Is civil
war coming to the West?
https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/07/is-civil-war-coming-to-the-west/
Is the
West on the brink of civil war?
A
question that would have seemed absurd a decade ago, is becoming ever more
prevalent. In recent weeks, there have been anti-migration demonstrations from
Spain to Ireland to Poland. There is no indication that they will not become
more common in the months ahead.
One
person who has been sounding the alarm on this is not a populist firebrand or
media demagogue but a professor of War Studies at King’s College London.
Professor
David Betz, a strategist by trade, has done the ideological arithmetic: The
chance for civil war or civil war-like conditions in western societies is now
above 50 per cent and he calls this a conservative estimate.
I had
Professor Betz on the Brussels Signal Podcast a few weeks back and the
entire conversation
is worth watching.
At first
glance, these claims might seem alarmist. But Betz’s analysis is not
speculation, it is estimation. He built it on decades of academic study into
the anatomy of war and is simply looking at a probable sequence of events.
What he,
along with thinkers like Barbara Walter, has grasped is that the factors once
reserved for forecasting civil war in “faraway lands” are now visible across
Europe and North America.
Contemporary
Western societies, to borrow Betz’s phrase, stand in “an explosive
configuration” with the roots of this volatility being what the research calls
“fractionalisation”.
This
phenomenon describes societies that are broken into self-defining blocs,
increasingly segmented along ethnic, cultural, or ideological lines.
Interestingly,
in the West, this condition did not appear out of the blue but is the result of
decades of political engineering by an out-of-touch, post-national elite, one
that no longer shares its constituents’ concerns or understands them.
If in
some countries only 34 per cent of European citizens say they have benefited
from European Union integration, yet 71 per cent of the elite claim the
opposite, one can see an ever-widening gap between the elites and the majority
of the population.
At the
heart of this crisis sits the “failure of the multicultural project”.
As Robert
Putnam’s large-scale survey on diversity (titled e pluribus unum)
already made clear in 2006, people living in culturally diverse neighbourhoods
do not grow closer. They hunker down and individuals are showing less trust and
less community engagement, even within their own groups.
Europe is
merely the next exhibit: Countries like France, Germany and the UK now host
large second-generation migrant populations but integration has often failed.
Rather
than assimilation, we get the rise of parallel societies and the slow erosion
of social cohesion. The problem is not migration per se but how it
has been handled: Too fast, too much, without sufficient mechanisms for
integration.
Europeans
are not experiencing an evolution of their societies but a forced
transformation that more and more people are feeling uncomfortable with.
A further
element is the growing gap between promise and reality. For the first time
since the dawn of the industrial era, children in the west are poorer than
their parents. They earn less, own less and face bleaker prospects for pensions
or home ownership.
At the
same time, a political expectation gap has opened: The belief that “elections
change nothing” is now among the most widespread in the west. People expect a
certain living standard but the current system is less and less capable of
providing it.
This
expectation gap is a recipe for frustration that will not only find expression
at the voting booth but potentially also in more “kinetic” ways, meaning
violence.
Betz’s
calculations are not guesswork. He uses statistical models pioneered by
scholars like Barbara Walter. Where the symptoms of civil conflict exist, the
chance of actual violence is 4 per cent per year.
That’s an
18.5 per cent risk of civil conflict within five years. Now recall that a
conservative estimate places at least 10 Western countries in this risk
category. Given civil conflicts’ tendency to spread, the risk climbs to a
stunning 60 per cent that if one country falls, others will follow suit.
The old
methods for taming unrest — welfare spending, mollifying rhetoric — are
faltering, simply because the money has run out. External crises, from Ukraine
to the Middle East, are but accelerants.
Old
Europe is running out of time and tools.
The
harbingers of retrenchment are everywhere. Betz calls it “retribalisation”:
Nations that devolve into ethnic or ideological fiefdoms, or (in the worst
case) population movements rivalling the convulsions of post–Second World War
Central Europe.
None of
this is inevitable but all of it is possible unless societies confront their
own foundational problems. Clinging to the delusion of a multicultural utopia
only guarantees further fragmentation.
The
irony, as always, is brutal: Those who scream loudest about the “dangers of
populism” are, through their denial and refusal to address real problems,
preparing the ground for the very catastrophe they claim to fear.
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