A Plan to
Stop the Far Right
The
German chancellor and his center-left coalition partners are trying to hold off
populist challengers. And they have a road map.
Katrin
Bennhold
By Katrin
Bennhold
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/07/world/germany-afd-centrist-far-right-le-pen-farage.html
Published
July 7, 2026
Updated
July 8, 2026, 1:06 a.m. ET
I first
wrote about far-right populism when it wasn’t a major force in European
politics. I interviewed Marine Le Pen in 2008. I met Nigel Farage in 2015 and
covered Alternative for Germany, AfD, that same year. At that point, many
observers still considered it unthinkable that any of them would come to power.
Fast
forward a decade and all three are the most popular political forces in their
countries. And as Le Pen and Farage made clear just yesterday, despite
investigations into their finances, they still see themselves as being on a
march to victory.
So far,
centrist parties have failed to stop them. But today, Jim Tankersley, my
successor as Berlin bureau chief, writes about — bear with me — a 34-point
reform package designed to do just that. An inspiring rallying cry it is not.
But as Jim writes, the German government is making a bet that voters will
reward politicians for doing something, however unflashy. (I’m not so sure.)
The
German government unveiled a 34-point plan last week to reignite the nation’s
sputtering economy. It arrived late, to mixed reviews from experts and the
public. Its details — pension reforms and modest tax cuts, among others — are
not exactly political red meat, except perhaps among the most techno-minded of
technocrats.
Which
made the bold promises that have accompanied the plan all the more striking.
This plan, officials have suggested, could be a blueprint for stopping the far
right’s momentum — not just in Germany, but across Europe.
Chancellor
Friedrich Merz, a conservative, and his center-left coalition partners are
desperately trying to hold off far-right challengers they see as threats to
Germany’s democratic system, who appeal to voters feeling battered by rising
prices, slowing economic growth and growing ruptures in the fabric of their
societies. They believe the only way to prevail is to show that the political
center can deliver results and govern effectively.
This is
why the fate of the package, and German voters’ response to it, will be watched
so closely across the continent.
Elsewhere,
centrist parties are also trying to contain populist rivals. The German
experience will provide clues as to whether such parties can regain the trust
of voters with policies that chip away at problems by applying incomplete or
imperfect solutions — or whether, at this point in 2026, that kind of politics
is what anyone actually wants anymore.
A game
changer?
The
package is a series of measures that, supporters say, will combine to
revitalize the stagnating German economy and lift the spirits of a country
saddened by much more than its early ouster from the World Cup.
These
include efforts to shore up public pensions by raising the national retirement
age, and a modest tax cut for middle-income families, offset by marginally
higher taxes on high earners. The package also cuts regulations, loosens some
labor laws and generally tries to goad Germans into working more.
Smart
economists differ on how much of an economic boost those measures will add up
to. Some say there could be a real boost to growth. Others say they’re too
watered down to matter much.
The
political outcome, though, might depend less on the details of the policies and
more on how they will be perceived — whether they give voters the sense that
centrist parties are still capable of improving things for ordinary people.
Betting
on action
Europe’s
political leaders have two wildly diverging theories on how to solve people’s
biggest problems.
The first
says simple solutions — deporting enough immigrants, say, or cutting enough
government — are being blocked by corrupt or incompetent elected officials.
Remove them, and those solutions can be implemented, and will improve things.
This view is gaining fans from Britain to Germany, where support for far-right
populist parties is surging.
The
alternative theory, espoused by the centrists who still govern much of Europe,
is that solutions require difficult choices, which large swaths of the
electorate might very well hate. (One provision of Merz’s plan, for example,
has already drawn intense public backlash: a move to force workers to get a
doctor’s note on their first day of calling in sick from their jobs. It’s an
attempt to address the problem of absenteeism; it also risks annoying a lot of
people.)
It can
add up to an eat-your-vegetables philosophy. But something I hear frequently in
my reporting is that centrists believe their difficult solutions will, with
time, improve life in Europe, and that voters will ultimately reward them for
it.
It was
that theory that brought Merz and his coalition partners, the Social Democrats,
together late last week in Berlin. They announced a whole bushel of vegetables.
Merz
frequently says it will take time to solve Germany’s problems, but that solving
them is the only way to hold off the AfD. He knows how fragile the compromise
he helped broker appears. Business groups dislike some elements of the plan.
Labor groups dislike other parts. Loud enough opposition could doom it before
it passes Parliament.
And even
if it passes, voters could recoil. They could decide these plans are the wrong
sort of vegetables — too focused on shoring up public budgets and encouraging
longer work hours, perhaps, and not focused enough on saving jobs threatened by
automation and global competition.
The
government’s bet, though, is that these plans will demonstrate that it can
still solve problems.
“The
citizens of our country want decisions and they do not want disputes, and that
is exactly what we have delivered,” Merz said. “I perceive an enormous
willingness in the public to leave stagnation behind and dare to make a new
start.”


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