NEWS
OPINION
Europe’s democratic charade
Prepare for postelection negotiations changing the
European Parliament just as much as voter choices.
For many voters, these fluid European party
affiliations make the upcoming election even less understandable. |
OPINION
JUNE 3,
2024 4:00 AM CET
BY NICOLAI
VON ONDARZA
Nicolai von
Ondarza is a political scientist and head of EU/Europe research division at the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
This
summer, the composition of the European Parliament will undergo a significant
shift, with changes stemming not only from voters’ decisions but also the
maneuvering undertaken by parliamentary groups themselves.
Although EU
discourse often treats party groups — such as the European People’s Party (EPP)
or the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) — as
homogeneous actors, by and large, they remain alliances of national parties
that can change at any time, easily altering the Parliament’s make-up.
And this
time around, this fluidity is most evident among the EU’s far-right parties,
which appear to be gearing up for a significant postelection reconfiguration.
Normally,
besides some high-profile switches, the number of changes taking place between
the Parliament’s political groups are overlooked. Take, for example, the
center-right EPP — the largest and, in many ways, best organized of these
groups. According to data from Europe Elects, during the current legislative
period alone, 12 MEPs from other political groups switched to the EPP, seven of
whom were previously part of one of the two far-right groupings. Conversely, 19
MEPs left the group, chief among them the 11 Fidesz MEPs from Hungary, who left
the group in March 2021 to avoid being booted out.
Still, at
the very least, it seems we can expect all current EPP member parties to remain
in the group in a couple months’ time.
The same
can’t be said, however, for the liberal Renew group — itself an alliance of
several different European parties. Renew is the third largest group in the
current Parliament, and has often taken on the role of kingmaker. But it’s also
been a reservoir, accepting 10 MEPs from almost all other political groups —
including the Greens, the S&D, the EPP, all the way to the European
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).
And
currently, Renew is debating whether to expel the Dutch People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy — one of its founding members — for agreeing a coalition
with Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom.
The
S&D, on the other hand, ended up with a net loss, recruiting “only” five
MEPs from other groups since 2019, while losing 13 along the way.
Still,
despite all this back and forth, the biggest changes afoot are among the EU’s
split far-right party groups.
In today’s
Parliament, these groups include the national-conservative ECR — home to
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy and Poland’s Law and
Justice party (PiS); the right-wing populist-to-extremist-ranging Identity and
Democracy group (ID), which brings French opposition leader Marine Le Pen’s
National Rally together with Italy’s the League and the Freedom Party of
Austria; and finally, there are the non-aligned far-right parties, such as
Fidesz and Alternative for Germany (AfD).
With
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán seeking a new political home for his
Fidesz party, and AfD’s recent expulsion, a major reconfiguration is on the
cards. And this means we’re faced with three distinct possibilities:
The first
is a continuation of the status quo, where both the ECR and ID gain seats in
the elections, but the AfD’s expulsion makes the ECR the bigger of the two. In
efforts led by Meloni and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,
the ECR would then try to work with the EPP as a “mainstreamed” negotiation
partner, leaving ID on the fringes.
The second
possibility is that a renewed ID would come together with Fidesz — and
potentially PiS from the ECR. Though the group would still remain on the
fringes, in this scenario, ID could leapfrog the ECR to become the third
largest group in the Parliament. The EXR, meanwhile, would be even more open to
cooperation with the EEPP.
Finally,
the third scenario would be a merger of the ECR, ID and Fidesz. Such a big-tent
far-right supergroup would come with huge policy differences — not least over
how to deal with Russia — and it’s the stated ambition of Le Pen and
entertained as an option by Meloni. It would also come at the cost of
re-toxifying the ECR, which would then likely lose some of its more
center-leaning parties to the EPP. Such a group would become the second largest
in the Parliament — and unacceptable as an EPP partner — altering the balance
of power significantly.
These three
possibilities all illustrate just how vastly different the Parliament could
look depending not just on voters’ choices but postelection backroom
negotiations. They also underscore the big decision Meloni will face — whether
to take the open hand offered by the center right or attempt to forge a broader
national conservative/populist alliance.
For many
voters, these fluid European party affiliations make the upcoming election even
less understandable. Even Brussels insiders can’t predict which European party
group the largest national delegations from France, Italy, Hungary, the
Netherlands or Austria will belong to after all the behind-the-scenes
deal-making.
And this
adds to the disconnect between voters’ choices and EU politics.
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