Even if
Victor Orbán is ousted on Sunday, Hungary’s return to liberal democracy is not
guaranteed
Gabriela
Greilinger and Cas Mudde
Challenger
Péter Magyar is no progressive – and after 16 years of creeping
authoritarianism, the PM has embedded Fidesz in the Hungarian state
Fri 10
Apr 2026 05.00 BST
On
Sunday, Hungarians will go to the polls to decide on their country’s direction
for the next four years in an election that looks as if it will be a
nail-biter. Viktor Orbán, Europe’s longest-serving prime minister – who has
been in power for 16 years and transformed his country into an electoral
autocracy – could lose the election. Ahead of the vote, EU officials have high
expectations for change in Hungary under a potential new leadership. Politico
reported that “the Brussels establishment is praying for [Péter] Magyar to win,
hoping a Tisza government will deepen ties with the EU”.
Magyar
became a trailblazer when he entered the Hungarian political scene in 2024
after a political scandal implicating the former president Katalin Novák and
the minister of justice, Magyar’s ex-wife, Judit Varga. By addressing the
socioeconomic concerns of ordinary Hungarians, politicising the run-down
healthcare and education systems and highlighting the country’s deteriorating
economic situation and corrupt government practices, Magyar has steadily risen
in the polls.
And yet
while an electoral victory for his Tisza party seems within reach, less than a
week before the election observers should not set their expectations too high
for the election outcome – or for Magyar’s prospects were he to become
Hungary’s new prime minister.
First,
although all independent pollsters show Magyar and his Tisza party clearly
ahead of Fidesz, the prospect of him actually winning the election remains
uncertain. While the elections are free, they are unfair, as Orbán has tilted
the electoral playing field in his favour over the years, creating an unfair
advantage. Measures include repeated gerrymandering, adding “winner
compensation” to benefit the strongest party in the districts and granting
Hungarian minorities abroad, who are overwhelmingly Fidesz supporters, the
right to vote. In addition, investigations have uncovered systematic electoral
fraud, including chain voting, voter buying and intimidation, particularly in
Hungary’s poorest regions.
Under
these circumstances, it remains unclear whether Tisza’s votes will translate
into a parliamentary majority, let alone a constitutional majority. Crucially,
without a two-thirds majority in parliament it will be near impossible to
dismantle the Orbán regime. Over the past 16 years, Fidesz has entrenched its
ideas and personnel into Hungary’s political system through cardinal laws that
require a supermajority to change or abolish them.
Bringing
Hungary back into the fold of electoral democracies would require replacing the
Fidesz loyalists who are constitutional court judges and heads of key public
institutions, such as the prosecutor general and the chair of the media
authority. Making matters worse, Hungary’s president, Tamás Sulyok, elected by
parliament, is another Fidesz loyalist who would ordinarily remain in office
until 2029. While the president’s role is largely ceremonial, Fidesz has
recently passed a bill reinforcing it, possibly in anticipation of being ousted
from power in the elections. The president could thus present another obstacle
to a Tisza government by sending legislation back or referring it to the
Fidesz-packed constitutional court for review.
Given
these circumstances, a situation could arise similar to that in Poland when the
Law and Justice party (PiS) lost the 2023 elections. After defeating the
radical right party, prime minister Donald Tusk was accused of resorting to
unlawful means to restore democracy, drawing criticism from legal scholars. In
a concerning portent for Hungarian democrats, since the election of PiS
candidate Karol Nawrocki as president last year, he has regularly obstructed
Tusk’s government by vetoing essential legislation, including a recent judicial
reform that was part of the government’s rule-of-law agenda.
A new
Hungarian government would face similar obstacles, but an even steeper uphill
battle. After 16 years in power, twice as long as PiS in Poland, Fidesz is much
more entrenched in the state than PiS ever was, making a return to the status
quo ante even more challenging.
Even if
Tisza’s vote share translates into a majority in parliament and enables it to
implement reforms, democrats should not expect too much from a Magyar
government. The leader of the opposition comes from a conservative family and
was a member of Fidesz for more than two decades – he spent years working for
the Orbán regime and is clearly ideologically aligned with his former party.
In fact,
some preliminary analyses of Tisza’s voting patterns in the European parliament
suggest that the party mostly aligns with Fidesz, especially on immigration and
Ukraine. While this could be tactical, given the sensitivity of these issues in
Hungarian political discourse, Tisza’s party programme also vows to reject the
EU’s migrant pact and quotas and to oppose Ukraine’s accelerated accession to
the EU. So even though Tisza will undoubtedly be a more constructive force in
its relations with European partners, some fundamental disagreements will
remain.
Finally,
although Tisza’s voter base mainly comprises liberal and leftwing voters,
progressives should not get their hopes up for a swift transition to liberal
democracy in Hungary. According to recent polling, the new parliament will be
made up solely of rightwing parties: the rightwing Tisza, the far-right Fidesz
and potentially the extreme-right Our Homeland Movement. Magyar, while
generally claiming to support equality, has so far avoided taking a clear
supportive stance on some core ideological issues, such as LGBTQ+ rights. While
this could also be part of a strategic approach to avoid offering Fidesz any
vulnerabilities it could exploit for its propaganda, it is also in line with
his political history and the rightwing nature of his party’s programme.
Considering
the challenges Magyar will encounter if he is elected, not to mention his own
rightwing ideology, it seems unlikely that he would prioritise restoring
liberal democracy to Hungary beyond trying to undo 16 years of Orbánism.
Progressives and democrats need to manage their expectations ahead of Sunday’s
vote. As it stands, the best case scenario for Hungary is a return to electoral
democracy under a Magyar government. Liberal democracy, however, will probably
remain out of reach for now.
Gabriela
Greilinger is a PhD student at the University of Georgia; Cas Mudde is the
Stanley Wade Shelton UGAF professor of international affairs at the University
of Georgia and author of The Far Right Today
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário