnell’s
sharp warning at a closed-door meeting had the desired effect on Friday, when
Senate Republicans largely opted to stick with the Senate minority leader. All
but six of them voted to block the commission and prevent a full accounting
into the events of 6 January.
But it also
underscored the alarm that gripped McConnell and Senate Republican leadership
in the fraught political moments leading up to the vote, and how they exploited
fears within the GOP of crossing a mercurial former president to galvanize
opposition to the commission.
The story
of how Republicans undermined an inquiry into one of the darkest days for
American democracy – five people died as a pro-Trump mob stormed the Capitol
and sought to hang Mike Pence – is informed by eight House aides, who spoke on
the condition of anonymity.
The
prospect of a commission unravels
Surrounded
by shards of broken glass in the Capitol on the night of 6 January, and as
House Democrats drew up draft articles of impeachment against Trump, Nancy
Pelosi, the speaker of the House, made her first outreach to canvas the
prospect of a commission to investigate the attack.
In the
immediate aftermath of the insurrection, Pelosi had reason to be hopeful.
Spurred on by the threat felt by many Republicans to their personal safety, a
swelling group of lawmakers had started to agitate for an inquiry to reveal how
Trump did nothing to stop the riot.
But what was
once heralded as a necessary step to “investigate and report” on the attack and
interference in election proceedings unravelled soon after, with the commission
swiftly reduced to an acrimonious point of partisan contention in a deeply
divided Capitol.
The main
objection from House and Senate Republicans, at first, centered on the lopsided
structure of Pelosi’s initial proposal, that would have seen a majority of
members appointed by Democrats, who would have also held unilateral subpoena
power.
And only
weeks after the riot, the House minority leader, Kevin McCarthy, was already
advancing the complaint for his ultimate opposition: that the scope of the
commission did not include unrelated far-left violence from last summer, a
political priority that stalled talks.
With little
progress three months after the Capitol attack, Pelosi made a renewed effort to
establish a commission on 16 April, floating a revised proposal that mirrored
the original 9/11 commission with the panel evenly split between Democrats and
Republicans.
Pelosi
briefed her leadership team that included the House majority leader, Steny
Hoyer, the House majority whip, Jim Clyburn, the assistant speaker, Katherine
Clark, and notably, the chair of the House homeland security committee, Bennie
Thompson, about the proposal the following Monday.
During that
meeting, Hoyer first raised the prospect of also extending equal subpoena power
to Republicans – a concession that would allow Democrats to meet all of
Republicans’ demands about the structure of the commission – which Pelosi
adopted a few days later.
By the
penultimate week of April, Pelosi had deputized Thompson to lead talks as she
felt the homeland security committee was an appropriate venue, and because the
top Republican on the committee, John Katko, was one of only three House GOP
members to impeach Trump.
With the
House on recess, Thompson made enough progress in negotiations to brief Pelosi
and her leadership team on 8 May that he secured a tentative deal on the commission,
though Katko wanted to wait on an announcement until Liz Cheney was ousted as
GOP conference chair.
Tensions
within the House Republican conference had reached new highs the previous week
after Cheney continued her months-long criticism of Trump’s lies about a stolen
election at a party retreat in Florida, and Katko was wary of injecting the
commission into the charged moment.
“As soon as
the vote on Liz Cheney is taken, he will be prepared to do a joint statement,”
Thompson said in remarks first reported by CNN.
Minutes
after House Republicans elevated Elise Stefanik to become the new GOP
conference chair on 14 May, Thompson and Katko unveiled their proposal for a
bipartisan 9/11-style commission.
McConnell
cracks down on the bill
The ouster
of Cheney solidified Tump’s outsize influence on the Republican party, and set
the scene for the weeks to come.
McCarthy
almost immediately sought to distance himself from the commission and was
non-committal about offering his endorsement. Asked whether he had signed off
on the deal, McCarthy was direct: “No, no, no,” he told reporters in the
basement of the Capitol.
By the
following Tuesday, top House Republicans were urging their colleagues to oppose
the commission bill, with McCarthy positioned against an inquiry on the basis
that its scope focused narrowly on the Capitol attack.
As Hoyer
had anticipated when he suggested that Pelosi also offer equal subpoena power
to Republicans, McCarthy struggled to demonize the commission, and several
House Republicans told the Guardian that they found his complaints about the
scope unconvincing.
The Senate
minority leader, meanwhile, had until then denounced Trump, who he faulted for
inciting the insurrection, and publicly seemed open to a commission. But as it
became clear the scores of House Republicans would vote for the bill, his
calculus quickly changed.
Two days
after the Senate returned for votes on 17 May McConnell informed Senate
Republicans at a private breakfast event that he was opposed to the commission
as envisioned by the House, and made clear that he would embark on a concerted
campaign to sink the bill.
Underpinning
McConnell’s alarm was the fact that Democrats needed 10 Senate Republicans to
vote in favor of the commission, and seven had already voted to impeach Trump
during his second Senate trial – a far more controversial vote than supporting
an inquiry into 6 January.
Cognizant
that Senate Democrats may find three or four more allies in uncertain
Republicans, McConnell cracked down.
After
announcing at the breakfast event that he would oppose the commission,
McConnell railed against the bill as being “slanted and unbalanced” on the
Senate floor, in biting remarks that represented a clear warning as to his
expectations.
He kept up
the pressure all afternoon on that Wednesday, so that by the evening, McConnell
had a major victory when Senator Richard Burr, who voted to impeach Trump only
four months before, abruptly reversed course to say that he would reject the
commission.
In the end,
only six Senate Republicans – Mitt Romney, Susan Collins, Bill Cassidy, Rob
Portman, Lisa Murkowski and Ben Sasse – voted to move forward on the
commission.
As the
final vote hurtled towards its expected finale, the Senate minority whip, John
Thune, who also switched his position to side with McConnell, acknowledged
McConnell’s arguments about a commission jeopardising Republican chances to
retake majorities in the House and Senate.
Summarising
his concerns, Thune said: “Anything that gets us rehashing the 2020 elections I
think is a day lost on being able to draw a contrast between us and the
Democrats’ very radical leftwing agenda.”
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