Analysis
Did
Trump’s tariffs kill economic populism?
Patrick
Wintour
Diplomatic
editor
Lasting
damage has been done not only to Trump’s political credibility but to
globalisation as a system
Sat 12 Apr
2025 06.00 BST
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/12/did-trump-tariffs-economic-populism-globalisation
At the
beginning of this helter-skelter week, Downing Street was declaring
globalisation not only dead but a failure. Now, only five trading days later,
the autopsy is still under way but the victim may instead be economic populism,
strangled by Wall Street, the citadel of globalisation. Donald Trump’s
so-called liberation day may in fact have been the anti-globalist’s entombment
day.
In an effort
to deny even a tactical retreat, Trump’s aides insist the White House goal all
along was not to weaken globalism, or even to protect the US economy with
tariffs, but instead to get into a negotiation to lower tariffs around the
world and to punish China. As cover stories go, it is hardly credible, partly
because the tariffs were repeatedly lauded by Trump as a macroeconomic
revenue-raising measure, or a means to bolster US manufacturing.
The reality
is that when faced by an attempt to remake the world trading system overnight,
or what the former UK Treasury minister Jim O’Neill describes as “a full-on
Kamikaze mission”, the markets revolted. But the retreat caused by the sell-off
of US Treasury bonds has been only partial, with tariffs set at 10%
universally, except for parts of trade with Mexico and Canada.
Washington’s
all-out trade spat with China, meanwhile, still leaves the average effective
tariff rate at 27%, the highest since 1903, according to the Yale Budget Lab.
Amid the
chaos, significant long-term damage has been done not only to Trump’s political
credibility but also to the resilience of globalisation as a system.
Trust,
agreed rules and a degree of political stability are the underpinnings of
globalisation. They are the prerequisite for specialised and highly extended
trade supply lines across political borders to function. Globalisation, after
all, is not just about the trade in goods or free markets, it is a set of
interconnected ideas and institutions underpinning wealth creation that has
dominated political thinking since the end of the second world war.
The UK prime
minister, Keir Starmer, was not alone in arguing that Trump’s liberation day
and its aftermath marked the end of an era. In a warning that holds true even
after Trump’s retreat, Mark Carney, the Canadian prime minister and a former
governor of the Bank of England, said: “The global economy is fundamentally
different today than it was yesterday. The system of global trade anchored on
the United States that Canada has relied on since the end of second world war,
a system that while not perfect helped deliver prosperity for Canada for
decades, is over.
“The 80-year
period when the US embraced the mantle of global economic leadership, when it
forged alliances rooted in trust and mutual respect and championed the free
exchange of goods and services, is over. While this is a tragedy, it is also
the new reality.”
In short,
this is not a phase, however the trade war with China is resolved. The legacy
of liberation day will linger for generations.
Paul
Krugman, the Nobel prize-winning economist, largely agreed that the US was
committing an act of abdication. “The rules governing tariffs and the
negotiating process that brought those tariffs down over time grew out of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, devised by Roosevelt in 1934 … It was, in
fact, one of America’s greatest policy achievements. Donald Trump burned it all
down,” he wrote.
When the man
elected to lead the country that invented globalisation places the rejection of
globalism at his ideological core, even if it means alienating the US’s closest
allies, a fundamental reordering is under way.
A key
difficulty is that Trump, 78, has shown no sign of wanting to learn from this
debacle. As far back as September 1987 he spent $95,000 to publish an “open
letter to the American people” in three newspapers. “For years, Japan and other
wealthy nations have been taking advantage of the US,” he wrote. “It is time to
end our vast deficits by making Japan, and others who can afford it, pay.”
While his
target may have shifted from Japan to China, Trump’s sense of resentment and
betrayal, coupled with an aversion to trade deficits, has never left him. His
election in 2016, alongside Brexit, merely confirmed to him how his message
resonated.
In fairness
to Trump, analysis showed that US voting districts with industries vulnerable
to Chinese imports tended to elect representatives with more polarised stances.
The vote
gave him a mandate to end what he described as the US carnage of “rusted-out
factories, scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation”. Many
in the Davos establishment acknowledged that he had seen something they had not
– globalism had left too many behind, not just in poor countries but among a
previously middle-class group in western economies.
Trump’s
first term would probably have seen a version of this week’s debacle if he had
chosen different advisers, and if he had not later been knocked off course by
Covid.
For the
first two years of his first term, in 2017-18, his instincts were largely kept
in check by his economic adviser Gary Cohn, a former chief operating officer at
Goldman Sachs, who dampened Trump’s determination to use tariffs to end trade
deficits.
Cohn engaged
in a two-year running argument, compiling a mass of statistics designed to
convince a sceptical Trump that the decline of US manufacturing and its
replacement by a service economy was largely benign.
He set out
how blanket tariffs rebound on American consumers. He explained the link
between consumer uncertainty and the stock market. He challenged Trump to
explain why he thought tariffs would not be counterproductive. Trump replied
that he did not know, but he just did and it was what he had thought for 30
years. At one point, exasperated, Cohn accused Trump of a dangerous nostalgia,
saying: “You have a Norman Rockwell view of America” – the artist remembered
for his idealised portrait of American workers.
In the end,
Cohn found Trump – who once scrawled “trade is bad” as the summation of his
thinking for a keynote speech – so immune to evidence, and so determined to
impose steel and aluminium tariffs, that he quit, leaving Peter Navarro, a man
Cohn regarded as a tariff flat earther, to take the reins.
Vestiges of
opposition to Trump’s tactics remained inside the Republican party. Ben Sasse,
a Nebraska senator, tweeted a now familiar criticism in 2018: “About those new
tariffs: Europe, Canada & Mexico aren’t China. You don’t treat allies the
same way you treat opponents. Blanket protectionism is a big part of why we had
a Great Depression. ‘Make America Great Again’ shouldn’t mean ‘Make America
1929 Again’.”
But Trump
largely ignored the critics inside his own party. Re-elected in 2024, with
Navarro and other tariff supporters reappointed to lead his trade team, Trump
was convinced that his key mistake in the first term had been taking any notice
of those advising him that globalisation had brought the US unparalleled
wealth.
The path was
clear for Trump’s headlong assault on tariffs, in part because in the four
years out of office the anti-globalist tide had appeared to be heading in his
direction. Many on the centre left bought the argument that hyperglobalisation
did not suit an era of geopolitical conflict.
The Biden
administration, for instance, in the name of reindustrialisation and national
security, retained many Trump-era tariffs, especially on China, a decision seen
as a mistake by a study published this week by Harvard Kennedy School. In the
study, Joe Biden’s economic advisers Adam Posen and Jonas Nahm argued that the
protectionism was excessive.
Since the
2007-08 financial crisis, there has been a steady increase in trade-restricting
measures – such as tariffs, non-tariff measures, export controls and investment
restrictions – contributing to growing trade fragmentation. In 2024 alone, more
than 3,000 trade restrictions were implemented globally.
Some arose
from legitimate concern about unfair competition, but much was being driven by
deepening geopolitical competition. Countries of all politics have resorted to
ever-expanding definitions of national security to screen foreign investment
and trade. New language has entered the vocabulary such as “friend or
near-shoring”, a term to encourage companies to align their supply chains with
the geopolitical interests of their countries.
The call for
resilient supply chains was given a spur by the vulnerabilities exposed by
Covid, including the west’s dependence on a small number of vaccine suppliers.
After the
invasion of Ukraine, Russia further exposed the west’s supply chain
vulnerability by exploiting Europe’s dependence on its gas pipelines.
Interconnectors designed to bring countries closer, such as undersea data
cables, have become targets – from the Baltic Sea to the Taiwan Strait. The war
also blew apart the myth that trade brought peace.
As a result,
investment screening measures were introduced by governments all over the west
empowering them to block takeovers and investments by foreign firms, mainly
Chinese in strategic industries.
Rachel
Reeves endorsed the trend in a speech in Washington as the UK’s shadow
chancellor in May 2023. “Globalisation as we know it is dead. Supply chains
that prioritise only what is cheapest and fastest struggle when a crisis
strikes, be that PPE during Covid or energy following the war in Ukraine.”
In a
diagnosis similar to Trump’s, Reeves claimed that a globalised system “can be
gamed by countries like China who have undercut and ignored the international
trading rules and made it impossible for our own to compete”.
Rajan
Raghuram, the former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund and
ex-governor of India’s central bank, has argued that friend-shoring is
“resurgent protectionism, cloaked and augmented by new geopolitical rivalries”.
He also criticised the initiative as “concentrating production within the gated
community of advanced communities”.
Even so,
trade as a proportion of GDP – the best measure of economic openness – has not
as yet collapsed. In its 2023 report titled Re-globalisation, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) said there had been a slowdown in world trade after the
financial crash and Covid, but the change may as much be to do with the growth
of services, as opposed to goods, in the world economy. Countervailing trends
such as digital trade have kept globalisation alive.
The issue
now is what can be preserved from the wreckage of the past week, and whether a
new coalition of the willing – this time of free traders – can be assembled, if
necessary. There is talk of a G6 – the G7 minus the US – going to China to see
if an agreement can be found to reduce its trade imbalances, and distorting
subsidies, a subject of complaint to the WTO not just by the west but by
emerging markets.
But this
will require the UK’s Labour party to stop briefing that globalisation has
failed. In the current context there is no room for nuance, and it risks
sounding as if Labour shares Trump’s utterly chaotic prescription. This is the
time to declare economic populism, and not free trade, dead.
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