OPINION
JAMELLE
BOUIE
Joe Manchin Is a Symptom, but It’s the Senate
That’s Sick
July 19,
2022
By Jamelle
Bouie
Opinion
Columnist
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/19/opinion/manchin-senate-climate.html
Seventy-two
percent of likely voters, according to the left-leaning polling group Data for
Progress, want the federal government to increase its tax incentives for solar,
wind and other clean energy projects. Sixty-nine percent of likely voters want
the government to take steps to make electric vehicles more affordable for more
people. And 60 percent of likely voters support policies that would regulate
carbon emissions and force power plants to clean up their act.
But Senator
Joe Manchin of West Virginia does not support these policies. He said so, last
week, in an announcement that essentially sank the Democratic Party’s
legislative plans to fight climate change. “Political headlines are of no value
to the millions of Americans struggling to afford groceries and gas as
inflation soars to 9.1 percent,” a spokesman for Manchin said. “Senator Manchin
believes it’s time for leaders to put political agendas aside, re-evaluate and
adjust to the economic realities the country faces to avoid taking steps that
add fuel to the inflation fire.”
There is
plenty of blame to go around for the death of the Democratic climate agenda.
There’s Manchin, of course, but there’s also the Senate majority leader, Chuck
Schumer, who played an admittedly bad hand poorly in an incredibly high-stakes
game. His mistakes last summer — signing but not honoring an agreement with
Manchin to devise a scaled-down version of Build Back Better — may have doomed
the whole process.
Then
there’s President Biden, whose vaunted skills as the one-time master of the
Senate could not penetrate the venal self-interest of the senator from West
Virginia, who happens to have a lot of money invested in a fossil fuel
brokerage company he helped found. And there is, of course, the Republican
Party, whose total opposition to climate action is what made Manchin the
pivotal vote to begin with.
Above all,
there’s the Senate itself.
It may seem
odd to blame the institution for this outcome. It’s not as if there is any
alternative to passing legislation through both chambers of Congress. But it’s
also no accident that climate legislation has repeatedly been passed in the
House only to collapse in the Senate. It is no accident that, as a general
rule, the upper chamber is where popular legislation goes to die or, if it
isn’t killed, where it is passed in truncated and diminished form, like the
recent (and lackluster) bipartisan gun bill. The Senate was built with this
purpose in mind. It was designed to keep the people in check — to put limits on
the reach of democracy and the scope of representation.
This is
separate from the issue of equal state representation, the constitutional rule by
which every state gets two senators, regardless of population. If James Madison
had somehow prevailed at the Constitutional Convention and secured a Senate
with proportional representation, the chamber would still work to stymie
popular legislation.
The reason
for this is simple: American-style bicameralism with its small and powerful
upper house works in most cases to put a tight lid on the interests and
aspirations of the public and its representatives.
That was
the point. Many of the framers of the Constitution were as interested in
suppressing the democratic experimentation of the previous decade as they were
concerned with building a more powerful national government. The two, in fact,
were connected. “Most of the men who assembled at the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia in 1787 were also convinced that the national government under
the Articles of Confederation was too weak to counter the rising tide of
democracy in the states,” the historian Terry Bouton writes in “Taming
Democracy: ‘The People,’ the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American
Revolution.”
As Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts argued in the first days of the convention, “The evils
we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue;
but are the dupes of pretended patriots.” Virginia’s Edmund Randolph concurred,
observing that the “evils under which the United States labored” were found in
the “turbulence and follies of democracy.”
And what
were these turbulences and follies of democracy? Bouton argues that they were
the popular efforts to make the American economy more favorable to the average
person. “Popular calls for a revaluation of war-debt certificates, bans on
for-profit corporations, progressive taxation, limits on land speculation, and
every other measure to make property more equal promised to take wealth away
from the elite,” Bouton writes. “The same was true of the popular resistance
that halted tax collection or frustrated creditors in their attempts to
foreclose on their debtors.”
Some of the
most ardent nationalists were also speculators who had wagered heavily on land
and war-debt certificates and feared that democracy would undermine, or even
destroy, their investments in property. This elite fear of financial ruin was
at its most acute in Pennsylvania, where ordinary people had written and
implemented the most radically democratic Constitution in the new nation.
The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 created a unicameral legislature with a weak
executive branch composed of a presidential and advisory council. It eliminated
most property requirements for voting and holding office, abolished
imprisonment for debt and established a system for public education supported
by taxes on property holdings. The state would hold elections every year, with
term limits for lawmakers and reapportionment every seven years on the basis of
census returns.
Founding-era
attacks on “mob rule” — often repurposed by modern-day reactionaries to oppose
greater democracy — were very often about these efforts to level American
society in accordance with the principles of the revolution. And indeed, to the
elite gentry of Pennsylvania, this new Constitution was a disaster.
“They
said,” writes Bouton, “that the democratic government would ‘go to the devil
for popularity’ and was creating an earthly ‘damnation’ filled with ‘ruin,
poverty, famine and distress, with idleness, vice, corruption of morals, and
every species of evil.”
A
government of “plain men” by “plain men” was just too much for them to bear. In
1787, other similarly situated men in other states gathered in Philadelphia to
do something about it.
“The
Constitution effectively outlawed most of the other popular reforms that
ordinary Pennsylvanians had tried to enact,” Bouton notes. It barred states
from enacting most forms of debt relief, from allowing debt arbitration (so
that debtors could pay with goods rather than specie) and from issuing paper
currencies, which destroyed “state-run land banks and the system of public,
long-term, low-cost credit.”
And to
stymie democratic impulses in the popularly elected House of Representatives,
the framers created a powerful Senate that could, as Alexander Hamilton argued,
form a “barrier against every pernicious innovation.”
Two-hundred
and thirty-five years later and the United States Senate still works to stymie
and stifle the “pernicious innovations” that might help ordinary Americans, or
preserve the planet for their children and grandchildren.
Americans
democratized the election of senators in 1913, but they’ve never addressed the
power of the Senate itself. They may never. Practical barriers aside, Americans
don’t often think of changing the fundamentals of our political system. But we
should. There is nothing about the concept of divided powers that demands a
powerful, aristocratic upper chamber. There’s nothing about federalism that
requires an elitist check on deliberation and representation. It is not for
nothing that a couple of years before the United States ratified the 17th
Amendment, Britain stripped its House of Lords of the power to veto most
legislation. Perhaps it’s finally time for us to follow suit.
At least as
far as the Senate went, the framers chose property and the interests of the few
over democracy and the interests of the many. Given the scope and scale of our
problems, are we sure we’re happy with their decision?
Jamelle
Bouie became a New York Times Opinion columnist in 2019. Before that he was the
chief political correspondent for Slate magazine. He is based in Charlottesville,
Va., and Washington. @jbouie
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