Bulgaria
Has Good Reasons To Say No to the Euro
Citizens’
needs won’t be a priority once national leaders are beholden to their fiscal
overlords in Brussels and Frankfurt.
Sven R.
Larson
— June 4,
2025
https://europeanconservative.com/articles/analysis/bulgaria-has-good-reasons-to-say-no-to-the-euro/
The European
Parliament recently approved a financial assistance package for Egypt worth €4
billion, despite the country’s ongoing persecution of the Christian population.
Rising
defense spending will cause fiscal fights in many NATO countries. In Spain, the
tension between social benefits and military outlays is perhaps more pointed
than anywhere else.
Ever since
joining the European Union back in 2007, many Bulgarians have questioned
whether the country has truly benefited from the membership. Becoming a member
state brought with it a wave of regulations—from environmental rules to labor
market standards—that have had a negative impact on the country’s economy.
Now that the
country is about to become the 21st member of the euro zone, there are
growing—and legitimate—concerns that this will add even more restrictions,
limiting Bulgaria’s ability to shape its own economic policies.
On June 4th,
Reuters reported:
Bulgaria has
met all criteria to adopt the euro currency from January 1, 2026, the European
Central Bank said on Wednesday after assessing progress on a host of indicators
from inflation to central bank legislation. … The final decision rests with EU
finance ministers, who are expected to sign off on the process in early July.
It has been
a somewhat bumpy ride for Bulgaria, with a couple of delays along the way, most
notably last year:
Bulgaria’s
accession to the eurozone was pushed back as the country failed to contain
price pressures. … The ECB and the Commission are now satisfied that the
economic criteria are fulfilled, notably relating to the public debt and
deficit, inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate.
When a
country joins the euro, there is usually quite a bit of fanfare on the domestic
policy scene. Not so in Bulgaria; according to TRT Global, the expected gains
from the euro accession are countered by skepticism from large segments of the
Bulgarian population:
Widespread
corruption, stark income inequality and a four-year political crisis marked by
a series of snap elections and weak coalitions has eroded trust in authorities.
Many fear a rise in prices during the switch, as had occurred in other
countries that joined over the past decade.
They give no
support for the claim of price hikes in other euro-accession countries, but
there were numerous documented cases of ‘unjustified’ price hikes in Croatia
when they adopted the common currency in 2023. With this in mind, it is not
surprising that, says BNT News, “50% of Bulgarians are against the adoption of
the euro, while 43% are in favour.”
We should
not underestimate the impact of these hidden price hikes—if they do happen.
However, euro-skeptic Bulgarians have far bigger reasons not to give up the
lev, their current currency. Currently, the only area of their economy where it
is performing acceptably well is in terms of unemployment:
The general
jobless rate has stood at just over 4.2 percent since 2022, compared to the
euro zone’s recent 5.4-5.5%;
Among young
workers, aged 15-24, the average so far in 2025 is just over 10%, more than
four percentage points below the euro zone.
Practically
every other metric suggests that the Bulgarians have not benefited from joining
the EU back in 2007.
It does not
take a deep dive into the Bulgarian economy to spot when things took a turn for
the worse—one that correlates eerily well with the 2007 entry into the European
Union. Figure 1 reports the real annual growth rates in the Bulgarian GDP
(columns) and adds the average for 2000-2007 (green) and for 2010-2019 (red):
The decline
in average growth following the EU accession is probably the most dramatic of
any EU country that I have studied. It has lasting consequences for people’s
standard of living, as well as for the government’s ability to fund its welfare
state obligations to taxpayers.
This last
point is essential. The most prominent consequence of a country’s entry into
the euro zone, compared to when it joined the EU, is that the EU’s fiscal
rules—generally known as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)—become more than
an abstract, bureaucratic rule. By joining the euro, Bulgaria is now vulnerable
to the same disastrous treatment as several countries, including Greece, were
subject to in 2009-2014.
While
outside the euro zone, Bulgaria could respond to a serious fiscal crisis by
devaluing its own currency, the lev, vs. other currencies, including the euro.
A devaluation would cheapen exports and thereby stimulate economic growth (much
needed during a fiscal crisis). It would also make government debt relatively
cheaper to foreign investors, who could buy more of it with the same amount of
their own currency. This helps alleviate some of the risks associated with
buying government debt when investors have lost some faith in that debt.
Once
Bulgaria joins the euro, the country can no longer rely on a currency
devaluation as a last-resort fix for its government’s fiscal problems. Those
problems will remain, and they will ‘rub off’ on other euro zone members, just
like the Greek government’s deep debt trouble did. For this reason, the EU and
the ECB will both be monitoring Bulgarian public finances closely.
They will
have good reasons to do that. As Figure 2 reports, the consolidated government
sector in Bulgaria is currently running a sizable budget deficit. As a share of
GDP, it has been at 2.7% since the beginning of 2023; the overall trend since
the EU membership is notably worse than before 2007:
Although the
most recent numbers—showing a deficit of just under 3% of GDP— keep Bulgaria
within the limits set by the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, the country’s
track record tells a more troubling story. Since joining the EU, budget
deficits have been more common than surpluses, raising concerns about ithe
fiscal future of the Bulgarian government. I would expect lasting deficits,
with desperate measures taken by the national legislature to formally keep
those deficits below the stability pact’s threshold.
The
Stability and Growth Pact also comes with a debt limit, but the Bulgarian
government’s total borrowing is only a fraction (as a share of GDP) of the euro
zone’s average.
As fiscal
policy concentrates on abiding by the EU’s fiscal rules, the national
government will gradually lose sight of more pressing policy goals with longer
and more significant impact on people’s lives. As a general rule, this will
weaken the nation’s economic resiliency over time, much like we have seen in
other euro zone countries. Investments in critical infrastructure will be
decided not by the macroeconomic needs of the country, but by the rigor of
fiscal Eurocrats who monitor the country’s government’s budget like it was the
stock market.
Weaker
economic resiliency translates into lower economic growth—hence the numbers in
Figure 1 above. Lower economic growth, in turn, means insufficient taxes to
fund the government budget. The conventional reaction from legislators who see
tax revenue shortfalls is to raise taxes. This is precisely what has happened
in Bulgaria—and it has done so already before the country joins the euro zone.
As Figure 3 reports, taxes, as a share of the Bulgarian GDP, were coming down
before the 2007 EU membership, and they have risen back up since then.
So far, the
macroeconomic legacy of the Bulgarian EU membership consists of lower economic
growth, weaker government finances, and higher taxes. It would be naive to
expect anything else as the country incorporates itself into the euro zone.
Sven R
Larson, Ph.D., has worked as a staff economist for think tanks and as an
advisor to political campaigns. He is the author of several academic papers and
books. His writings concentrate on the welfare state, how it causes economic
stagnation, and the reforms needed to reduce the negative impact of big
government. On Twitter, he is @S_R_Larson and he writes regularly at Larson’s
Political Economy on Substack.
Tags: budget
deficits, Bulgaria, ECB, euro zone, GDP, national currency, Stability and
Growth Pact, Sven R. Larson
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário