terça-feira, 21 de abril de 2026
Starmer's Mandelson statement to MPs - snap verdict
Starmer's
Mandelson statement to MPs - snap verdict
Andrew
Sparrow
It wasn’t
much of a win, but as Keir Starmer heads back to Downing Street he will
probably count that as a sort of success. Labour MPs did not turn on him; there
was no one on his side calling for his resignation, and those who did speak out
were mostly from the Corbynite left (whose views are discounted by No 10
anyway), and who were more keen to aim their fire at Morgan McSweeney and Peter
Mandelson.
If Kemi
Badenoch thought there was more mileage in this, she could have tabled a no
confidence motion on this which would have to be debated tomorrow, but she
didn’t. She can be brutal in the Commons, but her speech today did not cause
the PM any difficulties.
Last week
she was saying he was clearly lying. If he is, then he is doing it quite well,
because neither she, nor any other MP, made a convincing job this afternoon of
establishing that he has not been telling the truth about what he was told
about by the Foreign Office about the Mandelson vetting process.
On the
narrow process point – it is really plausible that No 10 did not know, and
could not find out, that Peter Mandelson failed his security vetting
interview?– Starmer may even have won some people around this afternoon. He
sounded believable.
But, in
other respects, the process point (as well the issue about whether he
inadvertently misled parliament) is irrelevant. Starmer’s problem is that he
decided to approve the appointment of Mandelson in the first place, when it was
already clear that there was ample evidence that his business record and his
friendship with Jeffrey Epstein made him suspect. That, presumably, is why Olly
Robbins decided to facilitate the appointment by using his discretion to
overrule the vetting recommendation.
It seems
the argument of some in Downing Street might have been that Mandelson should
get the job not despite being the sleazy former best friend of a paedophile,
but precisely because he was this sort of character. They weren’t appointing
him ambassador to the Vatican. There seems to have been the assumption that
this was the sort of interlocutor Donald Trump (another ex-Epstein best friend)
might like. You can understand why Starmer won’t put it like that in public.
Whatever
the reason, it turned out to be a colossal misjudgment. Starmer may have seen
off Kemi Badenoch, Ed Davey and all the others this afternoon, but this
controversy has only added to the long list of reasons Labour MPs have for
wanting him out before the next election and nothing he said this afternoon
changes that.
Tourism, driven by local accommodation and foreign investment, is a central factor in the housing crisis in Portugal. Real estate appreciation has skyrocketed, with house prices increasing by 121% between 2013 and 2023, making access to housing the worst in the OECD. Lisbon, Porto and the Algarve are the most critical areas.
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Tourism,
driven by local accommodation and foreign investment, is a central factor in
the housing crisis in Portugal. Real estate appreciation has skyrocketed, with
house prices increasing by 121% between 2013 and 2023, making access to housing
the worst in the OECD. Lisbon, Porto and the Algarve are the most critical
areas.
Main
Impacts of Tourism and Speculation:
Local
Accommodation (AL): The conversion of permanent housing into tourist units
reduces the supply for residents, increasing rental and purchase prices.
Real
Estate Speculation: Foreign investment (including Golden Visas) and the search
for appreciation inflated prices, which in 2025 rose 17.6%, reaching all-time
highs.
Affordability
Crisis: Wages have not kept pace with rising costs, forcing families out of
urban centers.
Contradiction
of the Housing Stock: While demand increases, there are about 730 thousand
vacant or abandoned houses in the country, evidencing failures in the
management of the real estate stock.
Consequences
and Responses:
Social
Protests: The population has protested against the lack of affordable housing.
Government
Measures: The government has announced plans to increase housing supply by
2030, including land redevelopment.
The
situation is considered a real estate bubble, where tourism acts as an engine
of appreciation, but also as a cause for the expulsion of residents.
Is Radev Kremlin’s next ally inside the EU?
Is Radev
Kremlin’s next ally inside the EU?
Following
the April 19, 2026 snap elections, Rumen Radev’s newly formed Progressive
Bulgaria (PB) party secured a decisive victory, winning approximately 44.6% of
the vote. This win allows him to potentially form a government with an outright
majority of around 130 seats in the 240-seat parliament.
Radev is
widely viewed as a potential new Russian ally inside the EU due to his
long-standing opposition to military aid for Ukraine and skepticism toward
Western sanctions against Moscow. His victory is particularly significant as it
follows the recent electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, leading
analysts to label Radev as Putin’s "next best bet" for influence
within the European Union.
Key
Reasons for the "Kremlin Ally" Label
Opposition
to Military Aid: As president (2017–2026), Radev consistently vetoed or
criticized efforts to supply Ukraine with ammunition and equipment, often
arguing for "peace" through dialogue with Moscow.
Skepticism
of Sanctions: He has condemned EU sanctions against Russia, claiming they harm
the European economy more than they deter the Kremlin.
Anti-US
Sentiment: Radev has previously vetoed the acquisition of American F-16 jets
and maintained a colder relationship with Washington compared to his
pro-European predecessors.
The
"Orbán Model": Analysts from the Atlantic Council and The Washington
Post warn that Radev might adopt an "Orbán-style" approach—using veto
power to stall EU and NATO decisions on Ukraine.
Differences
from the "Orbán Model"
Despite
the comparisons, some experts argue Radev may face more significant constraints
than Orbán did:
Institutional
Strength: Unlike Orbán, who had sixteen years to capture state institutions,
Radev is entering office with a brand-new party and a public that is still
largely supportive of EU and NATO membership.
EU
Oversight: Bulgaria remains under significant EU financial and accountability
scrutiny, especially as it moves toward full Eurozone integration.
Geopolitical
Balancing: Radev has maintained a surprisingly warm relationship with the
current U.S. administration, having been personally invited to international
initiatives by President Trump in early 2026.
While the
Kremlin has officially welcomed Radev's victory, describing his calls for
"pragmatic dialogue" as "impressive," EU leaders like
Ursula von der Leyen have offered standard congratulations while emphasizing
Bulgaria's role as a "proud member of the European family".
Orbán is out. Who’s the EU’s next disruptor-in-chief?
Orbán is
out. Who’s the EU’s next disruptor-in-chief?
The
obstructionist Hungarian leader is leaving after 16 years at the Council table
— but Brussels shouldn’t expect smooth sailing.
April 15,
2026 4:00 am CET
By
Sebastian Starcevic
https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-viktor-orban-out-who-eu-next-disruptor-in-chief/
Viktor
Orbán is out — and his crown as the EU’s chief disruptor is suddenly up for
grabs.
The
handover comes at a delicate moment, with the bloc leaning on unity to push
through sanctions, budgets and other decisions that still require unanimity.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wasted no time this week
after Orbán’s defeat to suggest changes to the EU’s voting rules to avoid
future bottlenecks.
For years
the pugnacious Hungarian prime minister has wielded his veto to stall key
initiatives, most notably on EU support for Ukraine. After his crushing loss in
Sunday’s election he will soon be replaced by Péter Magyar, a center-right
figure who has signaled a willingness to work more closely with Brussels.
Some hope
Magyar’s victory will make consensus easier to reach. “My impression is that
the political business model of being a systemic and structural disrupter broke
down with [Orban’s party] Fidesz’s severe election defeat,” said an EU
diplomat, granted anonymity to speak frankly like others in this article.
But
Orbán’s exit doesn’t mean von der Leyen — or Kyiv — can breathe easy. The
European Council, where all 27 leaders meet to take decisions, still includes a
handful of Orbán allies and a few potential new spoilers.
Here are
the five leaders most likely to take up Orbán’s mantle as the bloc’s next bête
noire.
The
Sidekick: Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico
Slovakia’s
premier was often Orbán’s faithful partner-in-veto, joining his fellow
pro-Russia leader in blocking sanctions on Moscow and demanding a carveout from
the EU’s €90 billion loan for Ukraine. With Orbán out, Fico stands alone as the
Kremlin’s closest — and perhaps last — friend in the EU.
“I am
interested in being a constructive player in the European Union, but not at the
expense of the Slovak Republic,” Fico declared last summer.
Fico
warned last month that he might veto the €90 billion tranche of funds for Kyiv
in Orbán’s stead if the Hungarian were to lose the election. Budapest has for
months blocked disbursement of the funds that had been agreed to at a summit in
December, over a dispute with Kyiv about a broken pipeline transporting Russian
oil to Central Europe. Magyar signaled on Monday that he would not stand in the
EU’s way.
With the
pipeline still not operational — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said
it wouldn’t be repaired until the end of April — the question now is whether
Fico will make good on his threat to take the baton from Orbán and block the
funds, or fall in line with the EU. The Slovak leader has previously always
backed down on sanctions and joined EU joint statements in support of Ukraine.
“I think
they [Fico and the other leaders] will be acutely aware of the risks and
consequences of choosing a somewhat similar path as him [Orbán],” the EU
diplomat quoted above said.
The
Populist Billionaire: Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš
Czechia’s
prime minister, a 71-year-old billionaire dubbed the “Czech Trump” who has
governed in coalition with the far right since December, has already shown some
Orbán-style leanings. Babiš was the only leader, along with Orbán and Fico, to
demand a carveout from the EU’s €90 billion loan for Ukraine. He has also
called for support to Kyiv to be scaled back, although he ultimately stopped
short of scrapping Czechia’s ammunition initiative in support of Ukraine’s
defense.
Babiš,
whose coalition includes the anti-green Motorists party, also has the EU’s
climate policies firmly in his sights. He has railed against the bloc’s carbon
permits scheme, arguing it is killing Czech industry.
Rather
than obstructing everything, right-wingers in the Council are expected to be
“difficult on certain items,” especially when “compared to mainstream thinking
among other European leaders,” the EU diplomat said.
The
Tightrope Walker: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni
The
Italian leader has walked a precarious tightrope of pragmatism with Brussels
since she came to power over three years ago, balancing her right-wing,
nationalist politics with a pro-EU stance in international affairs. By allying
with other leaders such Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen, Meloni sought to toughen
the EU’s migration rules through consensus rather than obstructionism.
One EU
diplomat said Meloni had proven to be a “totally different breed” of politician
from Orbán. But another warned she came from the same political family as the
Hungarian and shouldn’t be counted out.
“At the
last European Council, the only person to have agreed with Orbán was Meloni,”
the second EU diplomat said, referring to the Italian leader’s confession to
other leaders that she understood Orbán’s position on the Ukraine loan at the
March summit. “You can see there is an ideological link between the two of
them.”
The
Comeback Populist: Slovenia’s Janez Janša
Slovenia’s
former multi-term prime minister, a right-wing populist and self-described
Trump admirer with a penchant for picking fights with journalists, came in
second place by just one seat in last month’s dramatic espionage-marred
election. With negotiations ongoing it remains unclear whether Janša or
incumbent PM Robert Golob will be able to assemble a governing coalition.
Janša,
sometimes dubbed a “mini-Trump,” would add to a growing populist club in the EU
if he returns to power. On Ukraine, however, there is a notable difference
between Janša and Orbán or even Fico: Despite being allied with the Hungarian
on other issues, Janša has championed Ukraine’s EU membership and visited Kyiv
in 2022 in the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion to show support.
The
Bulgarian Wild Card: Rumen Radev
Bulgaria’s
former president resigned in January to launch a new party and run in Sunday’s
parliamentary elections. And he’s on track to win, according to POLITICO’s Poll
of Polls, in a potential breakthrough after years of political paralysis in
Sofia.
That
might be a problem for Ukraine and its European allies. In 2025 Radev said
Ukraine is “doomed” in its war against Russia and argued that increasing EU
military aid, or “pouring more weapons” into Kyiv, wasn’t the answer. He also
blamed European leaders for encouraging Kyiv’s counteroffensive, saying it had
led to “hundreds of thousands of victims” in Ukraine.
Radev’s
Kremlin sympathies earned him a salty rebuke from Zelenskyy during a televised
clash between the two leaders in 2023 at the presidential palace in Sofia. “You
would say: Putin, please grab Bulgarian territory?” Zelenskyy demanded. A
flustered Radev struggled to answer.
No Iranian delegation has departed for Pakistan yet - state TV
1h ago
09.41 BST
No
Iranian delegation has departed for Pakistan yet - state TV
Iranian
state TV is reporting that no Iranian delegation has yet departed for Pakistan
to attend peace talks with the US. It is not clear yet if they will attend the
talks today despite pressure from mediators to do so.
The
country’s state broadcaster wrote in a post on Telegram that “no delegation
from Iran has travelled to Islamabad, neither a primary nor a secondary,
neither initial nor follow-up.”
Axios,
meanwhile, is reporting that the US vice-president JD Vance is due to leave for
Islamabad by Tuesday morning for talks with Iran, a day before the ceasefire
expires.
Steve
Witkoff, Donald Trump’s special envoy who often acts like a de facto secretary
of state, and Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and adviser, are also
expected to travel to the Pakistani capital for the talks.
Iran has
been stalling because of possible pressure from the Revolutionary Guards on the
negotiators to adopt a firmer line and insist there cannot be diplomacy while
the US is blockading the strait of Hormuz, according to the Axios report.
Iran
holds a deep mistrust of the US as it has been attacked before during previous
negotiations.
REMEMBERING Mar 23rd 2025: Trump is a problem for Europe’s most important hard-right leaders
Trump is
a problem for Europe’s most important hard-right leaders
His antics
are causing headaches for Giorgia Meloni and Marine Le Pen
Illustration:
Klawe Rzeczy
Mar 23rd
2025|PARIS AND ROME
Correction
(April 1st 2025): The introduction to this article suggested that the absence
of Italy’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Portolano, from a meeting of the
“coalition of the willing” reflected Italian misgivings over Europe’s response
to President Trump. We now understand the general was not expected at the
meeting, which was for more junior officers.
WHEN
UKRAINE’S allies’ military top brass met in London on March 20th to discuss a
possible peacekeeping force, one of their number was missing. The chief of
Italy’s defence staff, General Luciano Portolano, apparently had more important
things to do and was represented by more junior officers. His absence was
suggestive. The meeting was part of Europe’s response to the growing
disengagement of America under President Donald Trump. But Italy’s hard-right
prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, is a friend of Mr Trump, and that has put her
in an awkward position.
Mr Trump’s
re-election initially invigorated the European hard right. The American
president’s anti-woke national conservatism chimes with the politics of leaders
such as Ms Meloni. Boosted by Elon Musk, a social-media mogul who is the
president’s ally, it also looked set to help the electoral chances of
hard-right candidates. The most important of these is France’s Marine Le Pen,
who leads polls for the country’s presidential election in 2027. (Judges will
decide on March 31st whether to block her from running over alleged misuse of
European Parliament funds.)
Yet the
speed with which Mr Trump has upended transatlantic relations, undermined NATO
and distanced himself from Ukraine has discomfited hard-right leaders. It has
put Ms Meloni at odds with Italy’s partners in the European Union and with
other allies. And it has exposed the ambiguous relationship of Ms Le Pen and
her party, the National Rally (RN), with their American analogues: French and
American nationalism do not always mix.
Unfashionably
late
Ms Meloni
has made plain her discomfort with Europe’s assertive response to Mr Trump. She
turned up 50 minutes late for the first Trump-era crisis meeting, organised in
Paris by France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, on February 17th. Italian
officials said she disapproved of the format, which did not include all 27 EU
states. When Sir Keir Starmer, Britain’s prime minister, held a broader virtual
summit a month later, she waited until the night before to decide to take part.
Last month,
when Volodymyr Zelensky was rebuked in the White House by Mr Trump and
Vice-President J.D. Vance, Ms Meloni was, conspicuously, the only major
European leader not to declare support for the Ukrainian president. On March
12th in the European Parliament the deputies of her hard-right Brothers of
Italy party abstained on a motion supporting Ukraine (one voted against it). On
both occasions, the reason was fear of upsetting Mr Trump. Ms Meloni has since
said she will not contribute Italian troops to a peacekeeping force in Ukraine.
Her MEPs did vote for the European Commission’s new ReArm Europe programme. But
she opposes confiscating Russian assets, frozen under EU sanctions, to give to
Ukraine.
For years Ms
Meloni staunchly backed Ukraine and condemned Russia. Why the apparent
volte-face? Personal resentment may play a part. Before the new American
administration took office, Ms Meloni was touted as Europe’s “Trump-whisperer”.
She was feted by America’s president as a “fantastic woman” and invited to his
inauguration. But that was before Mr Vance bashed Europe at the Munich Security
Conference, and before Mr Trump called the EU an organisation “formed in order
to screw the United States”. Now Europe’s initiative has been snatched by
leaders prepared to take a more robust line: Sir Keir and Mr Macron, with whom
Italy’s prime minister has a thorny relationship.
A further
reason is that Ms Meloni’s coalition is split over how to react to Mr Trump.
Matteo Salvini, the leader of the hard-right League party and one of her two
deputies, has condemned ReArm Europe and calls the French president “that
madman Macron who talks of nuclear war”. Though the League has now fallen to
single digits in polls, it still commands enough votes in parliament to bring
down the government. And in a country with a strong pacifist streak, Mr Salvini
seems to have public opinion on his side. A poll this month found barely a
third of voters back higher defence spending.
Nathalie
Tocci, the head of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, a think-tank in Rome,
suggests a more troubling reason. Many originally saw Italy’s prime minister as
a toxic far-rightist. “Backing Ukraine was a way of gaining credibility, a
means to an end. But now, with a new [American] administration, it works in the
opposite direction,” she says. Italy is unlikely to join Hungary and Slovakia
among the EU’s pro-Russian Trojan horses, she says. “But nor do I expect
Giorgia Meloni to do anything that could irritate Donald Trump.”
For Ms Le
Pen the calculation is different, and not only because she is in opposition.
Unlike Ms Meloni, the French nationalist leader has never portrayed herself as
close to America. Indeed, she and her party have often shown an affinity with
Russia. In early 2022, during France’s presidential campaign, Ms Le Pen printed
flyers featuring a photo of herself and Vladimir Putin, which were hastily
shelved after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On March 12th this year
the RN abstained in a non-binding parliamentary vote in support of Ukraine.
Until recently, such was Ms Le Pen’s scepticism about the transatlantic
alliance that she argued for France to withdraw from NATO’s military command.
This makes
it easier for Ms Le Pen to criticise Mr Trump. This month she denounced the
“brutality” of his suspension of military aid for Ukraine (since reversed),
something Hungary’s Viktor Orban would never do. In this, she is in tune with
French public opinion: in a poll conducted in March 73% of respondents said
that America is “no longer an ally” of France.
What the
party admires about Mr Trump, says a senior RN figure, is not only that he has
shown once again how nationalists can win elections. He is also a lesson in
political agency in sceptical times: that, once in office, “you can actually do
things, and fast.” This is a powerful message for Ms Le Pen’s team in a country
perennially hampered by bureaucracy and now burdened with a weak minority
government.
Leaving
early
Yet Ms Le
Pen’s party is torn. Jordan Bardella, her 29-year-old sidekick, travelled to
Washington for a recent national-conservative convention, only to quit the
event when Steve Bannon, Mr Trump’s former aide, made what looked very like a
Nazi salute. Ms Le Pen has not spent the better part of the past decade
scrubbing the image of her once-toxic party to have it tarnished again by
fascist associations. “Trump is turning into a real problem for Le Pen,” says a
French diplomat. In March her popularity dropped by two points to 34%,
according to a Cluster17 poll. (Mr Macron gained five points, to 23%.)
Mr Trump
still delights many hard-right European leaders. But for Ms Meloni and Ms Le
Pen, the American president could become a serious headache. Europeans don’t
like him: a tiny 6% of French and 8% of Italians told a poll in March that Mr
Trump is “a friend of Europe”. The more his blustering brand of nationalism
seems damaging to the continent, the more voters in Italy and France may doubt
its local versions. ■
Is Trump Losing Europe’s Far Right?
Is Trump
Losing Europe’s Far Right?
In early
2026, evidence suggests that while Donald Trump remains a powerful influence on
European populism, he is experiencing a significant "cooling" or
distancing from several key far-right allies.
The
primary reasons for this shift include:
1.
Contradictions in Economic Interests
- While Europe’s far right often shares Trump’s nationalist rhetoric, his "America First" trade policies—specifically high tariffs—are seen as a direct threat to the manufacturing sectors that many of these parties' voters rely on.
- France: Jordan Bardella, leader of the National Rally, recently accused the U.S. of "economic warfare," stating that while Trump may be good for Americans, he is "bad for Europeans".
- Germany: Polls from late 2025 and early 2026 show that only 20% of AfD (Alternative for Germany) voters believe Trump's election was good for their country, while nearly half viewed it as negative.
2.
Foreign Policy Friction
- Trump's recent assertive foreign policy moves have alienated even his most staunch European supporters:
- Greenland Interest: Trump’s renewed interest in Greenland has been met with rebukes. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, typically an ally on migration and EU skepticism, "resolutely rejected" such breaches of international law.
- Russia and Ukraine: While some leaders like Viktor Orbán (Hungary) and Robert Fico (Slovakia) still share Trump's desire for a quick end to the Ukraine war, others find his "civilizational war" rhetoric against the EU destabilizing for their own national security interests.
3.
Domestic Political Toxicity
In
countries like France, far-right leaders have calculated that being too closely
associated with Trump is politically damaging. National Rally leaders have
reportedly begun to distance themselves because Trump remains deeply unpopular
with the broader French electorate.
4. A
Deepening Divide
The
European far right is increasingly split into two camps:
The
Pragmatists: Parties like France’s National Rally and Italy's Brothers of
Italy, which are prioritizing domestic power and may view Trump's
unpredictability as a liability.
The
Loyalists: Groups like Germany’s AfD and Hungary’s Fidesz, which continue to
use Trump’s support as a tool for legitimacy and to "make Europe great
again" through a Nationalist International alliance.
Despite
these tensions, the Trump administration's 2025/2026 National Security Strategy
explicitly seeks to "cultivate resistance" by boosting far-right,
anti-EU parties to bypass traditional diplomatic channels.
How Trump Became a Liability for Europe’s Far Right
How Trump
Became a Liability for Europe’s Far Right
Europe’s
nationalist leaders once saw President Trump as an ideological ally. Now, as he
threatens European sovereignty, they are seeking distance — at least for the
moment.
By Jeanna
Smialek Koba
Ryckewaert and Catherine Porter
Jeanna
Smialek and Koba Ryckewaert reported from Brussels, and Catherine Porter from
Paris.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/27/world/europe/trump-liability-europe-far-right-populists.html
Jan. 27,
2026
Updated
5:39 a.m. ET
The
relationship between President Trump and Europe’s far right was always an
awkward one. European nationalists have long welcomed the momentum that the
president has given their parties even as his “America first” doctrine spelled
trouble for their countries.
Now,
their association with Washington is emerging as an outright liability as Mr.
Trump poses challenges to national sovereignty and chastises Europe.
In recent
days, Europe’s nationalist leaders have taken a more strident stance against
Mr. Trump after his military operations in Venezuela; his threats to take over
Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory; and a rambling speech in Davos,
Switzerland, that underscored his disdain for the continent.
Nigel
Farage, the leader of the British far-right party Reform UK and long an ally of
the American president, described Mr. Trump’s threats around Greenland as a
“very hostile act.” Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s right-wing prime minister, who is
largely seen as friendly to Mr. Trump, rejected his assertion that European
soldiers had played only a minor role in Afghanistan.
Jordan
Bardella, the president of the French far-right party National Rally, who has
long expressed wariness of the U.S. leader, sharpened his criticism last week
by describing Mr. Trump’s stance on Greenland as “unacceptable” and calling his
recent threats to impose tariffs on France “blackmail.”
The
European far right still shares key ideas with Mr. Trump and his political
movement — including a push for less immigration, a desire for tightly
controlled borders and worries about the erosion of European culture.
The Trump
administration has officially praised “patriotic European parties,” and that
affinity could quietly sustain ties between far-right leaders on either side of
the Atlantic. But right now, public association with the U.S. president is
increasingly looking like a politically treacherous high-wire act, especially
for parties that make national pride and sovereignty cornerstone issues.
“Whatever
the AfD or Rassemblement National believe about civilizational erasure and
migration, they’re not for the American annexation of a big chunk of Europe,”
said Justin Logan, a foreign-policy analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute
in Washington, referring to far-right parties in Germany and France.
The Trump
administration swiftly presented itself as a staunch defender of Alternative
for Germany, or AfD, a far-right party that German intelligence services have
called a “proven right-wing extremist organization.” Vice President JD Vance
gave a speech in Munich last February urging German leaders to allow the AfD to
enter the federal government, without mentioning any of the reasons, such as
the use of Nazi slogans by some members, other parties have shunned it.
Then Mr.
Trump and Mr. Vance expressed support for Marine Le Pen, a French far-right
leader, after she was found guilty of embezzlement and barred from running for
office — a conviction she is currently appealing.
The Trump
administration’s national security strategy, released in December, codified
what had long been apparent from its public statements: The White House sought
to throw its weight behind far-right parties across the continent.
That felt
like a “shot in the arm” to right-wing nationalist movements in Europe, said
Jacob Reynolds, the head of policy at MCC Brussels, a research group that hosts
events for European far-right politicians and is closely associated with Prime
Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary, a Trump ally.
Yet,
weeks later, Mr. Trump’s affronts to European sovereignty and dignity have left
his ideological allies in a tight spot — especially after he insisted that he
needed to own Greenland and threatened to impose more tariffs on European
nations that got in his way, only to walk back those ultimatums.
“It
damages populist, patriotic parties when these things are conducted in the
open,” Mr. Reynolds said.
The
challenge is all the greater for European nationalists because their voters
were already eyeing America with increasing suspicion. A substantial share of
voters aligned with the far right in Britain, France and Germany viewed Mr.
Trump negatively even before recent weeks, polls have shown. Only 15 percent of
Germans, the lowest figure ever recorded, now consider the United States a
trustworthy partner, a survey carried out early in January found.
Now, Mr.
Trump’s threats are being seized as an opportunity by the political center,
which senses a chance to skewer its right-wing political opponents.
Manfred
Weber, a German center-right politician who leads the largest party in the
European Parliament, said in a speech last week that far-right lawmakers “have
to decide if they want to be real Europeans, or they are a colony of
Washington.”
Against
that backdrop, Mr. Trump’s allies across the continent have sought to distance
themselves from him.
In Italy,
Ms. Meloni — who has long positioned herself as a bridge between Europe and Mr.
Trump — reacted unusually strongly to Mr. Trump’s assertions last Thursday that
NATO troops had “stayed a little back, a little off the front lines” in
Afghanistan. She pointed out in a statement that 53 Italian soldiers had died,
and that more than 700 had been injured.
“Friendship
requires respect, a fundamental condition for continuing to ensure the
solidarity that underpins the Atlantic alliance,” she said in a statement.
Other
far-right parties that had already been edging away from Mr. Trump have now
widened that space. Mr. Bardella in France had already been careful in how he
talked about the American president. Early last year, he called Mr. Trump’s
election “good news for America, but bad news for France and Europe.”
After the
United States captured Venezuela’s president earlier this month and then
promptly escalated its threats over Greenland, Mr. Bardella took an even
stronger stance. The choice Europe faces, he said in a speech last week, is
between accepting “a form of vassalization under the guise of trans-Atlantic
partnerships” or responding strongly.
Renaud
Labaye, a senior official in Mr. Bardella’s party, said in an interview: “We
are sovereigntists. We believe every state should do what it wants and defend
its own interests.”
In
France, Mr. Trump has become so unpopular that any tie to him could seem
politically toxic. Eric Ciotti, who leads a small party affiliated with
National Rally, deleted two congratulatory social media posts that he put out
after Mr. Trump’s election. Mr. Ciotti’s office did not respond to requests for
comment.
Some
nationalist parties, particularly those that had long benefited from their
association with Mr. Trump and his supporters, have stayed silent or wavered
over their response.
Robert
Fico, the Slovakian prime minister, was at Mar-a-Lago, Mr. Trump’s home in
Florida, on the day Mr. Trump threatened to raise tariffs on several European
nations to punish their support for Greenland. Mr. Fico later posted about his
visit on social media — without mentioning Greenland.
In
Germany, the AfD’s leaders publicly disagreed over whether to criticize Mr.
Trump’s actions over Greenland and in Venezuela or present it as a necessary
realignment of the international order.
Beatrix
von Storch, one of the AfD’s most prominent trans-Atlanticists, rejected any
American claims to Greenland, saying on public television that the territory
“clearly” belonged to Denmark. Alice Weidel, one of the two party leaders, said
that Mr. Trump’s incursion into Venezuela had “violated a fundamental campaign
promise, namely not to interfere in other countries.”
But the
other party leader, Tino Chrupalla, reacted more favorably to Mr. Trump’s
actions, saying that international law “must be renegotiated” and adding that
“Venezuela belongs to America’s sphere of influence, just as Ukraine belongs to
Russia’s sphere of influence.”
Maximilian
Krah, another AfD lawmaker, backed American ownership of Greenland in an
article on The Asia Times. “The U.S. cannot allow a significant part of the
North American landmass — with considerable mineral resources — to remain
outside its control,” Mr. Krah wrote.
Anton
Troianovski contributed reporting from Washington, Christopher F. Schuetze from
Berlin, and Ana Castelain from Paris.
Jeanna
Smialek is the Brussels bureau chief for The Times.
Catherine
Porter is an international reporter for The Times, covering France. She is
based in Paris.
IDF soldier’s destruction of Jesus statue triggers Poland-Israel spat
.jpeg)
IDF
soldier’s destruction of Jesus statue triggers Poland-Israel spat
Poland’s
Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski wrote on X that even Israeli “soldiers
themselves admit to war crimes.”
April 20,
2026 5:56 pm CET
By
Ferdinand Knapp
https://www.politico.eu/article/idf-soldier-destruction-jesus-statue-triggers-poland-israel-spat/
Israeli
Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar has accused his Polish counterpart Radosław
Sikorski of making “irresponsible statements” in a dispute over the destruction
of a Christian symbol in Lebanon by a member of the Israel Defense Forces.
Sa’ar
apologized “to every Christian” on Monday after a photo circulating on social
media over the weekend appeared to show an Israeli soldier hitting a statue of
Jesus in the head with a sledgehammer. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu said he was “stunned and saddened” by the incident.
But
despite the apologies, Sikorski wrote on X that the soldier in question should
be “punished” and “lessons should be drawn” about the army’s training.
“IDF
soldiers themselves admit to war crimes. They killed not only civilian
Palestinians but even their own hostages,” the center-right politician
continued.
Sikorski’s
criticism seemed to add fresh fuel to the dispute. “What you wrote reflects
ignorance and a deep lack of understanding,” Sa’ar responded on X on Monday.
The IDF is a “professional and ethical army,” the minister added, and “there is
no Western military that fights terrorism more precisely, or on the basis of
better intelligence, than the IDF.”
The
Israeli foreign ministry confirmed it had completed an initial investigation
into the act and that “appropriate measures” would be taken against “those
involved,” adding that the statue would be restored to its original location.
Patriarch
of Jerusalem Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa also condemned the images as “a
grave affront to the Christian faith,” calling for “disciplinary actions”
against the perpetrator.
The spat
comes as tensions between Israel and the EU continue to escalate, with even
traditional European allies of Israel voicing criticism of its treatment of
Palestinians.
German
Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he was “deeply concerned about developments in
the Palestinian territories” following reports by human rights organizations of
a surge in violence against the group by settlers in the West Bank. Meanwhile,
Italy suspended a defense and technology agreement with Israel last week “in
consideration of the current situation” in the Middle East.
Hungary must arrest Netanyahu if he visits, Magyar says
Hungary
must arrest Netanyahu if he visits, Magyar says
Israeli
PM Netanyahu, wanted by the International Criminal Court, is due to visit
Hungary later this year.
April 20,
2026 8:08 pm CET
By
Ferdinand Knapp
https://www.politico.eu/article/peter-magyar-hungary-would-arrest-benjamin-netanyahu-israel/
Hungary’s
Prime Minister-elect Péter Magyar said Monday that his country must take
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into custody if he enters Hungarian
territory while wanted by the International Criminal Court.
The ICC
issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu in November 2024 over alleged war crimes
and crimes against humanity. ICC member countries are in principle obliged to
detain individuals subject to such warrants.
Hungary
had previously refused to arrest the Israeli leader when he visited Budapest in
April 2025, with staunch Netanyahu ally Viktor Orbán serving as prime minister.
Prior to the meeting Orbán announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC, a
process that takes one year to take effect under the court’s statute, and
guaranteed Netanyahu immunity.
Magyar,
however, has announced he will halt the ICC withdrawal by June 2, which would
be a year after Hungary filed a formal withdrawal notification to the U.N.
secretary-general.
Asked by
reporters what this would mean for Netanyahu’s planned visit this fall — he has
already accepted Hungary’s invite — Magyar said: “I made this clear to the
Israeli prime minister as well … it is the Tisza government’s firm intention to
stop this and ensure that Hungary remains a member of the ICC.”
He added:
“If a country is a member of the ICC and a person who is wanted by the ICC
enters our territory, then that person must be taken into custody.”
Some
countries, however, have argued they can remain ICC members without enforcing
such warrants.
France
argued that arresting Netanyahu would contravene other agreements it has with
Israel. Article 98 of the ICC statute backs France’s reasoning, saying that a
country cannot “act inconsistently with its obligations under international law
with respect to the … diplomatic immunity of a person.”
Germany’s
then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz said in April 2025 that he couldn’t imagine his
country arresting Netanyahu. Italy also granted immunity to the Israeli leader.
Júlia
Vadler contributed to this report.
Orbán's EU fixer faces becoming Hungary's 'fall guy'
Orbán's
EU fixer faces becoming Hungary's 'fall guy'
Ambassador
Bálint Ódor's knowledge of the EU's inner workings helped the outgoing
government forcefully make its points for years. But his time in Brussels looks
like it's coming to an end.
By
GABRIEL GAVIN
April 21,
2026 4:00 am CET
By
Gabriel Gavin
https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-eu-ambassador-fixer-hungary-fall-guy-balint-odor/
Under
Viktor Orbán, Hungary needed someone in Brussels who could aggressively defend
his government’s belligerent anti-EU stance while quietly working with other
countries to get things done. In Bálint Ódor, it had its man.
Over the
past six years, the 50-year-old — more mild-mannered than his bosses’
reputations in Europe might suggest — served as Hungary’s ambassador to the EU
as relations with the bloc sank to historic lows. In that time, Budapest moved
closer to Russia, trashed Ukraine and saw the bloc freeze billions of euros in
funds over curbs on democratic freedoms.
But with
Orbán’s defeat after 16 years as prime minister, Ódor could be out of a job.
Opposition leader Péter Magyar, who ended the populist government’s rule in
parliamentary elections on April 12, promised a historic reset, signaling he
will sweep aside anyone too closely identified with the previous
administration.
“By
definition, everybody understands of each other that the loyalty is to your
political bosses and to delivering results to their instructions,” said Ivan
Rogers, about national ambassadors to the EU, a role he performed for the U.K.
in Brussels until 2017. And, whatever Ódor thought about these instructions
personally, he followed them to the letter.
While
even those who worked closely with Ódor were uncertain about whether he was
simply following orders or shared Orbán’s desire to bash Brussels, his
reputation as the outgoing prime minister’s fixer may well be his downfall,
according to five diplomats and officials from countries other than Hungary who
worked with him closely, and who were granted anonymity to speak to POLITICO.
It would
be easy to think that, given Orbán’s loud anti-EU stance, his man in Brussels
would be a blunt instrument. Quite the opposite. Ódor is an expert on its
treaties and has a PhD in international relations. Universities back home use
his books to teach students how Europe works.
That’s
why he was so effective, according to his fellow diplomats. Building any kind
of trust within the Brussels bubble when he took over as ambassador in 2022 was
a tough task. Ódor arrived in the wake of a spying scandal that saw the embassy
itself accused of running intelligence agents under diplomatic cover and amid
warnings Budapest was passing information to Moscow. The other leading
Hungarian in town, Olivér Várhelyi, had also served as ambassador before being
nominated by Orbán to be the country’s European commissioner, and is still
being probed for his involvement in the alleged affair. He denies any
wrongdoing.
‘You know
he will deliver’
As Rogers
implied, the group of ambassadors in Brussels are often a close-knit bunch.
They’re expected to keep a close eye on diplomatic moves by their counterparts,
feeding back notes on what other governments are saying or, perhaps more
crucially, not saying. They also play an essential role in hammering out
compromises and ensuring their countries’ interests are reflected in
negotiations. This requires bridge-building skills and strong working relations
with other envoys, MEPs and European Commission and Council officials.
For Ódor,
the job wasn’t made easier by Orbán’s broadsides at Brussels and his
accusations the EU was interfering in its domestic affairs. The ambassador had
to build constructive ties with colleagues, while not drawing suspicions back
home for being too friendly with them.
Ódor has
at least been a consistent opponent on issues where Budapest was digging in its
heels, clearly telegraphing to other nation’s ambassadors the Hungarian
government’s position and being upfront about where there was room for
negotiation, the four diplomats and officials who worked with him said. They
were granted anonymity because the nature of their roles means their working
relationships are sensitive.
“When you
talk to Balint and he says ‘I agree with you’ you know he will deliver,” one of
them said, adding that Ódor could be constructive even while having to follow
the Budapest hard line.
Six-foot-two
tall with glasses and graying hair, the Hungarian ambassador cuts a slightly
awkward figure — and is spotted more frequently in the background of pictures
while escorting his bosses in Brussels than during appearances in his own
right. And when publicly challenged to defend the Hungarian government’s public
priorities at a think tank event in late 2024, those present said he was
evidently uncomfortable at the prospect of speaking out beyond his brief on EU
affairs.
However,
his role representing the EU’s most notorious blocker gave Ódor a powerful
position during Coreper — the all-important meetings of ambassadors held in
Brussels at least twice a week to hash out policy on everything from economic
affairs to defense to relations with Washington. In practice, Budapest used its
leverage to secure major carveouts from schemes it didn’t want to be part of —
like funding Ukraine or quitting Russian oil — and staved off punishment for
breaching its obligations for as long as possible.
For some
who worked alongside him representing other European governments, this meant
Ódor was a clear success.
“This is
a country of 9.5 million people in a union of 450 million and yet around that
table they have wielded this much power,” said a senior EU official. “Nobody
thinks that isn’t impressive.”
Power
games
Magyar’s
sweep to power has career diplomats in Brussels worried. Most of the 135 staff
behind the blacked-out windows of Hungary’s towering permanent representation
in Brussels’ European quarter have never gone through a domestic handover of
power because they weren’t working there in 2010. While lawyers, technical
attaches and assistants are likely to be essential, more visible political
appointees could be in line to be moved or dismissed, starting with the
ambassador himself.
“It’s
always been hard to know if he believes what he says — if he shares Orbán’s
views, or if he’s just doing his job,” said a fellow ambassador, pointing out
that Ódor fitted in comfortably with his colleagues, cracking jokes in the
margins of meetings.
That’s a
perennial issue for most EU diplomats from countries with impartial civil
services, according to Rogers, who served as the U.K.’s ambassador to the bloc
throughout much of the Brexit negotiations.
“You
never really ask your colleagues, ‘are you a true believer?’ — nobody would
have asked me whether I was a true believer in [David] Cameron or [Theresa]
May,” two prime ministers he served, he said. Nonetheless, “Olivér [Várhelyi]
was a true believer, I think … When he came in there was probably rather less
collaboration behind the scenes. His predecessors and successors I suspect were
more apparatchik-class diplomats who nevertheless had good connections.”
Despite
this, Várhelyi is likely to stay on as European commissioner, because EU
convention makes it far harder for an incoming government to fire them than the
country’s ambassador.
‘True to
their oath’
The
insistence he was just doing his job looks unlikely to save Ódor from being
removed from the role, particularly given one of Magyar’s most important first
tasks is to unfreeze the €18 billion in EU funds. That would constitute a major
thaw in relations with Brussels, and would require Budapest to show a serious
departure from the Orbán days.
The
posting is also personal for Magyar — who worked in the Hungarian permanent
representation over a decade ago. His government will depend “on everyone who
has done their job well and has remained true to their oath,” he said in his
first press conference after the election victory.
The most
likely candidate to take charge of the embassy is Márton Hajdu, two Hungarian
officials told POLITICO. A former spokesperson for Hungary’s foreign ministry
who later climbed the ranks of the Commission, Hajdu became an advisor to
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and is understood to be an obvious
choice for the incoming Tisza Party, which is scrambling to find people it can
trust to do its bidding.
Hajdu
joined Magyar for talks with the Commission in Budapest over the weekend on how
to unlock the funds, photographed as part of the six-strong team expected to
take high-profile jobs.
Ódor is
unlikely to get much thanks for his service from the incoming government — or
from his opposite numbers in Brussels.
“He’d be
the one to be dressed down in Coreper whenever the government blocked a
decision yet again, cozied up to Russia or just generally refused to cooperate
with the EU,” said Júlia Pőcze, a Hungarian political expert and researcher at
Brussels’ CEPS think tank.
He has
always been “a convenient fall guy for Orbán in Brussels,” she said. He looks
like being the fall guy for Magyar too.
