OPINION
Change Makes Fools of Us All
Credit...Photo
illustration by Justin Metz
Ezra Klein
By Ezra
Klein
Opinion
Columnist
March 18,
2023
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/18/opinion/svb-banks-change.html
Over the
past week, an observation by Matt Klein, a financial journalist, has gotten
passed around quite a bit. “This was more a case of a ‘bank-run by idiots’
rather than a ‘bank run by idiots,’” he wrote, referring to the collapse of
Silicon Valley Bank.
But why
choose? Everyone involved in this looks terrible. Regulators did nothing, even
though Silicon Valley Bank’s woes had been widely noticed. Bank managers failed
at the basic work of hedging against the risk of interest rates rising. Midsize
banks, including Silicon Valley Bank itself, successfully lobbied Congress and
the Trump administration to be exempted from the regulations attached to
too-big-to-fail banks. Venture capitalists sparked a needless panic that
annihilated an institution central to their own industry. The Federal Reserve
ignored inflation for too long, and the whiplash of its response has become a
risk factor all its own.
I don’t
think all these people — many of whom performed quite well before in crises and
amid uncertainty — are, or suddenly became, idiots. Here’s a more generous
interpretation: Change makes fools of us all, and we are living through an era
of change. Three changes, in particular, are worth thinking about right now.
Low Interest Rates Came to an End
In his 2020
letter to investors, Seth Klarman, the chief executive and portfolio manager of
the Baupost Group, a hedge fund, wrote, “The idea of persistent low rates has
wormed its way into everything: investor thinking, market forecasts, inflation
expectations, valuation models, leverage ratios, debt ratings, affordability
metrics, housing prices and corporate behavior.” He went on to say that “by
truncating downside volatility, forestalling business failures and postponing
the day of reckoning, such policies have persuaded investors that risk has gone
into hibernation or simply vanished.”
Point for
Klarman. Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse is inseparable from the long era of low
interest rates. Silicon Valley specialized in providing banking to start-ups
that had little or no revenue but were nevertheless flush with cash, much of it
coming, indirectly, from the Fed’s huge increase in the money supply. Deposits
at Silicon Valley Bank grew from $62 billion at the end of 2019 to $189 billion
at the end of 2021. And the bank attempted to act conservatively. It squirreled
that cash away in what was, in an era of low interest rates, understood as the
safest, surest of investments: U.S. Treasuries and other long-term bonds.
But as Adam
Tooze, the financial historian, wrote, what that really meant was they were
“taking a huge $100-billion-plus, one-way bet on interest rates.” When interest
rates rise, bond values fall. Maybe it wouldn’t have mattered if Silicon Valley
had hedged or diversified properly. But it didn’t. Maybe it wouldn’t have
mattered if its customer base hadn’t needed its money back — and quick. But it
did. As interest rates rose, those same start-ups couldn’t raise money as
easily, and they needed to tap their cash. So Silicon Valley Bank was acutely
exposed to interest rate hikes in both its deposits and its investments.
To be fair,
rate hikes were widely thought unlikely. Interest rates had, with a few
exceptions, been on a downward trend for 40 years. Since 2009, they had often
been near zero, and negative when adjusted for inflation. In April 2021,
Richard Clarida, who was then the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, said
the conditions keeping rates low were “a global phenomenon that is widely
expected by forecasters and financial markets to persist for years to come.”
Less than a
year later, the Fed would embark on one of its fastest rate-hiking campaigns in
history. As it did, all manner of assets that had levitated toward eye-popping
valuations in recent years — stocks, cryptocurrencies, NFTs, Swiss watches —
began to tumble. As Edward Chancellor writes in “The Price of Time,” “A
disconnect between finance and the real world lies at the heart of all great
bubbles.”
The reason
Silicon Valley Bank’s travails have led to a wider panic — one now engulfing
banks with very different characteristics, like First Republic and Credit Suisse
— is that Silicon Valley Bank’s circumstances might’ve been specific, but its
problem generalizes: The financial economy we’re in was built atop low interest
rates.
If you ask
the question: “Who holds a lot of long-term bonds and provides banking largely
to tech start-ups in the Bay Area?” Well, not many institutions fit the
description. If you ask, instead: “Who planned for low interest rates to
continue and may be vulnerable now that they’re rising?” There are many, many
possible candidates.
The Dangers of Viral Finance Made an Appearance
John
Maynard Keynes didn’t have much patience for the myth of the rational market.
Picking stocks, he wrote, was akin to a game “in which the competitors have to
pick out the six prettiest faces from 100 photographs, the prize being awarded
to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average
preferences of the competitors as a whole: so that each competitor has to pick,
not those faces that he himself finds prettiest, but those that he thinks likeliest
to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the
problem from the same point of view.”
His point
was that in the short run, much of finance is about predicting what other
people think. But one difference between our era and Keynes’s is that we have
real-time, overwhelming access to what other people think. We do not have to
imagine which faces our competitors consider the prettiest. They’re talking
about it, constantly, loudly, with their opinions ranked by likes and retweets
all the time.
There’s
been some debate about whether Silicon Valley Bank would have survived if a
klatch of venture capitalists hadn’t worked one another into a frenzy in
various group chats. I’m not sure that’s a useful question. You can’t ban group
chats (nor should you, to be clear). But digital information and digital
banking mean bank runs can happen — and spread to other institutions — at
astonishing speed. As Gillian Tett noted at The Financial Times, “One
remarkable detail about the S.V.B. debacle is that, in a few hours last
Thursday, about $42 billion (one-quarter of S.V.B.’s deposits) left the
institution, mostly through digital means.”
And it’s
not just bank runs. Everything from the fast rise and fall of crypto to the
weird moment of meme stocks to the 2010 flash crash reflects the digital
acceleration of finance. There is a question that has lurked on the edge of
financial regulation for years now is: Should we slow the system back down to a
speed humans can work at? No one idea here would address all cases — a
financial transaction tax would curb high-speed, algorithmic trading, but it
wouldn’t stop a bank run — but it’s worth wondering whether speed should be
seen and addressed as a financial risk factor unto itself.
Financial Regulators Turned Out to Be Fighting the
Last War
In 2015,
Greg Becker, the chief executive of Silicon Valley Bank, submitted testimony to
the Senate Banking Committee arguing that the Dodd-Frank financial regulation
rules should be loosened for banks like his. If they weren’t, Becker warned,
Silicon Valley Bank “likely will need to divert significant resources from
providing financing to job-creating companies in the innovation economy to
complying with enhanced prudential standards and other requirements.” If only!
But
Becker’s testimony is an interesting read for reasons other than grim irony. It
is an argument about what makes a bank “systemically important” — the term of
art for a financial institution that cannot be allowed to fail. It is an
argument that persuaded the Trump administration, alongside nearly every
congressional Republican and no small number of congressional Democrats.
In his book
“The Money Problem,” Morgan Ricks, a financial regulation expert at Vanderbilt
Law School, writes that the problem here runs deep. Systemic risk, he says,
“has yet to be defined, let alone operationalized, in anything approaching a
satisfactory way.” Lawmakers had tried, in Dodd-Frank, to define it in terms of
assets: $50 billion or above, and you posed a systemic risk.
Becker, and
top executives at many other midsize banks, argued that this cutoff was too low
and too simplistic. You could not be a systemic risk, in their telling, unless
you were a large bank attempting exotic financial engineering. “S.V.B., like
our midsize bank peers, does not present systemic risks,” Becker said. “We do
not engage in market making, securities underwriting or other global investment
banking activities. We also do not engage in complex derivatives transactions
or dealing, offer complicated structured products or participate in other
activities of the sort that contributed to the financial crisis.”
Put more
simply, the idea here was that we know what a systemically risky bank looks
like: It looks like the banks, and assorted other financial institutions, that
caused the 2008 crash. This is a classic case of fighting the last war. But it
is pervasive.
As galling as
it is that Silicon Valley Bank got itself exempted from being regulated as
systemically important, it’s not clear that regulators would have caught the
bank’s problems even if Dodd-Frank had remained untouched. As Joseph R. Mason
and Kris James Mitchener noted, the Fed’s 2022 stress tests didn’t include
interest rate risks. It, too, was fighting the last war.
At the time
of its detonation, Silicon Valley Bank had roughly $200 billion in assets. It
was significant but not huge. As Becker said, it wasn’t trading complex
products or doing anything that looked like what sent the global economy into
crisis in 2008. And yet regulators still declared it systemically important
when it failed and backed up all its deposits. The government’s definition of
systemic importance — the one that is, even now, written into law — has been
proved false.
But this
gets to a broader point: Banking is a critical form of public infrastructure
that we pretend is a private act of risk management. The concept of systemic
risk was meant to cordon off the quasi-public banks — the ones we would save —
from the truly private banks that can be mostly left alone to manage their
liabilities. But the lesson of the past 15 years is that there are no truly
private banks, or at least we do not know, in advance, which those are.



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