Center of surveys and electoral
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Ceuta
crisis survey: 90% see Morocco behind and 84% reject sharing the 2030 World
Cup, according to Sigma Dos
The new
Sigma Dos survey for El Mundo reflects a transversal consensus after the Ceuta
crisis: 90.4% of Spaniards believe that Morocco knew about and allowed the
massive entry or directly favored it, a perception shared by more than 91% of
PSOE voters and 92% of Sumar voters. In addition, 82.2% believe that the
Government has not done enough and 84.4% reject maintaining the joint
organization of the 2030 World Cup with Morocco.
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Published
29 AUG, 2026
- 07:58
Last updated
29 AUG, 2026
- 07:58
The crisis
of Ceuta has profoundly changed the perception of Spaniards about Morocco and
the bilateral relationship with Rabat.
90.4%
believe that Morocco had some degree of responsibility in the massive entry recorded in
Ceuta on July 30, according to the
new Sigma Dos survey for El Mundo conducted between August 20 and 26.
This 90.4%
comes from two distinct responses. 52.6% believe that Morocco was aware of
the migratory movement and allowed it to happen without preventing it at its
border, while another 37.8% consider that the neighboring country even
encouraged the entry into Spain.
The
perception crosses practically the entire electoral spectrum. It is shared by
91.3% of those who voted for the PSOE and 92.9% of Sumar voters.
The survey
also leaves another result of enormous political and sporting significance: 84.4%
of Spaniards reject that Spain continues to share with Morocco the organization
of the 2030 World Cup.
Spain,
Portugal, and Morocco are officially the three organizing countries of the 2030
World Cup, designated by FIFA in December 2024.
Nine out of
ten Spaniards see Morocco behind the Ceuta crisis
The main
conclusion of the survey lies in the breadth of the perception about Morocco.
Only a small
minority of those interviewed dissociates the Moroccan state from what
happened. In contrast, more than nine out of ten believe that Rabat was
aware of the mobilization and allowed it to advance towards the border or that
it directly contributed to favoring it.
The
difference between both responses matters. The survey does not allow us to
affirm that 90.4% believe that Morocco organized the entry. What it shows is
that this percentage attributes to the neighboring country some degree of
knowledge, permissiveness, or encouragement.
In another
distinct question, 59.7% define what happened as a way for Morocco to pressure
or blackmail the Spanish Government.
The public
reading, therefore, is not limited to a migratory crisis. For a majority of
those interviewed, there is also a bilateral and diplomatic dimension.
91% of PSOE
voters and 93% of Sumar also point to Morocco
Probably the
most politically relevant data is within the electorate of the parties that
make up the Government.
91.3% of
PSOE voters believe that Morocco was aware and allowed the entry or favored
it. Among those who voted for Sumar, the percentage is even slightly higher, at
92.9%.
This means
that the perception of Rabat cannot be interpreted solely as a position of the
electorates of PP and Vox.
The
consensus crosses the main political blocks and leaves the Government facing a
public opinion much more critical of Morocco than the diplomatic position
that the Executive has been publicly defending.
82.2%
believe that the Government has not done enough in Ceuta
The second
major conclusion directly affects Spanish management.
82.2% of
those surveyed believe that the Government of Pedro Sánchez has not done enough
to resolve the situation in Ceuta.
A relevant
fact also appears here among coalition voters. 56.9% of the socialist
electorate shares this assessment, just like 52.7% of Sumar voters.
That is to
say, the negative perception of the Executive's response is not limited to the
opposition electorate.
The result
adds pressure to the Government after several weeks in which the crisis has
concentrated the debate on Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, intelligence
services, and the relationship with Morocco.
Two Sigma
Dos surveys show persistent concern about Morocco
This is not
the first measurement by Sigma Dos conducted during this crisis.
In a
previous study, conducted on August 5, 47.6% directly pointed to the
pressure from the Moroccan Government as the main reason for what happened in
Ceuta, compared to 18.4% who pointed to the regularization of migrants and
16.5% who primarily blamed the Spanish Government's migration policy.
The two
figures should not be compared as a direct evolution, because the questions are
different. In the previous survey, the question was what the main reason for
the crisis was. In the new one, the question specifically asks what role
Morocco played.
They do
allow, however, to detect a constant: Morocco has occupied a central place
in the public's interpretation of the crisis since the beginning of August.
66.9% want
Felipe VI to visit Ceuta
The survey
also includes an institutional question. 66.9% believe that King Felipe VI
should visit Ceuta.
This data
introduces the Crown into the debate about the institutional response to the
crisis and reflects the demand for a greater presence of the State in the
autonomous city.
This does
not necessarily equate to an assessment of the Government's actions, but it
does show that two out of three Spaniards would support a visit from the head
of State.
The 77.2%
bets on the return of Moroccan minors
The
management of unaccompanied minors reappears as another of the major issues of
the survey.
The 77.2%
shows support for Moroccan minors who arrived in Ceuta to return to Morocco, while
13.8% prefers to distribute them among other autonomous communities.
Also at this
point, there is significant backing within the socialist electorate: 59.1% of
those who voted for the PSOE support the return route.
The data
measures a political preference of the interviewees, but does not eliminate the
legal obligations applicable to each minor.
Spain and
Morocco have maintained a specific agreement since 2007 regarding unaccompanied
minors that contemplates their protection and a possible agreed return. The
agreement itself establishes that any return must respect Spanish legislation,
international law, and the best interests of the minor, and guarantee effective
family reunification or their delivery to a guardianship institution.
Militarizing
the border and sanctioning Morocco, among the most supported measures
Sigma Dos
also asks what measures should be adopted to avoid a new border crisis.
As it is a
multiple-choice question, the percentages do not add up to 100%.
- The option with the most support
is to militarize the border, supported by 55% of the interviewees.
- Next is the imposition of
sanctions on Morocco, with 52.8%.
- 48% demand greater involvement
from the European Union and 45% consider it necessary to expedite
expulsions.
The
combination is significant: public opinion does not bet on a single solution,
but on a set of security measures, diplomatic pressure, European policy, and
migration management.
Support for
militarizing the border remains majority
The issue of
militarization had already appeared in the Sigma Dos survey of August 5.
At that
time, posed directly as a yes or no question, 82.4% were in favor of
militarizing the southern border again.
84.4%
rejects maintaining the shared 2030 World Cup with Morocco
The probably
most unexpected result of the entire survey is outside of migration policy.
84.4% of
Spaniards reject continuing to share the organization of the 2030 World Cup
with Morocco.
The data
conveys the Ceuta crisis to one of the largest joint projects between both
countries for the coming years.
The FIFA
officially designated Spain, Portugal, and Morocco as co-hosts of the 2030
World Cup in December 2024. The tournament will also include three
commemorative matches in Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay.
Ceuta
divides Spaniards on the solidarity of the rest of the country
Not all
questions yield such broad consensus.
52.9%
believe that the rest of Spain should provide more support to Ceuta, while 47%
think that the solidarity shown so far is sufficient.
While in
matters like Morocco, government management, or the 2030 World Cup there are
very broad majorities, in the assessment of territorial solidarity society is
practically divided in half.
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