News
Analysis
An
Experiment in Recklessness: Trump as Global Disrupter
The global
trading system is only one example of the administration tearing something
apart, only to reveal that it has no plan for how to replace it.
David E.
Sanger
By David E.
Sanger
David E.
Sanger has covered six presidencies and served as a Times foreign correspondent
over more than four decades. He writes often on the revival of superpower
conflict, the subject of his latest book.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/08/us/politics/trump-tariffs-global-trade-war.html
Published
April 8, 2025
Updated
April 9, 2025, 12:00 a.m. ET
As the
breadth of the Trump revolution has spread across Washington in recent weeks,
its most defining feature is a burn-it-down-first,
figure-out-the-consequences-later recklessness. The costs of that approach are
now becoming clear.
Administration
officials knew the markets would dive and other nations would retaliate when
President Trump announced his long-promised “reciprocal” tariffs. But when
pressed, several senior officials conceded that they had spent only a few days
considering how the economic earthquake might have second-order effects.
And
officials have yet to describe the strategy for managing a global system of
astounding complexity after the initial shock wears off, other than endless
threats and negotiations between the leader of the world’s largest economy and
everyone else.
Take the
seemingly unmanaged escalation with China, the world’s second largest economy,
and the only superpower capable of challenging the United States economically,
technologically and militarily. By American and Chinese accounts, there was no
substantive conversation between Mr. Trump and China’s top leader, Xi Jinping,
or engagement among their senior aides, before the countries plunged toward a
trade war.
Last
Wednesday, Mr. Trump’s hastily devised formula for figuring out
country-by-country tariffs came up with a 34 percent tax on all Chinese goods,
everything from car parts to iPhones to much of what is on the shelves at
Walmart and on Amazon’s app.
When Mr. Xi,
predictably, matched that figure, Mr. Trump issued an ultimatum for him to
reverse the decision in 24 hours — waving a red flag in front of a leader who
would never want to appear to be backing down to Washington. On Wednesday, the
tariff went to 104 percent, with no visible strategy for de-escalation.
If Mr. Trump
does get into a trade war with China, he shouldn’t look for much help from
America’s traditional allies — Japan, South Korea or the European Union — who
together with the United States account for nearly half of the world economy.
All of them were equally shocked, and while each is negotiating with Mr. Trump,
they seem in no mood to help him manage China.
“Donald
Trump has launched a global economic war without any allies,” the economist
John Lipsky of the Atlantic Council wrote on Tuesday. “That is why — unlike
previous economic crises in this century — there is no one coming to save the
global economy if the situation starts to unravel.”
The global
trading system is only one example of the Trump administration tearing
something apart, only to reveal it has no plan for how to replace it.
State
Department officials knew that eliminating the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the nation’s premier aid agency, would inevitably cost lives. But
when a devastating earthquake struck central Myanmar late last month and took
down buildings as far away as Bangkok, officials scrambled to provide even a
modicum of help — only to discover that the network of positioned aid, and the
people and aircraft to distribute it, had been dismantled.
Having
dismantled a system that had responded to major calamities before, they settled
on sending a survey team of three employees to examine the wreckage and make
recommendations. All three were terminated from their jobs even while they
stood amid the ruins in the ancient city of Mandalay, Myanmar, trying to revive
an American capability that the Department of Government Efficiency — really no
department at all — had crippled.
Secretary of
State Marco Rubio was unapologetic about the paltry American response when he
talked to reporters on Friday: “There are a lot of other rich countries, they
should also pitch in and help,” he said. “We’re going to continue to do our
part, but it’s going to be balanced with all of the other interests we have as
a country.”
After last
month’s devastating earthquake in Myanmar, American officials scrambled to send
help, only to discover that the system that responded to major calamities had
been dismantled.Credit...Sai Aung Main/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Similarly,
there was no plan for retrieving a Maryland man who was wrongfully deported to
a notoriously dangerous Salvadoran prison, a move a judge called “wholly
lawless” and an issue the Supreme Court is expected to take up in the next few
days. A Justice Department lawyer in the case was placed on administrative
leave, apparently for conceding that the man never should have been sent to the
prison.
Mr. Trump
has appeared mostly unmoved as the knock-on effects of his policies take shape.
He has shrugged off the loss of $5 trillion in the value of the American
markets in recent days. Aboard Air Force One on Sunday night, he said:
“Sometimes you have to take medicine to fix something.”
In their
public appearances, Mr. Trump’s aides have often contradicted each other, even
on the rationale for imposing the tariffs. Peter Navarro, the most enthusiastic
defender of the tariffs, has repeatedly described them as a new, permanent
feature of America’s economic defenses.
“This is not
a negotiation,” he wrote in The Financial Times. “For the U.S., it is a
national emergency triggered by trade deficits caused by a rigged system.”
Like Mr.
Trump, Mr. Navarro has made the case that tariffs will become a major source of
government revenue, as they were in the 1890s, before the creation of the
income tax. (Among the skeptics of Mr. Navarro’s analysis is Elon Musk, who is
leading the Department of Government Efficiency and is the world’s richest man.
He called Mr. Navarro “truly a moron” and “dumber than a sack of bricks” on
social media.)
But if you
listen to Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, who has looked pained as he
has had to defend the tariff strategy, the taxes on imports are a negotiation
tool. He said on Monday that he is overseeing such talks with Japan, which is
the world’s No. 3 economy and the United States’ most critical ally in
containing Chinese power. But it is unclear whether that negotiation is about
tariffs, nontariff barriers or geopolitics.
(Clearly,
there are exemptions to the tariffs for gaining geopolitical advantage. Kevin
Hassett, one of Mr. Trump’s top economic advisers, said on ABC on Sunday:
“There’s obviously an ongoing negotiation with Russia and Ukraine, and I think
the president made the decision not to conflate the two issues.” Russia pays no
tariffs under the president’s current system; Ukraine, the victim of Moscow’s
2022 invasion, pays 10 percent.)
Mr. Trump,
never one to be pinned down on strategy, declared that all explanations for the
purposes of his tariffs work for him. “They can both be true. There can be
permanent tariffs and there can also be negotiations, because there are things
we need beyond tariffs.”
What is
missing, at least so far, is a vision of the future.
Mr. Trump’s
aides insist the speed at which they are working is a feature, not a bug, of
the system. Move too slowly, Mr. Musk has insisted, and the bureaucracy would
dig in, never to be dislodged. “Nobody’s going to bat a thousand,” he said at
the White House in February. “We will make mistakes. But we’ll act quickly to
correct any mistakes.” He cited the restoration of some aid to contain Ebola,
and the rehiring of workers at the National Nuclear Safety Administration who
oversee nuclear weapons.
But it is
impossible to move through the empty corridors of the Ronald Reagan Building —
where U.S.A.I.D., the Environmental Protection Agency and the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars all have been subject to DOGE mandates to
fire many workers — without it becoming clear that there is little plan for
dealing with the work left behind. U.S.A.I.D.’s doors are locked; the E.P.A.
has stopped collecting some critical data; no one knows what is happening to
the Wilson Center’s Cold War archive but its scholars are largely gone. Over at
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, monitoring Russian and
Chinese malware has taken a back seat to avoiding coming job cuts.
When the
question of whether departments are looking beyond the budget line and thinking
ahead to what happens when capabilities and expertise disappear gets asked, the
answer is a tinge defensive. The Department of Health and Human Services has
pulled back billions of dollars for monitoring Covid-19 and improving responses
to future viral outbreaks. When asked, the department said: “The Covid-19
pandemic is over, and H.H.S. will no longer waste billions of taxpayer dollars
responding to a nonexistent pandemic that Americans moved on from years ago.”
All this
suggests a failure to look around corners — which is hardly new in the American
presidency. Herbert Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley tariffs in June 1930,
thinking they would help create jobs, then went fishing. They instead
accelerated the Great Depression.
The White
House insists this time the result will be the opposite. It is a huge bet, one
on which not only Mr. Trump’s presidency but the fate of the global economy
rests. And no one can predict where the bottom is for the markets, or where the
top is for the escalation with China.
“The speed
and chaos surrounding President Trump’s policy rollout have created
extraordinary global economic disruption; nobody alive has ever witnessed
self-induced volatility on this scale,” Ian Bremmer, the founder of the Eurasia
Group, a consulting firm, wrote this week.
At the
beginning of the year, the United States had the strongest economic position of
any of the Group of 7 nations, he noted.
Now, he
concluded, “President Trump has become the principal disrupter.”
David E.
Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues.
He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four
books on foreign policy and national security challenges.
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário