Politics
27
September 2019 - 11 min. read
Nationalising
the Climate: Is the European Far Right Turning Green?
Alexander
Ruser
Amanda
Machin
With the
issue of climate now on the political centre stage, parties across the spectrum
can no longer afford to ignore it and must position themselves, the far right
included. Looking to Germany, Austria and Italy, researchers Amanda Machin and
Alexander Ruser bust the myth that far-right parties across Europe share a
stance of climate denialism and examine the rise of ‘climate nationalism’,
asking what the far right’s surge in the 2019 European elections might mean for
climate politics. Studying the positions of far-right parties on climate, they
argue, helps us to move beyond a technocratic framing to put the politics back
into the discussion.
If
climate change was once only a matter of concern to Green parties and
uncompromising environmentalists, it is no longer. Today, climate change
unquestionably occupies a prominent place on the political stage. According to
recent polls, 82 per cent of Democratic-leaning voters in the U.S. identified
climate change as the most important issue in the run up to the presidential
election, and in Europe, global warming was an important concern for 77 per
cent of potential voters across 11 countries in the 2019 European elections.
Political parties ignore climate change at their peril.
This is
not to say that the implications are straightforward. An agreement that climate
change is an important issue does not translate into an agreement on climate
policy.[1] Like many political concerns, climate change functions as a prism
through which parties and actors reflect their own agenda. This is certainly
true of far-right parties. Against any conventional assumption to the contrary,
at least some of these parties are actively engaging in climate politics.
Research
shows that sweeping claims that the far right is characterised by a uniform
disinterest or unreflective denial of climate change are dangerously
inaccurate. Such claims undermine both the diversity of positions within the
far right and the powerful way in which some of these parties utilise the issue
to support their nationalist agendas in the rise of ‘climate nationalism’.
Understanding this aspect of the differentiated and shifting positions of
far-right parties is crucial at a time when they are gaining influence at both
national and European level.
Changing
Climates
The
elections of May 2019 saw a surge of the far right into the European
Parliament. The newly formed Identity and Democracy (ID) group of far-right
parties has nearly double the number of members of its predecessor, Europe of
Nations and Freedom. [2] ID is the fifth-largest group in the European
Parliament and may well influence environmental policymaking. What then are the
positions held by this group of parties on climate change? Will there be
implications for climate politics in Europe? How might this issue fit within
the agendas and ideologies of the far right?
A common
assumption seems to be that the far right is characterised by a uniform denial
of the scientific evidence and political demands regarding anthropogenic
climate change.[3] But this assumption is simply not accurate. A widely cited
report from the environmental think tank Adelphi finds that attitudes towards
climate science in European right-wing populist parties range from explicit
rejection [4] to an “affirmative” attitude held by parties who “support the
scientific mainstream” [5] and that a
number of parties remain “disengaged/cautious”. [6] Although ideologically
similar in many ways, then, far-right parties display significant differences
in their attitudes towards climate change.
Like many
political concerns, climate change functions as a prism through which parties
and actors reflect their own agenda.
At the
same time, however, whether it is acknowledged as “real” and “dangerous”, or
forcefully denied as a matter of “degenerate fear-mongering”, climate change is
an issue that is highly politicised by the far right.
Take
three prominent parties that have done well both at a European and domestic
level: Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), The Austrian Freedom Party
(FPÖ) and the Italian Lega (League). Although unified by anti-immigration and
Eurosceptic perspectives that have allowed them to come together under the ID
alliance, these three parties have distinct positions on the issue of climate
change. Not only are there considerable differences between but also within
these parties on this issue. Moreover, their positions seem to be changing.
Amongst other reasons, the challenge of attracting younger voters can put
pressure on leaders to rethink their positions on climate change. Despite their
successes in the European Parliament, both the AfDand the FPÖ did rather badly
with young voters. The AfD youth organisation Junge Alternative demanded in an
open letter a “change of course” in climate politics to attract younger, more
“concerned” voters.
The
following snapshot of the climate politics of the AfD, the FPÖ and Lega
highlights their different and shifting positions and their politicisation and
nationalisation of the climate. It becomes clear that whether they deny or
accept the science, these parties are fully engaged with the politics of
climate change; not only do they reject the formation of climate policy at a
supranational or global level, but they are using the issue to strengthen their
nationalist agendas.
AfD:
“Save Diesel”
The AfD,
who only recently made significant gains in crucial state elections in eastern
Germany, have long been characterised by strong climate change denial. The 2019
party manifesto for the European elections, for example, boldly states: “We
doubt that human actions can affect the climate and that they are related to
current climate change… climate protection policy is a mistake”. Such
statements seem to originate in the discourses of the well-funded climate
denial industry in United States – some of the claims made by a renowned United
States climate-sceptic think tank are directly reiterated in the manifesto.
It is
noticeable that, unlike the previous 2017 manifesto, the ‘preamble’ of this
2019 manifesto explicitly selects the climate policy of the current German
government as a target for attack, claiming that it will deprive people of
cheap energy. Its denial of climate change is something that sharply demarcates
the AfD from the other political parties in Germany. This denial and its
opposition to climate protection policies is something it is continually
emphasising: a leaflet sent out to voters just before the 2019 European
elections clearly reiterates the alleged negative consequences of rising energy
costs for German consumers and the competitive disadvantage for the German
economy.
Climate
protection policy is equated by the AfD with a loss of national sovereignty.
Climate
protection policy is equated by the AfD with a loss of national sovereignty. In
the run up to the election, AfD party leader Alexander Gauland tellingly warned
of the possibility of a “United States of Europe” that he depicted as “a
de-industrialised settlement covered in wind turbines” in which not only would
all cars be electric but they would be “only available via car-sharing.” [7]
The aforementioned campaign leaflet opposes what they call the “aberration” of
European climate politics and in particular the “meddling” of the EU in setting
national emission targets. European and German climate politics as defamed as a
ploy to build an “ecological authoritarian planning state”. The AfD argues in
favour of national “energy autarchy”, re-investment in nuclear power and a
reclaiming of national sovereignty in environmental politics.
The AfD
therefore strongly opposes investment in renewables, the German Energiewende
and the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and has promoted ‘diesel demonstrations’ arguing
that the ban on diesel vehicles threatens Germany’s car industry. The AfD
rejects climate science and actively opposes climate protection policies,
offering a distinct alternative to mainstream parties in Germany.
FPÖ: “The
Blues will turn Green”
Until
recently, the FPÖ in Austria held a similarly sceptical position on climate
science to their German counterpart. In an interview in December 2018 with Der
Standard, for example, the former party leader (and until recently vice
chancellor of Austria) Heinz-Christian Strache stated that “Whether humans can
affect the climate is an open question. Climate has changed for thousands of
years. The Sahara desert once was the bread basket of the Roman Empire.” (The
fact that the climate has always changed does not, of course, disprove
human-caused climate change.) As with the AfD, it seems that US climate
denialism is influential; there are close ties between the FPÖ, the influential
Friedrich Hayek Institute in Vienna, and the climate-sceptic Heartland Institute
in the US.
However,
after Strache was forced to resign in May 2019 (due to the infamous “Ibiza
scandal”), this position has changed. The new party leader, Norbert Hofer,
declared in an interview that he wants the FPÖ to be “the” climate protection
party. It is explicitly declared on their website that “climate change is
reality and cannot be denied”.
Referring
to FPÖ’s party colour, Hofer has gone so far as to declare that “the blues will
turn green”, though he advocates “sensible” environmental protection without
what he calls ‘Klimahysterie”’ – a ‘climate hysteria’ which he contrasts to
“concrete measures”. This has meant that, for example, the FPÖ did not align
with the other Austrian Parties who, after an official all-party-meeting with
the with leaders of Austria’s Fridays for Future movement in July 2019,
supported the declaration of a “climate emergency” in order to “make curbing
the climate and environmental crisis the top political priority”.
While
stating their support of policies to combat climate change, the FPÖ reject any
policy that clashes with the interest of ‘Kleinenmannes’ (or ‘the ordinary
guys’) and that “punishes” commuters and diesel drivers and profits only the
few: “The FPÖ is committed to climate and environmental protection and has
already presented numerous policy proposals. We are not supporting ‘cheap
climate populism’ however”. [8] They argue that reducing C02 emissions without
a concomitant effort from the USA and China is futile.
The form
of climate protection the party articulates does not take place at the global
or European level but rather corresponds to
‘Heimattreue’ – which translates roughly as ‘fidelity to one’s home
land’. Among the measures they support are investments in public transport or
the scrapping of premiums for old cars. In Hofer’s words: “Many people keep
their old car simply because they cannot afford a new one. An environmental
bonus (‘Umwelprämie’) would increase the chances that low-paid workers could
switch to low-consumption vehicles which helps the climate and also reduces
monthly fixed costs”. [9]
Lega:
“What is the ‘Climate Migrant’?”
The
Italian Lega (formerly Lega Nord) – articulates a distinct position to the two
other parties. A section in their 2018 manifesto dedicated to the environment
does not only clearly articulate the existence of anthropogenic climate change
but states a commitment to tackling it and transitioning to ‘a more sustainable
economy’. The section starts with the statement “Man and environment are two
sides of the same coin. Those who do not respect the environment do not respect
themselves” and calls for greater knowledge of environmental issues. The
manifesto then lays out various climate policies including the strengthening of
public transport networks, the phasing out of high emission petrol and diesel
cars, the creation of incentives for consumers to buy electric and hybrid cars,
and the monitoring of emissions from power plants, with the aim of decreasing
of greenhouse gas emissions and increasing energy efficiency and renewables.
Although,
according to the manifesto, “environmental issues are universal”, climate
change is presented by Lega as a matter for national policy making. They state
the intention to draft a “national climate change adaption plan” and to
prioritise the establishment of a “national fund for energy transition”.
Although,
according to the manifesto, “environmental issues are universal”, climate
change is presented by Lega as a matter for national policy making.
The clear
acknowledgement of climate change science does not translate in Lega’s
discourse into acceptance of the global institutions such as the Paris
Agreement, rejected by the party President Gianluca Pini for being a “downward
compromise” that allowed developing countries to compete unfairly with Italian
companies that were compliant in environmental regulations. Indeed,
nation-state borders become more crucial in Lega’s presentation of climate
change as an issue that can only be tackled at the national or regional level.
If
climate change must be tackled at a national level, then it does not have to
contradict the notorious stance of Lega’s leader. Matteo Salvini (who, until
recently, held a powerful position in the Italian government) has complained on
Twitter about the recognition of the figure of the ‘climate migrant’ and that
‘serious’ environmental reasons should not be used to justify illegal
immigration, asking: “Is someone from Milan who doesn’t like fog also a climate
migrant?”
The Rise
of Climate Nationalism?
There are
numerous examples of the far right articulating a green agenda. Many
contemporary right-wing populist parties express a concern about environmental
issues and hazards and advocate policies for tackling pollution and conserving
resources [for more on green populism, click here]. For example, according to
their manifesto, the FPÖ “are dedicated
to protecting our homeland of Austria, our national identity and autonomy as
well as our natural livelihood”.
Although
often fiercely protective of the ‘national’ environment, the far right is
generally less concerned with ‘global’ phenomena. What is interesting at the
moment is the diverse ways that far-right parties are navigating the growing
emphasis on climate change in the European political arena. While the AfD
strongly rebuffs any science or policy on climate protection, both the FPÖ and
Lega accept the science and advocate climate protection. But either way, this coincides with a
rejection of policymaking at the supranational level and renewed affirmation of
national borders that are seen not as hindering climate policy but rather as
aiding it. Concern over climate change is reclaimed as an element of right-wing
nationalism and thus may actually strengthen that project. There is an
intriguing ‘climate nationalism’ at play here.
It is
surely unlikely that the ID group will vote for resolutions aligned with the
Paris Agreement, that seemingly further the project of European integration and
undermine national borders.
With its
strong claim that “every nation has the right to protect, control and supervise
its own borders”, the ID group in the European Parliament clearly articulates a
common nationalist position. It is surely unlikely therefore that the ID group
will vote for resolutions aligned with the Paris Agreement, that seemingly
further the project of European integration and undermine national borders.
However, crucially, this does not mean that the ID group would be able to
present a united front in parliamentary debates. If faced with a communication
from the Commission offering a long-term vision or strategy on climate change,
for example, Lega might object to the European co-optation of the climate
issue, whereas the AfD might object because it simply does not agree that there
is an issue.
And yet,
climate change denial may soon find itself in an embattled position within the
ID group. Should this be a welcome change by those promoting the prioritisation
of climate change in the European Parliament? To welcome this may actually be
to misunderstand the relationship between science and policy. Acceptance of the
scientific data indicating human-caused climate change should not be equated
with any particular political agenda. It’s possible for parties to accept the
reality of global warming while rejecting mainstream policy approaches.
Proponents of strong climate policymaking, however, often present climate
politics as if it is a matter of acceptance or denial of the facts: climate
change is commonly depicted as an issue that should transcend the petty
squabbles of messy politics and simply heed the science. This technocratic
framing promotes the foreclosure of any real political discussion over climate
change, one that might bring into sharp relief the differentiated impact of
environmental policies. If no opposition to the established climate regime is
expressed by any other party, then it is left open for the far right to reclaim
it as a national issue that demands the strengthening of borders.
While
pushing climate into politics, mainstream environmental activism simultaneously
takes the politics out of climate. The climate nationalism of the far right
puts the politics back in. This might result in a situation of polarised
impasse. What remains to be seen is whether the politicisation of climate
change provokes a discussion on alternatives.
Footnotes
[1] See
Amanda Machin. 2013. Negotiating Climate Change. Zed Books.
[2] Led
by Marco Zanni, ID encompasses 73 MEPs from Italy’s Lega; the French National
Rally; Germany’s AfD; Austrian FPÖ; Belgium’s Flemish Interest; the Danish
People’s Party; the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia; the Finns Party of
Finland and the Freedom and Direct Democracy party of the Czech Republic.
[3] See
for example the following articles in Friends of the Earth Europe and Buzz
Feed.
[4]
Germany’s AfD, the Austrian FPÖ, the Danish People’s Party; the Conservative
People’s Party of Estonia, UKIP, the Dutch Party for Freedom and the Swedish
Democrats.
[5] The
Hungarian Fidesz, the Finns Party and the Latvian National Alliance.
[6] The
French National Rally; the Belgian Vlaams Belang, the far-right Czech Freedom
and Direct Democracy, the Italian Lega; the Greek Golden Dawn party and the
Norwegian Progress Party.
[7]
Speech given by Gauland at the official start of the European election campaign
in Offenburg, 7 April 2019. See
<https://afdkompakt.de/2019/04/07/die-europawahl-entscheidet-ueber-die-zukunft-der-nationalen-demokratie/>.
[8] See
<https://www.fpoe.at/artikel/klimaschutz-konkrete-projekte-statt-klimahysterie-gefordert/>
[9] See
<https://www.fpoe.at/artikel/fpoe-plant-einfuehrung-der-umweltpraemie/>
Published
with the support of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union.
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