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In the face of mutiny, humiliated Putin didn’t
know what to do. We should worry about what he’ll do next
Samantha de
Bendern
The Russian leader, having faltered, is likely to
renew his assault on Ukraine and impose repression at home with even greater
intensity
Mon 26 Jun
2023 06.00 BST
When
something incomprehensible happens, it can be reassuring to fall back on old
cliches. Churchill’s famous description of Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a
mystery, inside an enigma,” summarises what many Russia analysts feel after the
aborted armed rebellion led by Wagner commander Yevgeny Prigozhin this weekend.
While answers remain elusive, some elements seem important to help navigate
through the fog.
There are
powerful arguments that Vladimir Putin has been weakened by Prigozhin’s armed
rebellion. For the first time in 23 years, many Russians will have woken up on
Saturday morning wondering whether their president was still in control. Then,
hours after a visibly shaken Putin announced that traitors would be punished,
charges against Prigozhin were dropped, and his armed men, who allegedly shot
down a transport plane and at least two helicopters (the exact number is still
unconfirmed), killing a number of highly skilled military pilots, were given
security guarantees.
This
indicates that Putin had to make concessions to Prigozhin, and in a country
where a social media post criticising the army carries a potential prison
sentence, the gap between the rich and powerful and ordinary citizens has been
unashamedly confirmed in full public view. The Russian army, which has
stagnated on the Ukrainian front for months, was unable – or unwilling – to
stop Wagner’s advance through swathes of Russian territory.
Putin’s
unspoken contract with the Russian people is that in exchange for democratic
freedoms he gives them stability and security. This contract has been broken.
In a democracy all of the above would spell political death. But Russia is
neither a democracy nor a functioning state. The only way to make sense of what
happened in the past few days is to view events through the prism of a feud
between criminal gangs in which each mafia boss holds so much leverage over the
other that the balance of power can easily tip either way. The fact that
Prigozhin is still alive indicates that whatever he holds over Putin is so
damaging, and so well protected by unseen allies, that it is safer for Putin to
allow him to live – for now.
In the days
leading to Wagner’s rebellion, Prigozhin multiplied his harangues against the
defence establishment, but was careful to spare Putin. After the president’s
address to the nation, in which he firmly came down on the side of the
military, Prigozhin’s gloves came off. This suggests that until the last minute
Prigozhin was unsure who Putin would back and that he expected political
support from the top. This never materialised, either from politicians or top
army brass. This is a defeat for Prigozhin. Moreover, his escapade smoked out
any traitors in Putin’s entourage. In this sense, Putin comes out stronger in
the short term.
There are
two factors Putin will have to contend with if he is to consolidate this small
victory.
In a
dictatorship that likes to pretend to be a democracy, the fractures within the
regime that this rebellion revealed will have to be dealt with through tighter
repression and even more control of the media. A whipping up of patriotic
frenzy and a few – preferably foreign – scapegoats would wrap things up nicely.
Prigozhin’s 25,000 men, who were prepared to march against the regular army,
will also need to be managed.
Add to
these the approximately 32,000 demobilised ex-Wagner troops who were put on
standby through Prigozhin’s networks when the rebellion began, and the Russian
state now has to deal with close to 60,000 angry men with combat experience,
some of whom are still armed and most of whom have criminal backgrounds. Some,
particularly those who feel betrayed by Prigozhin, may be lured into the
regular army. The others will pose a threat to the social order unless they are
brought under control through fear or violence. The future looks bleak.
At the time
of writing, Wagner posters are being torn down throughout Russia. But the fact
that Prigozhin is still alive suggests he still has a role to play. In Belarus,
he will be safely out of Putin’s way but close enough to be of use. It is
unlikely that Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarusian dictator, played a
significant role in the deal cut between Prigozhin and Putin. Russian sources
argue that Aleksey Dyumin, the governor of Tula oblast where Prigozhin’s army
stopped, and Nikolai Patrushev, the powerful head of the Russian security
council, were the chief negotiators. Dyumin is a former Putin bodyguard and
viewed by many as a potential successor to Putin who incarnates loyalty, youth
and fresh blood.
Lukashenko
will have obediently done what his master ordered as the frontman for the
negotiations, thus preserving Putin and his protege from being tainted by
association with Prigozhin. If he really does end up in Belarus, Prigozhin may
be the catalyst to finally drag Belarusian men into the war without Lukashenko
having to send his regular army, something he has resisted in spite of pressure
from Putin. Imagine a Wagner group re-registered in Minsk, able to recruit
Belarusian convicts or otherwise coerce Belarusian men into the war. The number
of men may not be enough to make serious incursions into Ukraine but would
force the Ukrainians to reinforce their northern border, thus taking away men
from the frontlines in the east and south.
While a
successful rebellion would have served Ukraine, at least in the short term, it
is now likely that a humiliated but rebooted Putin will renew attacks with more
intensity.
If round
one of Prigozhin v the Russian establishment went to Prigozhin on Saturday
morning, Putin had made a comeback by the afternoon. Dog eats dog but while
they hold each other by the tail, neither has a clear advantage. Either way,
Ukraine will need even more western support as Russia teeters on the brink
between chaos and absolute dictatorship.
Samantha de
Bendern is an associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham
House and a political commentator on LCI television in France
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