CHINA’S REAL ESTATE CRISIS IS STILL A POLITICAL
DANGER
WRITTEN BY
DR ARAVIND YELERY
2 June 2023
https://www.9dashline.com/article/chinas-real-estate-crisis-is-still-a-political-danger
The real
estate industry in China is facing an existential crisis. A series of offshore
dollar-denominated debts have defaulted and stringent government limits on debt
levels leave Chinese developers looking desperate for bailouts. In addition,
house buyers have resorted to protests, their delayed mortgage payments
creating a black hole of problems that are viciously interconnected and
explicitly political. The rise of protests is a mounting humiliation for
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, indicating that stern tests lie ahead of
party oligarchs. The dissent among home buyers in China against big property
developers is symptomatic of China’s biggest systematic incompetence in dealing
with crony capitalism, which lets debts, defaults in payments, and non-deliveries
of houses erode trust in the Chinese economy. Accounting for one-third of
China’s GDP in investment, the slump in the property and infrastructure sector
is causing significant distress.
The reforms
and rapid development of cities since the late 1980s lured young city dwellers
and migrants into investing their wealth in housing. Today, China claims that
80 per cent of its household wealth is locked in land and real estate. The
societal expectation and importance of owning a home as a precondition to
starting a family and building wealth put tremendous pressure on young Chinese
citizens. This pushed many young Chinese to invest in properties as a
generational investment. With the average home buyer in China being
approximately 29.5 years old, home ownership anxiety is particularly acute
among the young population. As the population starts to feel the consequences
of the crisis — the average income-to-repayment ratio for home buyers is outrageously
high outside first-tier cities — the Chinese government must find ways to
address its systemic economic challenges or get ready to face increasing
protests.
Systemic
risks behind extravagance and the sprawl of Chinese cities
Chinese
cities have experienced significant political, economic, and social pressures
stemming from the developmental currents of globalisation, migration, and
market reform. Still, the expansive growth of China’s cities also led to the
development of a flourishing property market, with the number of real estate
developers and their projects growing proportionally. This has been
particularly evident since 2000 when the supply of commercial housing and
complexes grew manyfold. The land prices offered handsome returns for
cash-strapped local governments. The infinite greed for money led to deliberate
regulatory incompetence and a super-inflated property market.
To prevent
growing unrest and panic among young Chinese and instil faith in Beijing’s rule
of law, the government must show that it is willing and able to deal with real
estate problems and deliver more than sprawling cities and glossy development.
Thus, the
growth of the cities and urban spaces across China was founded on significant
systemic risks of excess borrowing. Party elites hailed the extraordinary rise
of Chinese cities and eluded city indexes or growth models as an alternative
model of development to neoliberal globalisation. Subsequently, China’s
internal economic transformation intensified the contradictions, resulting in
enormous social and political costs. Among the most critical ones were the end
of the welfare housing system, the rise of the race for ownership, and the
affordability of owner-occupied housing in Chinese cities.
The
distortions in the property market created severe tensions among common Chinese
as well as political and economic leadership. The big developers cashed in on
the Party’s fear of slums, widespread squatting, crumble shacks, and low-rises
in dusty suburban landscapes in urban China, assuring higher and quicker
returns for the state-owned land and delivering on urbanisation campaigns run
by the leaders. Additionally, the state allowed private developers to invest in
residential real estate and the property developers rose to the expectations of
state institutions — including hospitals, universities, provincial schemes of
redevelopment, and urbanisation.
The real
estate bubble burst
By
commodifying housing into real estate, the Chinese state planned to reduce the
financial and welfare burdens of the state and provide a much-needed boon for
state-owned banks and state-controlled construction companies. Real estate soon
became the critical pillar of China’s development and prosperity, and with
leaders inaugurating projects and banks and firms providing essential
resources, young Chinese were drawn to urban properties. As a result, a
significant percentage of Chinese residents applied for loans to purchase
homes. In 2014, about 70 per cent of urban residents owned houses. This rose to
80 per cent in 2020, leading to China’s Central Bank unveiling that the state
urban homeownership rate would soon even reach 96 per cent.
The Chinese
state overestimated the promise of property developers in generating a balanced
macroeconomic metabolism. In the 1990s, when private businesses looked to lead
China’s market reforms from the front, property developers shot to fame with
their ability to stimulate hypergrowth. Property management and development,
the construction sector, and the commodity sector followed this growth
trajectory, making the real estate sector appear promising. However, what was
overlooked was the sharp rise in the construction industry’s debt-to-common
equity ratio over the last decade. The scale of borrowing appeared
unsustainable, and the property developers could not reduce their reliance on
debts as it would have exposed their balance sheets and imminent bankruptcy.
This was harmful as it directly affected the long-term outlook for Chinese
growth. The problems started surfacing when property developers delayed
projects and used prepayments by house buyers to maintain their cash flows.
Until a few
years ago, with cheaper land banks and higher demand for housing, Chinese
developers enjoyed a cash-rich balance. However, the current financial crisis
in China triggered by widespread defaults in debt repayment of Chinese
developers has led to a severe systemic crisis. Offshore bond defaults by
Chinese property developers have highlighted the over-dependence on offshore
financing, which has worsened the situation. Thus, the high-leverage financing
model of Chinese property developers failed to yield an increase, leading to
the bursting of the property market. The Chinese state’s decision to impose
restrictions on property developers’ leverage (their ability to borrow more
money) amplified the real estate crisis, leading to a dent in the image of
property developers. Large-scale construction projects were assumed to have had
the support of the state, but this was only the case until some of these
property developers failed to deliver houses on time due to a severe cash
crunch. The defaults by Chinese property buyers unleashed a chain reaction,
with more and more property developers finding it challenging to repay even the
interest on their loans. Amid the mounting debt and rising risk of looming
bankruptcy, the global (offshore) stakeholders grow anxious, with some forced
to take the legal course and with others forced to risk further funds infusion
to save the Chinese developers and, in extreme cases writing off loans.
Eventually, the consequences could be catastrophic for China’s economy and global
financial stability.
The role of
Beijing’s technocrats in containing systemic risks
Beijing’s
approach of stopping developers from leveraging and curbing speculative buying
has yielded limited success so far because developers are already struggling to
repay interest loans. Even if the developers attempt to sell their properties,
they cannot do so at the prices they were initially put up for sale as there is
also a lack of willingness among buyers to invest. Moreover, property
developers cannot sell all their properties because these houses have already
been sold or pledged against existing debts. The Chinese state’s approach to
regulating asset sales, stopping further asset price sliding and potentially
causing the bubble to burst, makes it even more difficult for developers to
find a solution.
The real
estate market uncertainty will continue in the foreseeable future. The
situation will get worse if deleveraging is delayed, especially when revenue
continues to decline, and steeply rising operating expenses look unsustainable
vis-à-vis the tighter liquidity, i.e. debt to capital ratio. Inflated growth
driven by firms and local authorities to please Beijing leads to leveraging and
results in bond-market chaos and protests. The Chinese state has to lead by
ending the opaque operations of Chinese enterprises in all sectors, not only
the property sector. The state must ensure that developers follow the rules and
that the regulators enforce them fairly. In addition, the government can
provide social welfare schemes to support the citizens affected by the current
crisis. There are speculations about the State Council considering listing the
real estate sector under its national Social Credit System. While this is
commonly used to assess an entity’s trustworthiness, it can also be used as a
safety valve to monitor compliance and legal violations and control the
developers so there is no excess risk of leveraging. Young people undoubtedly
feel betrayed as their hard-earned household savings and social well-being are
in danger. To prevent growing unrest and panic among young Chinese and instil
faith in Beijing’s rule of law, the government must show that it is willing and
able to deal with real estate problems and deliver more than sprawling cities
and glossy development. Structurally, Beijing has to rethink its role in
funding local authorities and find new sources of income to prevent their habit
of rekindling local economies with leveraging.
DISCLAIMER:
All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent
that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Aravind
Yelery is an Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Earlier, he was the MOFA Taiwan Fellow at the National Taiwan University,
Taipei. Dr Yelery was also associated with Peking University, Beijing/Shenzhen,
as the Senior Research Fellow (Associate Professor Grade). Yelery was also a
visiting faculty at the Fudan School of Management, Shanghai. Before joining
PKU, he was an Associate Fellow and Assistant Director at the Institute of
Chinese Studies, Delhi, India. Yelery holds a PhD in Chinese Studies with a
particular interest in Political Economy. He has co-edited a book titled
“Tailspin: The Politics of India-China Economic Relations” (London: Routledge,
2021) and recently authored “China Inc.: Between State Capitalism and Economic
Statecraft” (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2021). Image credit: Flickr/ILO
Asia-Pacific.

Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário