OPINION
Thomas Friedman on Iran, Israel and Preventing a
‘Forever War’
“It’s the worst story I’ve ever covered.”
April 19,
2024
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/19/opinion/israel-war-friedman.html
The
columnist Thomas L. Friedman joined the hosts of “Matter of Opinion” this week
to unpack Israel’s and Iran’s latest attacks, what they mean for Gaza and the
implications for the region writ large.
Lydia
Polgreen: From New York Times Opinion, I’m Lydia Polgreen.
Ross
Douthat: I’m Ross Douthat.
Carlos Lozada: I’m Carlos Lozada.
Lydia: And
this is “Matter of Opinion.”
Over the
past few weeks, Israel and Iran have engaged in a military standoff. Israel
struck the Iranian Embassy in Syria, killing several top Iranian military
officials. Then last weekend Iran sent hundreds of drones and missiles toward
Israel. And finally, early on Friday, Israel retaliated, striking a military
base in Iran.
Michelle
Cottle is out this week, so to try to unpack what all this means, we asked our
colleague Thomas L. Friedman to join us.
This
conversation was recorded before the latest attack, so keep that in mind. But
we think it provides some very helpful context to what led us to this moment
and what could happen next.
Welcome
back to “Matter of Opinion,” Tom.
Thomas L.
Friedman: Thank you, Lydia. It’s great to be back.
Lydia: So
let’s get right into it. How did Iran’s attack on Israel come to be?
Tom: Well,
roughly a week before Iran launched its missile attack, Israel killed several
very, very senior [Islamic] Revolutionary Guards commanders who were in an
adjunct building to the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, meeting with operatives at
the same time. And this gentleman was reportedly responsible for really running
all the sort of Iranian operations in Lebanon, in Syria.
And so,
from the Israeli point of view, he was a very high-value target. I was
surprised they did this. It’s not something I thought was very wise. My
grandmother used to say, just one war at a time, please. And this really was a
provocation, even for the ongoing shadow war between Israel and Iran, which has
been ongoing now for years.
This was
definitely a step-up. And the Iranians honored the Israelis’ step-up by taking
a massive step-up of their own on Saturday by launching some 300 drones,
missiles and cruise missiles at Israel from Iran, marking the first time that
any Middle East state has attacked Israel since Saddam Hussein did it with
Scuds 33 years ago.
And in the
context of the Israeli-Iranian conflict, again, tit-for-tat, shadow war,
neither has ever done such a thing. I didn’t buy and don’t buy the notion that
they were counting on Israel’s air defense system to shoot down basically all
300 with help from allies. That was actually quite a remarkable military feat.
Had one of
them gotten through and hit an Israeli school or a government building, this
audio program would be about full-scale war in the Middle East right now.
Ross: So
your view is that that possibility was built into the Iranian attack? Because
both during the attack, honestly, and then immediately afterward, there was
this running debate about the extent to which Iran had deliberately telegraphed
this move, telegraphed it to Israel, telegraphed it to the other Arab states
that cooperated in shooting down the missiles, which to some people seemed to
imply that Iran wanted the attack to fail.
But you
don’t think that was the case, and you think, therefore, Iran was prepared for
really dramatic escalation in response from Israel?
Tom: Yeah,
Ross. You know, I say two things. One is, just given the physics of it, no one
could count on firing 300 missiles and drones at another country, that
basically none would get through. That almost all 300 would be intercepted by
a, in effect, multinational force. And No. 2, when it comes to Iran, I always
prefer to put an s on the end: Irans.
So maybe
the supreme leader had one thing in mind and the [Islamic] Revolutionary Guards
had another thing in mind. It’s a notoriously factionalized system,
particularly between the Revolutionary Guards, the army and the government. And
not everyone is always aligned.
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Carlos:
Tom, so how much or how little can we discern about Iran’s offensive
capabilities and Israel’s defensive capabilities from what we just saw?
Tom: I was
trying to imagine when the head of the Iranian Air Force reported back to the
supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, did he breathe a sigh of relief or did he
say, “Zero out of 300?”
Lydia: Hmm.
Tom: “If
that’s how bad our offense is, what does that mean for our defense?” Remember,
Iran’s air force does not have F-35s. It does not have F-15s. So they have none
of the advanced technologies that Israel and its allies have.
And so I
think the Iranians are much more worried right now than not. It has been a
risk-averse leadership. This is not people who have gone out of their way to
bet the farm. And that’s why I was really surprised that in some ways they did,
because if just one out of 300 gets through and causes a mass casualty event in
Israel, I think Israel — they would have taken the plans out for Iran’s nuclear
program. And we’d be in Day 5 of that war right now. So I don’t think the world
fully appreciates how close we came. That’s just my gut feeling.
Lydia:
What’s going on in Israel? What are the calculations that are happening right
now in terms of how to respond? There was in the immediate moment this idea
that they must hit back and hit back hard. Now some time has passed. Life seems
to be returning roughly to normal in Israel. Where do things stand?
Tom: I
think we’re all trying to divine that, Lydia. So several factors are sort of
converging here. One is Israel is having the best week of this war since Oct.
7, in terms of global public opinion. People now see at the interstate level
what they’re up against, and it’s not inconsiderable. And that’s why you’ve had
visits by the German foreign minister, the British, people really expressing
solidarity. But within the Israeli government, one of the things that’s
troubled me since the war began is that there’s basically no opposition in
Israel. Since the beginning of the war, there’s been no opposition.
It’s not
like Gantz and Eisenkot who have joined the government from the leading
opposition party, I mean they’re — I don’t know — 10 degrees different from
Netanyahu, but it’s not like there’s a liberal party arguing something
completely different at all. It’s much more nuanced. In other words, Israeli
politics still revolves around Bibi Netanyahu, and he’s in everybody’s head.
And as a
result of that, there is no loud, significant opposition articulating an
alternative strategy, like maybe not retaliating, for either Gaza or now Iran.
There’s degrees of caution and separation. And I believe one reason for that is
that the army in Israel has often played that role more than the politicians.
What
happened is that because the Gaza war is a complete and catastrophic military
failure, all the military chiefs know their careers are over. And because of
that, we are six months into a war with no defined endgame. And the military
normally would be playing that role, but I think because everyone here is
traumatized and a little bit compromised in their own way, they’re not playing
that role.
Ross: So I
think we want to talk about endgame scenarios, but just to push on the
Netanyahu thread for a minute: Netanyahu is politically unpopular in Israel
right now, in the sense that opinion polls that we can see suggest that he
would not be returned as prime minister if elections were held suddenly.
And we’ve
had various people — yourself included, our colleague Bret Stephens — arguing
that for the sake of Israel’s war effort, Netanyahu should go. If Netanyahu
went, in whatever way, shape or form, what would actually follow? Beyond the
change in leadership style, who would be in charge, and would there be any
shift in strategy or tactics?
Tom: Ross,
there certainly would be a change in tone. When Netanyahu came in with the
farthest far-right government Israel’s ever had — including real Jewish Proud
Boys, I mean, Jewish supremacists — their approach was, you know, “We’re living
in a one-state reality. Let’s behave without self-restraint. In fact, let’s try
to take the Supreme Court down so we can truly behave without self-restraint.”
So I think
the first answer to your question, Ross, would be it’s a government that would
not be looking in any way to provoke things. That’s where I would start. But
absent what is the resolution on the ground in Gaza, how much of Hamas
survives, now this Iran factor — it’s very hard to predict actually how
different they would be.
And all I
can say about Netanyahu is that he’s compromised. He knows he has to stay in
power in order to be able to trade his office for a plea bargain if he is
convicted. Therefore, there isn’t a decision he makes in this war that isn’t
factored in with his own political needs, which a lot of people would argue
would be, keep the war going.
And in
fact, look, he didn’t invite this Iran attack, I don’t believe, but it sure
works for him politically. I bet if they took a poll today, you’d see his
numbers have gone way up.
Carlos:
Tom, I want to widen that question just a tiny bit. In your latest column, you
wrote that there’s no hope for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
or the conflict between Israel and Iran without leadership change, in Israel
with Netanyahu but also in Tehran and also in Ramallah with the Palestinian
Authority.
And it’s
very persuasive. You kind of walk through each case. But what I wanted to ask
you is how much of this problem is about the particular leadership that’s in
place, versus how much is about the competing interests and forces at play that
have shown themselves to be somewhat resistant at times to leadership changes.
Tom: So
Carlos, I’ll start at 30,000 feet ——
Carlos:
That’s where you live, Tom. That’s great. [Laughter]
Tom:
Exactly. That’s where I have to live, because if you’re down on the ground,
man, there aren’t enough drugs to keep you going. [Laughter.] So anyone who
knows my politics knows that it’s a tension between Walter Mondale and Thomas
Hobbes. A lot of people keep saying, “Two-state solution’s a fantasy.”
And I say,
“Oh, thank you for telling me! I had no idea that this was hard. Thank you for
telling me.” I get it. There’s about a 95 percent chance that this won’t work.
But I’ve decided to dedicate my life 100 percent to the 5 percent chance that
it will, because the alternative is a forever war. And if you care about
Israel, care about Palestinians, that’s the end of both communities. Because
they’ll just destroy each other, basically.
And so the
hope I base that on, Carlos, is this: Bibi Netanyahu has been in power for 16
years. He has spent 16 years doing everything he could to denigrate the
Palestinian Authority. In those 16 years, with kind of a free hand, Mahmoud
Abbas, the leader of the P.A., has done everything to shift money to relatives
and really take advantage of the fact that they couldn’t have an election.
I would
just like to do a lab test: What if you had an Israeli leader and a Palestinian
leader who actually wanted to try to make this work? Would it work
automatically? I have no idea. And we have the whole question of settlements
and physical problems on the ground. But I would at least like to run that test
of having someone in power in Ramallah and someone in power in Jerusalem who
actually wanted to make it work and see how far we can get. And because it’s
going to happen incrementally.
Ross: I
think one of the questions here, right, is people say, “No one wants a wider
war.”
Tom: Yeah.
Ross: But
there are people who want a wider war, right?
Tom:
Definitely.
Ross: Who
are they right now, and what are they thinking?
Tom: So,
Ross, one is Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who is hiding somewhere in Gaza.
Ross:
Right, he needs a wider war.
Tom: He
needs a wider war, because he’s out to destroy Israel. The thing people need to
remember about Sinwar is, Sinwar actually doesn’t know the Arabs very well,
which is why I think he was surprised by some of them not joining in. But he
knows Israelis really well. In fact, he learned his Israeli studies in prison.
He learned all his Hebrew in prison. And he spent years observing Israel and
all its weaknesses, and he put them all into play in this war. And he wants
Israel wiped out. So he’s certainly one of them.
I always go
back when I think about Iran, Ross, to remember what Ayatollah Khomeini said
when he came to Tehran from Paris in 1979 and took over, basically, Iran from
the shah. He said: We didn’t make this revolution to lower the price of
watermelons. This is a truly ideological movement with an agenda that it is
ready to prioritize over advancing the well-being of Iranians.
And we’ve
seen that now since 1979. And so you have to take these people very seriously.
They want to destroy Israel out of conviction and ambition. Whether they think
they can actually do it is a whole other question, but they’re not playing
around.
Lydia: So
the Iranians — what are the Palestinians to them? Are they just an instrument
trying to humiliate Israel? Because there’s not a natural alliance, as you
said, so how is Iran positioned vis-à-vis the Palestinians here?
Tom: So
Iran is not popular among the West Bank. Remember a big part of the Palestinian
community are Christians — not a majority, but they have a significant
Christian minority. In the P.A., Iran is not popular. Iran is extremely adept
at cultivating underground networks. And so Palestinians are to them the same
as Houthis are to them, the same as Hezbollah is to them, the same as Shia
militias in Iraq are to them. They’re instruments, and they are how Iran
projects power.
And by
basically enabling these militias with resources and money to either take over
these countries or eat away at the systems there, so you can’t get a majority
against them. Lebanon hasn’t been able to elect a president now for a couple of
years because Iran can’t necessarily, within the Lebanese system, get the man
it wants, but it can make sure that no one else can get the person they want
that would be hostile to Iran.
And Hamas,
— one has to remember, Hamas launched this war because there was a big
political struggle going on inside Hamas between more moderate forces led by
Haniyeh and Sinwar and because Hamas was in a giant rivalry with Fatah in the
West Bank and Fatah seemed to be lining up with Israel and Saudi Arabia to do a
giant normalization deal. So take a step back from all the sort of Hamas
ideology charter — this was also very much local politics at work.
Ross: So I
just want to push you to make a specific prediction — sorry — [Laughter] about
what the Israelis are going to do. Because in the narrative, your narrative of
the Iranian desire for a wider war, it seems like what constrains Iranian
leadership is fear. That they would happily go to war with Israel ——
Tom: Yeah.
Ross: ——
tomorrow if they thought they could win it. So if you are in the Israeli
cabinet right now, are you thinking, “We must strike back to restore deterrence
and maintain fear”? Or are you thinking, “Iran failed sufficiently that they
will be deterred from trying this again”? What are you thinking, and what are
they going to do?
Tom: What
are they going to do? I don’t know, Ross. I’ll just say what I’ve been thinking
from Day 1 of the war: that Israel needs to ask itself what its worst enemies
want it to do and do the opposite. And it’s rooted in a larger framework that I
have, which is that I can write the history of this conflict for you long. I
wrote a whole book, “[From] Beirut to Jerusalem,” about it. Or I can write
history really short, and it fits on a business card: war, timeout, war,
timeout, war, timeout, war, timeout, war, timeout, war, timeout, going back to
1929, if not earlier. And the difference between the two sides is what each did
in the timeout. Israel built one of the strongest economies in the world. Hamas
dug tunnels and nursed a grievance. And my view is that the Israeli No. 1
objective should always be to get to the timeout whenever they can, as much as
they can.
Now maybe
in this situation, it’s unavoidable. They just can’t. That’s what they would
argue. I’m not sure that’s the case. But Israel wins in the timeouts, and it
loses in times of war, especially where we are now historically, politically
and technologically in a social wired network world where when you lose on
TikTok now, you don’t just lose Muslim Americans in Michigan. You lose a whole
generation. And I think Israel is in real danger of losing a whole generation
right now.
Carlos: I
wonder if we could maybe spend some of our remaining time talking about what
the next timeout might look like if we’re able to get there. Back in January,
which feels so long ago, you wrote a column saying that Oct. 7 had propelled a
fundamental rethinking of the Middle East inside the Biden administration. You
outlined what you thought was an emerging Biden doctrine for the region. Given
how the conflict has evolved since then, how is the administration thinking
about the region, broadly speaking, now? Is there a coherent doctrine that you
see still at work or in development here?
Tom:
Carlos, I’d just say before I answer, I’ve been doing this my entire adult
life. I’ve been following the Middle East since I was 15. I’m now 70. This is
the absolutely worst moment I ever remember and the most worrisome for the
whole region spinning out of control.
I would say
the administration has a broad doctrine, which is Israel should find a way to
finish the operation of dismantling Hamas in a way that spares as many innocent
Gazan civilians as possible. It should then work with the P.A., with the
support of countries like the U.A.E. or Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, when they
are of sufficient capacity and strength. The P.A. plus allied countries —
Jordan, Egypt, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia — should then be the ones to govern Gaza,
maybe even with some American logistical help.
And then
Israel should provide some political horizon for the Palestinians, so Israel
can then normalize with Saudi Arabia. And we then find ourselves with a broad
inclusion network in the region, stretching from Egypt through Gaza, the
Arabian Gulf countries, and we’re in a whole new Middle East.
That’s the
hope. It’s still not impossible, I would say, but it takes me back, Carlos, to,
again, what I said early on after the war, which is what was going on in the
world on Oct. 6? On Oct. 6, Ukraine was trying to join the West, and Israel was
trying to join the Arab East. Ukraine was trying to get into the European
Union, and Israel was trying to normalize with Saudi Arabia.
This was a
pivotal 1989 moment. And Russia understood the first and stopped it, and Hamas
and Iran understood the second and stopped it. Because if these two events had
happened — if the first had happened, it would be the biggest change in Europe
since East Germany joined West Germany. We would be nine-tenths to a Europe
whole and free. In the Middle East, it would be the biggest expansion of the
Inclusion Network since Camp David, and it would have opened up the whole
Muslim world to Israel. So we were at a pivotal — we still are at a pivotal
moment that will actually define the post-post-Cold War world in both Europe
and the Middle East if we take these two theaters together.
It may not
feel like it, but this is 1989. This is a pivotal moment that is going to
define the post-post-Cold War world. And that’s why I feel strongly about both
aid for Ukraine and making sure that the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan come out of this the right way.
Lydia: But
one big stumbling block to that, and you didn’t mention when you talked about
who wanted a widening war, but it’s clear that Netanyahu wants this war to
continue ——
Tom: Yeah.
Lydia: ——
and needs this war to continue.
Tom: Yeah.
Lydia: Does
the potential widening of the war weaken or strengthen him? And how do we
contend with that as a factor overall? I mean, Biden has been trying very hard
to exercise influence, but it’s hard to exercise influence on someone who feels
cornered and running for their life.
Tom: Yeah.
You know, Lydia it’s been a problem from Day 1, and it’s why I’ve focused on
him so much. He’s not on the level as a leader right now in terms of his
decision making. That said, he’s also not alone. He has to balance his
far-right coalition partners with Benny Gantz, with the army and with the
public.
So it’s not
like he can just keep people at war forever. He’s under huge pressure from
hostage families. But he can drag things out at the margins, more and less. He
can extend this thing if he wants, but I don’t think it’s indefinite.
Joe Biden —
it seems like an eternity ago, but a couple of weeks ago after the tragic
killing of José Andrés’s team, Biden basically called [Netanyahu] up and said:
Here’s what you’re going to do, and if you don’t do it, you’re basically on
your own.
And that
got his attention because Israeli prime ministers depend on an American
president to deal with their internal politics. They need to be able to go back
to the cabinet and say, “I would never do that. But this S.O.B. Biden, he broke
my arm! He broke — he broke my arm! I would never do this, but the Americans
made me do it.”
And so we
need to always be aware of that role that we play. Some would say Biden didn’t
play it hard enough early enough. I think it’s a tricky question because you
also don’t want to give Hamas a pass and think that, OK, now the Americans have
got Bibi’s hands tied behind his back because then Hamas will take advantage of
it. So navigating this war is just hell on wheels.
Ross: But
so just to clarify, from the point of view of the Israelis who do not have
Netanyahu’s specific political incentives but share his perspective, which, as
you’re arguing, is most of the key players ——
Tom: Yes.
Ross: ——
what’s the difference between the endgame you just sketched or the timeout you
just sketched, which presumably is the one the Biden administration is seeking
——
Tom: Yes.
Ross: ——
and what they think? Like, if Netanyahu’s cabinet gets what they want in the
war in the next six months, what does their view of the timeout look like?
Tom: Ross,
I’m going to tell you the craziest thing, one of the craziest things I’ve ever
seen covering international relations. I don’t know the answer, because no one
in Israel has said — even the opposition has not said — what is the endgame in
Gaza. And we are six months into this war, and, and I’m not being cute or
anything. I, I have no idea.
It just
doesn’t make sense to me, and worse, I think it’s just incredibly reckless. One
can only divine by their actions, Ross, that their idea is to finish off Hamas
in Rafah if they can, and I think that’s a dubious proposition. I wrote early
on, the four most dangerous words in the Middle East are “once and for all.”
Nothing ever ends once and for all there.
And then
the plan, Ross, seems to be to pull largely out of Gaza, except for a perimeter
and the road bisecting it and use those two sort of positions to go in and out
at will.
But I was
there a few weeks ago with General Carrillo, our Centcom commander. We were
actually at the Erez crossing and being briefed by an Israeli colonel. And he
said, “We’re basically all out of northern Gaza.” I said, “What? What?” He
said, “We’ve left northern Gaza.” I said, “Well, who’s governing northern
Gaza?” Now, a lot of the population has been depopulated, but he didn’t have an
answer.
And I
immediately — and I wrote a column about this — had a flashback to being in
Iraq three weeks after the war in Umm Qasr and saying, “Where are the
Americans? Where are the British?” And no one was there because they had left a
completely ungoverned space.
So either
you’re going to have a Somalia, where Israel goes in and out, or Hamas coming
back. Or you’re going to get a new Israeli government that invites the P.A. in.
But right now, no one is talking that way.
And so
we’re six months into this war, and I can’t answer your most basic question —
not just because Netanyahu hasn’t answered it, because Gantz and Eisenkot, the
opposition, haven’t answered it, and the opposition outside the government
haven’t offered a kind of third way. And that gets to the deformities of the
Israeli political system right now — that there is no opposition.
Lydia: Tom,
thank you so much for coming to spend some time with us today.
Carlos:
Thank you so much, Tom.
Tom: I feel
like it’s wonderful to be with my great colleagues. I wish I had better
answers. I don’t. It’s the worst story I’ve ever covered.
Lydia:
That’s saying something.
Tom: Great
to be with you guys. Anytime.
Ross:
Thanks Tom.
“Matter of
Opinion” is produced by Phoebe Lett, Sophia Alvarez Boyd and Derek Arthur. It
is edited by Jordana Hochman. Mixing by Sonia Herrero and Pat McCusker.
Original music by Isaac Jones, Efim Shapiro, Carole Sabouraud, Sonia Herrero
and Pat McCusker. Our fact-checking team is Kate Sinclair, Mary Marge Locker
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Ross
Douthat has been an Opinion columnist for The Times since 2009. He is the
author, most recently, of “The Deep Places: A Memoir of Illness and Discovery.”
@DouthatNYT • Facebook
Carlos
Lozada is an Opinion columnist and a co-host of the weekly “Matter of Opinion”
podcast for The Times, based in Washington, D.C. He is the author, most
recently, of “The Washington Book: How to Read Politics and Politicians.” @CarlosNYT
Lydia
Polgreen is an Opinion columnist and a co-host of the “Matter of Opinion”
podcast for The Times.
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