News
Analysis
Trump’s
Tariffs Are Coming, but at a Cost to U.S. Alliances
President
Trump is already showing signs of concern that his targets may team up against
him.
David E.
Sanger
By David E.
Sanger
David E.
Sanger, who has covered six presidencies, writes often on the revival of
superpower conflict, the subject of his latest book.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/01/us/politics/trump-tariffs-nato-allies.html
April 1,
2025
The incoming
German chancellor, more convinced than ever that the defense and trade
relationship with Washington is crumbling, has made plans to execute on his
goal of “independence from the U.S.A.”
He’s not the
only one.
The new
Canadian prime minister said last week that “the old relationship we had with
the United States” — the tightest of military and economic partnerships — is
now “over.” Poland’s president is musing publicly about getting nuclear
weapons. And the new leader of Greenland, host to American air bases since
World War II, reacted to the uninvited visit of a high-level American
delegation with indignation.
“President
Trump says that the United States ‘will get Greenland,’” Prime Minister
Jens-Frederik Nielsen said on social media. “Let me be clear: The United States
will not get it. We do not belong to anyone else. We decide our own future.”
These are
the results so far of President Trump’s threats to abandon NATO allies whose
contributions he judges insufficient, his declaration that the European Union
was designed “to screw” the United States and his efforts to expand the United
States’ land mass. The main reaction is resistance all around. Now, into this
maelstrom of threats, alienation and recriminations, President Trump is
expected to announce his “Liberation Day” tariffs on Wednesday.
The details
of the tariffs are still unclear, which is one reason the markets are so on
edge. Political leaders are on edge as well, because Mr. Trump has made clear
that the tariffs will fall on adversaries like China as well as nations that,
until recently, were considered America’s closest defense and intelligence
allies.
Trump
administration officials do not dwell on the price that will be paid by
consumers, nor on the effects that the inevitable retaliation will have on
American farmers. But just as curiously, the administration has not described
any cost-benefit analysis of the president’s actions, such as whether the
revenue gained is worth the damage done to America’s central alliances.
Gone are the
days when Mr. Trump merely threatened to pull troops out of nations like South
Korea and Japan that run a trade surplus with the United States. Now, he wants
them to pay up — for some kind of ill-defined mix of subsidies to their own
industries, taxes on American goods, free-riding on American security and
refusal of his expansionist demands.
Mr. Trump is
already showing signs of concern that his targets may team up against him.
A few days
ago, he posted a middle-of-the-night warning on social media to his closest
allies that “if the European Union works with Canada in order to do economic
harm to the USA, large scale Tariffs, far larger than currently planned, will
be placed on them both.”
On Sunday
China declared that its trade minister had agreed with Japan and South Korea —
Washington’s two most powerful treaty allies in the Pacific — on a common
response to Mr. Trump’s actions. In Seoul, the statement was described as an
“exaggerated” version of a discussion about new supply chains. But Beijing
clearly wanted to leave the impression that it can work with America’s allies
if Washington will not.
Viewed one
way, Mr. Trump’s “Liberation Day” is the logical extension of the goal he
announced in his inaugural address. “Instead of taxing our citizens to enrich
other countries,” he said, “we will tariff and tax foreign countries to enrich
our citizens.” That suggests he does not intend the tariffs to be a negotiating
tool. Instead, they are expected to be a permanent source of revenue and — if
you believe officials like Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick — “they are going
to reduce the deficit and balance the budget.” He added: “Let the people who
live off our economy pay, and we will pay less.”
Viewed less
optimistically, the imposition of the tariffs may well kick out the last of the
three pillars of the trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific and Canadian alliances. The
defense relationships, the trade interdependencies and the bond nurtured over
80 years in those regions have all been intertwined.
Those three
strands were deliberately designed to be reinforcing. To Mr. Trump and his
allies, though, they have been twisted to take advantage of the United States,
a view made clear in the exchanges in the now-famous Signal chat made public
last week. It drove home the fact that while President Trump is taking on all
of America’s allies, he harbors a particular animus for Europe.
As they
debated the timing and wisdom of a strike on the Houthis for their attacks on
shipping, Vice President JD Vance wondered whether “we are making a mistake”
since it is Europe and Egypt that are most dependent on moving ships through
the Suez Canal. (In fact, China is among the biggest beneficiaries, but it was
never mentioned.)
“I just hate
bailing out Europe again,” he wrote, leading the defense secretary, Pete
Hegseth, to respond, “I fully share your loathing of European free-loading.
It’s PATHETIC.” They went on to discuss that, somehow, Europe would be made to
pay for the cost of the operation — even though the European allies appear to
have been kept in the dark about the planned attack.
“There needs
to be some further economic gain extracted in return,” Stephen Miller, the
deputy chief of staff in the White House, noted in the chat.
Ivo Daalder,
a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, wrote recently that the clear conclusion
other countries can reach from the chat is “apparently, the U.S. military is
for hire, even if there has been no request for its services.”
“And if you
want us — you have to pay,” he continued.
Somewhat
remarkably, Mr. Trump’s national security officials are acting as if all is
normal, as if their boss is not upending the system. On Thursday, a day after
Mr. Trump is expected to announce the tariffs, Secretary of State Marco Rubio
will represent the United States at a long-scheduled NATO meeting that will be
heavily focused on the war in Ukraine.
He will have
to navigate the resentments of fellow foreign ministers, most of whom argue,
largely in private, that the United States is making a fundamental error by
seeking to normalize relations with Russia — rather than contain it and punish
it for invading Ukraine — and that it is seeking to hobble their economies.
(Occasionally these leak out: Justin Trudeau, before he left office as prime
minister of Canada, told a Canadian audience that Mr. Trump was attempting “a
total collapse of the Canadian economy because that will make it easier to
annex us”.)
The result
is that the NATO nations are meeting regularly to discuss whether it is
possible to design a peacekeeping or observer force to go into Ukraine, in the
event that a cease-fire takes hold, without the United States. They are
discussing whether Britain and France’s nuclear umbrella could extend over the
other NATO allies, because the United States may no longer be relied upon. It
is an erosion of trust that, just two-and-a-half months ago, seemed almost
unthinkable.
Such
discussions are prompting a long-overdue recognition by European nations that
they will have to spend significantly more on defense, though it would probably
take a decade or longer to replicate the capabilities the United States brings
to the alliance. The downside is that should there be a world crisis in coming
years, the United States may have to enter it without its greatest
force-multiplier: its allies.
“In the
1950s the U.S. thought NATO was going to be one of many alliances,” Kori
Schake, the director of foreign and defense Policy Studies at the American
Enterprise Institute, said on Monday.
“The reason
that NATO survived and prospered was because the common values and the trade
relationship supported the security commitments,” Ms. Schake, a defense
official in President George W. Bush’s first administration who writes
extensively on the history of alliances, added.
“Who does
President Trump think will help us when we need allied forces for operations
critical to the security of the United States?” she asked. “And who is going to
sympathize with Americans if there is another 9/11, given the behavior of the
government of the United States?”
David E.
Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues.
He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four
books on foreign policy and national security challenges. More about David E.
Sanger
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